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SUMMARY OF THESIS 
 
Foreign investments in SADC are regulated by Annex 1 of the SADC Protocol on 
Finance and Investments (SADC FIP), as well as the laws of SADC Member States. At 
present, SADC faces the challenge that this regime for the regulation of foreign 
investments is unstable, unsatisfactory and unpredictable. Furthermore, the state of the 
rule of law in some SADC Member States is unsatisfactory. This negatively affects the 
security of foreign investments regulated by this regime. The main reasons for this state 
of affairs are briefly explained below.   
 
The regulatory regime for foreign investments in SADC is unstable, due to recent policy 
reviews and amendments of key regulatory instruments that have taken place. Major 
developments in this regard have been the suspension of the SADC Tribunal during 
2010, the amendment of the SADC Tribunal Protocol during 2014 to bar natural and 
legal persons from access to the Tribunal, and the amendment of Annex 1 during 2016 
to remove investor access to international investor-state arbitration, better known as 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).  
 
The regulation of foreign investments in SADC has been unsatisfactory, among others 
because some SADC Member States have failed or neglected to harmonise their 
investment laws with both the 2006 and the 2016 Annex 1. Furthermore, SADC Member 
States such as Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Malawi, Mauritius, 
Seychelles, Eswatini, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have multiple Regional 
Economic Community (REC) memberships. This places these Member States in a 
position whereby they have conflicting interests and treaty obligations.  
xvii 
 
 
Finally, the future of the regime for the regulation of foreign investments in SADC is 
unpredictable, due to regional integration efforts such as the recent formation of the 
COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Zone (T-FTA) and the African Continental Free 
Trade Area (AfCFTA). The T-FTA is entitled to have its investment protocol, while the 
AfCFTA investment protocol will be negotiated from 2018 until 2020. These 
developments entail that the 2016 Annex 1 will soon be replaced by an investment 
protocol at either the T-FTA or AfCFTA levels, thereby ushering a new regime for the 
regulation of foreign investments in SADC. The unknown nature of the future regulations 
create uncertainty and instability among foreign investors and host states alike. 
 
This study analyses the regulation of foreign investments in terms of Annex 1 and 
selected laws of SADC Member States. In the end, it makes the three findings 
mentioned above. In order to address these findings, the study makes four 
recommendations. The first is that foreign investments in SADC must be regulated at 
African Union (AU) level, by means of an AfCFTA investment protocol (which incidentally 
is now the case). Secondly, investor-state disputes must be referred to the courts of a 
host state, optional ISDS, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJ&HR) or 
other agreed forum. Thirdly, an African Justice Scoreboard (AJS) must be established. 
The AJS will act as a gateway to determine whether an investor-state dispute shall be 
referred to the courts of a host state, ISDS, the ACJ&HR or other forums. Fourthly, the 
office of an African Investment Ombud (AIO) must be created. The AIO shall facilitate 
the early resolution of investor-state disputes, so as to reduce the number of disputes 
that may end-up in litigation or arbitration. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
African states need vast financial resources to achieve their African Union Commission 
(AUC) Agenda 2063 Objectives1 as well as the United Nations (UN) Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs).2 Key sectors in this regard are power generation, transport, 
telecommunications, water and sanitation, food security and agriculture, climate change 
mitigation, health, and education.3 The objectives of Agenda 20634 converge with those 
of the SDGs, thus the two are equally relevant to this study.5 Agenda 2063 is a 50-year 
                                                
1  Agenda 2063 is the African Union (AU)’s plan to transform and develop Africa by 2063.  
For further information see African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 Framework 
Document” (Addis Ababa 2015) http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-
framework.pdf (Date of use: 15 November 2017); African Union (Commission) “Agenda 
2063 Popular Version” (Addis Ababa 2015) 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063.pdf (Date of use: 15 November 
2017); African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 First Ten-Year Implementation Plan 
2014-2023” (Addis Ababa 2015), at 37, 63 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-first10yearimplementation.pdf (Date 
of use: 16 November 2017); African Union (Commission) “African Agenda 2063 General 
Briefing Kit Presentation” (Addis Ababa 2015) 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-presentation.pdf (Date of use:  
16 November 2017).  
2  SDGs emanate from the United Nations (General Assembly) “Transforming Our  
World: The Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development” (New York 2015) 
https://www.un.org/pga/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/08/120815_outcome-document-
of-Summit-for-adoption-of-the-post-2015-development-agenda.pdf (Date of use: 24 
August 2017). 
3  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Investment Policy Framework  
For Sustainable Development 2015” (United Nations New York and Geneva 2015) at 18  
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 August 
2017). 
4  African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 Framework Document” at 2-19, 131-180 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf (Date of use: 15 
November 2017). 
5  African Union (Commission) “African Agenda 2063 General Briefing Kit Presentation” at  
para 4 http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-presentation.pdf (Date of  
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continental programme for the socio-economic transformation and development of Africa 
and its people.6 It was conceived on the occasion of the Golden Jubilee of the 
Organisation for African Unity (OAU) during May 2013, where AU Heads of State and 
Government (AU Assembly) tasked the AUC to prepare a 50-year continental agenda for 
the socio-economic development of Africa through a people-driven process.7  
 
Some of Agenda 2063’s objectives8 are the establishment of a continental road 
network,9 a continental high-speed rail network,10 an air and maritime transport 
network,11 a continental TV channel network,12 a Pan African University with 25 satellite 
centres,13 and modern communication, education, sanitation and health facilities in all 
                                                                                                                                            
use: 16 November 2017. 
6  African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 Framework Document” at iii 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf (Date of use: 15 
November 2017). 
7  African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 Framework Document” at iii, 1 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf (Date of use: 15 
November 2017). 
8  The Agenda 2063 objectives are summarised in African Union (Commission) “Agenda  
2063 Framework Document” at 94-99 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf (Date of use: 15 
November 2017). 
9  African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 Framework Document” at 11 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf (Date of use: 15 
November 2017). 
10  African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 Framework Document” at 11, 172 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf (Date of use: 15 
November 2017). 
11  African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 Framework Document” at 11 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf (Date of use: 15 
November 2017). 
12  African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 Framework Document” at 172 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf (Date of use: 15 
November 2017). 
13  African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 Framework Document” at 167 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf (Date of use: 15 
November 2017). 
3 
 
communities in Africa.14 Agenda 2063’s objectives such as the high-speed rail network 
and the Pan African University must be achieved by 2023.15 They will no doubt cost 
billions of rands to implement.16 
 
It cannot be disputed that public sector funding alone will be insufficient to meet the cost 
of achieving Agenda 2063’s objectives and SDGs.17 The AUC admits this fact, and 
stipulates the areas of Agenda 2063 that will require funding, as well as the sources of 
the funding.18 Foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investments are some of the 
sources of private funding that will be required to make Agenda 2063 a reality.19 A report 
by the AUC, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the 
African Development Bank (AfDB) also states that private funding helps African states to 
upgrade their infrastructure faster than would otherwise be possible.20 The report states 
                                                
14  African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 Framework Document” at 3-6 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf (Date of use: 15 
November 2017). 
15  African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 First Ten-Year Implementation Plan 2014- 
2023” at 43, 44, 65 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-first10yearimplementation.pdf (Date 
of use: 16 November 2017). 
16  For a discussion of the Agenda 2023 goals see African Union (Commission) “Agenda  
2063 First Ten-Year Implementation Plan 2014-2023” at 40-42, 47-84 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-first10yearimplementation.pdf (Date 
of use: 16 November 2017). 
17  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Investment Policy Framework  
For Sustainable Development” at 17 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 August 
2017).  
18  African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 Framework Document” at 113-116 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf (Date of use: 15 
November 2017. 
19  African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 Framework Document” at 113-116 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf (Date of use: 15 
November 2017). 
20  African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the  
Continental Free Trade Area About ECA” (AUC Printing and Publishing Unit Addis 
Ababa) at 33 
4 
 
that during 2015, 44 African states had jointly committed USD 28 Billion towards 
infrastructure development, while China committed USD 20 Billion, the private sector 
invested USD 7 Billion, the World Bank committed USD 6 Billion, the AfDB committed 
USD 4 Billion, and other banks and states committed more Billions.21 The bulk of the 
funds, therefore, came from private and foreign sources. 
 
A picture that emerges is that there is a vast shortage of FDI in SDG sectors, since only 
a fraction of investments by transnational corporations and institutional investors, private 
equity funds, sovereign wealth funds etc. is directed at these sectors, as compared to 
commercial investments.22 The AUC, UNECA and the AfDB acknowledge that the deficit 
in the funding of infrastructure projects is delaying the development of Africa.23  
 
Foreign investors are wary of SDG sectors for reasons such as the political nature of 
SDG sectors,24 as well as issues of low risk-return relating thereto.25 Investment in these 
                                                                                                                                            
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (date of use 
15 December 2017).  
21  African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the  
Continental Free Trade Area About” at 34 
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 
15 December 2017). 
22  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Investment Policy Framework  
For Sustainable Development 2015” at 17 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 August 
2017).  
23  African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the  
Continental Free Trade Area About” at 2 
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 
15 December 2017. 
24  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Investment Policy Framework  
For Sustainable Development” at 19-20 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 August 
2017). 
For example, health and sanitation projects are sensitive because the services in these 
sectors are seen as basic needs. This can limit returns that an investor can make in the 
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sectors may also be discouraged by an unwelcoming investment climate and regulatory, 
administrative or policy-related challenges.26 Hence a stable and supportive 
macroeconomic and regulatory environment is a necessary driver for the attraction and 
retention of private investment.27  
 
The need for private funding in order to advance the socio-economic development of 
SADC Member States as contemplated in Agenda 2063 brings the effective security of 
the required investments to the fore.  
 
As already indicated in the summary of this study above and further explained below, the 
challenge that underpins this study is that the regime for the regulation of foreign 
investments in SADC is currently unstable, unsatisfactory and its future is unpredictable. 
Furthermore, the state of the rule of law in some SADC member States is 
                                                                                                                                            
sector, as it may be necessary to keep prices low. Furthermore, these sectors are by 
nature exposed to the intervention of host states. The dispute in Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) 
v United Republic of Tanzania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22) Award of 24 July 2008, is 
one example that shows the sensitivity of water and sanitation projects. Bayindir Insaat 
Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S v Islamic Republic of Pakistan (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/29) Decision on Jurisdiction of 14 November 2005, Desert Line Projects L.L.C v 
The Republic of Yemen (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17) Award of 6 February 2008, and 
Walter Bau AG (In Liquidation) v The Kingdom of Thailand (Ad hoc UNCITRAL Tribunal) 
Award of 1 July 2009 are similar examples relating to road construction projects.  
25  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Investment Policy Framework  
For Sustainable Development” at 19-20 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 August 
2017). 
26  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Investment Policy Framework  
For Sustainable Development” at 20 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 August 
2017). 
27  See for example Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa) “InvestSA  
Investment Insights”, Issue 1 October 2017 at 18 http://www.investsa.gov.za/wp- 
content/uploads/2017/03/InvestSA-newsletter.pdf (Date of use 15 December 2017). 
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unsatisfactory.28 This affects the security of foreign investments in SADC, and does not 
bode well for the creation of a conducive climate for the attraction and regulation of 
foreign investment by the Member States.  
 
This status quo is a result of recent developments in SADC, which are described below.  
 
Firstly, the regulatory regime for foreign investments in SADC is unstable, due to recent 
policy reviews and the amendment of key regulatory instruments that have taken place. 
                                                
28  See the discussion of each Member State in Chapter 4 below under the discussion of  
each state, where comments are made regarding the rule of law. The quality of the rule of 
law is essential, hence it is one of the priorities of Agenda 2063. See for example African 
Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 First Ten-Year Implementation Plan 2014-2023” at 
68-70 http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-first10yearimplementation.pdf 
(Date of use: 16 November 2017). 
For a discussion of the rule of law in general see Adler J Constitutional and administrative 
law 6th ed (Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke 2007) at 124-144; Bingham TH The rule of 
law (Allen Lane London 2010); Bradley AW and Ewing KD Constitutional and 
administrative law 13th ed (Longman Harlow 2003) at 90-102; Brand-Ballard J Philosophy 
of law: introducing jurisprudence (Bloomsbury Academic London 2013) at 23-29; Costa P 
and Zolo D (eds) The rule of law: history, theory and criticism (Springer Dordrecht 2007); 
Fletcher GP Basic Concepts of legal thought (Oxford University Press New York 1996) at 
11-60; Hatchard J Combating corruption: legal approaches to supporting good 
governance and integrity in Africa (Edward Elgar Cheltenham 2013); Head JW Great 
Legal Traditions: civil law, common law, and Chinese law in historical and operational 
perspective (Carolina Academic Press Durham, N.C 2011); Isanga JM “The Rule of Law 
and African Development” 2016 (42) North Carolina Journal of International Law and 
Commercial Regulation 1-59; Mujuzi JD “The Rule of Law: Approaches of the African 
Commission on Human and People’s Rights and Selected States” 2012 (12) African 
Human Rights Law Journal 89-111; Ntephe P Does Africa Need Another Kind of Law: 
Alterity and the Rule of Law Subsaharan Africa (PhD Thesis SOAS University of London 
2012); Ramcharan BG The fundamentals of international human rights treaty law 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Leiden 2011) at 63-79; Sannerholm Z Rule of law after war 
and crisis: ideologies, norms, and methods (Intersentia Cambridge 2012); Saunders C 
and Le Roy C (eds) The rule of law (Federation Press Sydney 2003); Shapiro I The Rule 
of law (New York University Press New York 1994); Slapper G How the law works 2nd ed 
(Routledge London 2011) at 1-43; Shivute P “The Rule of Law in Sub-Sahara Africa- An 
Overview” 
http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/HumanRights/shivute2.pdf 
(undated) (Date of use 10 April 2018). 
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Major developments in this regard have been the suspension of the SADC Tribunal 
during 2010, the amendment of the SADC Tribunal Protocol during 2014 to bar natural 
and legal persons from access to the Tribunal, and the amendment of Annex 1 during 
2016 to remove investor access to ISDS. These developments will now be briefly 
discussed. 
 
The SADC Tribunal, which was opened during 2005, was suspended during 2010.29 The 
suspension of the tribunal has prejudiced cases that were pending at the tribunal, such 
as Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Limited, Mr. Josias Van Zyl (South Africa), The 
Josias Van Zyl Family Trust (South Africa) and Others v The Kingdom of Lesotho.30  In 
addition, the SADC Tribunal Protocol was amended in 2014 to remove access to the 
Tribunal by natural and legal persons. 
 
                                                
29  http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/sadc-institutions/tribun/ (Date of use: 17 January  
2017). 
30  Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Case No. 2013-29 (Josias Van Zyl 1). This  
case proceeded as Mr Josias Van Zyl (South Africa), The Josias Van Zyl Family Trust 
(South Africa) and The Burmilla Trust (South Africa) v The Kingdom of Lesotho (PCA) 
Case No. 2016-21 (Josias Van Zyl 2). See Josias Van Zyl 2 Procedural Order No.1 of 3 
November 2016 that details the background to the case; Josias Van Zyl and Others v 
Kingdom of Lesotho, Singapore High Court Case No. (2017) SGHC 104 — Originating 
Summons No 95 of 2017 (Registrar’s Appeal No 91 of 2017) Grounds of Decision of 8 
March 2017 at para 6-10 http://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/search-
judgment?q=Kingdom%20of%20lesotho;http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2017/05/09/boo
ked-singapore-post-on-lesotho-matter-on-service-of-process-olga-boltenko-9th-may/ 
(Date of use: 25 July 2017). See also Procedural Order No. 2 at para 4, 16.2. However, 
the Singapore High Court annulled the arbitral decision on jurisdiction on 14 August 2017 
(see judgment at https://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/docs/default-source/module-
document/judgement/170814---lesotho-judgment---final-clean-pdf.pdf (Date of use: 03 
October 2017).  For the South African background to the case see Van Zyl and Others v 
Government of Republic of South Africa and Others (170/06) [2007] ZASCA 109; [2007] 
SCA 109 (RSA); [2008] 1 All SA 102 (SCA); 2008 (3) SA 294 (SCA) (20 September 
2007). For the SADC Tribunal background of the case see Van Zyl and Others v The 
Kingdom of Lesotho Case No. SADC (T) 04/2009. 
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During 2016, the SADC Agreement Amending Annex 131 repealed the 2006 Annex 1 of 
the SADC FIP and introduced a 2016 Annex 1.32 A noteworthy change that the 2016 
Annex 1 introduced was the removal of investor access to ISDS. This amendment has 
further weakened the protection of foreign investments in SADC, since investor-state 
disputes that are not protected by Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), Treaties with 
Investment Provisions (TIPs) or investment agreements must henceforth be referred to 
local courts of host states, whose state of rule of law may be unsatisfactory.33 
 
Secondly, the regulation of foreign investments in SADC is unsatisfactory, among others 
because some SADC Member State have failed or neglected to harmonise their 
investment laws with Annex 1. The investment laws of some SADC Member States are 
in conflict with 2006 or 2016 Annex 1, as the case may be.34 This is despite the fact that 
Articles 17 and 19 of the 2016 and 2006 Annex 1 respectively require that the Member 
States must harmonise their foreign investment laws with the relevant version of Annex 
1. Despite this, SADC Member States have failed to harmonise their laws with Annex 1, 
as shown in Chapter 4 below. 
                                                
31  Southern African Development Community Agreement Amending Annex 1 (Co- 
Operation on Investment) of the Protocol on Finance and Investment, (Date of signature 
31 08 2016, in force 24 August 2016) (2016 Annex 1) 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5527 (Date of use: 15 
October 2017). 
32 See http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/5000 (Date of use: 20 August  
2017). According to the Trade Law Centre (Tralac), the 2016 Annex 1 came into force on 
24 August 2017, see https://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/12350-the-first-
international-arbitration-case- 
under-the-sadc-finance-and-investment-protocol-lesotho-v-swissbourgh-diamond-mines-
case.html (Date of use: 03 October 2017). 
33  The state of the rule of law in each SADC Member state is discussed in Chapter 4  
below. 
34  See Chapter 4 below; Ngobeni L and Fagbayibo B “The Investor-State  
Dispute Resolution Forum under the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment: 
Challenges and Opportunities for Effective Harmonisation” 2015 (19) Law, Democracy 
and Development 175-192 at 184-185. 
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Furthermore, the regulation of foreign investments by RECs,35 as well as the multiple 
REC membership that some SADC Member States have, create multiple challenges.36 
Multiple REC memberships make regional integration costly, inefficient and ineffective.37 
Furthermore, multiple REC memberships cause challenges of divided loyalty, conflicting 
                                                
35   There are eight RECs in Africa that are recognised by the AU. Including  
SADC, these are: Community of Sahel-Sahara States (CEN-CAD); The Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); East African Community (EAC); Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS); Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU). For more information see http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/african-union-
au-regional-economic-communities-recs-africa (Date of use: 19 November 2016); African 
Union (Commission) “African Union Handbook 2017” (Addis Ababa 2016) at 128-140 
https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/31829-file-african-union-handbook-2017-edited.pdf 
(Date of use: 08 April 2017); Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)  
“Regional Economic Communities in Africa: A Progressive Overview” (Nairobi 2009) at 
11-12 https://www2.giz.de/wbf/4tDx9kw63gma/RECs_Final_Report.pdf (Date of use: 31 
October 2017); Mbengue MM and Schacherer S “The ‘Africanization’ of International 
Investment Law: The Pan-African Investment Code and the Reform of the International 
Investment Regime” Journal of World Investment and Trade 2017 (18) 414–448 at 417; 
Ngobeni and Fagbayibo 2015 (19) Law, Democracy and Development 175 at 186; United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Intra-Africa Trade: Unlocking Private 
Sector Dynamism” (United Nations New York and Geneva 2013) at 9-10  
http://uctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/aldcafrica2013_en.pdf (Date of use: 31 October 
2017). 
36  SADC Member States with cross-membership are: Angola (ECCAS, SADC), the  
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (COMESA, ECCAS, SADC), Malawi (COMESA, 
SADC), Mauritius (COMESA, SADC), Seychelles (COMESA, SADC), Kingdom of 
Eswatini (formerly Swaziland) (COMESA, SADC), Tanzania (EAC, SADC), Zambia 
(COMESA, SADC) and Zimbabwe (COMESA, SADC). See United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development “Intra-Africa Trade: Unlocking Private Sector Dynamism” at 
9-10 http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/aldcafrica2013_en.pdf (Date of use: 31 
October 2017); Gathii JT “African Regional Trade Agreements as Flexible Legal 
Regimes” 2010 (35) North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial 
Regulation 571-668 at 642-656.  
37  GTZ “Regional Economic Communities in Africa: A Progressive Overview” 
at 12 https://www2.giz.de/wbf/4tDx9kw63gma/RECs_Final_Report.pdf (Date of use:  
31 October 2017). 
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treaty obligations, competition for resources, and legal complexities relating to projects 
that are undertaken in RECs with conflicting legal systems.38  
 
Finally, the future of the regime for the regulation of foreign investments in SADC is 
unpredictable, due to the recent formation of the T-FTA39 and the AfCFTA.40 The T-FTA 
agreement provides for the conclusion of a protocol on investments,41 while the AfCFTA 
Agreement also provides for an investment protocol will be negotiated during the second 
phase of AfCFTA negotiations between 2018 and 2020.42 There is therefore no doubt 
that the 2016 Annex 1 will soon be replaced by an investment protocol at either the T-
FTA or AfCFTA levels. The big unknown here is what the contents of either investment 
protocol shall be. In dealing with the above challenges, the historical evolution of 
international economic law, and in particular of investor-state dispute resolution, must 
not be lost. According to Gathii, international economic law serves as a tool by which 
capital-exporting states access resources in developing states.43 As a result, the rules of 
                                                
38  GTZ “Regional Economic Communities in Africa: A Progressive Overview” at 12  
https://www2.giz.de/wbf/4tDx9kw63gma/RECs_Final_Report.pdf (Date of use:  
31 October 2017); Gathii 2010 (35) North Carolina Journal of International Law and 
Commercial Regulation 571 at 656-663. 
39  Agreement Establishing a Tripartite Free Trade Area Among the COMESA, EAC and  
SADC, (date of signature 10 June 2015, in force) https://www.tralac.org/resources/by-
region/comesa-eac-sadc-tripartite-fta.html (Date of use: 15 October 2017). 
40  Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (date of signature 21  
March 2018, not in force) https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/african-
union/1964-agreement- 
establishing-the-afcfta-consolidated-text-signed-21-march-2018-1/file.html (Date of use  
30 April 2018). 
41  Article 45(1) (b) T-FTA. 
42  Article 7(1)(iii) AfCFTA Agreement; African Union (Assembly) (Tenth Extraordinary  
Session, 21 March 2018) “Decision on the Draft Agreement Establishing the African 
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA”) Doc. Ext/Assembly/AU/2(X) at para 12(iii), 13 
https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/african-union/1834-au-decision-on-the-draft-
agreement-establishing-the-african-continental-free-trade-area-21-march-2018-1/file.html 
(Date of use, 28 March 2018). 
43  Gathii JT “War’s Legacy in International Economic Law” 2009 (11) International  
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international economic law are skewed in favour of capital-exporting states, thereby 
encroaching upon the sovereignty of developing states.44 It is in this context that BITs 
have come to be referred to as the “bills of rights of foreign investors.45  
 
It cannot be disputed that for historical reasons, the majority of BITs and TIPs are 
designed to protect foreign investors, irrespective of any other stated objective such as 
the development of host states.46 A factor that lends credibility to this argument is that 
BITs and TIPs are in general designed to allow investors to sue host states, not the 
other way round. For example, in the first seven months of 2017 alone, investors used 
BITs and TIPs to open 35 ISDS cases against 32 host states.47  
 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 
This study will seek to answer the following question, against the background of the 
Problem Statement as described above:  
 
“Are foreign investments in the SADC region effectively secured, in view of the 
challenges identified in the Problem Statement?” 
 
The main research question will be broken down into the following sub-questions: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Community Law Review 353-386 at 354, 385. 
44  Gathii 2009 (11) International Community Law Review 353 at 363-370.  
45   Gathii 2009 (11) International Community Law Review 353 at 368. 
46  A database of BITs and TIPs is available at  
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu  
(Date of use: 30 March 2018). 
47  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment  
Agreement Issues Note”, Issue 3 November 2017 (United Nations New York 2017) at 1  
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 30 March 
2018).  
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1.2.1 In the event of an expropriation, can a state rely on its internal law to avoid 
compliance with its international obligations? 
1.2.2 What are the consequences of an unlawful expropriation? Must an expropriating 
state pay compensation in terms of applicable treaty, investment contract or law, 
or must it pay damages in the form of reparation? 
1.2.3 Does the definition of an investment as applied in International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) arbitration cases such as Salini 
Construttori S.P.A and Italstrade S.P.A v Kingdom of Morocco48 apply to non-
ICSID tribunals? If so, what are the implications for Annex 1? 
1.2.4 Are the remedies that are available to an investor based on the 2006 and 2016 
Annex 1 and the laws of SADC Member States in the event of expropriation, 
satisfactory?  
1.2.5 If the regulation of foreign investments by Annex 1 and SADC Member States’ 
laws is not satisfactory, what options does SADC have for the regulation of 
foreign investments, as well as the mechanism for the resolution of investor-state 
disputes, based on the recent developments in Brazil, the European Union (EU) 
and India?  
 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The high-level objective of this study is to analyse the security of foreign investments in 
SADC, with a view to make recommendations regarding some of the regulatory 
defeciencies that may be identified.49 The sub-objectives of this study are to analyse: 
 
                                                
48  (ICSID Case No. ARB 00/4) Decision on Jurisdiction of 16 July 2001. 
49  See in particular, the findings made in Chapters 3 and 4 below. 
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1.3.1 The basis on which a state may incur international responsibility towards an 
investment or investor for an expropriation; 
1.3.2 The consequences of unlawful expropriations, such as those that are in breach of 
a treaty, contract, international law or the internal law of a state; 
1.3.3 The definition of an investment as applied in ICSID tribunal decisions such as 
Salini, with a view among others to determine if the definition may be applied by 
non-ICSID tribunals, and what the implications thereof for Annex 1 are; 
1.3.4 The remedies available to an investor in terms of the 2006 and 2016 Annex 1 
and the laws of SADC Member States, in the event of expropriation, so as to 
determine if they are satisfactory or not; and 
1.3.5 The options open to SADC in addressing the challenges identified in the Problem 
Statement regarding the regulation of foreign investments and the mechanism 
and forum for the resolution of investor-state disputes, in view among others of 
developments in Brazil, the EU, and India. 
 
1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Following upon the last two objectives of this study, there are two areas that are central 
to this literature review. These are the level at which foreign investments in SADC must 
be regulated, as well as the mechanism and forum in which investor-state disputes must 
be resolved. The level at which foreign investments in SADC must be regulated is 
important, particularly in view of the findings made in Chapters 3 and 4 below, as well as 
the formation of the African Economic Community (AEC), AfCFTA and the T-FTA. This 
is a critical area for discussion, as the T-FTA provides for the conclusion of its 
investment protocol,50 while the AfCFTA will also have an investment protocol that will 
                                                
50  Article 45(1) (b) T-FTA Agreement. 
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be negotiated from the second half of 2018 until 2020.51 The mechanism and forum in 
which investor-state disputes must be resolved are also relevant, given among others 
the suspension of the SADC Tribunal, the removal of ISDS from the 2016 Annex 1, and 
the poor state of the rule of law in some SADC Member States. Despite the challenges 
stated in the Problem Statement, there has not been a robust literary discussion on 
these issues. This study endeavours to contribute towards the discourse and the body of 
knowledge in this regard. 
 
For now the selected literature on the abovementioned issues will now be briefly 
considered. The conceptual framework will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
With regard to the level at which foreign investments in SADC ought to be regulated, 
there is limited scholarly critique of the two main instruments that regulate foreign 
investments in SADC, namely the SADC Treaty52 and Annex 1.53 However, scholars 
have made extensive comments on the prospects and challenges of regional integration 
efforts in general.54 
                                                
51  Article 7(1)(iii) AfCFTA Agreement; African Union (Assembly) “Decision” at para 12(iii), 13  
https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/african-union/1834-au-decision-on-the-draft-
agreement-establishing-the-african-continental-free-trade-area-21-march-2018-1/file.html 
(Date of use, 28 March 2018). 
52  In Particular Articles 4 and 6 thereof. The SADC Treaty and its background are discussed  
in Chapter 3 below. 
53  Two articles that analyse Annex 1 are Kondo T “A Comparison with Analysis of the  
SADC FIP before and after Its Amendment” 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law 
Journal 1- 47; Ngobeni and Fagbayibo 2015 (19) Law, Democracy and Development 
175-192. 
54  See for example Mapuva J and Muyengwa-Mapuva L "The SADC regional bloc: what  
prospects for regional integration?" 2014 (18) Law, Democracy and Development 22-36; 
Saurombe A "Regional integration agenda for SADC “Caught in the winds of change” 
Problems and Prospects” 2009 (4) (2) Journal of International Commercial Law and 
Technology 100-106; Saurombe A “The role of SADC institutions in implementing SADC 
treaty provisions dealing with regional integration" 2012 (15) (2) Potchefstroom Electronic 
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Three proposals have emerged from the available literature that was reviewed with 
regard to the level at which foreign investments in Africa ought to be regulated. The 
proposals can be classified as regionalism, and two variants of continentalism. These 
proposals will be briefly discussed, so as to set the basis for the options that are open to 
SADC as discussed in Chapter 5 below, and subsequent proposals that will be made in 
Chapter 6.  
 
Firstly, Denters and Gazzini propose regionalism what they term the “third alternative” to 
bilateralism and multipluralism.55 This proposal promotes the use of RECs to regulate 
foreign investments. This is similar to the status quo, where Annex 1 regulates foreign 
investments in SADC. The challenge with this proposal is that it will perpetuate the 
status quo, where a “spaghetti bowl” of conflicting BITs, state investment laws, REC 
laws, and TIPs regulate foreign investments.56  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Law Journal 453-485; Saurombe A “The European Union as a model for regional 
integration in the Southern African Development Community: a selective institutional 
comparative analysis" 2013 (17) Law, Democracy and Development 457-470. 
55  Denters E and Gazzini T “The Role of African Regional Organizations in the  
Promotion and Protection of Foreign Investment” 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment  
and Trade 449-492 at 472-478, 491-492. 
56  Denters and Gazzini 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment and Trade 449 at 452-472;  
Mbengue and Schacherer 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment and Trade 414 at 416-
419; Gathii 2010 (35) North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial 
Regulation 571 at 642-656; Paez L “Bilateral Investment Treaties and Regional 
Investment Regulation in Africa: Towards a Continental Investment Area?” 2017 (18) 
Journal of World Investment and Trade 379–413 at 381-401. 
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At the moment, each of the AU-recognised eight RECs has an instrument that regulates 
foreign investments in one way or another.57 This practice does not contribute to the 
harmonisation of investment regulation in Africa, since it promotes diverse practices 
rather than uniformity. It is shown in Chapters 3 and 4 below that the regulation of 
foreign investments in SADC by means of Annex 1 has failed, as Member States fail to 
harmonise their foreign investment laws with Annex 1.58 The regulation of foreign 
investments by means of RECs stands to replicate the challenges that SADC is 
experiencing. Therefore the challenges identified with regard to the regulation of foreign 
investments by RECs in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 below apply to this approach. This also 
applies to the resolution of investor-state disputes at REC level. 
 
Secondly, Mbengue and Schacherer suggest that the Pan African Investment Code 
(PAIC)59 has the potential to bring an end to the conflicts caused by varying foreign 
investment regulatory instruments that exist throughout the continent.60 Mbengue argues 
that Africa is not ready for a binding legal instrument such as a multilateral investment 
treaty, and thus according to him, a soft law instrument such as the PAIC is ideal.61 The 
AU and its Member States support this view, as can be seen from the PAIC’s Preamble. 
However, the same AU has now concluded the AfCFTA Agreement, with its own 
investment protocol. One can therefore conclude that the AU has moved beyond the 
                                                
57  Mbengue and Schacherer 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment and Trade 414 at  
416-419. 
58  See also Ngobeni and Fagbayibo 2015 (19) Law, Democracy and Development 175 
  at 182-185. 
59  Pan African Investment Code (PAIC) 
https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/32844-doc-draft_pan-
african_investment_code_december_2016_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017). 
60  Mbengue and Schacherer 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment and Trade 414 at  
446.  
61  Mbengue MM “Africa and the Reform of the International Investment  
Regime: An Introduction” 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment and Trade 371-378 at 
376. 
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PAIC. It is difficult to see how the PAIC can bring uniformity in the regulation of foreign 
investments in Africa, when it is only a guiding instrument that has no binding legal 
effect.62 Strangely, Mbengue and Schacherer also admit this fact.63 Without being a 
binding instrument, the PAIC cannot have the effect of harmonising the regulation of 
foreign investments in Africa.  
 
Furthermore, in order for the PAIC to have the desired effect, it relies on Member States 
to adopt its contents when they conclude BITs.  However, there is no proof that AU 
Member States will sign BITs that follow the PAIC in numbers that are high enough to 
accelerate and spread the recommendations of the PAIC. Presently, there are only 159 
intra-Africa BITs, out of 881 BITs entered into by African states.64 Therefore African 
states enter into more BITs with other states than they do among themselves. 
Furthermore, it cannot be ignored that states such as South Africa are moving away 
from the conclusion of BITs.65  
 
                                                
62  Article 2 PAIC; Preamble PAIC (last sentence). For a discussion of the challenges of  
using soft law instruments, see Paez 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment and Trade 
379 at 400-402. 
63  Mbengue and Schacherer 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment and Trade 414 at  
420, 446.  
64  Mbengue and Schacherer 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment and Trade 414 at  
416. 
65  See General Notice 961 of 209, Government Gazette 32386 of 7 July 2009; Department  
of Trade and Industry (Republic of South Africa) (June 2009) “Bilateral Investment Policy 
Review Framework Review, Government Position Paper” 
https://archive.opengazettes.org.za/archive/ZA/2009/government-gazette-ZA-vol-529-no-
32386-dated-2009-07-07.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018); Department of Trade and 
Industry (South Africa) (February 2011) “Policy Statement: The South African 
Government’s Approach to Future International Investment Treaties; Department of 
Trade and Industry (South Africa) (February 2011): “A review Framework for cross-border 
direct investment in South Africa, Discussion Document” 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2011/A%20review%20framew
ork%20for%20cross-border%20direct%20investment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf 
(Date of use: 18 January 2018)  
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In addition to the above, the PAIC cannot foster uniformity in BIT practice in Africa as 
intended, since it encourages diverse practices rather than uniformity with regard to 
investor-state dispute settlement. For example, the PAIC allows Member States to 
resolve investor-state disputes as they see fit, rather in a uniform and consistent way.66 
The consistency it promotes is in fact diversity, not harmonisation or uniformity. 
Furthermore, the PAIC provides that disputes under investment agreements shall be 
resolved under the terms provided in such agreements.67 The PAIC also provides that 
ISDS in the form of arbitration under the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules68 may only take place if a host state agrees to 
an investor’s request to commence it, and in line with its domestic laws and policies.69 
This situation is a compromise position that reflects the need for ISDS by some Member 
States, while regions such as SADC do not want ISDS.70  
 
In recognition of the necessity for such compromise in SADC, Ngobeni and Fagbayibo 
proposed that the 2016 Annex 1 provide that the SADC Member States may delay 
consent to ISDS until after an investor-state dispute arises.71 This is similar to the 
position adopted by the PAIC as shown above. 
 
                                                
66  Article 42(1) PAIC.  
67  Article 42(1) PAIC. 
68  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Arbitration Rules”  
(United Nations New York 2013) 
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on- 
Transparency-E.pdf (Date of use: 15 November 2017). 
69  Article 42(1) PAIC; Mbengue and Schacherer 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment and  
Trade 414 at 444. 
70  Mbengue and Schacherer 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment and Trade 414 at 443- 
444. 
71  Ngobeni and Fagbayibo 2015 (19) Law, Democracy and Development 175 at 189. 
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The overall result is that even if AU Member States widely adopted the PAIC, this will not 
lead to uniformity with regard to the regulation of the resolution of investor-state 
disputes. The PAIC is therefore not an ideal instrument for the creation of a harmonised, 
Africa-wide regime for the regulation of foreign investments. It is incapable of 
harmonising the regulation of foreign investments in Africa, and will in practice be 
overtaken by the upcoming AfCFTA investment protocol. 
 
The third view, proposed by Paez, is that foreign investments in Africa should be 
regulated by means of an African Continental Investment Area (ACIA) treaty. Paez 
correctly opines that requiring the Member States to comply with soft law (such as the 
PAIC) adds to the mixture of conflicting instruments and further complicates the 
situation.72 Paez therefore proposes that an ACIA treaty is the ideal solution to the 
problem.73 The ACIA would comprise of sectoral agreements dealing with areas such as 
infrastructure, energy, agriculture, and industry.74 Furthermore, Paez proposes that 
investor-state disputes should be referred to the ACJ&HR.75 Paez’s position is thus the 
total opposite of Mbengue and Schacharer’s proposal. 
 
Paez’s proposals resonate with those recommended in Chapter 6 of this study, to the 
extent that it proposes that foreign investments be regulated by a continental treaty. 
Indeed, this is the direction being adopted by the AfCFTA, which will have an investment 
protocol as indicated above. However, Paez does not provide details motivating the 
proposal, nor how the proposal can be implemented. Therefore, it is difficult to analyse 
                                                
72  Paez 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment and Trade 379 at 402. 
73  Paez 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment and Trade 379 at 403-407. 
74  Paez 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment and Trade 379 at 406. 
75  Paez 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment and Trade 379 at 404-405. 
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the proposal further. This study takes this issue further with the discussions made in 
Chapter 5, and proposals made in Chapter 6. 
 
With regard to the mechanism and forum for the resolution of investor-state disputes, 
there has as stated above been a dearth of literature. This is hardly surprising, since 
SADC only commenced the regulation foreign investments by means of Annex 1 during 
2010. Furthermore, the SADC Tribunal functioned from August 2005 to August 2010,76 
and it only delivered one significant judgment in Mike Campbell v Zimbabwe.77 Most 
scholars have focused their commentary on the suspension of the SADC Tribunal, and 
the amendment of the SADC Tribunal Protocol to deny natural and legal persons access 
to the SADC Tribunal.78 
                                                
76  http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/sadc-institutions/tribun/ (Date of use: 11 January 2018). 
77  Mike Campbell Pvt Ltd and 78 Others v Republic of Zimbabwe (2/2007) (2008) SADCT 2  
(28 November 2008). 
78  See for example Banda F “The Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 – Constitutional  
Curate's Egg” 2014 The International Survey of Family Law 491-506; Beukes M 
“Zimbabwe in the Dock: the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Tribunal's 
First Decision” 2008 (33) South African Yearbook of international Law 228-243; Cohen 
DF “A President, an International Tribunal and a Band of Farmers Walk into a 
Constitutional Court - The Last Laugh: Mike Campbell v. the Government of the Republic 
of Zimbabwe” 2014 (28) Emory International Law Review 29-42; De Wet E “The Case of 
Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Louis Karel Fick: A First Step towards 
Developing a Doctrine on the Status of International Judgments within the Domestic 
Legal Order” 2014 (17) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 553-565; Du Plessis M and 
Forere M “Enforcing the SADC Tribunal's Decisions in South Africa: Immunity” 2010 (35) 
South African Yearbook of International Law 265-269; Ebobrah ST and Nkhata MJ “Is the 
SADC Tribunal under Judicial Siege in Zimbabwe – reflections on Etheredge v Minister of 
State for National Security Responsible for lands, Land Reform and Resettlement and 
Another” 2010 (43) Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 81-92; 
Hemel D and Schalkwyk A “Tyranny on Trial: Regional Courts Crack down on Mugabe's 
Land Reform” 2010 (35) Yale Journal of International Law 517-524; Mkandawire MCC 
“The SADC Tribunal Perspective on enforcement of Judgments: State Support and 
Cooperation” 2010 (36) Commonwealth Law Bulletin 567- 574; Moyo A “Defending 
Human Rights and the Rule of Law by the SADC Tribunal: Campbell and beyond” 2009 
(9) African Human Rights Law Journal 590-614; Naldi GJ “Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd et al v 
the Republic of Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe's Land Reform Programme Held in Breach of the 
SADC Treaty” 2009 (53) Journal of African Law 305-320; Ndlovu L “Following the NAFTA 
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Phooko calls for the amendment of the SADC Tribunal Protocol, with a view to again 
grant natural and legal persons access to the SADC Tribunal.79 This proposal would be 
easy to support, if one focused on SADC in isolation from the formation of the AEC, 
AfCFTA, and the T-FTA. However, the view adopted in this study is that the use of sub-
regional courts as a forum for investor-state disputes will lead to forum shopping, and is 
not efficient or cost-effective, in view of the resource limitations that face RECs in 
Africa.80  
 
In other words, the revitalisation of the SADC Tribunal would be good for foreign 
investors, if SADC was a closed system, if other RECs also had similar courts, and if all 
the sub-regional courts were equally efficient. At present, there are 3 sub-regional courts 
in the T-FTA, namely the COMESA81 Court of Justice (CCJ),82 the East African Court of 
                                                                                                                                            
Star: SADC Land Reform and Investment Protection after the Campbell Litigation” 2011 
(15) Law, Democracy and Development  59-89; Ndlovu PN “Campbell v Republic of 
Zimbabwe: A moment of truth for the SADC Tribunal” 2011 (1) SADC Law Journal 63-79; 
Phooko MR “No Longer in Suspense - Clarifying the Human Rights Jurisdiction of SADC 
Tribunal” 2015 (18) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 531- 568;  Phooko MR “Legal 
Status of International Law in South Africa's Municipal Law: Government of the Republic 
of Zimbabwe v. Fick and Others (657/11)[2012] ZASCA 122” 2014 (22) African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 399-419; Scholtz W and Ferreira G “Much Ado About 
Nothing? The SADC Tribunal’s Quest for the Rule of Law Pursuant to Regional 
Integration” 2011 (71) Zao RV 331-358; Swart M “Extending the Life of the SADC 
Tribunal” 2013 (38) South African Yearbook of International Law 253-262.  
79  Phooko MR The SADC Tribunal: Its Jurisdiction, the Enforcement of its Judgments  
and the Sovereignty of its Member States (LLD Thesis UNISA 2016) at para 6.2.1. 
80  See the discussion in this regard in Chapter 5 below. 
81  The Common Market for Southern Africa (COMESA) was formed in terms of the Treaty  
Establishing the Common Market for Southern Africa (date of signature 05 November 
1993, in force 08 December 1994) (COMESA Treaty) 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2422 (Date of use: 15 
October 2017)  
82  http://comesacourt.org/ (Date of use: 11 January 2018). 
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Justice (EACJ)83 and the SADC Tribunal.84 The caseload and resources for the efficient 
and full-time operation of CCJ, EACJ and SADC Tribunal are non-existent. Furthermore, 
the fact that these sub-regional courts do not have the same level of resources means 
that they will not have the same level of efficiency.  This issue is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5 below. 
 
It is against this background that this study aims to fill the gaps identified in the literature 
review, and to answer the research questions posed above. In so doing, the study aims 
to contribute to the body of literature on the subject matter by means of the 
recommendations made in Chapter 6. 
 
1.5 METHODOLOGY 
The methodology applied in this study is a desktop literature review. It entails an 
analysis of the investment laws of SADC Member States, Annex 1, selected treaties, 
BITs, Model Bilateral Treaty Templates and TIPs, decisions of national and international 
courts, ISDS tribunals, international documents, and academic writings.  
 
1.6   LIMITATIONS 
The scope of this study is by design very wide, as it covers all SADC Member States 
except the Union of Comores, which joined SADC during 2017 towards the end of this 
study. It is not feasible to conduct an in-depth analysis of all the laws that regulate 
                                                
83  http://eacj.org/ (Date of use: 11 January 2018). The EACJ is the judicial organ of the East  
African Community (EAC), which was formed in terms of the Treaty Establishing the East 
African Community (date of signature 30 November 1999, in force 07 July 2000) (EAC 
Treaty) 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2487 (Date of use: 15 
October 2017). 
84  The CCJ and EACJ are discussed in Chapter 5 below. 
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foreign investments in all sectors of SADC Member States. This study therefore 
analyses the 2006 and 2016 Annex 1’s, as well as selected laws that regulate foreign 
investors in general sectors only, so as to gauge the general level of the security of 
foreign investments in SADC. It is noteworthy that investors can, and do by-pass the 
Member State laws discussed herein, by accessing applicable BITs, TIPs or investment 
contracts in order to litigate or arbitrate against host states. Therefore, this study 
analyses risks to investors who are not such instruments.  
 
This study was written over several years. Therefore, ISDS statistics, case law, 
legislation and events are up to date at the different timeframes indicated in the relevant 
references. The reader is advised to follow the appropriate sources provided herein for 
updated information. The Trade Law Centre ((Tralac), website https://www.tralac.org/) 
provides useful updates regarding the signature, ratification and further negotiation of 
protocols to the AfCFTA and T-FTA. Other websites and organisations cited herein also 
provide updated information with regard to issues they deal with. 
 
1.7   CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This study is comprised of six chapters, which can be summarised as follows:  
 
Chapter 1 introduces the problem statement, research questions, research objectives, 
literature review, methodology and limitations of this study. 
 
Chapter 2 introduces the concepts that underlie this study, namely state responsibility, 
expropriation, investment, and investor-state dispute resolution methods. 
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Chapter 3 discusses the regulation of foreign investments at SADC level in terms of the 
2006 and 2016 Annex 1. The chapter analyses selected provisions thereof insofar as 
they affect the security of foreign investments in SADC. In the analysis, the 2016 Annex 
1 is compared with the SADC Model BIT, as well as TIPs from other selected 
jurisdictions.  
 
Chapter 4 analyses the remedies that an investor may have in terms of the selected 
investment laws of each SADC Member State, in the event of the expropriation of an 
investment. 
 
Chapter 5 is a comparative discussion that shows how Brazil, the EU, and India have 
dealt with the challenges arising from ISDS. It indicates the lessons that SADC can learn 
from these jurisdictions, as well as SADC’s options regarding the future regulation of 
foreign investments, and the resolution of investor-state disputes. 
 
Chapter 6 provides a summary of findings made by the study, and makes normative 
recommendations regarding the future regulation of foreign investments in SADC, as 
well as with regard to the forum to which investor-state disputes must be referred.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE ORIGIN AND SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES: A THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK  
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter introduces the concepts that form the pillars of this study, namely state 
responsibility, expropriation, an investment, and investor-state dispute resolution forums 
and mechanisms. It lays the foundation for the fulfillment of the first three objectives of 
this study.85  
 
The discussion of state responsibility outlines the basis on which a host state may be 
liable for damage or loss suffered by an investor or an investment, such as in the event 
of expropriation of an investment. The discussion shows how the duty of host states to 
honour treaties, contracts and the laws of a host state create the international 
responsibility of a host state. Most important is that the duty of host states to honour 
treaties and contracts has given immense power to BITs, TIPs, and investment 
contracts, which in turn have provided investors with the right to commence ISDS cases 
and litigation against host states. The takeaway from this section is that investors have a 
wide and deep arsenal of ammunition that they can, and they do use against host states. 
 
The discussion of expropriation lays the basis for the discussion that is undertaken in 
Chapter 4, where the remedies available to an investor in the event of expropriation of 
an investment in terms of the laws of SADC Member States are discussed. This 
                                                
85  See Objectives 1.3.1 – 1.3.3 in Chapter 1 above. 
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discussion, coupled with those undertaken in Chapters 3 and 4, enables conclusions to 
be drawn regarding the effective security of foreign investments in SADC in the event of 
the alleged expropriation of an investment.  
 
The discussion of the definition of an investment is equally important, because an 
investment is the subject matter of an investor-state dispute. This section analyses the 
definition of an investment as applied by ICSID arbitral tribunals. The discussion lays the 
basis for the discussion of an investment that is undertaken in Chapters 3 and 4. It 
shows that in the event of non-ICSID arbitration being brought against a SADC Member 
State, the criteria that an investment must meet as outlined in Salini may apply to the 
definition of an investment, with the result that some assets that are defined as 
investments by the 2006 Annex 1 or the laws of SADC Member States may not qualify 
as investments after all.  
 
The discussion of investor-state dispute resolution forums and mechanisms (or 
methods) is in line with the fourth objective of this study.86 It lays the basis for the 
discussions of investor-state dispute resolution methods that follow in Chapters 3, 4 and 
5, as well as the recommendations that are made in this regard in Chapter 6. This 
discussion outlines the pros and cons of the different mechanisms and the forums for the 
resolution of investor-state disputes, namely alternative dispute resolution (ADR), 
arbitration and litigation. The discussion concludes that all the investor-state dispute 
resolution methods are important, albeit to different extents. 
 
 
 
                                                
86  See Objectives 1.3.4 in Chapter 1 above. 
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2.2 STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
2.2.1 Introduction 
The area of state responsibility consists of the rules of international law that are used to 
determine the general conditions under which a state can be held responsible for 
wrongful acts or omissions, as well as the legal consequences of the breach.87 These 
rules are known as the secondary rules of international law, in contrast to the primary 
rules of international law that set out the contents of obligations that states must adhere 
to.88 The rules of state responsibility are used among others to determine the 
circumstances under which an act of state may be wrongful, the attribution of a wrongful 
act to a state, as well as the consequences of wrongful acts.  
 
A state may incur international responsibility as a result of one or more internationally 
wrongful acts that are attributable to it. The Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) describe the sources of state responsibility as 
follows: 
 
                                                
87  United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft articles on Responsibility of  
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001” (adopted on 31 May 
2001, 3 August 2001, 6-9 August 2001) UN Doc A/56/10 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf; 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017).  
For a discussion of ARSIWA and state responsibility see Anton D, Mathew P and Morgan 
W International Law Cases and Materials 1st ed (Oxford South Melbourne Victoria 2005) 
at 259-275; Crawford J State Responsibility: The General Part Reprint (Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge 2014); Crawford J “Investment Arbitration and the ILC 
Articles on State Responsibility” in Reinisch A (ed) Classics in International Investment 
Law Volume II (Edward Elgar Cheltenham 2014) at 3-11; Dixon MJ Cases and Materials 
on international law 5th ed (Oxford University Press Oxford 2011) at 394-441; Wittich S 
“State Responsibility” in Bungenberg M et al (eds) International Investment Law: A 
Handbook (Nomos Baden-Baden 2015) at 23-45.   
88  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” at para 1 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017). 
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State responsibility can arise from breaches of bi-lateral obligations or of 
obligations owed to some States or to the international community as a whole. It 
can involve relatively minor infringements as well as the most serious breaches 
of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law.89 
 
In customary international law, a state is responsible to observe its obligations under a 
treaty, contract, or international law.90 On this basis, a state may incur international 
responsibility towards an investor91 through the commission of one or more of the 
following acts, namely: 
 
(a) Breach of a rule of customary international law by a host state; 
(b) Breach of a treaty obligation by a host state; 
(c) Breach of an investment contract between a host state and a foreign investor; 
and/or 
(d) Breach or the enactment of legislation by a host state. 
 
These breaches will now be briefly discussed, so as to indicate their connection to the 
origins of investor-state disputes and the responsibility of host states. 
 
                                                
89  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” at 55 para 6. 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017). 
90  Dugard CJ International Law: A South African Perspective 4th ed (Juta Cape Town 2011)  
at 269. Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment 3rd ed (Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge 2010) at 136. 
91  A claim against a host state can be brought by an investor (e.g. a shareholder) or an  
investment (i.e. the legal entity that holds an investment). Therefore, reference to a claim  
that can be brought by investor includes a claim that can be brought by an 
 Investment, vice versa. Whether an entity qualifies to be an investor or an investment  
differs from state to state, depends on the legal instrument that regulates the relevant  
foreign investment. 
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2.2.2 Breach of customary international law  
As indicated above, a state must observe its obligations under a treaty, contract, or 
international law, failing which it may be responsible for the consequences thereof.92 
Articles 1, 2, 3 and 12 of ARSIWA provide the basis on which a state may be held 
accountable for the consequences of internationally wrongful acts.93 Whether an act is 
wrongful in terms of international law or not is to be determined in terms of international 
law, and not the internal law of the host state.94  
 
ARSIWA provides that an act must have two elements in order to be an internationally 
wrongful act.95 Firstly, the act must be attributable to the accused state.96 Secondly, it 
must be a breach of an international obligation.97 The four bases of these obligations are 
indicated in the preceding section. 
                                                
92  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Article 1 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017). 
ARSIWA Commentary at 32-34; Biwater Gauff at para 773-775. 
93  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA”  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017); Crawford (2014) State  
Responsibility: The General Part at 93. 
94  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Articles 3, 32 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017); ARSIWA Commentary 
at 36 para 1, 38 para 9; Crawford (2014) State Responsibility: The General Part at 101; 
Article 27 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, 1969 (8) ILM 679 
(adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-
english.pdf (Date of use: 31 October 2017); Mike Campbell at 67. 
95  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Article 2 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017); ARSIWA Commentary 
at 34 para 1; 34-36; Anton, Mathew and Morgan International Law Cases and Materials 
at 261-262; Aust A Handbook of International Law 2nd ed (Cambridge University Press 
Cambridge UK 2010) at 410; Rothwell DR et al International Law: Cases and Materials 
with Australian Perspectives 2nd ed (Cambridge University Press Port Melbourne Victoria 
2014) at 504-454.  
96  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Articles 2(a) 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017); ARSIWA  
Commentary at 35 paras 3, 6.  
97  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Articles 2(b) 
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Attribution is the process by which international law establishes whether or not the 
conduct of a natural person or other entity can be considered an act of a state.98 If an act 
is not attributable to a state, then an inquiry as to the responsibility of the state for the act 
must end.99 Two of the rules of attribution of the conduct of organs and entities of a state 
will now be briefly discussed in order to indicate their operation.100 
 
Firstly, Article 4 of ARSIWA provides that the conduct of an organ of a state is 
attributable to the state.101 International law, not the internal law of a host state, 
                                                                                                                                            
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017);   
ARSIWA Commentary at 35 para 5-8. For a discussion of the attribution of conduct to a 
state, see ARSIWA Commentary at 43-54; Anton, Mathew and Morgan International Law 
Cases and Materials at 263-266; Aust Handbook of International Law at 410-414; Bishop 
RD, Crawford J and Reisman W (eds) Foreign Investment Disputes 2nd ed (Kluwer Law 
International Alphen aan den Rijn Netherlands 2014) at 548-576; Crawford (2014) State 
Responsibility: The General Part at 113-211; Henkin L et al International Law: cases and 
materials 3rd ed (West Publishing Company St. Paul Minnesota 1993) at 546-550; 
Rothwell et al International Law: Cases and Materials with Australian Perspectives at 
455-464; Bayindir at para 257-261; Bosh International, Plc. v Ukraine (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/11) Award of 25 October 2012 at para 141–49; Deutsche Bank AG v Democratic 
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/02) Award of 31 October 2012 
at para 401-407; Eastern Credit Limited, Inc and A.S Baltoil v Republic of Estonia (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/99/2) Award of 25 June 2001 at para 327; Helnan International Hotels A/S 
v The Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19) Decision on Jurisdiction of 17 
October 2006 at para 29 and 95; Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v The Russian 
Federation (PCA Case No. AA 226) Final Award of 14 July 2014 at para 1465-1480; 
Ioannis Kardassopoulos and Ron Fuchs v The Republic of Georgia (ICSID Case No. 
ARB 05/18 and 07/15) Award of 3 March 2010 at para 189-194, 275, 280; Jan de Nul N.V 
and Dredging International N.V. v Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No ARB/04/13) 
Award of 6 November 2008 at para 155-162; Tulip Real Estate Investment and 
Development Netherlands B.V. v Republic of Turkey (ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28) Award 
of 10 March 2014 at para 276-328. 
98  Crawford (2014) State Responsibility: The General Part at 113. 
99  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 38, 39 para  
9 http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017). 
100  Due to space constraints the attribution of acts in terms of Article 6-9 of ARSIWA will not  
be discussed here. 
101  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 40-42  
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determines how acts of organs and agents can be attributed to a state.102 The general 
rule in this regard is that the conduct of an organ of state may be attributable to a state, 
irrespective of the functions performed by the organ, the position occupied by the organ, 
and the character or nature of the organ as a part of the state or territorial unit.103 This 
rule follows upon the principle that a state is viewed as a single unit that is comprised of 
all its organs.104 For the purposes of attribution, it is irrelevant whether an organ acted in 
a governmental capacity (ius imperii) or in a commercial capacity.105 Furthermore, a 
state is liable for the acts of its municipalities and provinces.106 
 
Secondly, Article 5 of ARSIWA deals with the attribution of the acts of state entities that 
are authorised to exercise governmental authority and functions, such as state-owned 
entities, public agencies, semi-public entities, central banks, stock exchanges, privately-
run prisons and the like.107 A state entity must be authorised to exercise governmental 
authority by the internal law of a state, even if details regarding the exercise of the 
                                                                                                                                            
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017); Bernhard Von Pezold 
and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe (ICSID Case No.ARB/10/15) Award of 28 July 2015 
at para 443. 
102  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 38 para 4  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017). 
103  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Article 4(1)  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017); Crawford (2014) State 
Responsibility: The General Part at 117. 
104  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 40 para 5,  
40(1)-42(13) http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017); Crawford 
(2014) State Responsibility: The General Part at 117. 
105  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 41 para 6  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017).  
106  Crawford (2014) State Responsibility: The General Part at 123-124; Rothwell et al  
International Law: Cases and Materials with Australian Perspectives at 464.  
107  Crawford (2014) State Responsibility: The General Part at 127-128; United Nations  
(International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Article 8 http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ 
(Date of use: 02 October 2017) deals with the attribution of entities that do not have 
delegated authority. 
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authority are not stated.108 The act(s) in question must have been performed by an entity 
in the exercise of the delegated governmental authority.109  
 
The test with regard to whether a state entity falls within the ambit of Article 5 or not is a 
functional one.110  Unlike with acts of organs of a state, the acts of a state entity are 
attributable to a state when the entity acted ius imperii only. For example, the tribunal in 
Bosh held that a state is responsible for a state-owned university’s acts that are ius 
imperii, but not for its private or commercial activities.111  
 
It is a necessary condition of state responsibility that a person must have suffered an 
injury to itself as a result of a wrongful act of a state.112 Otherwise, in the absence of 
injury, there can be no cause for complaint. Article 31 of ARSIWA provides that injury 
includes any damage caused, whether the damage is material or moral.113 Material 
damage means damage that can be assessed in financial terms, while moral damage 
includes pain and suffering, for example, the loss of loved ones.114 However, damage is 
not a pre-requisite for a claim based on state responsibility, but injury is.115 Nonetheless, 
                                                
108  Crawford (2014) State Responsibility: The General Part at 127; EDF Services  
Limited v Romania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13) Award of 8 October 2009 at para 191. 
109  EDF Services at para 191,193. 
110  EDF Services at para 193. 
111  Bosh at para 175-176; See also Emilio Agustin Maffezzini v The Kingdom of Spain  
(ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7) Award of 9 November 2000, at para 52; EDF Services at 
para 195-198; Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz 
Company v The Government of Mongolia (Ad hoc UNCITRAL Tribunal) Award of 28 April 
2011 at para 574-576, 592. 
112  Henkin et al International Law: Cases and Materials at 553-558. 
113  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 91 para 3  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017); Crawford (2014) State  
Responsibility: The General Part at 485-491. 
114  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 92 para 5  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017). 
115  Crawford (2014) State Responsibility: The General Part at 485. 
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the nature of the damage suffered may affect the quantum and form of the reparation 
that can be obtained.116 
 
It is necessary that there must be a connection between a wrongful act and the injury 
complained of. Thus an internationally wrongful act that is attributable to a state, and 
which is alleged to have caused injury, must be the proximate cause of the injury 
complained of.117 ARSIWA connects an injury to a wrongful act by stating that a wrongful 
act must be the cause of the injury.118 For example, the tribunal in Biwater Gauff applied 
this rule and declined to award compensation because there was no causal link between 
the expropriation that was found to have taken place, and the compensation claimed.119 
Also, in Guinea v Democratic Republic of Congo, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
held that the DRC could not be held responsible for the loss of Diallo’s property, when it 
                                                
116  Crawford (2014) State Responsibility: The General Part at 486. 
117  See for example Factory at Chorzow (Merits), Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A,  
No. 17 at 30. For tribunal practice on this issue see example: Achmea B.V. (Formerly 
known as Eureko B.V.) v The Slovak Republic (PCA case No. 2008-13) Final Award of 7 
December 2012 at para 320; CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v The Czech 
Republic (Ad hoc UNCITRAL Tribunal) Partial Award of 13 September 2001 at para 575-
585, 602, 615; Desert Line Projects at para 282; Gemplus S.A, SLP S.A, Gemplus 
Industrial S.A de C.V, Talsud S.A v The United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF) 04/3 and ARB (AF) 04/04) Award of 16 June 2010 at para 11.8-11.16; Hulley 
Enterprises Limited at para 1770-1775; Ioan Micula and Others v Romania (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/20) Award of 11 December 2013 at para 1154; Khan Resources Inc., Khan 
Resources B.V., CAUC Holding Company Ltd. v The Government of Mongolia (PCA 
Case No. 2011-09) Award on Merits of 2 March 2015 at para 376-382; LG&E Energy 
Corp, LG&E Capital Corp, LG&E International Inc v Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/1) Decision on Liability of 3 October 2006 at para 256; Swisslion DOO Skopje v 
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (CSID Case No ARB/09/16) Award of 6 
July 2012 at para 350; Yukos Universal Limited (Isle-of-Man Of Man) v The Russian 
Federation, (PCA Case No. AA 227) Final Award of 18 July 2014 at para 1770-1775; 
Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v The Russian Federation (PCA Case No. AA 228) 
Final Award of 18 July 2014 at para 1770-1775. 
118  See United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Articles 31(1), 34 and  
37(1) http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017); ARSIWA 
Commentary at 91 para 1-14, 95 para 1, 96 para 6, 107 para 8. 
119  Biwater Gauff at 239 para 805-807; Ioan Micula at para 922-924. 
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was not proven that the loss of the property was caused by the DRC’s unlawful 
conduct.120  
 
According to ARSIWA, causation is a necessary, but not sufficient factor. In addition to 
causation, the remoteness, directness or proximity of an injury may be relevant.121 Thus 
if there is an intervening event, the causal link between the original act and the injury 
should not be too remote.122 The test in this regard is whether an intervening event is so 
compelling that it interrupts the causal link, thus making the initial event too remote.123  
 
The commission of an internationally wrongful act creates a new set of international 
relations or legal consequences.124  
 
Firstly, a state comes under an international obligation to cease the conduct complained 
of.125 Secondly, a state has a duty to make full reparation to the victim of its conduct.126 
Thirdly, an injured and non-injured state (if any) may invoke the responsibility of the 
                                                
120  Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of  
The Congo), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J Reports 2012, p. 324 at 13 para 31. 
121  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 93 para 10  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017); Ioan Micula at para 
924-927; Yukos Universal Limited at para 1770-1775.  
122  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 93 para 10  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017); Ioan Micula at para 
925. 
123  Ioan Micula at para 926-927. 
124  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 33(3)  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017); Aust Handbook of 
International Law at 417-418. 
125  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Article 30  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017); ARSIWA Commentary  
at 88-91; Aust Handbook of International Law at 418. 
126  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Article 31(1)   
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017); ARSIWA Commentary 
at 91. The obligation to make reparation arises automatically and is not dependent on a 
demand by the injured state (ARSIWA Commentary at 91 para 5). 
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breaching state.127 In appropriate cases, an affected state(s) can take countermeasures 
against the breaching state.128 Fourth, when the conduct of a state is wrongful and 
therefore attracts international responsibility, such responsibility may be such that it is 
owed to all states, rather than to the wronged state only.129 An obligation owed to all 
states is called an obligation orga omnes.130 Finally, being part of the international 
community entails that every state has a legally enforceable interest in the protection of 
certain rights, as well as the upholding of certain obligations by itself and other states.131 
 
2.2.3 Breach of treaty obligations 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as a written agreement 
concluded between states that is governed by international law.132. Aside from state 
laws, treaties are the main instruments that regulate foreign investments. As a result, 
they are also the main source of investor-state disputes. Historically, BITs and TIPs 
                                                
127  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Article 43   
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017) sets out the process to  
be observed when invoking the responsibility of a state pursuant to Articles 42 and 48 
(see ARSIWA Commentary at 119-120). Article 44 provides for circumstances where the 
responsibility of a state may not be invoked (see ARSIWA Commentary at 120-121). 
Article 45 provides for circumstances where the responsibility of a state may not be 
invoked (ARSIWA Commentary at 121-123). 
128  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Articles 49-53  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017); ARSIWA Commentary 
at 130-137; Aust Handbook of International Law at 425-428; Rothwell et al International 
Law: Cases and Materials with Australian Perspectives at 480-484. 
129  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 33(4)  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017). 
130  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 33(4)  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017). 
131  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 33 para 4  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017).  
132  Article 2(1) (a) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See also Anton, Mathew and  
Morgan International Law Cases and Materials at 276-388; Henkin et al International 
Law: cases and materials at 420-425; Dorr O and Schmalenbach K (eds) Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Springer Heidelberg 2012) at 131-
133; Fitzmaurice M and Elias O Contemporary Issues In The Law of Treaties (Eleven 
International Publishing Utrecht 2005) at 1-3, 7-25.  
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respectively contributed 60 percent and 29 percent of opened under the ICSID.133 On an 
annualised basis, during 2017 BITs contributed 62 percent of new cases, while TIPs 
contributed 29 percent of new cases.134 When non-ICSID cases are added, BITs and 
TIPs respectively contributed 80 and 20 percent of new cases opened during 2017.135 
 
The first modern BIT was the Promotion and Protection of Investments Germany and 
Pakistan of 25 November 1959 (Germany-Pakistan BIT).136 This BIT referred investor 
disputes to the ICJ or international arbitration, depending on the agreement of the 
                                                
133   International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes “The ICSID Caseload 
Statistics”, Issue 2017-2 (New York 2017) at 10 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-
2%20(English)%20Final.pdf (Date of use: 10 March 2018). For details of cases opened 
under various BITs and TIPs see 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByApplicableIia (Date of use: 30 March 
2018). 
134  International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes “The ICSID Caseload  
Statistics”, Issue 2017-2 at 25  
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-
2%20(English)%20Final.pdf (Date of use: 10 March 2018). 
135  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment  
Agreement Issues Note”, Issue 3 at 3 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 30 March 
2018). 
136  English version is available at  
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1387 (in force 28 April 1962) 
(Date of use 23 April 2018); Aust Handbook of International Law at 373. For a history of 
investment treaties see Salacuse JW “BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries” in Beveridge F 
(ed) Globalization and International Investment (Ashgate Publishing Limited 2005) at 25-
45; Salacuse JW and Sullivan NP “Do BITs Really Work: An Evaluation of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain” 2005 (46) Harvard International Law 
Journal 67-130 at 73; Salacuse JW The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University 
Press Oxford 2010) at 78-125; Tietje C and F Baetens “The Impact of Investor-State-
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership”: Study 
prepared for Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands, 26 June 2014 at para 10-39 
http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/the-impact-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds-in-
the-ttip.pdf (Date of use: 17 April 2018); Vandenvelde KJ “A Brief History of International 
Investment Agreements” 2005 (12) University of California Davis Journal of International 
Law and Policy 157-194. 
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parties.137 After this BIT was concluded, the use of BITS grew gradually, such that at 1 
April 2018 there were 2947 BITs, of which 2364 were in effect.138 The number of TIPs 
was 379, of which 309 were in force.139 
 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that every treaty in force is 
binding upon the parties thereto, and that the parties must comply with their treaty 
obligations in good faith.140 The basis of the obligation to honour treaties is the maxim 
pacta sunt servanda.141 Pacta sunt servanda emanates from private law, and means that 
treaties must be honoured.142 The maxim has been codified as Article 2(b) of 
ARSIWA.143  
 
A state may not rely on its internal law to avoid compliance with a treaty.144 This is an 
important pillar for the observance and existence of treaties because in its absence 
treaties could be easily avoided, given that a state would be able to rely on its internal 
law to avoid responsibility for breach of the treaty.145 This rule enables international law 
                                                
137  Article 11(2) Germany-Pakistan BIT. 
138  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (Date of use: 1 April 2018). 
139  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (Date of use: 1 April 2018). 
140  Article 26; Henkin et al International Law: cases and materials at 463. 
141  Fitzmaurice and Elias Contemporary Issues In The Law of Treaties at 3. 
142  Dorr and Schmalenbach (eds) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary  
at 428-429. 
143  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 35-36  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017). 
144  Article 27 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; Dorr and Schmalenbach (eds)  
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary at 453-473. This rule was  
codified as Article 32 of United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARISWA” 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017), see ARSIWA 
Commentary at 94 para 2-3. Article 27 is also a codification of international customary 
law (Dorr and Schmalenbach (eds) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A 
Commentary at 454; Azurix Corp. v The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12) 
Decision on Annulment of 1 September 2009 at para 146). 
145  Dorr and Schmalenbach (eds) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary  
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to “turn a blind eye” to a state’s internal law, thus rendering it irrelevant for the purpose 
of determining state responsibility.146 Hence a provision such as that found in Zimbabwe 
to the effect that in the event of the expropriation of agricultural land, compensation shall 
only be paid for improvements but not for the land, is invalid under international law.147 
 
A state may in the compliance with its internal law act in violation of a treaty, or it may, 
while acting in compliance with a treaty obligation, violate its internal law.148 In the former 
case, the state’s conduct will be an internationally wrongful act because as already 
stated, a state may not rely on its internal law to avoid compliance with its treaty 
obligations. A state may also not argue that its consent to be bound by a treaty is invalid 
by virtue of the fact that the consent was given contrary to its internal law, unless the 
granting of the consent was manifest, and it concerned a rule of its internal law of 
fundamental importance.149  
 
The sum of the above is that breach of a treaty is an internationally wrongful act,150 and it 
attracts the consequences outlined in Part Two of ARSIWA,151 as well as in international 
customary law.152 This consequence is the power behind BITs and TIPs, as it compels 
                                                                                                                                            
at 453. 
146  Dorr and Schmalenbach (eds) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary  
at 460. 
147  See the discussion relating to Zimbabwe in Chapter 4 below. 
148  Case Concerning Electtronica Sicula S.p.A (USA v Italy) I.C.J. Reports 1989 (ELSI), at  
40 para 73.  
149  Article 46 Vienna Convention; Dorr and Schmalenbach (eds) Vienna Convention on the  
Law of Treaties: A Commentary at 776-804. 
150  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 54(2), 55(3)  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017); ELSI at 70 para 136; 
Factory at Chorzow (Merits), Judgment No. 7, 1926, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 7 of 25 May 
1926 at 34; Chorzow (Merits) Decision of 13 September 1928 at 46-48.  
151  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Articles 28-41 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017).  
152  Article 60(2) (b) of the Vienna Convention. A party affected by material breach can  
39 
 
host states to honour their obligations in terms thereof.153 In this regard, it is noteworthy 
that recent arbitral awards in the amounts of USD 39 Billion,154 USD 8 Billion,155 USD 1.8 
Billion,156 and USD 1.7 Billion,157 were based on breach of investment treaty.158 In SADC, 
                                                                                                                                            
suspend its obligations in terms of A treaty, See Fitzmaurice and Elias Contemporary 
Issues In The Law of Treaties at 164-171. 
153  For a breakdown of ISDS cases per BIT or TIP, see  
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByApplicableIia (Date of use: 1  
April 2018). 
154  Hulley Enterprises Limited at para 1888. The awards were annulled by The Hague  
District Court under (Chamber for Commercial Affairs) under case number 
C/09/477160/HA ZA 15-1, Judgment of 20 April 2016 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7255.pdf (Date of use: 10 
April 2018). This decision is pending appeal before The Hague Court of Appeal under 
case number Case No. 200.197.079/01 (see Russia’s defence at 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw9633.pdf) (Date of use: 
10 June 2018). The basis of the annulment was that there was no valid consent to 
arbitration by the Russian Federation (Decision of the District Court at para 5.95 - 5.97). 
155  Veteran Petroleum Limited at para 1888. Russia was successful in setting aside the  
award, what was said in the preceding note applies in this case as well. 
156  Yukos Universal Limited at para 1888. Russia was successful in setting aside the  
award, what was said in the preceding note applies in this case as well. 
157  Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company  
v The Republic of Ecuador (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11) Award at para 876. 
158 See also the following cases where the host states were held liable for breach of treaty:  
ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v The Republic of Hungary 
(ICSID Case No. ARB03/16) Award of the Tribunal of 2 October 2006 at para 483, 499; 
Alpha Projektholding GMBH v Ukraine (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16) Award of 8 
November 2010 at para 413-416; American Manufacturing & Trading Inc v Republic of 
Zaire (ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1) Award of 10 February 1997 at para 6.01-6.24; ATA 
Construction, Industrial and Trading Company v The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/08/02) Award of 18 May 2010 para 121, 129; Bernhard Hendricus 
Funekkotter v Republic of Zimbabwe (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6) Award of 24 July 2008 
at 32 para 107; Biwater Gauff at para 814(b); Cargill Incorporated v United Mexican 
States (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/05/02) Award of 18 September 2009 at para 554 – 
561; CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No, 
ARB/01/8) Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of 17 July 2003 at para 281, 303; 
Desert Line Projects at para 193-194, para 3 of the tribunal’s order; Duke Energy at para 
325, 361, 364, para 2 of tribunal’s order; Eureko at para 234, 243, 260, 262; Gemplus at 
para 7-76, 8-25- 8-27; Ioannis Kardassopoulos at para 541-452; Metalclad Corporation v 
United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1) Award of 30 August 2000 at 
para 112; Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A v Arab Republic of Egypt 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6) Award of 12 April 2002 at para 144; OKO Pankki OYJ, VTB 
Bank (Deutschland) AG and Sampo Bank Plc. v The Republic of Estonia (ICSID Case 
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the highest known arbitral award of USD 194 Million based on breach of treaty was 
made in Bernhard Von Pezold.159  
 
2.2.4 Breach of contract  
A state may enter into an investment agreement with an investor160 when the latter 
envisages making an investment.161 A contract and rights relating thereto are assets that 
can be expropriated.162 Investment contracts are binding on a state because of the 
maxim pacta sunt servanda.163 Like BITs, TIPs and investment laws of host states, 
investment contracts may provide for an investor to refer an investor-state dispute to 
ISDS. As a result, 16.8 percent of ICSID arbitration cases opened up to 30 June 2017 
                                                                                                                                            
No. ARB04/6) Award of 19 November 2009 at para 283, 376; Tecnicas Medioambienta 
Tecmed S.A v The United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2) of 29 May 
2003 (Tecmed) at para 201; Wena Hotels Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/98/4) Award of 8 December 2000 at para 131 and 134. 
159  Bernhard Von Pezold at para 521. The annulment of this award was pending at the time  
of writing. 
160  Or a state may contract with an investment (i.e. the entity that will hold an investment),  
depending on the circumstances and provisions of the applicable regulatory instrument.  
161  For a discussion of international investment contracts see Dumberry P “International  
Investment Contracts” in Gazzini T and Brabandere E (eds) International Investment 
Law: The Sources of Rights and Obligations (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Leiden 2012) at 
215-243; Von Walter A “Investor-State Contracts in the Context of International 
Investment Law” in Bungenberg M et al (eds) International Investment Law: A Handbook 
at 80-92; Salacuse The Law of Investment Treaties at 60-62. 
162  See for example Azurix at 112 para 314; Biwater Gauff at para 453; Emmis International  
Holding, B.V and Emmis Radio Operating, B.V and Mem Maygar Electronic Media 
Kereskedelmi Es Szolgaltato KFT. V Hungary (ICSID Case No. ARB/12/2) Award of 16 
April 2014 at para 163, 221; White Industries Australia v The Republic of India (Ad hoc 
UNCITRAL Tribunal) Final Award of 30 November 2011; Southern Pacific Properties 
(Middle East) Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt  (ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3) Award 20 
May 1992 para 164-165; Vivendi award of 2010 at para 7.5.4, 7.5.5 – 7.5.34; Schreuer C 
(2005) “The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other Investment Protection 
Treaties” at para 65 http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/csunpublpaper_3.pdf (Date of use: 
20 October 2017). 
163  Desert Line Projects at para157. This principle is in line with Article 26 of the Vienna  
Convention on the Law of Treaties.  
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were based on consent to ISDS provided in investment contracts.164 It is also noteworthy 
that the arbitral award of USD 935 million made in Al-Khafira v Libya was based on 
breach of contract.165  
 
However, unlike with breach of treaty, breach of an investment contract by a state does 
not automatically amount to an internationally wrongful act.166 Something additional is 
required to elevate breach of contract to the international plane, as explained below. An 
investor faced with a breach of a contract by a host state must first exhaust local 
remedies, if any are provided for in a contract or the internal law of the host state.167 
Only if the alleged breach of contract is followed by the denial of justice in the host state, 
if the breach of contract amounts to breach of a treaty, if the contract is protected by an 
umbrella clause in a treaty,168 or if a state acted in its jus imperii capacity when it 
                                                
164  International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes “The ICSID Caseload  
Statistics”, Issue 2017-2 at 10  
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-
2%20(English)%20Final.pdf (Date of use: 10 March 2018). 
165     Mohamed Abdulmohsen Al-Kharafi and Sons Co. Kuwaiti Company v The Government of  
The State of Libya and Others (PCA Case No. 2011-09) Award on Merits of 2 March 
2015. An earlier decision of 2004 that was also based on breach of contract by a state is 
Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v Slovak Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4) 
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of 24 May 1999 (CSOB). 
166  Abaclat and Others (Case Formerly known as Giovanna A Beccara And Others) v The  
Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/05) Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility of 4 August 2011 para 316; Biwater Gauff at para 457; SGS Société 
Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6) 
Decision on Jurisdiction of 29 January 2004 at para 161; United Nations (International 
Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 41 para 6 http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ 
(Date of use: 02 October 2017). 
167  The decision in Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3)  
Decision on Annulment of 10 August 2010 at para 96 entails that a dispute regarding 
breach of contract must first be resolved according to the internal law of the host state. 
168  An umbrella clause is a treaty provision in terms whereof state parties agree to  
honour their contractual obligations towards investors, default of which renders breach of 
a contract to be breach of treaty. For a definition, history and application of an umbrella 
clause see Sinclair AC “The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the International Law of 
Investment Protection” in Reinisch (ed) Classics in International Investment Law Vol I 
42 
 
committed the breach,169 will the breach create an international responsibility for a host 
state.170 In such an event, ICSID or other international arbitration, or other remedies 
such as diplomatic protection can in qualifying instances be brought.171  
 
The same facts that found an alleged breach of contract may also found a claim for 
breach of a treaty.172 Whether breach of a contract also amounts to a breach of treaty or 
not depends on the facts of each case. As the tribunal in Vivendi v Argentine held, a 
state may commit a breach of the treaty without breaching a contract, and vice versa.173 
The fact that an alleged breach is the result of a state having exercised a contractual 
right or remedy does not exclude the fact that such conduct could be a breach of a treaty 
or an expropriation.174 Furthermore, where as a result of an alleged breach an investor 
                                                                                                                                            
(Edward Elgar Cheltenham 2014) at 619-642; Salacuse The Law of Investment Treaties 
at 271-283. The first umbrella clause was contained in the Germany-Pakistan BIT of 
1959 (Sinclair “The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the International Law of Investment 
Protection” at 641). The first tribunal to consider an umbrella clause was Fedax N.V. v 
The Republic of Venezuela (ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3) Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction of 11 July 1997.  
169  Schreuer “The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other Investment Protection  
Treaties” at 24 para 65-77 http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/csunpublpaper_3.pdf  
(Date of use: 20 October 2017). 
170  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA Commentary at 41(6)  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017). For examples of denial  
of justice see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Fair and Equitable 
Treatment”, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II (United 
Nations New York and Geneva 2012) at 80-81 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017). In 
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has a right of recourse against a host state in terms of both a treaty and a contract, it 
may pursue its rights in terms of the treaty, in addition to those in terms of a contract.175 
Even when an investor has elected to pursue its remedies in terms of a contract, it still 
has the right to pursue those in terms of the treaty, and can abandon the former.176  
Where it is alleged that breach of a contract is also a breach of a treaty, it must be 
shown that the host state concerned acted as a sovereign (‘puissance publique’), and 
not as an ordinary party to a commercial transaction, when it committed the alleged 
act.177 
 
Breach of contract entails that a host state must pay compensation for the 
consequences thereof.178 Breach refers to breach in the general sense of the failure, 
neglect or refusal by a host state to adhere to an agreement.  
 
Whether or not a contract was breached is assessed in terms of the internal law of the 
relevant host state, not international law.179 Thus where a contract was breached, and 
the breach amounts to a breach of an international obligation as discussed above, then 
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the consequences of the breach will follow the rule of international law to the effect that 
reparation is payable.180  
 
2.2.5 Enactment of, and non-compliance with internal laws  
Legislation is typically made by a legislature, or by decree of a minister, president or 
another member of the executive of a state.181 In this regard it must be noted that both 
the legislature and the executive are organs of state, and, therefore in terms of Article 4 
of ARSIWA a state is responsible for the acts of these organs. As a result, almost ten 
percent of all ICSID arbitrations were opened on the basis of the consent provided in the 
laws of host states.182  
 
Whether the mere passing of legislation will amount to a breach of an international 
obligation or not, depends on the facts of a case. Thus, the mere passing of legislation 
without more, may not amount to a breach, while in some cases it may amount to a 
breach.183 A few examples will suffice here. In Santa Elena v Costa Rica the tribunal 
found that Costa Rica incurred international responsibility by enacting a decree that 
expropriated the claimant’s property without agreeable compensation.184  In Metalclad 
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the tribunal found that a decree that declared a Metalclad waste disposal site to be an 
ecological site amounted to expropriation.185 Recently, the tribunal in Rusoro Mining 
Limited v The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela found that Venezuela had breached the 
relevant BIT by enacting a law that restricted the sale of gold produced by Rusoro 
Mining.186 In Mike Campbell, the SADC Tribunal found that the constitutional amendment 
by Zimbabwe that denied victims of farm expropriations compensation and access to 
local courts was a wrongful violation of Article 4 of the SADC Treaty.187 
 
A state can also incur international responsibility by failing to adhere to its laws. For 
example, in Duke Energy v Ecuador the tribunal held that Ecuador had failed to comply 
with its own laws as well as agreements between the parties, and by so doing it 
breached an umbrella clause contained in the relevant BIT in that matter.188 
 
2.2.6 Conclusion 
It was shown above that the rules of state responsibility lay the foundation on which host 
states may be exposed to claims by investors. The result of the application of these rules 
is the high number of ISDS cases that are opened every year by investors, which at the 
time of writing were 855.189 It is therefore no surprise that among others, SADC’s repeal 
of the 2006 Annex 1 is meant to mitigate the international responsibility of Member 
States by reducing the exposure of host states to ISDS claims. How the 2016 Annex 1 
achieves this is discussed in Chapter 3. 
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However, the 2006 or 2016 Annex 1 are not the only bases on which investors can sue 
SADC Member States. BITs, TIPs, investment contracts and the laws of host states also 
provide access to ISDS. Hence in practice, major investors negotiate investment 
contracts that will ensure that they obtain the maximum level of security the can, while 
capital-exporting states negotiate BITs and TIPs so as to secure maximum protection for 
their national abroad. Without the rules of state responsibility discussed above, investors 
would have little protection in international law, and similarly, states would be less 
exposed to international responsibility.  
 
2.3 EXPROPRIATION 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Expropriation is the mandatory taking of property by a state, ostensibly in the public 
interest.190 Public international law does not create property rights that are capable of 
being expropriated.191 Therefore, property rights must first exist in terms of the internal 
law of a host state, before an inquiry can be made in terms of international law as to 
whether the property was expropriated or not.192 A person who alleges that its property 
was expropriated must show that the expropriated property vests in it, whether directly or 
indirectly.193 In addition to the expropriation of individual assets, a state may take 
property in two other ways, namely, nationalisation or confiscation.194 Nationalisation is 
the expropriation of an entire sector or an industry of an economy.195 Confiscation is the 
                                                
190  Booysen Principles of International Trade Law as a Monistic System at 72. 
191  Booysen Principles of International Trade Law as a Monistic System at 72; Emmis at  
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taking of property by a ruler or head of state for his personal gain, although this may 
include the benefit of persons close to the ruler, such as senior military personnel.196   
 
Expropriation may be direct or indirect. Direct expropriation refers to the mandatory 
taking or seizure of property by a state, with the resultant loss of possession and title to 
the property.197 This is the original form of expropriation.198 Unlike direct expropriation, 
indirect expropriation is complex, as it is not always clear if indeed it has taken place. 
Indirect expropriation is discussed below. 
 
2.3.2 Forms of indirect expropriation 
When property is indirectly expropriated, it nominally remains in the hands of its owner, 
but the use, economic value or benefit thereof gets diminished or neutralised by virtue of 
the actions of a host state.199 Despite the manner in which an indirect expropriation takes 
place, the effect of an indirect expropriation must be the same as that of a direct 
expropriation.200 It is not always easy to determine whether an indirect expropriation took 
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place or not.201 According to UNCTAD, the following must occur to confirm that an 
indirect expropriation took place:202 
 
(a) The expropriatory measure must have resulted in a total or near total 
destruction of the investment’s economic value;203  
(b) An investor must have been deprived of the control over the investment 
e.g. by being deprived of management control, detention or deportation 
etc.;204 and 
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(c) The effect of the expropriatory action or measure must be permanent.205 
 
Indirect expropriation comes in various forms, such as creeping expropriation, breach of 
contract, and regulatory takings. These will now be briefly discussed.  
 
Creeping expropriation has been described as: 
 
…the incremental encroachment on one or more of the ownership rights of a 
foreign investor that eventually destroys (or nearly destroys) the value of his or 
her investment or deprives him or her of control over the investment.206 
(Emphasis added). 
 
As can be seen from the above definition, creeping expropriation is premised on the idea 
that property ownership consists of a bundle of rights relating to the use and enjoyment 
of property, and that the expropriatory act(s) of a state interfere with these rights.207 The 
fact that creeping expropriation takes place over a period of time, and not by means of a 
single act, makes it potentially difficult to identify the point in time or in the chain of 
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events at which expropriation took place.208 This makes creeping expropriation difficult to 
prove in practice. 
 
Creeping expropriation has been codified into Article 15 of ARSIWA. In terms of this 
Article, a series of incidents can cumulatively amount to creeping expropriation.209 Hence 
the tribunal in Biwater Gauff found that a series of actions taken by Tanzania amounted 
to expropriation.210 These actions were: the repudiation of the lease, the occupation of 
City Water’s facilities, usurpation of management control and deportation of City Water’s 
senior managers. The tribunal in Walter Bau v Thailand also affirmed previous tribunal 
decisions on creeping expropriation, as well as the application of Article 15 of ARSIWA 
to a series of actions.211  
 
Where it is alleged that a host state has committed expropriation by breach of a contract, 
it must be borne in mind that not every breach of contract by a state amounts to 
expropriation.212 For breach of contract create international responsibility, a state must 
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have acted as a sovereign in committing the breach.213 Thus a mere refusal to pay a 
debt due in terms of a contract does not amount to expropriation.214 
 
Non-performance, including the late payment or failure to pay a debt under a contract, 
does not amount to expropriation.215 Where an investment has as its basis a contract 
acquired after a successful tender process, and the tender and subsequent contract are 
declared invalid by a court after due process, such invalidation is not expropriation. Thus 
the tribunal in Frank Charles Araf found that the setting aside of a tender, as well as the  
the subsequent tender agreement between the state and the claimant by the courts, was 
not an expropriation of the claimant’s rights by the courts.216 
 
A state’s regulatory measures can amount to indirect expropriation, as discussed below. 
A state by virtue of its sovereign powers has the right to regulate all activities in its 
territory.217 These regulatory powers are also known as public order or police powers.218 
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Regulatory acts of general application are presumed to be valid because states are 
presumed to act in good faith until the contrary is proved.219 The onus is on a state to 
show that a measure is in the public interest, is non-discriminatory, and was 
implemented according to due process.220  
 
Thus the tribunal in Ioannis Kardassopoulos found that the expropriation in that matter 
was not a result of the state’s bona fide use of its police powers.221 In this case, the state 
of Georgia had in bad faith passed a decree that extinguished the exclusive rights that 
and investor, GTI held in an oil pipeline and related facilities.222 No compensation was 
paid for the expropriation. The expropriated rights were then given to a Georgian state 
entity, which in turn licensed them to another private entity in return for a fee.223 The 
tribunal found that the issuing of the decrees was not bona fide regulation, but was a 
means to expropriate the claimant’s rights.  
 
In order to determine whether a regulatory act is expropriatory and, therefore, 
compensable, a distinction must first be drawn between regulatory acts which are 
expropriatory, in the sense that compensation must be paid for the acts, and those which 
are not.224  
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The criteria used to assess whether a regulatory measure is expropriatory or not are: 
lack of public purpose, discrimination, lack of due process, lack of proportionality, lack of 
fair and equitable treatment, abuse of rights and direct benefit to a state.225 These 
criteria must be taken together in making an assessment, considering the context in 
which the measure is adopted and applied.226  
 
The tribunal in Philip Morris Brand SARL undertook a succinct review of the authorities 
on the issue, and affirmed that in order for a state’s exercise of police powers not to 
amount to indirect expropriation, the measure must be bona fide, non-discriminatory and 
proportionate.227 It held that in order to amount to indirect expropriation, a state’s 
regulatory measure must amount to a substantial deprivation of its value, use or 
enjoyment.228 The tribunal added that where sufficient value remains in an investment, 
there is no indirect expropriation.229 The tribunal concluded that the general rule with 
regard to police powers is that a state is not liable for any loss suffered by a person due 
to the bona fide and non-discriminatory use of such power.230 
 
Scholars have proposed two methods that can be used to differentiate between 
expropriatory and non-expropriatory regulatory measures.231 The first method considers 
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the intention of a state in passing the regulatory measure. Measures in this category 
include those within the scope of police powers for which a state cannot be held 
accountable, despite the negative economic consequences of the measure. An example 
thereof is legislation that affects property by regulating aspects such as the planning, 
safety, health and environmental aspects of the property.232  
 
The second method considers the effects of the regulatory measure (effects doctrine). 
For example, in Metalclad, the Mexican federal government had authorised Metalclad to 
establish a landfill in the municipality of Guadalcazar, but thereafter, the municipality 
refused to issue a permit for the construction of the landfill. The tribunal found that the 
actions of the municipality had the effect of expropriating Metalclad’s right to operate the 
landfill.233 Schreuer and other scholars conclude that the majority of tribunal decisions 
analysed indicate that the effects doctrine is the dominant approach.234 This position was 
recently affirmed in Philip Morris Brand SARL.235 It is submitted that this is correct and in 
line with the rule that an indirect expropriation must have the same effect as a direct 
expropriation.236  
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2.3.3 Requirements for expropriation 
Expropriation is not in itself illegal because, under international law, states have a 
sovereign right to expropriate property, subject to meeting the requirements of public 
purpose, non-discrimination, compliance with due process and payment of 
compensation.237 Under international law, all four requirements for expropriation must be 
present, or else the expropriation will be unlawful. For example, the tribunals in Ioannis 
Kardossopoulos238 and Bernhard Von Pezold239 held that there was no need to consider 
the other requirements for expropriation, since the requirement for the payment of 
compensation was not met. The four requirements for expropriation will now be briefly 
discussed. 
 
Firstly, an expropriation must have a public interest purpose or objective.240 The relevant 
time for the determination of whether the public purpose requirement was met or not is 
the time of the expropriation.241 When an expropriation was not for a public purpose, but 
it subsequently achieved a public purpose, this requirement will not have been met.242 It 
is immaterial whether the public purpose was subsequently met or not after the 
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ADC at 78 para 429-433.  
241  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 31  
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017). 
242  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 31  
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017). 
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expropriation was effected, provided there was originally a bona fide public purpose.243 It 
is generally left to a state’s discretion to decide whether an expropriation is for a public 
purpose or not. Once a state has decided that an expropriation is for a public purpose, 
its decision is respected, but there are cases where tribunals have held that this 
requirement was not met.244  
 
In Bernhard Von Pezold the tribunal held that an expropriation without compensation in 
order to “right the wrongs” of a colonial past does not serve a public purpose.245 In Valeri 
Belokon v Kyrgyzstan, the tribunal found that the placement of the claimant’s bank under 
administration, seizure of its assets and the placement of the bank under indefinite 
sequestration for four years did not serve a public purpose other than the narrow political 
interests of the government.246 In this case, the seizure was motivated by the bank’s 
suspected connections to a previous regime. 
 
The public purpose requirement is found in Annex 1,247 ASEAN Comprehensive 
Investment Agreement (ACIA),248 Investment Agreement for the COMESA investment 
                                                
243  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 31  
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017). 
244  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 32-34  
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf  
(Date of use: 15 October 2017). 
245  Bernhard Von Pezold at para 502. 
246  Valeri Belokon v The Kyrgyz Republic (Ad hoc UNCITRAL Tribunal) Award of 24 October  
2014 at para 215. 
247  Article 5 2006 Annex 1; Article 5 2016 Annex 1. 
248  Article 14(1) of the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (date of signature 26  
02 2009, in force 24 02 2012)  
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3095 (Date of use: 15 
October 2017). 
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Area (IACCIA),249 Energy Charter Treaty (ECT),250 and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).251  
 
The second requirement is that an expropriation must not be discriminatory. This 
requirement may be best presented by a quotation from ADC where the tribunal said 
that: 
 
…in order for a discrimination to exist, particularly in an expropriation scenario, 
there must be different treatments to different parties. However and 
unfortunately, the Respondent misses the point because the comparison of 
different treatments is made here between that received by the Respondent-
appointed operator and that received by foreign investors as a whole.252 
 
International treaties such as the United Nations Charter,253 the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR),254 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
                                                
249  Article 20(1) of the Investment Agreement for the COMESA investment Area (date of  
signature 23 May 2007, not in force) 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/treaty/3225 (Date of use: 15 October 2017). 
250  Article 13(1)(a) Energy Charter Treaty 2080 UNTS 95 34 ILM 360 (1995) (date of  
signature 17 December 1994, in force 16 April 1998) 
http://www.ena.lt/pdfai/Treaty.pdf#search=%22energy%20charter%20treaty%22 (Date of 
use: 21 November 2017). 
251  Article 1110(1)(a) of the North American Free Trade Agreement 32 ILM 289, 605 (1993)  
(date of adoption 17 December 1992, in force 01 January 1994) http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?DetailID=78 (Date of use: 31 October 2017). 
252  ADC Affiliate at para 442. 
253  Charter of the United Nations (date of signature 26 June 1945, in force 24 October 1945)  
1 UNTS XVI, Article 1(3) https://treaties.un.org/doc/publications/ctc/uncharter.pdf (Date of 
use: 31 October 2017). 
254  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III) (adopted 10  
December 1948), Article 2 http://www.un.org/en/udhrbook/pdf/udhr_booklet_en_web.pdf 
(Date of use: 21 October 2017). 
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(ICCPR),255 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR),256 the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter),257 the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),258 and the SADC Treaty259 prohibit 
discrimination in various forms. Where the discrimination is on racial grounds, the 
discrimination will be unlawful because it violates the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, among other conventions.260  
 
A generalised way to state the requirement against discrimination is that an 
expropriation is discriminatory if the property in question was expropriated on the 
grounds that the owner of the expropriated property had certain characteristics (e.g. 
nationality, race, gender, religion etc.) on the basis of which they were targeted by the 
host state. An important criterion here is that the person must have been treated 
differently compared to others, based on some discriminatory criteria. Recently, the 
                                                
255  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR  
Supp (No 16), UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171 (date of signature 16 December 
1966, in force 23 March 1976) 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-
english.pdf (Date of use: 31 October 2017). 
256  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI),  
21 UN GAOR Supp (No 16) at 49, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3 (date of signature 
19 December 1966, in force 3 January 1976) 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cescr.pdf (Date of use: 31 October 
2017). 
257  Article 2 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (date of signature 01 June  
1981, in force 21 October 1986) https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-human-and-
peoples-rights (Date of use: 15 October 2017). 
258  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,  
as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5, Article 14 (date of 
signature 4 November 1950, in force 3 September 1953) 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (Date of use: 21 October 2017). 
259  Article 6(2) SADC Treaty. 
260  Mike Campbell at 47. The convention is the International Convention on the Elimination  
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965, UNTS vol. 660, p. 195 (date of 
signature 21 December 1965, in force 4 January 
1969) http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3940.html (Date of use: 21 October 2017). 
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tribunal in Bernhard Von Pezold found that the claimants’ investments were targeted for 
expropriation because of their skin colour.261  
 
There are conflicting views as to whether the targeting of persons on the grounds that 
they are foreigners per se amounts to discrimination.262 One view is that there will be 
discrimination if foreigners are targeted on the basis of their nationality, not just because 
they are foreigners. 263 However, a contrary view was adopted in Eureko where the 
tribunal found that the measures adopted by Poland in that matter were intended to 
prevent a consortium led by a foreigner from having control of the company in 
question.264 It submitted that the correct view is that discrimination against foreigners of 
any nationality is unlawful because discrimination against foreigners is discrimination 
nonetheless. UNCTAD describes non-discrimination against foreign investors as follows: 
 
The non-discrimination requirement implies the diffusiveness of the impact on 
different actors and constituencies and serves to prevent singling out or targeting 
a foreign investor. It primarily concerns nationality-based differentiation but it also 
seems to cover racial, religious, ethnic and other types of discrimination 
prohibited under customary international law. It appears that a non-discriminatory 
regulation that is enforced in a discriminatory manner will also fit the description. 
Where a formally non-discriminatory regulation is designed in a way that it only 
                                                
261  Bernhard Von Pezold at para 501. 
262  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation”  
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf at 34  
(Date of use: 15 October 2017).  
263  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation”  
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf at 34  
(Date of use: 15 October 2017). 
264  Eureko Partial Award of August 2005 at para 242.  
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covers certain foreign investor or investors, other indicators need to be examined 
to decide whether the measure is bona fide.265  
 
The requirement of non-discrimination is found in the ACIA,266 ACCIA,267 Annex 1,268 
ECT,269 NAFTA,270 and the SADC Treaty.271 
 
Thirdly, an expropriation must be in terms of due process.272 The tribunal in ADC Affiliate 
held that in the context of an expropriation, due process demands an actual and 
substantive legal procedure for a foreign investor to raise its claims against the depriving 
actions already taken or about to be taken against it.273 Due process in relation to 
expropriation entails three things: the expropriation must be in terms of internal 
procedures provided for that purpose e.g. in terms of a law providing for such 
expropriation; a person affected by the expropriation must have access to proceedings 
for review of the expropriation before an impartial forum, either in terms of its legality, 
compensation or other aspects, and the expropriation must not be arbitrary. 274 
 
                                                
265  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation”  
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf at 96  
(Date of use: 15 October 2017); Mike Campbell at 41-54. 
266  Article 14(1) ACIA. 
267  Article 20(1) IACCIA. 
268  Article 5 2006 Annex 1; Article 5 2016 Annex 1. 
269  Article 13(1)(b) ECT. 
270  Article 1110(1)(b) NAFTA. 
271  Article 6(2) SADC Treaty. 
272  See also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation”  
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf at 36-40 (Date of use: 15 October 
2017). 
273  ADC Affiliate at para 435. 
274  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation”  
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf at 36  
(Date of use: 15 October 2017); ADC Affiliate at para 434, 440; Ioannis and Fuchs at 
para 408. 
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The tribunal in Rusoro held that a party who does not utilise due process provisions that 
are provided by the internal law of a state cannot later complain that it was denied due 
process.275 While it is submitted that this is correct, it must be noted that due process in 
the form of local remedies need not be followed if doing so would be futile,276 a 
respondent state systematically ignores the judgments of its courts,277 there are no 
effective remedies,278 the respondent state has waived the requirement,279 there is 
undue delay caused by the respondent state,280 or the injured person is manifestly 
precluded from exhausting local remedies.281  
 
The due process requirement is found in Annex 1,282 ACIA,283 IACCIA,284 ECT,285 and 
NAFTA.286  
                                                
275  ADC Affiliate at 386-393. 
276  See Ngobeni L “Barcelona Traction and Nottebohm Revisited: Nationality as a  
Requirement for Diplomatic Protection of Shareholders in South African Law” 2012 (37) 
South African Yearbook of International Law 169-186 at note 23. 
277  Ngobeni 2012 (37) South African Yearbook of International Law 169 at note 23. 
278  See Article 15(a) United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on  
Diplomatic Protection”, in Report of the International Law Commission Fifty-eighth 
session (1 May-9 June and 3 July-11 August 2006) at p.13 para 34, General Assembly 
Official Records Sixty-first Session Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10) 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 
September 2017); Mike Campbell at 21. 
279  United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic  
Protection” Article 15(e) http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf 
(Date of use: 04 September 2017). 
280  United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic  
Protection” Article 15(b) http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf 
(Date of use: 04 September 2017). 
281  United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection”  
Article 15(d) 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 
September 2017). 
282  Article 5 2006 Annex 1; Article 5 2016 Annex 1.  
283  Article 14(1) 2006 Annex 1. 
284  Article 20(1) IACCIA. 
285  Article 13(1)(c) ECT. 
286  Article 1110(1)(c) NAFTA. 
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Finally, compensation must be paid for an expropriation.287 There is no universally 
agreed standard for compensation for expropriation in international law. In practice, 
BITs, TIPs, investment contracts and laws provide the quantum of compensation that will 
be payable in the event of expropriation.288 In international law, compensation can be 
either for the capital value of property, for loss of profits there from, or both.289 The 
determination of compensation involves choosing a compensation standard and a 
method to be used to quantify the compensation.290 On the latter, Chinen describes the 
methods used to assess the loss of capital value as follows: 
 
The loss to capital is often assessed by its fair market value and the fair market 
value itself is assessed according to the nature of the asset involved. The task is 
relatively straightforward if there are comparable assets on the open market; it 
becomes more complicated if a business is privately held. With regard to 
businesses, the attempt is to value the company's assets and to allow for good 
will and profitability as appropriate. Another method for evaluating capital loss is 
net book value, the difference between the company's assets and liabilities as 
                                                
287  See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at  
40-52 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf  
(Date of use: 15 October 2017). 
288  In SADC, Article 5 2006 Annex 1, Article 5 2016 Annex 1, as well as the laws of Member  
States, provide for the quantum of compensation (see Chapter 4 below). 
289  United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 103-105  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017); Chinen M “The 
Standard of Compensation for Takings” 2016 (25) (2) Minnesota Journal of International 
Law 335-380 at 372, 378-379. 
290  For a discussion of the valuation of compensation see Chinen 2016 (25) (2)  
Minnesota Journal of International Law 335-380 at 337, 357; Marboe I “Compensation 
and Damages in International Law: The Limits of ’Fair Market Value’” in Reinisch (ed) 
Classics in International Investment Law Volume II at 24-60; Simmons JB “Valuation in 
Investor-State Arbitration: Toward A More Exact Science” 2012 (30) Berkeley Journal of 
International Law 196-250. 
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they appear on its books. If the business is not a going concern, sometimes 
"dissolution" value is used. This is the value of the assets if the company is 
broken up and the assets are sold separately.291 
 
On the other hand, lost profits are usually paid if a business is not destroyed, while both 
loss of capital and profits are payable if an expropriated business was impaired for a 
significant period, and then subsequently destroyed.292 
 
Three compensation standards have been selected for discussion due to their 
prevalence in SADC Member States’ investment laws. These are full compensation, 
appropriate compensation, and just and equitable compensation. These standards 
reflect a clash of interests between investors and host states, since investors would 
typically ask for full compensation in all situations, while host states would prefer to pay 
less compensation.293 The standards will now be briefly considered. 
  
The prompt, adequate and effective compensation standard was introduced by former 
United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull in 1938, hence it is known as the Hull 
formula or the “full compensation standard”.294 This standard was inherited from the 
early American treaties.295 It is associated with Article 34 of ARSIWA and the Factory at 
                                                
291  Chinen 2016 (25) (2) Minnesota Journal of International Law 335 at 372. 
292  Chinen 2016 (25) (2) Minnesota Journal of International Law 335 at 373. 
293  Chinen 2016 (25) (2) Minnesota Journal of International Law 335 at 369. 
294  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 40 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf  
(Date of use: 15 October 2017). 
295  For example, between 1946 and 1966, the USA entered into at least 20 FCN treaties.  
See Vandenvelde 2005 (12) University of California Davis Journal of International Law 
and Policy 157 at 162,172. 
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Chorzow case.296 In terms of this standard, “prompt” means that the compensation must 
be paid immediately or provision for the payment must have been made when the 
expropriation takes place. In short, there must not be a delay in making the payment.297 
“Adequate” means that an investor is paid the full value of his investment,298 or that the 
compensation has a “reasonable relationship with the market value of the property.”299 
“Effective compensation” means that the payment must be in useful currency, typically in 
a form that is capable of being expatriated.300 For example, in Rusoro, the tribunal 
agreed with the claimant that the compensation which Venezuela was ordered to pay, be 
declared to be net of taxes in order to prevent Venezuela from withholding the 
compensation on the basis that tax was due on it, thus defeating the effective nature 
thereof.301 Dugard is of the view that this standard is no longer accepted by international 
law.302  
 
                                                
296  Chinen 2016 (25) (2) Minnesota Journal of International Law 335 at 338. 
297  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 41 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf  
(Date of use: 15 October 2017); Dolzer and Schreuer Principles of International 
Investment Law at 101. 
298  Comeaux PE and Kinsella NS Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law  
(Oceana Publications New York 1997) at 82.  
299  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 40  
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf    
(Date of use: 15 October 2017); Dolzer and Schreuer Principles of  
International Investment Law at 296. 
300  Comeaux and Kinsella Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law at 82;  
Dolzer and Schreuer Principles of International Investment Law at 101. 
301  Rusoro at para 855. 
302  Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective at 305. Sornarajah The  
International law on foreign investment at 435-488. However, Sornarajah says that full 
compensation is payable for illegal expropriations i.e. those in violation of a treaty (at 
482), and when a small business is expropriated (at 482). He says that only partial 
compensation need be paid in the event of large scale nationalizations (at 484), as well 
as “where past practices of the foreign investor were harmful to the host state”, or “where 
there had been inordinate profits made from the investment” (at 485). 
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Furthermore, Vandenvelde says that the United States of America deliberately flooded 
the BITs landscape with BITs that contain the full compensation standard, in order to 
create the impression that the standard was a norm of customary international law.303 
Chinen observes that this standard may prevent states from engaging in economic 
reform.304 
 
In SADC, eight Member States provide for full compensation in their investment laws.305 
The 2006 Annex 1 also provides for full compensation, while the 2016 Annex 1 provides 
for a fair and adequate compensation.306 The ECT also provides for “prompt, adequate 
and effective” compensation.307 NAFTA provides for “fair market value”, which is close to 
full compensation.308  
 
Article 4 of the General Assembly Resolution 1803 of 1962 introduced the appropriate 
compensation standard.309 This standard was then incorporated in Article 2(c) of the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. Appropriate compensation, unlike full 
                                                
303  Vandenvelde 2005 (12) University of California Davis Journal of International Law and  
Policy 157 at 171. 
304  Chinen 2016 (25) (2) Minnesota Journal of International Law 335 at 339. 
305  These are Botswana (“adequate and prompt”), Lesotho (“full’), Mauritius (“adequate),  
Seychelles (“full”), Eswatini (“adequate and fair”), Tanzania (“prompt, fair and adequate”), 
Zambia (“market value”) and Zimbabwe (“fair and adequate”). Of the remaining states, 5 
apply the just or fair standard, namely Angola (“just”), DRC (“fair and equitable”), 
Mozambique (“fair”), Namibia (“prompt and just”), and South Africa (just and equitable”). 
Only Malawi uses the “appropriate” compensation standard. For the purpose of this 
classification, investment codes include the constitution of a state to the extent that it 
deals with expropriation.  
306  Article 5 2006 Annex 1; Article 5 2016 Annex 1. 
307  Article 13(1)(d) ECT. 
308  Article 1110(2) NAFTA. 
309  United Nations (General Assembly) “Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural”  
Resources 1803(XVII) of 1962 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/resources.pdf (Date of use: 20 
November 2016); Chinen 2016 (25) (2) Minnesota Journal of International Law 335 at 
339. 
66 
 
compensation, is not prescriptive.310 Instead, it allows for flexibility in deciding what 
would be fair compensation to an investor.311 It ranges in scope from payment of full 
compensation to no compensation at all.312 It appears that in the SADC region, the 
appropriate standard of compensation is applied in the investment code of Malawi.313 
 
The just and equitable standard of compensation provides room for the balancing of 
public and private interests.314 Therefore, the amount of compensation will depend on 
the outcome of the considerations taken into account in each particular case. This 
standard is used in the investment codes of five SADC member states, namely Angola, 
DRC, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa.315  
 
2.3.4 The consequences of an unlawful expropriation 
The distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriation necessitates that there must 
be different consequences for a state as to whether it expropriates property lawfully or 
not. Otherwise, the distinction does not serve a purpose.316 Therefore, if an expropriation 
                                                
310  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 41 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf  
(Date of use: 15 October 2017). 
311  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 41 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf  
(Date of use: 15 October 2017). 
312  Sornarajah The International law on foreign investment at 480; United Nations  
Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 41 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf  
(Date of use: 15 October 2017). 
313  See Table 1 in Chapter 4 below. 
314  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 41 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf  
(Date of use: 15 October 2017). 
315  Table 1 in Chapter 4 below. 
316  Chinen 2016 (25) (2) Minnesota Journal of International Law 335 at 367-370; Tidewater  
at para 132. 
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is lawful, compensation ought to be due by the state, while reparation, as anticipated by 
Article 31 of ARSIWA, ought to be due if an expropriation is illegal.317  
 
There are at least four main differences between the consequences of a lawful and an 
unlawful expropriation, as explained briefly below. 
 
Firstly, in an unlawful expropriation, the value of the property taken is assessed as at the 
date of the award, rather than the date of taking.318 Furthermore, in the event of an 
unlawful expropriation, a claimant has a choice of claiming damages as at the date of 
expropriation or date of the award.319  The shift in the date of valuation to the date of 
award entails that a state is liable for the increase in value during the intervening 
period.320 Secondly, a state is liable for consequential damages arising from an unlawful 
expropriation.321 Thirdly, in the event of an unlawful expropriation, a state’s first duty is to 
undertake restitution, an obligation that does not apply to a lawful expropriation.322 
Finally, an expropriating state must make restitution, or if this is not possible, it must pay 
reparation that must place an investor in the position it should be, but for the 
expropriation.323 If an investor has contributed to its loss, such will be taken into 
consideration in assessing the damages due to the investor.324 
                                                
317  Marboe I “Compensation and Damages in International Law: The Limits of ‘fair Market  
Value’” in Reinisch (ed) Classics in International Investment Law Volume II at 26-27.  
318  Dolzer and Schreuer Principles of International Investment Law at 296; ADC Affiliate at  
para 497; ConocoPhillips at para 343. 
319  Hulley Enterprises Limited at para 1763, 1769, 1826; Yukos Universal Limited at para  
1763, 1769; Veteran Petroleum Limited at para 1763, 1769.  
320  Dolzer and Schreuer Principles of International Investment Law at 296; Hulley  
Enterprises at para 1767. 
321  Dolzer and Schreuer Principles of International Investment Law at 295; Occidental at  
para 792-798. 
322  Hulley Enterprises Limited at para 1766; Yukos Universal Limited at para 1766; Veteran  
Petroleum Limited at para 1766. 
323  Factory at Chorzow (Merits), Judgment No. 13, 1928, at 47.  
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ISDS tribunals differ as to whether compensation in terms of a treaty standard of 
compensation or reparation in terms of Article 31 ARSIWA is payable for an unlawful 
expropriation. One group of decisions is of the view that compensation in terms of a 
treaty compensation standard is payable. This group includes Wena Hotels,325 Middle 
East Cement,326 and Occidental,327 and Guaracachi America Inc and Rurelec Plc. v 
Bolivia.328  Another group adopts the position that reparation, as contemplated by Article 
31 of ARSIWA, is payable in the event of an unlawful expropriation. This group includes 
Anatolie Stati and Others v Kazakhstan,329 ADC Affilliate,330 CME,331 Gemplus,332 Hulley 
Enterprises Limited,333 Metalclad,334 Veteran Petroleum Limited,335 Ioannis 
Kardassopoulos,336 ConocoPhillips,337 and Yukos Universal Limited.338 These decisions 
are based on the view that an unlawful expropriation is an internationally wrongful act, 
                                                                                                                                            
See also Dolzer and Schreuer Principles of International Investment Law at 100, 294-
295.  
324  MTD at para 242; Hulley Enterprises Limited at para 1637; Veteran Petroleum Limited  
at para 1637; Yukos Universal Limited at para 1637; Dolzer and Schreuer Principles of 
International Investment Law at 295. 
325  Wena Hotels at para 95, 118.  
326  Middle East Cement at para 144.  
327  Occidental at para 790-798. 
328  Guaracachi Inc and Rurelec Plc. v The Plurinational State of Bolivia (PCA case No. 2011- 
17) Award of 31 January 2014 at para 441-444.  
329  Anatolie Stati, Gabriel Stati, Ascom Group S.A, Terra Raf Trans Trading Ltd. v The  
Republic of Kazakhstan (SCC Arbitration V (116/2010)) Award of 19 December 2013 
  at para 1527. The award and its enforcement continue to be contested, see  
https://www.italaw.com/cases/2358 (Date of use: 11 June 2018). 
330  ADC Affiliate at para 476, 480-485.  
331  CME Partial Award at para 609, 615-618, Final award at 501. 
332  Gemplus at para 7-76, 7-77, 8-27, 12-51, 12-52, 12-53.  
333  Hulley Enterprises Limited at 1585, 1765-1769. 
334  Metalclad at para 107, 109, 118, 122.  
335  Veteran Petroleum Limited at para 1585; 1765-1769. 
336  Ioannis Kardassopoulos at para 387, 501-517. 
337  ConocoPhillips at para 342. 
338  Yukos Universal Limited at para 1585-1591, 1765-1769. 
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which attracts reparation as a consequence. It is submitted that the latter decisions are 
correct and reflect the position in international law as stated in Article 31 of ARSIWA. 
 
With regard to the non-payment of compensation, tribunals disagree as to whether an 
expropriation that lacks compensation only is legal or not. One view is to the effect that 
such an expropriation is legal, since all that remains is for compensation to be agreed 
between the parties or to be determined by a tribunal and thereafter be paid.339 Another 
view is to the effect that failure to pay compensation is a breach of customary 
international law,340 a factor that renders the expropriation illegal.341 The correct position 
ought to be that, in line with the view expressed above that all four requirements of an 
expropriation must be met, an expropriation that lacks compensation or any one 
requirement is unlawful under international law.  
 
2.3.5 Conclusion 
Expropriation will always be a controversial measure, given among others its threat to 
the regulatory powers of host states, its effect on investments and investors, 
complications regarding the quantification of compensation, and the difficulty of proving 
indirect expropriation. In SADC, the laws that will apply in the event of expropriation are 
those that are provided in Annex 1 and the laws of host states. These are discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4 below.  
 
 
 
                                                
339  Tidewater Investment SRL and Tidewater Cabire, CA v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  
ICSID (Case No. ARB/10/5) Award of 13 March 2015 at para 136-141. 
340  Santa Elena at para 68. 
341  Tidewater at para 136; Gemplus at para 12-59. 
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2.4 THE MEANING OF AN INVESTMENT IN ISDS 
2.4.1 Introduction 
The definition of an investment is central to investor-state disputes, because an 
investment must exist in order for an arbitral tribunal or court of law to have jurisdiction 
ratione materiae.342 Locally, this point was recently driven home in the long-running case 
                                                
342  See Schreuer C The ICSID Convention: A Commentary Second Edition (Cambridge  
University Press Cambridge 2009) at 114 para 113. For ISDS cases relating to 
jurisdiction ratione materiae see Al-Kharafi; Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and 
A.S Baltoil v Republic of Estonia (ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2) Award of 25 June 2001; 
Generation Ukraine Inc. v Ukraine (ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9) Award of 16 September 
2003; H&H Enterprises Investments Inc. v Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/15) Decision on Jurisdiction of 5 June 2012; Jan De Nul (Jurisdiction, Award); 
Nordzucker AG v The Republic of Poland (Ad hoc Tribunal) Partial Award of 10 
December 2008; Joy Mining v Arab Republic of Egypt ((ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11) 
Award on Jurisdiction of 6 August 2004; Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (Canada) v 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/11/1) Excerpts of Award of 
30 April 2014; Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13) Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of 6 
August 2003; Société Generale In respect of DR Energy Holdings Limited and Empresa 
Distribuidora de Electricidad del Este, S. A. v The Dominican Republic (UNCITRAL 
Arbitration, LCIA Case No. UN 7927) Award on Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction of 
19 September 2008; Standard Chartered Bank v United Republic of Tanzania (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/10/12) Award of 2 November 2012; Wena Hotels; First Arbitration 
Proceeding and First Annulment Proceeding Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and 
Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3) Award of 21 
November 2000 and Decision on Annulment of 3 July 2002; Second Arbitration 
Proceeding Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v 
Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3) Award of 20 August 2007 and Decision 
on Annulment of 10 August 2010. Decisions which followed Vivendi on contracts and 
treaties are Aguas del Tunari S.A v The Republic of Bolivia (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3) 
Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction of 21 October 2005; AWG Group 
Ltd. v The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19) Decision on Jurisdiction of 3 
August 2006; Azurix; Camuzzi International S.A v the Argentine Republic (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/2) Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of 11 May 2005; CMS Gas 
Transmission Company; Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets LLP v The Argentine 
Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB01/3) Decision on Jurisdiction (Ancillary Claim) of 2 
August 2004; Eureko; Helnan; IBM World Trade Corporation v Republic of Ecuador 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/02/10) Decision on Jurisdiction of 22 December 2003; Sempra 
Energy International v The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16) Decision on 
Objections to Jurisdiction of 11 May 2005; Siemens AG v The Argentine Republic (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/8) Decision on Jurisdiction of 3 August 2004.  
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of Kingdom of Lesotho v Swissbourgh Diamond Mines343 where the Singapore High 
Court annulled the arbitral decision on jurisdiction, on the grounds that the claimants did 
not have a qualifying investment under the 2006 Annex 1.344  Hence in ICSID arbitration, 
the requirement for jurisdiction ratione materiae is that there must be a legal dispute,345 
which must arise directly out of an investment.346 The same applies in non-ICSID 
arbitration, the only difference being the method applied to determine the existence of an 
investment, as shown below. 
 
                                                
343  Singapore High Court (2017) SGHC 195, Originating Summons 492 of 2016, Decision on  
Annulment of 14 August 2017. 
344  At para 194-228, 237-252. 
345  A full discussion of this requirement is beyond the scope of this study. For further 
information see Dolzer R and Schreuer C Principles of International Investment Law at 
245-246; Schreuer The ICSID Convention: A Commentary at para 41-82 – 76-82; Abaclat 
at para 254-256, 301-331; AES Corporation at para 43- 47; Alpha Projektholding at para 
250-253; Azurix at para 58-66; Daimler Financial Services AG v Argentine Republic 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1) Award of 22 August 2012 at para 62-64; El Paso Energy 
International Company v The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15) Decision 
on Jurisdiction of 27 April 2006 at para 60-65; Fedax at para 15; Jan de Nul (Jurisdiction) 
at para 74; Lao Holdings N.V. v Lao People’s Democratic Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/12/6) Decision on Jurisdiction of 21 February 2014 at para 120-121; Mavrommatis 
Palestine Concessions Case 1924 P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 2, at 11-12; M.C.I. Power Group, 
L.C. and New Turbine, Inc. v Republic of Ecuador (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6) Award of 
31 July 2007 at para 63; Noble Energy Inc. and Machala Power Cía. Ltd. v Republic of 
Ecuador and Consejo Nacional de Electricidad (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/12) Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 5 March 2008 at para 123; Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v 
Republic of the Philippines (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6) Order of the Tribunal on Further 
Proceedings of 17 December 2007 at para 19; Teinver S.A., Transportes de Cercanías 
S.A. and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/1) Decision on Jurisdiction of 21 December 2012 at para 117-125; Tokios 
Tokelés v Ukraine (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18) Decision on Jurisdiction of 29 April 2004 
at para 15. 
346  A full discussion of this requirement is beyond the scope of this study. For further  
information see Abaclat; AES. Alpha Projektholding; Camuzzi; CMS Gas Transmission; 
CSOB; Enron; Fedax; LG&E; SAIPEM; Suez, Barcelona and Interagua; Tokios Tokeles. 
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At present, the definition of an investment depends on the arbitration rules and laws that 
will apply to the dispute. Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention places an investment at 
the center of jurisdiction ratione materiae when it states that: 
 
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out 
of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or 
agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a 
national of another Contracting State…347  (Emphasis added). 
 
Unlike with ISDS in terms of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the process of defining an 
investment in ICSID arbitration is complicated, because a tribunal must conduct a two-
step, “double barrelled”, or “double keyhole” process in order to determine if there is an 
investment in terms of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention.348 The first step determines 
if a transaction, project, business etc. is an investment in terms of a treaty, law or 
contract on which an investor relies to commence arbitration.349 If the transaction, 
project, business etc. qualifies as an investment at this stage, then the tribunal moves to 
                                                
347  See also Fellenbaum J “GEA v Ukraine and the Battle for Treaty Interpretation Principles  
over the Salini Test” 2011 (27) Journal of Arbitration International 249-266; Grabowski A 
"The Definition of Investment under the ICSID Convention: A Defence of Salini" 2014 (15) 
(1) Chicago Journal of International Law Article 13 
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol15/iss1/13 (Date of use: 20 October 2017);  
Schreuer (2009) The ICSID Convention: A Commentary at 71-347; Timmer LJE “The 
Meaning of Investment as a Requirement for Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae of the ICSID 
Centre” 2012 (29) International Arbitration 363-373. 
348  See Schreuer (2009) The ICSID Convention: A Commentary at 117-118. 
349  Alpha Projektholding at para 254; Ambiente Ufficio S.P.A and Others (Case Formerly  
known as Giordano Alpi and Others) v The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/9) Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 8 February 2013 at para 435; 
Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn, BHD v The Government of Malaysia (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/10) Award on Jurisdiction of 17 May 2007 at para 55; Millicom International 
Operations B.V. and Sentel GSM Claimants v The Republic of Senegal (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/20) Decision on Jurisdiction of 16 July 2010 at para 76-78. 
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the second stage. At this stage, an assessment is made as to whether the transaction, 
project, business etc. is an investment in terms of Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention.350   
 
However, in UNCITRAL and other non-ICSID arbitration, a tribunal need only assess 
whether a transaction, project, business etc. is an investment in terms of the applicable 
treaty, law or contract etc. This is because non-ICSID tribunals do not use a two-stage 
process like that applied in ICSID arbitration. 
 
There are three other factors that make the determination of whether an investment 
exists in terms of Article 25(1) difficult in practice. The first is that the drafters of the 
ICSID Convention deliberately abstained from defining what an investment is.351 
Therefore, the ICSID Convention is of no use in this regard. Secondly, ICSID arbitral 
tribunals do not agree on what an investment is. This is further complicated by the fact 
that the doctrine of judicial precedent does not apply in ISDS, with the result that no 
tribunal can make a final ruling on the matter.352 Thirdly, it is not settled whether an 
ICSID arbitral tribunal is bound by the definition of an investment provided for in a treaty. 
There are at least three views on this issue. One view is to the effect that an ICSID 
tribunal is not limited or bound by the definition of an investment contained in a treaty. 
                                                
350  Salini at para 44; Alpha Projektholding at para 254, 264, 303, 309-310, 332. 
351   See for example Philip Morris Brand SARL at para 197-198; Alpha Projektholding 
at para 311; Ambiente at para 439; Frank Charles Araf at para 362; Ioannis 
Kardassopoulos at para 116; Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services GMBH v 
Ukraine ICSID Case No. ARB/08/8 (Decision on jurisdiction) of 8 March 2010 at para 
128; Malaysian Historical Salvors at para 56. 
352  See for example Burlington Resources Inc v Republic of Ecuador (ICSID Case No.  
ARB/08/5) Decision on Jurisdiction of 2 June 2010 at para 100; Enron Corporation and  
Ponderosa Assets LLP v The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB01/3) Decision on 
Jurisdiction (Ancillary Claim) of 2 August 200 at para 25, 170-171; Malaysian Historical 
Salvors at para 56; Romak S.A (Switzerland) v Republic of Uzbekistan (PCA Case No. 
AA280) Award of 26 November 2009 at para 171. 
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Joy Mining,353 Fedax,354 Alex Genin,355 Helnan,356 Ioannis Kardassopoulos,357 Patrick 
Mitchell,358 RFCC359 and Salini360 support this view. The second view is to the effect that 
the definition of an investment in a treaty is authoritative. This view is supported by 
Alpha Projektholding,361 Inmaris,362 M.C.I Power,363 Parkerings,364 SGS v Paraguay.365 A 
third, flexible view emanates from Ambiente. In this case, the tribunal suggested that the 
term “investment” is to be given a broad meaning.366  
 
The characteristics of an investment as applied in selected ICSID and UNCITRAL 
arbitrations will now be discussed. The discussion is deliberately technical, as it is meant 
to show the responses of the various tribunals to the Salini criteria. 
 
2.4.2 Characteristics of an investment 
As will be seen from the discussion that follows, there is no fixed set of characteristics or 
attributes that a transaction, project, business etc. must meet in order to qualify as an 
investment in terms of the ICSID Convention. Schreuer laid the basis for the current 
debate on what an investment ought to be when he said that:  
                                                
353  Joy Mining at para 50. 
354  Fedax at para 20-30. 
355  Alex Genin at para 324. 
356  SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v The Republic of Paraguay (ICSID Case  
No. ARB/07/29) Award of 10 February 2012 at para 80. 
357  Ioannis Kardassopoulos at para 113. 
358  Mr Patrick Mitchell v The Democratic Republic of Congo (ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7)  
Decision on Annulment of Award of 1 November 2006 at para 31. 
359  RFCC at para 50-66. 
360  Salini at para 43-44, 45-58. 
361  Alpha Projektholding at para 314. 
362  Inmaris Decision on Jurisdiction at para 130.  
363  M.C.I Power at para 160. 
364  Parkerings at para 254. 
365  SGS v Paraguay at para 83. 
366  Ambiente at para 470. 
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…a qualifying project must show a certain duration, a regularity of profit and 
return, an element of risk, a substantial commitment, and a significant 
contribution to the host State's development. 367 (Emphasis added). 
 
Fedax and CSOB were the first two cases to consider the above criteria.368 Thereafter 
Salini discussed the criteria, and accepted all but the requirement of profit, as did 
subsequent cases.369 The tribunal in Salini held that an investment must meet the 
following requirements (Salini criteria): there must be a contribution by an investor, the 
investment must be of qualifying (but unspecified) duration, the investment must involve 
a risk taken by the investor, and the investment must be of economic benefit to the host 
state.370 Salini thus set the scene for the current debate about what an investment is or 
ought to be.371 The Salini criteria will now be briefly discussed in order to show how 
subsequent decisions responded thereto, and to indicate how it was applied in 
subsequent cases.372 Of further importance is that based on the conclusion drawn at the 
                                                
367  Fedax at para 43; Schreuer The ICSID Convention: A Commentary at 128 para 153. 
368  Fedax at para 25; Biwater Gauff at para 310; Schreuer The ICSID Convention: A  
Commentary at 129 para 154. 
369   Salini at para 52-58; Malaysian Historical Salvors at para 108. However, in Achmea the  
tribunal held that the making of an investment “necessarily implied the right to enjoy the 
profitability of a return on the investment, if it proves profitable” (at para 281). 
370  Salini at para 52. Schreuer The ICSID Convention: A Commentary at 129 para 157 says  
that the profit requirement was not adopted by most tribunals. 
371  See the discussion in Schreuer The ICSID Convention: A Commentary at 129-134.  
372  For a critique of Salini see Andreeva Y “Salvaging or Sinking the Investment - MHS v. 
Malaysia Revisited,” 2008 (7) The Law and Practice of International Courts Tribunals 
161-176; Bechky PS “International Adjudication of Land Disputes: For Development and 
Transnationalism” 2014 (7) The Law and Development Review 313-327; Burger L “The 
Trouble with Salini (Criticism of and Alternatives to the Famous Test)” 2013 (31) ASA 
Bulletin 521-536; Demirkol B “The Notion of Investment in International Investment Law” 
2015 (1) The Turkish Commercial Law Review 41-49; Desierto DA “Development as an 
International Right: Investment in the New Trade-Based IIAs” 2011 (3) Trade Law and 
Development 296-333; Dupont P “The Notion of ICSID Investment: Ongoing Confusion or 
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end of this section,373 it is highly probable that an investment in SADC that is covered by 
Annex 1 or the investment laws of a Member State as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 
below, must have the characteristics that are described below.  
 
(a) Contribution 
This requirement entails that an investor must bring resources towards an investment. 
This can be in the form of know-how, personnel, funds, expertise, equipment etc.  Based 
on this approach, if an investor is found not to have contributed anything to a project or a 
transaction, a tribunal may rule that it did not make an investment. For example, in KT 
Asia v Kazakhstan, where the investment was a shareholding acquired via loans that did 
not have to be paid, the tribunal held that the acquisition of the shares did not amount to 
an investment.374 In Salini, where the project undertaken was the construction of a 
                                                                                                                                            
Emerging Synthesis” 2011 (12) Journal of World Investment and Trade 245-272; Engfeldt 
HJ “Should ICSID Go Gangnam Style in Light of Non-Traditional Foreign Investments 
Including Those Spurred on by Social Media - Applying and Industry-Specific Lens to the 
Salini Test to Determine Article 25 Jurisdiction” 2014 (32) Berkeley Journal of 
International Law 44-63; Exelbert JM “Consistently Inconsistent: What Is a Qualifying 
Investment under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention and Why the Debate Must End” 
2016 (85) Fordham Law Review 1243-1279; Garay J “Abuse of Process through 
Corporate Restructuring of Assets: The Legal Standard for the Multinational Investor” 
2017 (35) Boston University International Law Journal 397-424; Grabowski “The 
Definition of Investment under the ICSID Convention: A Defense of Salini” at 287-309; 
Martin A “Definition of Investment: Could a Persistent Objector to the Salini Tests Be 
Found in ICSID Arbitral Practice” 2011 (11) (2) Global Jurist 1-19; Musurmanov IU “The 
Implications of Romak v Uzbekistan for Defining the Concept of Investment” 2013 (20) 
Australian International Law Journal  105-129; Okpe FO “The Definition of Investment 
and the ICSID Convention: Matters Arising under the Nigerian Investment Promotion Act 
and International Investment Law” 2017 (8) Journal of Sustainable Development Law and 
Policy 133-154; Vargiu P “Beyond Hallmarks and Formal Requirements: A Jurisprudence 
Constante on the Notion of Investment in the ICSID Convention” 2009 (10) The Journal 
of World Investment and Trade 753-768; Yala F “The Notion of “Investment” in ICSID 
Case Law: A Drifting Jurisdictional Requirement?” in Reinisch (ed) Classics in 
International Investment Law Volume II at 112-123. 
373  The conclusion is that these characteristics are applicable to non-ICSID arbitration and  
litigation cases. 
374  KT Asia Investment Group B.V v Republic of Kazakhstan (ICSID Case No. ARB 09/8) 
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motorway, the tribunal found that the investors’ contribution of funds and expertise was 
acceptable.375 In Bayindir, the project that had to be undertaken by the investor was also 
the construction of a motorway. The tribunal found that Bayindir had contributed financial 
resources, equipment, personnel and expertise in the project.376  
 
In Helnan, the tribunal found that the investment of funds to upgrade and operate a hotel 
was a contribution.377 In Malaysian Historical Salvors, the tribunal found that in the 
salvaging of an old shipwreck, the investor had contributed funds, expertise, and 
knowledge.378 The respondent did not dispute that the claimant made an investment.379 
In Millicom, the tribunal found that Millicom’s establishment of and financing of a mobile 
phone network was a sufficient contribution.380 
 
Where there is more than one investor involved in a project, a tribunal will look at their 
combined investment to see if the group as a whole made an investment. Hence in 
Inmaris the tribunal concluded that the combined contributions by companies in the 
Inmaris group amounted to an investment.381 Similarly, in Ambiente, where the 
investments in question were bonds issued by the Argentine government to foreign 
investors, the tribunal held that what mattered is the total bonds issued to the group of 
investors.382 In Phoenix Action, the tribunal held that the payment of a nominal price to 
acquire an investment is not a bar to meeting the requirement of a contribution, provided 
                                                                                                                                            
Award of 17 October 2013 at para 204, 206. 
375  Salini at para 53.  
376  Bayindir at para 116, 120 and 131. 
377  Helnan at para 77. 
378  Malaysian Historical Salvors at para 109.  
379  Impregilo at para 78. 
380  Millicom at para 80. 
381  Inmaris Decision on Jurisdiction at para 96. 
382  Ambiente at para 483. 
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the investor has a bona fide intention of undertaking economic activities through the 
investment.383 
 
(b) Duration 
In terms of this criterion, an investment should be held for a medium to long-term 
duration, although there is no specific period that is agreed among tribunals.384 In Salini, 
where the duration of the contract was three years, the tribunal said that this duration 
met the criteria “according to the doctrine”, which was said to be two to five years.385 In 
Bayindir, the construction period of three years was found to be acceptable.386 In Jan de 
Nul, the tribunal also held that an investment period of three years was sufficient.387 In 
Malaysian Historical Salvors, where the original contract was for 18 months, the tribunal 
said that this original period did not meet the duration requirement in a “qualitative 
sense”.388 In Helnan, the tribunal accepted the investment duration of 26 years.389 In 
Ioannis Kardassopoulos, the tribunal accepted a period of three years as sufficient.390 In 
Millicom, the tribunal found that the mobile phone concession period of 20 years was a 
sufficient duration.391 
 
 
 
                                                
383  Phoenix Action, Ltd v The Czech Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/05) Award of 15  
April 2009 at para 122. 
384  KT Asia at para 207, 216. 
385  Salini at para 54 
386  Bayindir at para 133. 
387  Jan de Nul Decision on Jurisdiction at para 95; Malaysian Historical Salvors at para  
101-102. 
388  Malaysian Historical Salvors at 37 para 111(b). 
389  Helnan at para 77. 
390  Ioannis Kardassopoulos at para 117. 
391  Millicom at para 80. 
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(c) Risk 
In terms of this criterion, an investment must have a measure of risk to qualify as an 
investment.392 In the case of an equity investment, the risk is that the value of the equity 
may depreciate.393 Hence in KT Asia, the tribunal found that no investment was made 
because there was no risk involved in the transaction.394 In Bayindir, Bayindir had to 
issue bank guarantees for huge sums of money in favor of the host state, risking an 
unlawful call of these sums by the state.395 Furthermore, Bayindir was liable for defects 
for a certain period, and also had to maintain the roads for four years. The tribunal found 
that the investor did undertake a risk in the project.396 The tribunal in Malaysian Historical 
Salvors found that the risk assumed by the investor was an ordinary commercial risk 
and, therefore, qualitatively it was not the risk envisaged in ICSID jurisprudence.397 The 
tribunal concluded that the risk was only superficially met.398 In Helnan, the tribunal 
found that the refurbishing of a hotel to five-star quality amounted to taking a risk of 
commercial success.399 In Ioannis Kardassopoulos, the tribunal found that the mere 
conduct of the claimant’s operation under the prevailing economic and political 
circumstances amounted to a risk.400 The tribunal in Alpha Projektholding also agreed 
that conducting business under adverse political and economic climate amounted to a 
risk.401 In Saipem, the tribunal found that the work stoppages and the necessity to 
renegotiate the contract amounted to a risk.402 In Fedax, the tribunal found that the 
                                                
392  Salini at para 217.  
393  KT Asia at para 218. 
394  KT Asia at para 206, 217-219. 
395  Bayindir at para 135. 
396  Bayindir at para 136. 
397  Malaysian Historical Salvors at para 39. 
398  Malaysian Historical Salvors at para 39. 
399  Ioannis Kardassopoulos at para 77. 
400  Ioannis Kardassopoulos at para 117. 
401  Alpha Projektholding at para 320. 
402  Saipem at para 109. 
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existence of a dispute relating to the payment of the capital and interest was sufficient 
proof of risk.403 The tribunal in Phoenix Action found that the fact that the claimant 
invested in businesses that were financially distressed was sufficient risk.404 
 
(d) Benefit to host state 
In terms of this criterion, an investment must make a significant contribution to the 
economy of a host state. The tribunals in Fedax,405 Salini406 and CSOB407 were early 
adopters of this requirement. The requirement has since been adopted in subsequent 
cases, with varying emphasis on the scale of the economic contribution to the host state, 
as can be seen in the analysis of tribunal decisions conducted in Malaysian Historical 
Salvors.408 In Bayindir, the tribunal found that the construction of the motorway was of 
benefit to Pakistan.409 In Helnan, the tribunal found that the investment in the hotel was 
of benefit to tourism in Egypt.410 The tribunal in Malaysian Historical Salvors also 
acknowledged this requirement after an in-depth analysis.411 In Inmaris, the tribunal 
found that the combined investment benefitted Ukraine’s development because Ukraine 
obtained the renovation of a ship, as well as the training of its cadets.412 In Alpha 
Projektholding, the tribunal found that the significant taxes paid by the hotel business 
contributed to the economy of Ukraine.413 Although the UNCITRAL tribunal in Bernhard 
Von Pezold declined to apply the Salini criteria, it found that Zimbabwe’s economy 
                                                
403  Fedax at para 40. 
404  Phoenix Action at para 127. 
405  Fedax at para 40. 
406  Salini at para 52. 
407  CSOB at para 97. 
408  Bayindir at 39 para 113, 145. 
409  Bayindir at para 137. 
410  Helnan at para 77. 
411  Malaysian Historical Salvors at para 68, 105, 113, 124; 125. 
412  Inmaris Decision on Jurisdiction at para 96, 132. 
413  Alpha Projektholding at para 330. 
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benefited from job creation and the injection of know-how.414 Similarly, the UNCITRAL 
tribunal in White Industries declined to follow Salini, yet it applied the same criteria and 
found that the investment in that case contributed to India’s development.415 
 
However, some tribunals did not agree with Salini. In Phoenix Action, the tribunal held 
that the development of economic activities by the investment need not be successful, 
especially when the acts of the host state destroyed the investment. What matters most 
is that an investor intended to undertake economic activities, and that it made good faith 
efforts to achieve them.416 The tribunal in KT Asia held that the requirement of economic 
development of the host state cannot be mandatory.417 The tribunal in L.E.S.I v Algeria 
was also not keen on the requirement.418 In Patrick Mitchel, the Ad hoc Committee in the 
annulment proceedings acknowledged the requirement, with a cautionary.419 The 
tribunal in Quiborax held that the economic development criterion is not part of the 
objective criteria for an investment, because an investment may fail and, therefore, not 
contribute to the development of a state.420 In Alpha Projektholding, the tribunal said that 
the criterion makes a tribunal to engage in a post hoc evaluation of the business, 
economic, financial and/or policy assessments that prompted the claimant’s activities 
and thus leads to second-guessing. The tribunal in Deutsche Bank also held that this 
                                                
414  Bernhard Von Pezold at para 286. 
415  White Industries at para 7.4.18. 
416  Phoenix Action at para 133. 
417  KT Asia at para 171-173. 
418  Consorzio Goupemente L.E.S.I-DIPENTA (Italy) v Peoples Democratic Republic of  
Algeria ICSID Case No. ARB/03/08 (Award) of 10 January 2005 at para 13(iv);  
Malaysian Historical Salvors at para 89. 
419  Patrick Mitchel at para 28, 32 - 33. 
420  Quiborax S.A, Non-Metallic Minerals S.A and Alan Fosk Kaplun v Plurinational State of  
Bolivia (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/02) Decision on Jurisdiction of 27 September 2012 at 76  
para 220, 225. 
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requirement should not be part of the criteria for an investment.421 Expectedly, the 
UNCITRAL tribunals of Bernhard Von Pezold and White Industries are among those that 
declined to follow Salini. 
 
As can be seen from the above discussion, some tribunal decisions differed with Salini, 
while others agreed with Salini wholly or in part. What follows is a summary of what 
various tribunals said about the Salini criteria.  
 
The tribunal in Alpha Projektholding refused to follow Salini because it opined that the 
Salini criteria are not contained in Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention.422 The tribunal 
in Global Trading v Ukraine also distanced itself from the Salini criteria.423 In Hassan 
Awdi v Romania, the tribunal held that the Salini criteria cannot override the will of the 
parties in terms of what they wanted to amount to an investment or not.424 The tribunal in 
Malaysian Historical Salvors held that the Salini “test” is “not a punch list of items which, 
if completely checked off, will automatically lead to a conclusion that there is an 
“investment.”425 In Biwater Gauff, the tribunal held that there is no basis for a strict 
application of the Salini criteria since international law or the ICSID Convention does not 
prescribe it.426 The tribunal in Phillip Morris Brand SARL followed Biwater.427 In Phoenix 
Action, the tribunal added the criteria that an investment must be made in terms of the 
                                                
421  Deutsche Bank at para 295. 
422  Alpha Projektholding at para 311. 
423  Global Trading Resource Corp. and Globex International, Inc v Ukraine (ICSID Case No.  
ARB/09/11) Award of 1 December 2011 at para 55. 
424  Hassan Awdi, Enterprise Business Consultants, Inc, And Alfa El Corporation v Romania  
(ICSID Case No. ARB/10/13) Award of 2 March 2015 at para 197. 
425  Malaysian Historical Salvors at para 106(e). 
426  Biwater Gauff at para 312-316. 
427  Phillip Morris Brand SARL at para 201-206. 
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laws of the host state and must be bona fide.428 In GEA v Ukraine the tribunal declined to 
apply the Salini test, and said that the Salini test is problematic if its criteria are taken as 
inflexible.429 The tribunal in Ambiente cautioned that the Salini criteria must not be taken 
as expressing jurisdictional requirements stricto sensu.430 In Abaclat the tribunal held 
that it would be wrong to disqualify an investment which was intended to be protected by 
the Argentina-Italy BIT simply because it did not meet the Salini criteria.431 Similarly, in 
Deutsche Bank the tribunal held that there is no basis for the strict application of the 
Salini criteria.432  The tribunal in Bernhard Von Pezold also held that Salini was not 
authoritative.433 
 
Schreuer revisited the debate, and clarified his original view of what an investment ought 
to be, as follows: 
 
These features should not necessarily be understood as jurisdictional 
requirements but merely as typical characteristics of investments under the 
Convention…The development in practice from a descriptive list of typical 
features towards a set of mandatory legal requirements is unfortunate. The First 
Edition of this Commentary cannot serve as authority for this development.434 
(Emphasis added). 
 
                                                
428  Phoenix Action at para 101-144. 
429  GEA Group AktienGesellschaft v Ukraine (ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16) Award of 31  
March 2011 at para 314. 
430  Ambiente at 161 para 479. 
431  Abaclat at para 364. 
432  Deutsche Bank at para 294. 
433  Bernhard Von Pezold at para 285. 
434  Cited in Ambiente at para 480-481; Schreuer The ICSID Convention: A Commentary at  
128 para 153.  
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The tribunal in Philip Morris Brand SARL accepted Schreuer’s proposal above.435  
 
It is submitted that the views expressed by Schreuer as well the cases above to the 
effect that the Fedax and Salini criteria should be taken as guidelines only, find 
acceptance. In any event, in the absence of judicial precedent in ISDS, it is impossible 
for Salini to be authoritative. This is also supported by the fact that the drafters of the 
ICSID Convention deliberately refrained from defining an investment so as to allow 
flexibility in the determination of an investment. Therefore, tribunals will have to decide 
on a case-by-case basis whether an investment exists or not.  
 
2.4.3 Conclusion 
For the reasons that follow, it is submitted that in SADC, the criteria for an investment 
discussed above are applicable to non-ICSID arbitrations and even courts of law that 
adjudicate investor-state disputes. The tribunal in Grupo Francisco Hermando Contreras 
v Republic of Ecuador held that the Salini criteria can be applied to an ICSID Additional 
Facility arbitration,436 while the tribunal in Romak held that the Salini criteria can be 
applied in UNCITRAL arbitration. The tribunal therefore applied the criteria, and 
concluded that the claimant did not make a qualifying investment.437  
 
Furthermore, a trend is emerging in terms whereof states and regions are adopting the 
Salini criteria into their model treaties. For example, the following instruments adopt the 
                                                
435  Philip Morris Brand SARL at para 206. 
436  Grupo Francisco Hermando Contreras v Republic of Ecuador ICSID Case No.  
ARB/ (AF)/12/2 Award on Jurisdiction of 4 December 2015. The award is in Spanish. For 
a summary see https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/05/16/the-only-known-investment-treaty-
arbitration-against-equatorial-guinea-fails-on-jurisdictional-grounds-grupo-francisco-
hernando-contreras-sl-v-republic-of-equatorial-guinea-icsid-case-no-arb-af-12-2-m/ (Date 
of use: 10 April 2017). 
437  Romak at para 191-208. 
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Salini criteria: Article of 1.2.1 of the India Model Bilateral Treaty 2015,438 Article 4(4) of 
the PAIC, and Article 1(10) of the SADC Model Bilateral Treaty Template of 2012.439 The 
adoption of the Salini criteria into regulatory instruments is commendable, and will serve 
to pre-empt costly disputes with regards to whether the criteria are applicable to non-
ICSID arbitrations or not. It will also create consistency and add to the jurisprudence 
relating to the interpretation of the criteria. 
 
2.5 INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION METHODS  
2.5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to briefly discuss the processes by which investor-state 
disputes are resolved. These are negotiation and mediation (alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR)), arbitration and litigation.440 These processes form a continuum, and 
proceed from left to right from ADR through to arbitration and/or litigation.441 The parties 
to a dispute gradually lose control over the resolution of a dispute as it progresses 
through these stages.442 This is because, by not resolving the dispute themselves, the 
parties pass the adjudication thereof to a third party, who may be an arbitrator or a 
judge, as the case may be. However, the reality is that not every dispute can be resolved 
via ADR. This makes arbitration and litigation relevant to investor-state dispute 
resolution. 
                                                
438  The India Model BIT is discussed in Chapter 5 below. 
439  Southern African Development Community (2012) Model Bilateral Treaty Template,  
available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/SADC-Model-BIT-
Template-Final.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018). 
440  See for example Carneiro D Conflict resolution and its context: from the analysis of  
behavioural patterns to efficient decision-making (Springer Cham 2014); Salacuse JW “Is 
There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute 
Resolution” 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138-185 at 154; Salacuse The 
Law of Investment treaties at 357-374. 
441  Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 154. 
442  See Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 154-155. 
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According to International Court of Justice (ICJ) and tribunal decisions, a dispute is a 
disagreement over a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or interests between 
two persons. 443 There must have been some communication between the parties, 
leading to a difference in the position of the parties.444 The dispute between the parties 
must be practical, not theoretical or academic.445 Schreuer says that a dispute is legal if 
remedies such as restitution or damages are claimed, and if the claim is based on a 
contract, treaty, legislation and other source of law.446 
 
Investor-state disputes are unique and vastly different from normal commercial disputes. 
Salacuse attributes the uniqueness of investor-state dispute to various factors, as 
indicated below447  
 
Firstly, investor-state disputes are typically regulated by public international law instead 
of the laws of a host state, in that they are often regulated by treaties and rules of 
                                                
443  Fedax at para 15; Schreuer C “What is a Legal Dispute? International Law  
between Universalism and Fragmentation” in Buffard I, Crawford J, Pellet A, and Wittich 
S (eds) International Law between Universalism and Fragmentation, Festschrift in 
Honour of Gerhard Hafner (Koninklijke Brill NV. Netherlands 2008) 959-980, at 960-961 
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/95.pdf (Date of use: 7 October 2017); 
Schreuer The ICSID Convention: A Commentary at 93 para 42 (see the authorities cited 
at notes 44-45). 
444  Schreuer The ICSID Convention: A Commentary at 94 para 43. 
445  Schreuer The ICSID Convention: A Commentary at 94 para 44-45. 
446  Schreuer “What is a Legal Dispute? International Law between Universalism  
and Fragmentation” at 978; Schreuer The ICSID Convention: A Commentary at 99 para  
60. 
447  See also Maupin JA “Differentiating Among International Investment  
Disputes” in Douglas Z, Pauwelyn J and Vinuales JE (eds) The Foundations of  
International Investment Law (Oxford University Press Oxford 2014) at 467-498; 
Salacuse The Law of Investment treaties at 354-356. 
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international law.448 Secondly, investor-state disputes involve public policy, in that they 
involve a challenge to a state’s sovereign right to regulate its affairs.449 Thirdly, investor-
state disputes are political in nature, since they involve a challenge on the public policy 
of a state.450 Fourth, investor-state disputes often have a bearing on a long-term 
relationship between an investor and a host state, wherein the parties need each 
other.451 This makes the relationship difficult to unravel.452 Fifth, the amounts being 
claimed in ISDS can be significant, and do run into hundreds of millions of US Dollars 
and in some cases, billions.453 In addition, the costs of the ensuing ISDS are significant 
for a host state as well.454 Sixth, investor-state disputes are a rare type of disputes that 
allow a private party to sue a state for its sovereign acts under international law.455 
Finally, investor-state disputes are unique, since it is usually an investor who can sue a 
host state (usually via ISDS), not the other way round.456 
 
Currently, the resolution of investor-state disputes is controversial due to the fact that the 
majority of BITs and TIPs refer investor-state disputes to ISDS, which often bypasses 
the courts of host states.457 This has created the impression that ISDS is the main 
mechanism for the resolution of these disputes. 
 
                                                
448  Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 140. This is due to BITs,  
TIPs, investment contracts etc. that make international law applicable to investments. 
449  Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 140. 
450  Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 141. 
451  Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 141. 
452  Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 141. 
453  Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 142. 
454  Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 142. 
455  Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 144. 
456  Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 145. 
457  For a database of BITs and TIPs see http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (Date of  
use: 10 April 2018). 
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For example, in North America, NAFTA refers investor-state disputes directly to ISDS.458  
In Europe, the ECT refers investor-state disputes to ISDS or the courts of host states, at 
the option of an investor.459 Still in Europe, the European Union (EU) is championing an 
Investment Court System (ICS) that will refer investor-state disputes directly to an ICS 
tribunal.460 The recently concluded Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) also provides investors with direct access to ISDS.461 
In Asia, ACIA also refers investor-state disputes directly to ISDS.462 The India Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaty of 2015 refers investor-state disputes to ISDS, albeit after the 
exhaustion of local remedies.463 In SADC, the 2006 Annex 1 referred investor-state 
disputes to ISDS after the exhaustion of local remedies.464 The laws of some SADC 
Member States also refer investor-state disputes to ISDS, while others refer them to the 
courts of host states.465 
 
2.5.2 Alternative Dispute Resolution  
ADR refers to informal, amicable means of the settlement of a dispute. ADR can 
therefore be defined as the settlement of a dispute by means other than binding 
decisions made by courts or arbitral tribunals.466 ADR processes include negotiation, 
                                                
458  Article 1120 NAFTA. 
459  Article 26(2)-(3) ECT. 
460  See the discussion of the ICS in Chapter 5 below. 
461  Article 9.19 CPTPP http://wtocenter.vn/tpp/full-text-comprehensive-and- 
progressive-agreement-trans-pacific-partnership-cptpp (Date of use: 3 April 2018. The 
parties to the agreement are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam.  
462  Article 32 ACIA. 
463  See the discussion of the India Model BIT in Chapter 5 below. 
464  Article 28 2006 Annex 1. 
465  See Table 1 in Chapter 4 below; Ngobeni and Fagbayibo 2015 (19) Law Democracy and  
Development 175 at 182-185. 
466  For further reading see DeMarr BJ and de Janasz SC Negotiation and dispute resolution  
1st ed (Pearson/Prentice Hall Boston 2013); D’Ambrumenil P What is dispute resolution? 
(LLP London 1998); Fenn PF Commercial conflict management and dispute resolution 
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mediation, conciliation, and arbitration.467 These processes are taken as alternatives to 
litigation.468 However, in the context of investment disputes, ADR consists of negotiation, 
mediation, and conciliation, which then become alternatives to arbitration.469 ADR may 
be invoked before a conflict becomes a dispute, in which event it is referred to as 
preventative ADR.470 If ADR is invoked after a conflict has become a dispute, it is 
referred to as resolutive ADR.471 Both forms of ADR are used in conjunction with ISDS 
and litigation, and are therefore useful. 
 
ADR has various advantages. Firstly, ADR takes less time than arbitration or litigation to 
conclude.472 Secondly, ADR allows the parties, and not a third party such as a judge or 
an arbitrator, to reach the decision they desire.473 Thirdly, ADR allows parties to focus on 
                                                                                                                                            
(Spon Press Abingdon 2012); Goldberg SB et al Dispute resolution: negotiation, 
mediation and other process 4th ed (Aspen Law & Business Gaitherburg 2003); Hames 
DS Negotiation: closing deals, settling disputes and making team decisions (SAGE 
Publications Thousand Oaks California 2012); Ho-Won J Conflict management and 
resolution: an introduction (Routledge London 2010); Lewiki RJ, Saunders DM and Barry 
B Negotiation 7th ed (McGraw-Hill/Irwin New York 2015); Moffit ML and Bordone RC The 
Handbook of Dispute Resolution 1st ed (Jossey-Bass San Francisco CA 2005); Mayer BS 
The dynamics of conflict: a guide to engagement and intervention 2nd ed (Jossey-Bass 
San Francisco 2012); Nolan-Haley JM Alternative Dispute Resolution in a nutshell (West 
Publishing Company St. Paul Minnesota 2013); Partridge MVB Alternative Dispute 
Resolution: an essential competency for lawyers (Oxford University Press Oxford 2009); 
Stefek F and Unberath H (eds) Regulating dispute resolution: ADR and access to justice 
at the crossroads (Hart Publishing Oxford 2013). 
467  See Salacuse The Law of Investment treaties at 357-368. 
468  Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 157. 
469  Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 157. 
470  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Investor-State Disputes:  
Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration” 
UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development (United Nations 
New York and Geneva 2010) at xii http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf (Date 
of use: 18 January 2018). 
471  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Investor-State Disputes:  
Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration” at xii  
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018). 
472  Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 157. 
473  Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 157. 
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their non-legal interests in addition to their rights.474 Fourthly, by virtue of its amicable 
nature, ADR allows the parties to preserve their relationship.475 Fifth, even after 
commencement of litigation or arbitration, resolutive ADR still has a role to play to bring 
a matter to a close. For example, ISDS statistics indicate that 36 percent of all ICSID 
cases up to December 2017 were settled or discontinued after commencement.476  
 
However, ADR takes place in private, and there is no empirical evidence to support the 
claims regarding its low cost, efficiency or speed of resolution. Nonetheless, there can 
be no doubt that ADR saves parties time, money and even their relationship if a dispute 
is settled. ADR should be embraced in investor-state disputes. 
 
2.5.3 Arbitration 
Arbitration is a process whereby one or more private individuals (the arbitrators) decide a 
dispute which parties have voluntarily agreed to refer to them.477 ISDS is a special form of 
                                                
474  Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 158; Welsh NA  
and Schneider AK “The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into Bilateral Treaty 
Arbitration” 2013 (18) Harvard Negotiation Law Review 71-144 at 91. 
475  Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 157, 176. 
476  International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes “The ICSID Caseload  
Statistics” Issue 2017-2  
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-
2%20(English)%20Final.pdf (Date of use: 10 March 2018). 
477  Booysen Principles of International Trade Law As A Monistic System 767; Salacuse 2007  
(31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 154; Salacuse The Law of Investment 
treaties at 369-374. For ISDS tribunal decisions see  
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources/ICSID-Caseload-Statistics.aspx, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx 
https://www.italaw.com/, https://pca-cpa.org/en/home/ (all Date of use: 07 October 2017).  
For further reading see Born G International commercial arbitration 2nd ed (Wolters 
Kluwer Law & Business New York 2014); Carbonneau TE Arbitration in a nutshell 3rd ed 
(Thomas/West St. Paul Minnesota 2012); Merrills JG International dispute settlement 5th 
ed (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2011). 
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arbitration that was primarily brought into being by BITs and TIPs.478 Arbitration can be 
international or national. National arbitration is arbitration that takes place in a particular 
state and according to the laws of that state.479 International arbitration takes place in 
terms of international law. Due to its prevalence, ISDS is generally the main mechanism 
for the resolution of investor-state disputes.480  
 
The majority of ISDS cases take place under the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID 
Convention),481 followed by the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.482 The ICSID Convention 
established ICSID, which administers arbitration cases under the convention as well as 
those in terms of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.483 ICSID handles the highest ISDS 
caseload, followed by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).484 
 
                                                
478  See for example Vandenvelde 2005 (12) University of California Davis Journal of  
International Law and Policy 157 at 161-175. 
479  Booysen Principles of International Trade Law as a Monistic System at 770.  
480  Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 155. 
481  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of  
Other States (with Rules and Regulations) 1965, amended to 2006 (ratified 14 
September 1966, in force 14 October 1966) 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/2006%20CRR_English- 
final.pdf (Date of use: 15 November 2017).  
482  Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 157; United Nations  
Commission on International Trade Law ‘Arbitration Rules” United Nations, New York 
2014  https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-2013/UNCITRAL-
Arbitration-Rules-2013-e.pdf (Date of use: 15 November 2017). 
483  Article 1 ICSID Convention. 
484  https://pca-cpa.org/en/home/ (Date of use: 15 November 2017). For cases decided under  
other arbitration rules see 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByRulesAndInstitution (Date of use: 05 
November 2017). By 30 March 2018, 467 cases were opened under the ICSID Rules, 
plus 54 that were begun under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, while 262 cases were 
opened under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The ICSID handled 542 cases, while the 
PCA handled 118. See 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByRulesAndInstitution (Date of use: 30 
March 2017). 
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When the ICSID was launched, there was much optimism about its potential to resolve 
investor-state disputes.485 This optimism encouraged many states to become members of 
the ICSID Convention.486 From the 1970s until the early 1990s, there were few ISDS 
cases.487 Thus, from 1972 to 1996, the ICSID had less than five ISDS cases per year.488 
However, this lull was short-lived, as the caseload increased gradually, up to recent peaks 
of 77 cases per year in 2015.489 In total, from 1972 until the end of June 2017, 619 ISDS 
cases were registered with the ICSID.490 When non-ICSID cases are added, on 18 March 
2018 the global number of known ISDS cases was 855, of which 548 were concluded, and 
297 were pending.491 
 
Proponents of ISDS argue that it has various benefits. Firstly, it provides an impartial, 
cheap and quick forum for the resolution of an investor-state dispute.492 Secondly, ISDS 
                                                
485  See Report of the Executive Directors, in the ICSID Convention at 40. 
486  For a database of ICSID member states see  
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx (Date of 
use: 04 September 2017). 
487  International Centre for the Settlement of Investor-state Disputes “The ICISD Caseload  
Statistics”, Issue 2017-2 at 7  
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017- 
2%20(English)%20Final.pdf (Date of use: 10 March 2018). 
488  International Centre for the Settlement of Investor-state Disputes “The ICSID Caseload  
Statistics”, Issue 2017-2 at 7  
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017- 
2%20(English)%20Final.pdf (Date of use: 10 March 2018) 
489  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment  
Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 3 at 1-2 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 30 March 
2018). 
490  International Centre for the Settlement of Investor-state Disputes “The ICSID Caseload  
Statistics” Issue 2017-2 at 7  
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-
2%20(English)%20Final.pdf (Date of use: 10 March 2018). 
491  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS (Date of use: 18 March 2018). Please note  
that these statistics change as they are continually being updated.  
492  Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 157. 
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provides an additional avenue of legal redress to covered foreign investors.493 Thirdly, 
ISDS allows foreign investors to avoid national courts of a host State if they have little 
trust in their independence, efficiency, or competence.494 Fourth, ISDS avoids recourse 
to diplomatic protection of investors. Fifth, ISDS ensures the adjudication of claims by a 
qualified and neutral tribunal.495 Sixth, ISDS removes any State immunity obstacles that 
may complicate domestic legal claims in some States.496 Finally, ISDS allows for the 
recognition of awards in terms of the ICSID Convention and the New York 
Convention.497 
 
Despite its touted benefits, ISDS has many challenges.498 Firstly, ISDS is costly, at least 
from a developing state point of view.499 Secondly, ISDS cases take a long time to 
                                                
493  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment  
Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 9 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMEN
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498  See for example Mbengue and Schacherer 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment  
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conclude.500 Thirdly, ISDS lacks an appeal mechanism, and therefore it fails to provide 
for the correction of wrong decisions.501 Fourth, ISDS lacks judicial precedent, and 
therefore it suffers from inconsistent tribunal rulings.502 Fifth, as a private process, ISDS 
is perceived as lacking legitimacy, and there are concerns about arbitrator bias.503 In this 
                                                                                                                                            
and Trade 414 at 441-442; For a discussion of ISDS and its challenges, see for example  
Schwieder RW “TTIP and the Investment Court System: A New (and Improved) 
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Development of International Law by ICSID Tribunals” 2016 (31) ICSID Review 728-739. 
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regard, a recent study has exposed the extent of “double hatting”, in terms whereof 
some arbitrators act as counsel in some matters, and as arbitrators and even 
professional experts in others.504 Sixth, ISDS provides an exclusive forum for foreign 
investors to sue host states, and therefore it discriminates against local and other foreign 
investors.505 Seventh, there are complications regarding the enforcement of arbitral 
awards, especially those from non-ICSID tribunals, in that a court of a host state may 
refuse to enforce an award.506 Finally, ISDS exposes host states to additional legal and 
financial risks, without giving them additional benefits beyond the expectation of 
incoming investments.507 
 
Van Harten argues that the fact that only investors can commence ISDS claims, 
provides arbitrators with an incentive to favour investors, so as to advance the interests 
of the ISDS industry.508 Furthermore, Van Harten argues that the fact that arbitrators are 
                                                                                                                                            
Murdoch University 2008); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
“International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 9 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMEN
T%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf (Date of 
use: 10 April 2018). 
504  Langford M, Behn D and Lie RH “The Revolving Door in International Arbitration” 2017  
(20) Journal of International Economic Law 301-331 at 320 Table 6, 325 Figure 5. 
505  See Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 145 note 25. 
506  Article III, V Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral  
Awards, (date of signature 10 June 1958, in force 7 June 1959) (New York Convention) 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1959/06/19590607%2009-
35%20PM/Ch_XXII_01p.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018). For statistics on the 
enforcement of awards by national courts see 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByFollowUpProceedings (select 
“Judicial review by national courts”) (Date of use: 30 January 2018). 
507  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment  
Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 9 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMEN
T%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf (Date of 
use: 10 April 2018). 
508  Van Harten G “Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and The Rule of Law”  
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appointed on a case-by-case basis provides them with an incentive to appease those 
who appoint them.509 Van Harten concludes that the lack of institutional safeguards to 
protect ISDS from the above possibilities undermines the normative basis for ISDS.510 
 
In addition to the above challenges, ISDS data provides empirical proof of why SADC is 
moving away from it.511 This is explained below. 
 
BITs, TIPs, investment contracts and host state laws are the primary sources of ISDS 
cases since these contain the consent of host state to ISDS.512 Of these sources, BITs 
and TIPs contribute over 70 percent of all ICSID cases opened to date.513 There are 
other factors that also contribute to the increase in ISDS cases, such as the growing 
availability of ISDS as a remedy, and the perceived lack of satisfactory alternatives to 
ISDS for the settlement of investor-State disputes.514  
 
                                                                                                                                            
in Schill SW (ed) International Investment Law and Comparative Law (Oxford University 
Press Oxford 2010) at 628; 643-657. 
509  Van Harten “Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and The Rule of Law”  
at 628 in Schill (ed) International Investment Law and Comparative Law. 
510  Van Harten “Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and The Rule of Law”  
at 628 in Schill (ed) International Investment Law and Comparative Law. 
511 The other part of the story relates to the challenges facing ISDS. See for example  
Schwieder 2016 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 178 at 184-189.  
512  See for example Gazzini T “Bilateral Investment Treaties” in Gazzini T and Brabandere E  
(eds) International Investment Law: The Sources of Rights and Obligations at 99-131;  
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes “The ICISD Caseload  
Statistics” Issue 2017-2 at 10 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-
2%20(English)%20Final.pdf (Date of use: 10 March 2018). 
513  International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes “The ICSID Caseload  
Statistics” Issue 2017-2 at 10 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-
2%20(English)%20Final.pdf (Date of use: 10 March 2018). 
514  Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 147-153. 
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As of July 2017, 114 states had been sued in ISDS by investors.515 Of these, developing 
states comprised over 65 percent of all countries sued.516 Despite the popularity of ISDS, 
investors were successful in only 29.7 percent of all ICSID claims, while 34 percent were 
dismissed, and the rest were either discontinued or settled.517 Furthermore, 68 percent 
of all arbitrators appointed in ICSID cases are from Western Europe and North America, 
ten percent were from South America and six percent were from Africa and the Middle 
East.518 From 1987 to 31 July 2017, of the more than 500 arbitrators ever appointed to 
known ISDS cases, only thirteen were appointed in 545 cases, with French arbitrator 
Bridgitte Stern being appointed in 87 cases, while the remaining twelve had no less than 
31 appointments each.519 All these arbitrators are from developed nations.520 Therefore, 
                                                
515  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment  
Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 3 at 2 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 30 March 
2018). 
516   See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International  
Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 3 at 3 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 30 March 
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March 2018). For updated statistics per host state see  
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByCountry (Date of use: 30 March  
2018). 
517  International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes “The ICSID Caseload  
Statistics” Issue 2017-2 at 14 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-
2%20(English)%20Final.pdf (Date of use: 10 March 2018). For statistics including  
non-ICSID cases see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
“International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 3 at 4 
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2018), where the patterns are similar. 
518  International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes “The ICSID Caseload  
Statistics” Issue 2017-2 at 14  
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-
2%20(English)%20Final.pdf (Date of use: 10 March 2018). The total cases to  
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519  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International  
Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue at 6 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 30 March 
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the most-used regions are under-represented in ISDS cases and only a handful of 
arbitrators handle the majority of cases. 
 
Another challenge that ISDS faces is that investors rely on controversial breaches to open 
cases,521 namely fair and equitable treatment (FET),522 and expropriation.523 FET, together 
with the minimum standard of treatment and denial of justice, was used to open almost 
half of all known ISDS cases, namely 412 cases.524 Under this category, investors were 
successful in 105 cases.525 366 cases were opened based on alleged indirect 
expropriation, while 94 claims were based on alleged direct expropriation.526 Investors 
were successful in 55 cases of indirect expropriation and 28 cases of direct expropriation 
cases.527  
                                                                                                                                            
2018); Langford, Behn and Lie 2017 (20) Journal of International Economic Law 301-331 
at 313 Table 2. 
520  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International  
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Schreuer “The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other Investment Protection 
Treaties” at 3 http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/csunpublpaper_3.pdf (Date of use: 20 
October 2017); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 
7, 63 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 
2017); Bernhard Von Pezold at para 507.  
524  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByBreaches (Date of use: 10 April  
2018).  
525  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByBreaches (Date of use: 10 April   
2018). 
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The size of ISDS claims and awards is concerning, especially for developing states. 
Historically, investors claimed compensation in excess of USD 90 Billion in more than 90 
cases.528 Of these, awards in excess of USD 1 Billion each were made in six cases, 
while three settlements in excess of USD 1 Billion each were made.529 The Yukos 
Universal Limited group of cases530 tops the list with a combined award of USD 50 
Billion, while regarding settlements Repsol v Argentina tops the list with USD 5 Billion.531 
The highest recent arbitral award against a SADC Member state is for USD 194 million 
against Zimbabwe in Bernadus Von Pezold.532 
 
It is generally accepted that the influx of ISDS claims has resulted in a phenomenon 
called regulatory chill. Although there is no uniform definition of regulatory chill,533 the 
                                                                                                                                            
2018). 
528  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByAmounts (Date of use: 10 April 2018). 
529  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByAmounts (Date of use: 10 April 2018). 
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532  Bernadus Von Pezold at para 1020. The award in this matter is being challenged. 
533  For a discussion of regulatory chill see Bartl M “Regulatory Convergence through the  
Back Door: TTIP's Regulatory Cooperation and the Future of Precaution in Europe” 2017 
(18) German Law Journal 969-992; Brown JG “International Investment Agreements:  
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preferred definition herein is that when regulatory chill occurs, “a State actor will fail to 
enact or enforce bona fide regulatory measures because of a perceived or actual threat 
of investment arbitration.”534 A brief discussion of regulatory chill will suffice. 
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Tietje and Baetens identify three kinds of regulatory chill. The first is “anticipatory 
chill”.535 This occurs when policy-makers take into account potential disputes with foreign 
investors before they begin taking regulatory measures.536 The second kind is “specific 
response chill”.537 It stems from actual, threatened or perceived disputes, which 
regulators begin to identify as a risk.538 As a result, regulators may cease the relevant 
measures, or they may make changes thereto in order to avoid the risk.539 Finally there 
is “precedential chill”, which occurs when regulators change a measure in response to a 
settled or resolved investor-state dispute, due to fear of facing a repeat of a damages 
award (in the case of a losing state party), or of facing a similar dispute (in the case of 
other states).540   
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However, there are arguments against the existence of regulatory chill.541 Irrespective of 
whether regulatory chill exists or not, there is no denying that the challenges of ISDS 
discussed above have made states to review their position towards it, as exemplified by 
the states and regions discussed herein. Furthermore, ISDS is not the only factor that 
regulators consider when taking regulatory measures. Therefore regulatory chill alone 
may not always deter states from taking measures they deem necessary.542 
Furthermore, the lack of judicial precedent in ISDS, as well as the low investor success 
rate of approximately 30 percent may give states optimism when anticipating disputes. 
 
2.5.4 Litigation 
Litigation is the resolution of a dispute before a court of law. The court may be that of a 
host state, a sub-regional court such as the SADC Tribunal, a continental court such as 
the ACH&PR,543 or an international tribunal such as the ICJ.544 In the absence of consent 
to arbitration by a host state, local litigation is the default forum for the resolution of 
investor-state disputes.545  
 
According to UNCTAD, there are five benefits to the use of the courts of host states.546 
Firstly, such use puts foreign investors on equal footing with domestic investors, as well 
                                                
541  Tietje and Baetens “The Impact of Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the  
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership” at para 74-85 
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543  See http://www.african-court.org/en/ (Date of use: 18 January 2018). 
544  See http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/ (Date of use: 13 October 2015). 
545  See for example Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 154 at  
163. 
546  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International  
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as with other foreign investors from States that do not have BITs or TIPs with a host 
state.547 Secondly, this helps to establish a level playing field among foreign investors.548 
Thirdly, local courts are well suited to applying and interpreting domestic laws.549 
Fourthly, ISDS is less critical in countries with well-developed and efficient legal 
systems.550 Finally, the use of local courts enables and brings to the fore the 
development of legal and judicial institutions of a host state.551 
 
However, local litigation also has its downside. Firstly, there is a possibility that a host 
state may not guarantee an efficient and independent judicial system, or that local courts 
                                                                                                                                            
Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 11 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMEN
T%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf (Date of 
use: 10 April 2018). 
547  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International  
Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 11 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMEN 
T%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf (Date of 
use: 10 April 2018). 
548  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International  
Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 11 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMEN 
T%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf (Date of 
use: 10 April 2018). 
549  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International  
Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 11 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMEN 
T%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf (Date of 
use: 10 April 2018). 
550  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International  
Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 11 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMEN 
T%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf (Date of 
use: 10 April 2018). 
551  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International  
Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 11 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMEN 
T%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf (Date of 
use: 10 April 2018). 
104 
 
may lack independence, or be subject to political control.552 Secondly, local litigation may 
take long to conclude (e.g. due to high caseloads), thereby resulting in costly litigation.553 
Thirdly, local courts may be subject to political interference.554 Fourth, they may be 
biased towards foreigners.555 Fifth, they may lack the expertise to deal with complex 
international law principles applicable to investment transactions.556 Sixth, local courts 
may suffer from backlogs and inefficient procedures.557 However, local courts may, 
depending on the state of their rule of law, be an attractive forum for the adjudication of 
investor-state disputes.558 Furthermore, the extent of these challenges will differ from 
one host state to another.559 Therefore the above challenges are not global, and will vary 
from state to state. On the other hand, the challenges of ISDS are global in nature. 
Recommendations regarding their future use of litigation are made in Chapter 6.560 
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2.5.5 Conclusion 
All the mechanisms for the resolution of investor-state disputes discussed above are 
important. Host states will always have different policies on foreign investment, and their 
socio-economic positions will always vary as well. Therefore, a one-size-fits-all approach 
towards the choice dispute resolution mechanism is not ideal. The failure of the PAIC in 
providing a single mechanism for African states is testament to these differences. 
SADC’s options with regard to the resolution of investor-state disputes are analysed in 
Chapter 5. 
 
2.6 SUMMARY  
This chapter introduced the concepts of state responsibility, expropriation, investment as 
well as the processes, mechanisms or methods by which investor-state disputes are 
resolved.  
 
With regard to state responsibility, it was shown that a state can incur international 
responsibility from the breach of international law, breach of treaty, breach of contract, or 
the enactment or failure to comply with its own laws. This international responsibility, 
especially which is underpinned by the duty to honour treaties, has enabled BITs, TIPs 
and investment agreements to spawn the ISDS industry.  
 
Expropriation will always be contentious between host states and investors, due to the 
potential cost it has to both parties. The thin distinction between regulatory measures 
that are acceptable, and those that are expropriatory, the open-ended nature of key 
aspects such as indirect expropriation, the quantum for compensation, varying tribunal 
decisions, etc. adds to this controversy. 
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With regard to the concept of an investment, it was noted that there is no universal 
definition of an investment. Furthermore, it was noted the Salini criteria and subsequent 
ICSID tribunal decisions are not prescriptive. Instead, they are guidelines with regard to 
the characteristics which a transaction or business should have in order to qualify as an 
investment for the purpose of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. Based on the 
decisions in Romak and Grupo Francisco Hermando Contreras, these criteria may be 
applied to non-ICSID arbitrations. The Salini criteria (or variations thereof) are being 
gradually incorporated into BITs, TIPs, human rights treaties, sub-regional court practice, 
and model treaties such as the Brazil-Malawi Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation 
of Investment (ACFI), India Model BIT, the SADC Model BIT and the PAIC.  
 
With regard to investor-state dispute resolution methods, it was noted that both ISDS 
and litigation have challenges. Therefore, neither ISDS nor litigation is inherently better 
than the other. The circumstances of a host state or region are the best determinants of 
the appropriate method for the resolution of investor-state disputes. As Salacuse opines, 
litigation may be an attractive option for the resolution of investor-state disputes, if the 
rule of law in a state is satisfactory. In other circumstances such where there no rule of 
law in a host state, ISDS may be a better option for an investor. This issue is discussed 
further in Chapter 5 below.  
 
The next chapter will analyse selected provisions of the 2006 and 2016 Annex 1, which 
regulate foreign investments at SADC level.  
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CHAPTER 3  
THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS UNDER SADC LAW 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
It will be recalled that one of the research sub-questions of this study is whether the 
remedies that are available to an investor based on Annex 1 in the event of expropriation 
are satisfactory or not.561 Furthermore, one of the sub-objectives of this study is to 
analyse the options that are open to SADC with regard to the regulation of foreign 
investments, with regard to the mechanism and forum for the resolution of investor-state 
disputes.562 
 
This chapter will address the above sub-question and sub-objective, and lays the basis 
for the discussion of the second issue that is undertaken in Chapter 5, and the 
recommendations made in Chapter 6. It commences with a historical background of 
SADC, followed by an analysis of selected provisions of the 2006 and 2016 Annex 1 
insofar as they relate to the resolution of investor-state disputes in the event of 
expropriation. The chapter concludes with a discussion of SADC Member States’ ISDS 
experience. Together with Chapter 4, this chapter will lay the basis for a view to be 
adopted, as to whether the regulation of foreign investments in terms of Annex 1 and 
Member State laws is satisfactory or not.  
 
In the course of the analysis, the 2006 and 2016 Annex 1s will be compared to similar 
BITs and TIPs such as ACIA, the Brazil-Malawi ACFI,563 IACCIA, ECT, the EU-U.S. 
                                                
561  This is sub-question 1.2.4 in Chapter 1.  
562  This is objective 1.3.5 in Chapter 1. 
563  The ACFI is discussed in Chapter 5 below. 
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Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP),564 the India Model BIT,565 
NAFTA, and the SADC Model BIT. The Annex 1s have both differences and similarities 
with these instruments, as will be shown during the analysis. These provide a context 
against which to interpret and analyse the Annex 1s.  
 
The ECT and NAFTA are useful in the analysis because they have produced a vast 
body of international arbitral decisions, which can aid in the interpretation and application 
of the relevant provisions of the Annex 1’s.566 On 8 April 2018, the ECT was the most 
invoked TIP (113 ISDS cases),567 followed by NAFTA (61 ISDS cases).568 The IACCIA is 
relevant herein as it reflects the foreign investment regulatory policy approach within 
COMESA, SADC’s partner in the T-FTA.  The DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Seychelles, Eswatini, Zambia, Zimbabwe are members of both SADC and COMESA.569 
                                                
564  The TTIP is discussed in Chapter 5 below. 
565  The India Model BIT is discussed in Chapter 5 below. 
566  For a list of NAFTA ISDS cases opened against Canada see  
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-
domaines/disp-diff/gov.aspx?lang=eng (Date of use: 10 April 2018), 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/35?partyRole=2 (Date of use: 
10 April 2018); For cases opened against the USA see 
https://www.state.gov/s/l/c3741.htm (Date of use: 25 March 2017), 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/223?partyRole=2 (date of use: 
10 April 2018); for cases opened against Mexico see https://www.state.gov/s/l/c3742.htm 
(Date of use: 10 April 2018), 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/136?partyRole=2 (Date of 
use: 17 January 2018). For access to cases opened in terms of the ECT see 
http://www.energycharter.org/what-we-do/dispute-settlement/all-investment-dispute-
settlement-cases/ (Date of use: 10 April 2018), 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByApplicableIia (Date of use: 10 April 
2018).  
567  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByApplicableIia (Date of use: 8 April  
2018). 
568  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByApplicableIia (Date of use: 8  
April 2018). 
569  http://www.comesa.int/comesa-members-states/ (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
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The ACIA has produced only two ISDS cases,570 but it is still relevant to show an Asian 
perspective to the issues herein. The ACFI, TTIP and India Model BIT are relevant 
herein because they are used as case studies in Chapter 5 below, to demonstrate 
among others the lessons that SADC can learn therefrom. 
 
The SADC Model BIT is used herein because it is reflects SADC’s BIT policy at the time 
of its conclusion.571 It does not have the force of a legal instrument, and is a 
recommended template for the Member States that wish to enter into BITs, as permitted 
under Annex 1.572 According to the introduction to the Model BIT, the Model BIT came 
into being in support of the requirement of the 2006 Annex 1, which required the 
harmonisation of investment laws and practices in SADC.573 The Model BIT project was 
funded by the EU FIP Project and the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) on behalf of the German government.574 
 
The PAIC is used herein because it is the recommended Model BIT template for AU 
Member States. It therefore has a similar legal status to the SADC Model BIT, except 
that its scope is continent-wide. Being a recent instrument from 2016 just like the 2016 
Annex 1,575 the PAIC shows the current BIT policy direction of combined AU Member 
States, especially with regard to the resolution of investor disputes. For the same 
                                                
570  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByApplicableIia (date of use: 10 April  
2018). 
571  For a brief discussion of the Model BIT see Ngobeni and Fagbayibo 2015 (19) Law  
Democracy and Development 175 at 179-182. 
572  SADC Model BIT at 3; Article 26 2006 Annex 1; Article 24 2016 Annex 1; Mbengue and  
Schacherer 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment and Trade 414 at 419. 
573  SADC Model BIT at 3. 
574  SADC Model BIT at 4. 
575  The version of the PAIC used here was circulated on 8 February 2017. 
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reason, the PAIC could be a guide as to what can be expected with regard to dispute 
resolution from the upcoming AfCFTA investment protocol. 
 
3.2 SADC: A GENERAL OVERVIEW 
SADC is one of the recognised eight RECs of the African Union (AU).576 It is comprised 
of 16 Member States situated in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as four Indian Ocean 
Islands neighboring Eastern Africa.577 SADC’s roots can be traced to the activities of the 
Frontline States (FLS), namely Angola Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Eswatini and 
Tanzania and Zambia.578 The idea of the Front Line States was born out of the 
Liberation Committee of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) in the 1960s. This 
initiative used Tanzania as a base for the support of the liberation of other Southern 
African states, such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe.579 
Zambia and Botswana joined the initiative, the latter covertly so by accepting refugees 
                                                
576  https://au.int/en/organs/recs (Date of use: 18 January 2018). 
577  SADC Member States are: The Republic of Angola; The Republic of Botswana, The  
Democratic Republic of Congo, the Kingdom of Lesotho, the Republic of Madagascar, 
the Republic of Malawi, The Republic of Mauritius; the Republic of Mozambique, The 
Republic of Namibia, The Republic of Seychelles, the Republic of South Africa, The 
Kingdom of Eswatini, The United Republic of Tanzania, The Union of Comoros, The 
Republic of Zambia; and The Republic of Zimbabwe, available at http://www.sadc.int 
(Date of use: 09 October 2017). 
578  SADC “Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan” (2004) at 1 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_P 
lan.pdf (Date of use: 09 October 2017); SADC “Major Achievements and Challenges: 25 
Years of Regional Cooperation and Integration” (2005) at 8 
http://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf (Date of use: 28 
February 2017). For a historical background of SADC see also Peters W The quest for an 
African economic community: regional integration and its role in achieving African unity- 
the case of SADC (Lang Frankfurt 2010) at 129-152. 
579  SADC “Major Achievements and Challenges” at 8 
http://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf (Date of use: 28 
February 2017). 
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from Angola, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe.580 Nigeria also played a supporting 
role for the liberation of Southern African states by supporting the FLS.581  
 
The focus on the FLS was the political liberation of the region.582 The FLS coordinated 
their efforts, resources, and strategies in the fight against colonialism, racism and white 
minority-rule.583 The idea was that since the States had common challenges of poverty 
and economic woes, they needed to work together to survive and achieve economic and 
social development. They also defended themselves against military attacks by the 
regime of the then apartheid South Africa.584 Once each State gained independence, it 
joined the FLS.585 After most of the states in the region achieved their main objective of 
political liberation from colonial rule, the focus of the FLS moved to the economic and 
social development of the region through co-operation and integration.586  
 
                                                
580  SADC “Major Achievements and Challenges” at 8 
http://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf (Date of use: 28 
February 2017). 
581  SADC “Major Achievements and Challenges” at 8 
http://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf (Date of use: 28 
February 2017). 
582  SADC “Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan” at 1 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_P 
lan.pdf (Date of use: 09 October 2017). 
583  SADC “Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan” at 1 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_P 
lan.pdf (Date of use: 09 October 2017). 
584  SADC “Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan” at 1 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_P 
lan.pdf (Date of use: 09 October 2017); SADC “Major Achievements and Challenges” at 8 
http://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf (Date of use: 28 
February 2017). 
585  Botswana joined in 1975, Mozambique and Angola joined in 1975, and Zimbabwe joined  
in 1980 and Namibia joined in 1990. 
586  SADC “Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan” at 1 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_P 
lan.pdf (Date of use: 09 October 2017). 
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In 1977, the FLS held consultations that led to a meeting of their respective Foreign 
Ministers in 1979.587 They agreed to convene an international conference at Arusha, 
Tanzania.588 This conference of Economic Ministers of the FLS and international 
participants took place during July 1979 at Arusha, Tanzania. The conference resolved 
to form a structure that will coordinate and promote regional cooperation efforts.589 The 
leaders of the then nine independent states met in Lusaka, Zambia on the 1st April 1980, 
where they formed the Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC).590 The Summit adopted a Declaration titled 'Southern Africa: Toward 
Economic Liberation' as well as a Programme of Action covering areas of Transport and 
Communications, Food and Agriculture, Industry, Manpower Development and 
Energy.591 SADCC was formally constituted on the 20th July 1981.592 The aim of the 
                                                
587  SADC website (http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty/) (Date of use:  
28 February 2017). 
588  SADC “Major Achievements and Challenges” at 9 
http://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf (Date of use: 28 
February 2017). 
589  SADC “Major Achievements and Challenges” at 9 
http://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf (Date of use: 28 
February 2017). 
590  The founding states were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Eswatini,  
United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe SADC “Regional Indicative 
Strategic Development Plan” at 2 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_P 
lan.pdf (Date of use: 09 October 2017); SADC “Major Achievements and Challenges” at 9 
http://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf (Date of use: 28 
February 2017); SADC 35th Summit Brochure (2015) at 36 
https://www.sadc.int/files/1914/5019/1522/35th_SADC_Summit_Brochure.pdf (Date of 
use: 18 February 2017); (http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-andtreaty/ 
(Date of use: 28 February 2017). 
591  SADC “Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan” at 2 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_P 
lan.pdf (Date of use: 09 October 2017); SADC “Major Achievements and Challenges” at 9 
http://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf (Date of use: 28 
February 2017). 
592  SADC website http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty/ (Date of use:  
28 February 2017). 
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SADCC was to create regional economic integration, to mobilise resources for 
implementing national and interstate policies, and to secure international co-operation 
within the framework of the strategy of economic liberation.593 In 1989, a summit of the 
Heads of State and Government held in Harare, Zimbabwe resolved that SADCC be 
transformed into an international organisation by treaty.594  
 
When Namibia attained independence in 1990, and the end of apartheid in South Africa 
was imminent, the SADCC region moved from war and fighting colonialism to attaining 
peace and stability.595 At the continental level, the Heads of State and Government of 
the OAU signed the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC Treaty) 
during 1991, thereby setting the course for the establishment of the AEC.596 This treaty 
made RECs the building blocks of the continent.597 Based on these events as well as the 
decision of the summit of Heads of State and Government of SADCC held in Harare as 
stated above, the SADCC Heads of State and Government signed the SADC Treaty on 
17 August 1992 at Windhoek, Namibia.598  
                                                
593  SADC “Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan” at 2 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_P 
lan.pdf (Date of use: 09 October 2017). 
594  SADC “Major Achievements and Challenges” at 24 
http://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf (Date of use: 28 
February 2017); SADC website  
http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty/) (Date of use: 28 February 
2017. 
595  SADC “Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan” at 2 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_P 
lan.pdf (Date of use: 09 October 2017).  
596  Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (date of signature 3 June 1991, in  
force 12 May 1994 (AEC Treaty) 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/trtdocs/en/aec/trt_aec.pdf (Date of use: 28 February 2017). 
597  Article 6 AEC Treaty. 
598  SADC “Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan” at 3 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_P 
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A recent regional integration milestone with major implications for SADC is the formation 
of the AfCFTA. The AU launched the negotiations towards the formation of the AfCFTA 
during January 2012.599 The first phase of the negotiations was concluded at the Tenth 
Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly, where the agreement establishing the 
AfCFTA, the Protocol on Trade in Goods, the Protocol on Trade in Services and the 
Protocol on Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes on were adopted on 21 
March 2018.600 44 out of the 55 AU Member States signed the AfCFTA agreement at 
this stage.601 The next round of negotiations, which will commence during the second 
                                                                                                                                            
lan.pdf (Date of use: 09 October 2017); SADC “Major Achievements and Challenges” at 
10 
http://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf (Date of use: 28 
February 2017); SADC 35th Summit Brochure at 36 
https://www.sadc.int/files/1914/5019/1522/35th_SADC_Summit_Brochure.pdf (Date of 
use: 18 February 2017); SADC website http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-
and-treaty/ (Date of use: 28 February 2017). The founding members of SADC are: 
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Eswatini, Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. South Africa joined SADC in 1994, Mauritius joined in 1995, The DRC 
and Seychelles joined in 1998, and Madagascar joined in 2005 (SADC website 
http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty/) (Date of use: 28 February 
2017). 
599  African Union (Assembly) (Eighteenth Ordinary Session, 29-30 January 2012) “Decision  
on Boosting Intra-African Trade and Fast Tracking the Continental Free Trade Area” 
Doc.EX.CL/700(XX), Assembly/AU/Dec.394(XVIII) 
https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9649-assembly_au_dec_391_-_415_xviii_e.pdf 
(Date of use: 18 December 2017).  
600  African Union (Assembly) “Decision” at para 5-6  
https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/african-union/1834-au-decision-on-the-draft- 
agreement-establishing-the-african-continental-free-trade-area-21-march-2018-1/file.html 
(Date of use: 28 March 2018). 
601  See African Union (Assembly) (Tenth Extraordinary Session, 21 March 2018)  
“INDICATION OF LEGAL INSTRUMENTS SIGNED AT THE 10TH EXTRAORDINARY 
SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY ON THE LAUNCH OF THE AFCFTA” 
https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/african-union/1831-legal-instruments-signed-
at-10th-extraordinary-summit-on-afcfta-21-march-2018/file.html (Date of use: 22 March 
2018). 
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half of 2018 and conclude in 2020, will focus on competition policy, investment and 
intellectual property rights.602  
 
The AfCFTA is a flagship programme of Agenda 2063,603 and is also a milestone 
towards the formation of the AEC, as contemplated in Articles 1 and 6(2) (c) of the AEC 
Treaty.604 In order to lay a basis for the formation of the AfCFTA, the AU resolved that 
each of the eight RECs must establish their Free Trade Areas (FTAs) by 2014.605 
However, only COMESA, EAC, and SADC managed to achieve this by forming the T-
FTA. The T-FTA Agreement was signed by 15 of the member states on 10 June 2015.606 
It was thereafter going to be signed by the remaining 11 states, and then await 
                                                
602   African Union (Assembly) “Decision” at para 12(iii), 13  
https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/african- 
union/1834-au-decision-on-the-draft-agreement-establishing-the-african-continental-free-
trade-area-21-march-2018-1/file.html (Date of use: 28 March 2018). 
603  African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 Framework Document” at viii, 97 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf (Date of use: 15 
November 2017): African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 First Ten-Year 
Implementation Plan 2014-2023” at 15, 37, 63, 120 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-first10yearimplementation.pdf (Date 
of use: 16 November 2017). For a detailed background to the AfCFTA see African Union 
(Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the  
Continental Free Trade Area About” at 51-152. 
604  African Union (Commission) (2017) “Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the  
Continental Free Trade Area About” at 2,3,15, 118 and 149 
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 
15 December 2017). 
605  African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the  
Continental Free Trade Area About” at 14-16, 123 
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 
15 December 2017). 
606  The states which signed the treaty at that point are: Angola, Burundi, Comoros, the  
Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Eswatini. 
See SADC (2015) 35th Summit Brochure at 30. For an analysis of the T-FTA see 
Angweyi V “The Tripartite Free Trade Area: A Step Closer to the African Economic 
Community?” 2016 European Yearbook of International Economic Law 589-613. 
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ratification by at least 14 member states in order to come into effect.607 Thereafter, and 
in line with the aims, objectives, and principles in Articles 2, 3, 4 and 6 of the AEC 
Treaty, the eight regional FTAs would be consolidated to form the AfCFTA. States that 
are not members of regional FTAs will join the AfCFTA directly.608  
 
The 26-member T-FTA is the biggest economic regional block in the AfCFTA. It 
represents 59 percent (USD 1.3 Trillion) of African GDP, 57 percent of Africa’s 
population, and half of AU Member States.609 SADC, as a member of the T-FTA, is an 
important and active player in the formation of the AfCFTA. South Africa was the 19th 
state to sign the T-FTA during July 2017, in preparation for the formation of the 
AfCFTA.610 Thereafter, South Africa hosted the 3rd Meeting of the AfCFTA Technical 
Working Groups from 22 August 2017 to 01 September 2017.611 SADC and the T-FTA 
are therefore active in the formation of the AfCFTA. 
                                                
607  The remaining states were: Botswana, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Libya, Lesotho, Madagascar,  
Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa, South Sudan and Zambia. See SADC 35th Summit 
Brochure at 30 
https://www.sadc.int/files/1914/5019/1522/35th_SADC_Summit_Brochure.pdf (Date of 
use: 18 February 2017). 
608  SADC 35th Summit Brochure at 2 
https://www.sadc.int/files/1914/5019/1522/35th_SADC_Summit_Brochure.pdf (Date of 
use: 18 February 2017); African Union (Assembly) (undated) “Draft Framework, Road 
Map and Architecture for Fasttracking the CFTA at 4 
https://www.tralac.org/images/Resources/Continental_FTA/Draft_ 
framework_for_the_CFTA.pdf (Date of use: 08 April 2017). 
609  Communiqué of the Third COMESA-EAC-SADC Summit: “Towards a Single Market” (10  
June 2015) at para 1(b) https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/tfta/1079-
communique-third-tripartite-summit-june-2015-english/file.html (Date of use: 10 April 
2018). 
610  http://www.sabc.co.za/wps/portal/news/main/tag?tag=TFTA (Date of use: 09 September  
2017); https://www.tralac.org/news/article/11860-the-tripartite-free-trade-area-a-
breakthrough-in-july-2017-as-south-africa-signs-the-tripartite-agreement.html (Date of 
use: 09 September 2017); http://www.spoor.com/en/News/the-tfta-and-your-trade-marks/ 
(Date of use: 09 September 2017). 
611  https://www.tralac.org/images/docs/12091/summary-update-on-the-outcomes-of-the- 
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The main objective of the AfCFTA is to reduce trade protectionism and to liberalise and 
boost intra-Africa trade.612 The AfCFTA will comprise of 55 AU Member States, a 
population of 1.2 Billion people, and a combined GDP of USD 3.4 Trillion.613 The 
milestones for the formation of the AEC are as follows:614 
 
(a) The creation and strengthening of RECs in regions where such do not yet 
exist (to be completed in 1999);  
(b) The strengthening of intra-REC integration and inter-REC harmonisation, and 
the gradual removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers (to be completed in 2007); 
(c) The creation of a free trade area (AfCFTA) and customs union in each REC 
(to be completed in 2017);  
(d) The coordination and harmonisation of tariff and non-tariff systems among 
RECs to create the continent-wide Customs Union, and a Free Trade Area 
(to be completed in 2019);  
(e) The creation of a continent-wide African Common Market (to be completed in 
2023);  
                                                                                                                                            
third-meeting-of-the-cfta-twgs-durban-september-2017.pdf (Date of use: 07 September 
2017). 
612  African Union (Assembly) (undated) “Draft Framework, Road Map and Architecture for  
Fasttracking the CFTA at 3 
https://www.tralac.org/images/Resources/Continental_FTA/Draft_ 
framework_for_the_CFTA.pdf (Date of use: 08 April 2017); 
https://www.tralac.org/news/article/12252-chief-negotiators-conclude-the-7th-round-of-
continental-free-trade-area-cfta-negotiations.html (Date of use: 06 November 2017).  
613  https://au.int/en/ti/cfta/about (Date of use: 10 April 2018). 
614  African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the  
Continental Free Trade Area About” at 15 
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 
15 December 2017). 
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(f) The creation of a continent-wide Economic and Monetary Union, a Currency 
Union and Pan-African Parliament (to be completed in 2028).  
 
The AfCFTA aims to build on RECs’ achievements and structures. As the building blocks 
of the AfCFTA, RECs are integral to the AfCFTA. Hence RECs will remain relevant, and 
they will be intensely involved in the architecture and operations of the AfCFTA.615 RECs 
shall be involved through their participation in the AfCFTA architecture.616 Among others, 
RECs will coordinate and administer Regional Technical Working Groups, Regional 
Steering Committees, and Regional Ministerial Oversight Committees for the 
implementation of the AfCFTA.617 The RECs will also administer the Regional Monitoring 
and Evaluation Committee for the AfCFTA.618 The REC institutional structures for the 
AfCFTA will then link-up with those at the continental level.619 
 
                                                
615  African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the  
Continental Free Trade Area About” at 122-124 
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 
15 December 2017). 
616  African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the  
Continental Free Trade Area About” at 121 
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 
15 December 2017). 
617  African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the  
Continental Free Trade Area About” at 122 
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 
15 December 2017). 
618  African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the  
Continental Free Trade Area About” at 122 
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 
15 December 2017).  
619  African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the  
Continental Free Trade Area About” at 122 
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 
15 December 2017). 
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Agenda 2063 also includes RECs extensively in its implementation. Thus RECs shall be 
involved in the implementation of Agenda 2063 by means of their participation in the 
Ministerial Committee on Agenda 2063.620 The roles of RECs in Agenda 2063 include:621  
 
(a)  The provision of leadership at inception in the regional and national 
consultative process with respect to the implementation of Agenda 2063;  
(b) Participation in continental level operational oversight in Agenda 2063 
implementation;  
(c) The adaptation and alignment of continental long and medium term Agenda 
2063 10-Year Plans;  
(d) The issuing plan guidelines to the Member States;  
(e) The coordination of preparation and implementation of regional programs;  
(f) The integration of regional monitoring and evaluation reports and provision of 
leadership in resource mobilisation for Agenda 2063.  
 
One hopes that as the AfCFTA and Agenda 2063 programmes and initiatives are 
implemented, the AU, RECs and Member States heed the advice of Fagbayibo with 
regard to the obstacles that hinder the realisation of supranationalism in Africa. 
Fagbayibo notes in this regard that the following factors hinder regional organisations 
from exercising supranational powers: weak institutional machinery, non-integration of 
                                                
620  African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 Framework Document” at 111 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf (Date of use: 15 
November 2017). 
621  African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 Framework Document” at 122 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf (Date of use: 15 
November 2017). 
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key integration initiatives, crowded integration landscape, skewed distribution of benefits 
and hegemonic threats, policies, instability and a democracy deficit.622  
 
It is also noteworthy that one of Agenda 2063 objectives is to achieve full gender parity 
in public and private institutions.623 Hope suggests that the AfCFTA should contribute 
towards this objective in one way or another.624 
 
In terms of Article 3 of the SADC Treaty, SADC is an international organisation with a 
separate existence independent of its members. It has the power to enter into contracts, 
acquire property, and to sue and be sued in its own capacity. The headquarters of SADC 
are in Gaborone, Botswana.625 SADC’s Vision is: 
 
… one of a Common Future, a future within a regional community that will ensure 
economic wellbeing, improvement of the standards of living and quality of life, 
freedom and social justice, and peace and security for the people of Southern 
Africa.626 
 
 
                                                
622  Fagbayibo B “Common Problems Affecting Supranational Attempts in Africa: An  
Analytical Overview” 2013 (16) (1) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 32-68 at 47-58. 
623  African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 First Ten-Year Implementation Plan 2014- 
2023” at 23, 37, 45, 77, 79 http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063- 
first10yearimplementation.pdf (Date of use: 16 November 2017.) 
624  See Hope A “A gender Responsive AfCFTA” Tralac Newsletter, 8 March 2018 
available at https://us2.campaign-
archive.com/?u=3bfd093b3611382763c2c1a5e&id=99767baa0e (Date of use: 10 March 
2018). 
625  Article 2(2) SADC Treaty. 
626  SADC 35th Summit Brochure at 3 
https://www.sadc.int/files/1914/5019/1522/35th_SADC_Summit_Brochure.pdf (Date of 
use: 18 February 2017). 
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SADC’s Mission is: 
 
…to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic 
development through efficient, productive systems, deeper cooperation and 
integration, good governance, and durable peace and security; so that the region 
emerges as a competitive and effective player in international relations and the 
world economy. 627  
 
SADC’s main objectives are: 
 
…to achieve economic development, peace, and security, and growth, alleviate 
poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern 
Africa, and support the socially disadvantaged through Regional Integration. 
These objectives are to be achieved through increased Regional Integration, built 
on democratic principles, and equitable and sustainable development.628  
 
The SADC Treaty enshrines human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.629 These 
provisions, especially that relating to the rule of law, facilitate investment protection. In 
the context of an expropriation, the rule of law forms part of the requirement of due 
process, in that an affected person must be entitled to access to the courts or relevant 
tribunals in order to challenge the expropriation. 
                                                
627  SADC 35th Summit Brochure at 23 
https://www.sadc.int/files/1914/5019/1522/35th_SADC_Summit_Brochure.pdf (Date of  
use: 18 February 2017). 
628  Article 5 SADC Treaty; SADC 35th Summit Brochure at 5 
https://www.sadc.int/files/1914/5019/1522/35th_SADC_Summit_Brochure.pdf (Date of 
use: 18 February 2017). 
629  Article 4 SADC Treaty. 
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The SADC Tribunal recognised this principle in Mike Campbell.630 The quality of the rule 
of law is important in SADC, because Annex 1 requires investor-state disputes to be 
referred to the courts of a host state.631 This means that an investor may be prejudiced 
(e.g. by being exposed to denial of justice), if it is compelled to refer a dispute to a court 
in a country that has a poor state of rule of law. 
 
The SADC Treaty has policies and strategies that guide the organisation in its quest for 
regional development and integration.632 The policies are listed in Article 5(1), while the 
strategies are in Article 5(2). Together, these are known as the SADC Common 
Agenda.633 The SADC Common Agenda can be traced to the founding declaration of 
SADC.634 Under the heading, “A Shared Future”, the SADC Declaration of August 1992 
(also known as the Windhoek Declaration)635 states that Southern Africa needs to 
arrange its affairs in such a way that it creates opportunities for its people, and to elevate 
them to become participants in regional and international markets.636 The Declaration 
also notes that the countries of Southern Africa are individually weak and 
underdeveloped. They must, therefore, come together in order to be a “serious player in 
international relations”.637  
                                                
630  Mike Campbell at 26. 
631  Article 27 2016 Annex 1. 
632  http://www.sadc.int/sadc-secretariat/directorates/office-deputy-executive-secretary- 
Regional-integration/ (Date of use: 15 July 2017).  
633  http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/sadc-common-agenda/ (Date of use: 25  
September 2015). 
634  http://www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8378/Declaration__Treaty_of_SADC.pdf (Date of  
use: 10 January 2018)  
635  SADCC Declaration “A Shared Future”, the Windhoek Declaration” at 1-10 
http://www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8378/Declaration__Treaty_of_SADC.pdf (Date of 
use: 18 January 2018). 
636  SADCC Declaration at 4 
http://www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8378/Declaration__Treaty_of_SADC.pdf (Date of 
use: 18 January 2018). 
637  SADCC Declaration at 4 
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The Common Agenda overlaps with the regional and continental economic integration 
objectives of the AU and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (“NEPAD”).638 
Some of the AU’s objectives that are relevant to the Common Agenda in terms of 
regional and continental economic integration are the promotion of sustainable 
development at the economic, social and cultural levels, the economic integration of 
African economies,639 and the coordination and harmonisation of policies between 
existing and future RECs for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union. 
NEPAD also has regional and continental integration as one of its objectives.640 
NEPAD’s founders saw RECs as the building blocks of continental integration.641 Hence 
SADC, the AU, and NEPAD all share the same objective of continental integration, 
which is encompassed in the Common Agenda. 
 
The SADC Tribunal is the judicial organ of SADC.642 It was officially established on the 
18th of August 2005. Its headquarters are in Windhoek, Namibia.643 The 2006 Annex 1 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8378/Declaration__Treaty_of_SADC.pdf (Date of 
use: 18 January 2018). 
638  http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/continental-interregional-integration/sadc- 
African-Union/. Article 24(1) allows SADC to cooperate with other organizations in the  
achievement of its objectives. 
639  Article 3(j) Constitutive Act of the African Union, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/23.15, (date of  
signature 7 November 2000, in force 26 May 2001) 
https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7758-treaty-0021_-
_constitutive_act_of_the_african_union_e.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018). 
640  United Nations Regional Coordination Mechanism Africa “Challenges and  
Prospects in the Implementation of NEPAD” (RCM-Africa Secretariat 2007) at 3 
http://www1.uneca.org/Portals/rcm/2009/reports/Challenges%20and%20Prospects.pdf  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
641  UN RCM-Africa “Challenges and Prospects in the Implementation of NEPAD” at 8  
http://www1.uneca.org/Portals/rcm/2009/reports/Challenges%20and%20Prospects.pdf  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
642  Article 9(7), 16 SADC Treaty. 
643  http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/sadc-institutions/tribun/ (Date of use: 20 August 2017). 
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enabled investors to refer investor-state disputes to the SADC Tribunal.644 However, the 
tribunal’s tenure was short-lived, as its operations were effectively suspended in 2010 by 
the SADC Summit645 after the tribunal handed down its decision in Mike Campbell. 
Thereafter, the SADC Tribunal Protocol was amended in 2014 to remove access to the 
court by natural and legal persons.646  
 
As of 2014, SADC had a total population of approximately 426,249 million,647 and a total 
landmass of 7 774 166 square kilometers.648 Based on 2015 data, SADC had an 
aggregate Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of approximately USD 725 Billion.649  
                                                
644  Article 28(2)(a) 2006 Annex 1. 
645  The SADC Tribunal is the judicial organ of the SADC region. It was formed in terms  
Article 9 of the SADC Treaty.  
646  Article 15(1) of the SADC Tribunal Protocol of 2000 as amended. For a discussion the  
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal see Zenda F The SADC Tribunal and the Judicial Settlement 
of International Disputes (LLD Thesis UNISA 2010); Phooko (2016) The SADC Tribunal: 
Its Jurisdiction, Enforcement of Its Judgments and The Sovereignty of Its Members.  
647  See Table 2, Appendix hereto. The DRC is the most populous state in SADC, with a  
population of 79 million, followed by South Africa (55 million), Tanzania (55 million), 
Mozambique (28 million), Madagascar (25 million) and Angola (25 million), Namibia (2.5 
million), Botswana (2.3 million), Lesotho (2.1 million), Mauritius (1.3 million), (1.3 million), 
and Seychelles (100 000). 
648  See Table 2, Appendix hereto. The DRC is the largest SADC state, with a landmass of 2  
344 858 Km, followed by Angola (1 246 700 Km2), South Africa (1 2221 037 Km2), 
Tanzania (947 303 Km2), Namibia (824 268 Km2), Mozambique (799 380 Km2) and 
Zambia (752 612 Km2). The smallest states are the islands of Seychelles (457 Km2), and 
Mauritius (1 969 Km2). 
649 See Table 2, Appendix hereto. During this period, South Africa had the largest GDP in  
SADC (USD 349 Billion).649 The state with the second largest GDP was Angola (USD 
146 Billion), followed by Tanzania (USD 48 Billion), Democratic Republic of Congo (USD 
35 Billion), Zambia (USD 27 Billion), and Zimbabwe (USD 14 Billion).649 Seychelles had 
the lowest GDP  (USD 1.5 Billion), followed by Lesotho (USD 2 Billion) and Eswatini 
(USD 4.4 Billion). Zambia had the highest GDP growth at 10% per annum, followed DRC 
(9.5%), Seychelles (8.7%), Tanzania (7%), Mozambique (7%), Malawi (6.5%), Botswana 
(4.4%), Angola (4.8%), Namibia (4.5%), Lesotho (4.5%), Botswana (4.4%), Eswatini 
(2.6%) and South Africa (1.5%). Due to their low populations, Seychelles and Mauritius 
had the highest per capita income at USD 15 758 and USD 9 945 respectively.649 They 
were followed by Botswana (USD 7 123), South Africa (USD 6 481), Angola (USD 6 054), 
Namibia (USD 5 588), Eswatini (USD 3 531), Zambia (USD1 715), Zimbabwe (USD 965), 
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SADC attracts a fair amount of FDI, both from within Africa and from abroad. Hence 
SADC Member States rank on par with other African states in terms of the size of FDI 
inflows. For example, during 2015, SADC states were among the top Ten African States 
that received 75 percent of the total African FDI inflows. These were Egypt (USD 14.5 
Billion), Nigeria (USD 8.6 Billion), Mozambique (USD 5.1 Billion), South Africa (USD 4.7 
Billion), Morocco (USD 4.5 Billion), Cote d’Ivoire (USD 3.5 Billion), Angola (USD 2.7 
Billion), Kenya (USD 2.4 Billion), Senegal (USD 1.9 Billion), and Cameroon (USD 1.8 
Billion).650 Angola, Mozambique, South Africa represented SADC in this group, and 
together they received 19 percent of African FDI inflows for the year.651 
 
In terms of the top ten for incoming FDI projects in Africa, South Africa led with 118 
projects, followed by Kenya (85), Morocco (71), Egypt (59), and Nigeria (51).652 
Mozambique and Tanzania were the two other SADC states to feature in the top ten, 
with 29 and 20 FDI projects respectively.653 The leading sectors that received FDI in 
2015 are Coal, Oil & Natural Gas (USD 15.7 Billion; 24 percent), Alternative/Renewable 
Energy (USD 12.2 Billion; 18 percent), Real Estate (USD8.7 Billion; 13 percent), 
Communications (USD 5.1 Billion), and Metals (USD 3.8 Billion; 6 percent).654  
                                                                                                                                            
Tanzania (USD 952), Lesotho (USD 986), Mozambique (USD 627), Madagascar (USD 
452), and Malawi (USD 342). 
650  FDI Intelligence “The Africa Investment Report 2016” at 4 
http://www.casafrica.es/casafrica/Agenda/2016/11_Africa-Investment-Report_Klassa-
Presentation.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018). 
651  FDI Intelligence “The Africa Investment Report 2016” at 4 
http://www.casafrica.es/casafrica/Agenda/2016/11_Africa-Investment-Report_Klassa-
Presentation.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018). 
652  FDI Intelligence “The Africa Investment Report 2016” at 4 
http://www.casafrica.es/casafrica/Agenda/2016/11_Africa-Investment-Report_Klassa-
Presentation.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018). 
653  FDI Intelligence “The Africa Investment Report 2016” at 4 
http://www.casafrica.es/casafrica/Agenda/2016/11_Africa-Investment-Report_Klassa-
Presentation.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018). 
654  FDI Intelligence “The Africa Investment Report 2016” at 10 
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FDI inflows into the SADC Member States during 2015 can be summarised as follows. 
Angola received USD 8.6 Billion, which was by far the highest FDI of all SADC States.655 
Mozambique received the second highest FDI of USD 3.7 Billion, followed by South 
Africa (USD 1.7 Billion), DRC (USD 1.6 Billion), Zambia (USD 1.6 Billion), Tanzania 
(USD 1.5 Billion), and Namibia (USD 1 Billion).656 The rest of the States received less 
than USD 1 Billion.657 Eswatini is the only State whose net FDI inflows was negative, 
meaning that its FDI outflows exceeded its inflows. Lesotho, Malawi, and Eswatini have 
consistently received the lowest FDI since 2005. Each of these States never received 
over USD 200 Million in any one year.658 Zimbabwe ranked slightly above these States, 
and the most FDI it received in any one year is USD 544 Million.659 Mauritius has 
received a maximum of USD 589 in a year over the ten-year period.660 South Africa 
received less FDI in 2014 (USD 5.6 Billion) and 2015 (USD 1.7 Billion) than it did it in 
2013 (USD 8.3 Billion).661 Mozambique has consistently received over USD 3 Billion 
since 2011.662 Tanzania and Zambia have also consistently increased their FDI since 
2005.663 Madagascar also recovered from a low of USD 86 Million in 2005 to a high of 
USD 1 Billion in 2008 and 2009.664 Botswana’s FDI inflows have been flat, with an 
average of approximately USD 400 Million each year.665 
 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.casafrica.es/casafrica/Agenda/2016/11_Africa-Investment-Report_Klassa-
Presentation.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018). 
655  See Table 3, Appendix hereto. 
656  See Table 3, Appendix hereto. 
657  See Table 3, Appendix hereto. 
658  See Table 3, Appendix hereto. 
659  See Table 3, Appendix hereto. 
660  See Table 3, Appendix hereto. 
661  See Table 3, Appendix hereto. 
662  See Table 3, Appendix hereto. 
663  See Table 3, Appendix hereto. 
664  See Table 3, Appendix hereto. 
665  See Table 3, Appendix hereto. 
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3.3 THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN SADC 
 
This section will discuss the selected provisions of the 2006 and 2016 Annex 1’s as 
indicated in the introduction above.  
 
Annex 1 is contained in the FIP, a multilateral TIP that seeks to harmonise the regulation 
of finance and investments in SADC.666 The FIP was concluded in terms of Articles 21 
and 22 of the SADC Treaty. Article 21 of the SADC Treaty requires the Member States 
to cooperate in all areas necessary to foster regional development and integration, while 
Article 22 requires the Member States to conclude such protocols as may be necessary 
for each area of co-operation. The FIP therefore discharges the mandate of Member 
States to integrate the SADC community in the areas covered by the FIP, of which 
foreign investments is the area covered by Annex 1. Article 19 of the 2006 Annex 1 and 
Article 17 of the 2016 Annex 1 contribute towards regional integration by requiring 
Member States to harmonise their laws, policies and practices in line with the Annex.667  
 
The FIP was signed on 18 August 2006, and it came into effect on 16 April 2010.668 
However, Annex 1 had a short tenure, since the SADC Summit at its 36th session on 31 
August 2016 approved the Draft Agreement Amending Annex 1 to the SADC Protocol on 
Finance and Investment, which repealed the 2006 Annex 1 and introduced the 2016 
                                                
666  The scope of investments covered by the Protocol is described in Article 1(2) of the  
SADC FIP. For an analysis of the 2006 Annex 1 see Ngobeni and Fagbayibo 2015 (19) 
Law, Democracy and Development 175 at 175-92. For a comparative analysis of 2006 
and 2016 Annex 1 see Kondo 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1- 47. 
667  See Ngobeni and Fagbayibo 2015 (19) Law, Democracy and Development 175 at 178. 
668  http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/1009. Article 29 of the SADC FIP  
stipulates that the FIP shall come into force after ratification by two-thirds of Member 
States.  
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Annex 1.669 The 2016 Annex 1 is supposed to come into effect upon ratification by three 
quarters of Member States,670 although according to Chidede, the 2016 Annex 1 is in 
effect.671 
 
In a nutshell, Annex 1 seeks to reduce the exposure of SADC Member States to investor 
claims, by among others narrowing the scope of covered investments, and reducing 
investor rights.  
 
Annex 1 seeks to create a favorable investment environment within SADC, with the aim 
of attracting and promoting foreign investment.672 It envisages the creation of a SADC-
wide investment zone with a common Regional Investment Policy Framework.673 This is 
done through Article 19 of the 2006 Annex 1 and Article 17 of the 2016 Annex 1, which 
require that Member States’ investment policies, laws, and practices be harmonised into 
a single investment regime applicable across the anticipated SADC investment zone.674 
The Baseline Study on the implementation of the FIP describes the harmonisation 
process as follows: 
 
                                                
669  See Communiqué of the SADC 36th Summit at para 37 
https://www.sadc.int/files/4914/7274/8383/Communique_of_the_36th_SADC_Summit_Es
watini__31_August_2016.pdf) (Date of use: 15 October 2017).   
670  Article 3 of the Agreement Amending Annex 1 (attached to the beginning of the new  
Annex 1). 
671  See Chidede T “Amendments of Annex 1 to the SADC Finance and Investment Protocol:  
Are they in force yet?” 
https://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/11875-amendments-of-annex-1-to-the- 
sadc-finance-and-investment-protocol-are-they-in-force-yet.html (Date of use: 15 October  
2017); Kondo 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 at 5. 
672  Article 2(2) (a) 2006 Annex 1. The other ways of achieving this objective are listed in  
Article 2(2) (c)-(n) of 2006 Annex 1. See also Article 2 of the 2016 Annex 1. 
673  Ngobeni and Fagbayibo 2015 (19) Law, Democracy and Development 175 at 178. 
674  See also Article 17 2016 Annex 1. 
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Focus shifts from the individual Member States to the region. The 
agreement is reached on harmonized standards, systems, and policies. 
Through domestic adoption of these, individual domestic frameworks start 
to look and function the same. At the end of this phase, all domestic 
frameworks are harmonized to a regional standard.675 (Emphasis added) 
 
In order to make harmonisation a reality, Member States agree to co-operate to create a 
favorable investment climate in the SADC region, as envisaged by Annex 1.676 Selected 
provisions of 2006 and 2016 Annex 1 that relate to the resolution of investor-state 
disputes will now be considered.  
 
3.3.1 Definition of an investment 
It was shown in Chapter 2 above that there is no universally agreed definition of an 
investment in ISDS. In SADC, the 2006 and 2016 Annex 1’s provide the definitions of an 
investment, while investments at Member State level are defined in investment laws. 
The 2006 Annex 1 defines an investment as: 
 
…the purchase, acquisition or establishment of productive and portfolio 
investment assets, and in particular, though not exclusively, includes:  
 
(a)  Movable and immovable property and any other property rights such as 
mortgages, liens or pledges;  
(b)  Shares, stocks and debentures of companies or interest in the property of 
such companies;  
                                                
675  Ngobeni and Fagbayibo 2015 (19) Law, Democracy and Development 175 at 178. 
676  Article 3 2006 Annex 1; Article 2 2016 Annex 1. 
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(c)  Claims to money or to any performance under contract having a financial 
value, and loans;  
(d)  Copyrights, know-how (goodwill) and industrial property rights such as 
patents for inventions, trademarks, industrial designs and trade names;  
(e) Rights conferred by law or under contract, including licenses to search for, 
cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources. 677 
 
It must be borne in mind that the Salini criteria may apply to the above definition, as 
explained above.678 The effect of this is that some of the categories of assets that are in 
the definition of investments above, such as shares, claims to money, copyright, may not 
meet the Salini criteria should a dispute arise.679 This will is a realistic risk, as shown by 
the decision in Romak. 
 
The definition above is similar to that of an investment under Article 4(c) of the ACIA, 
Article 159(2) of the COMESA Treaty and Article 1(9) of the IACCIA. 
 
On the other hand, the 2016 Annex 1 defines an investment as: 
 
… an enterprise within the territory of one Member State established, acquired or 
expanded by an investor of the other Member State, including through the 
constitution, maintenance or acquisition of a juridical person or the acquisition of 
shares, debentures or other ownership instruments of such an enterprise, 
                                                
677  Article 1(2) 2006 Annex 1.  
678  See the Conclusion in Chapter 2 above. 
679  In fact, all the investment categories stated may not meet the Salini criteria, by virtue of  
their nature i.e. the 2006 Annex 1 uses an open-list asset-based definition and not  
an enterprise-based one.  
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provided that the enterprise is established or acquired in accordance with the 
laws of the Host State and registered in accordance with the legal requirements 
of the Host State.680 (Emphasis added)  
 
This definition is the same as that provided in the SADC Model BIT681 and the PAIC.682 
The definition is most likely to meet the Salini criteria, as it requires the establishment of 
a business, unlike the definition in the 2006 Annex 1 that requires an investor to hold an 
asset only. 
 
The main difference between the old and new definitions is that while the old definition 
requires the acquisition of the assets specified in the definition as a pre-requisite (open-
list asset-based definition), the new definition requires that there must be an enterprise, 
which may possess assets in the normal course (enterprise-based definition).683 
 
The other noticeable change brought by the 2016 Annex 1 is that the new definition 
excludes the following from the definition of an investment (the definition in the 2006 
Annex 1 did not have exclusions): 
 
(a) Debt securities issued by a government or loans to a government;  
(b) Portfolio investments;  
(c) Claims to money that arise solely from commercial contracts for the sale of 
goods or services by a national or enterprise in the territory of a Member State to 
                                                
680  Article 1(2) 2016 Annex 1. 
681  SADC Model BIT at 9. 
682  Article 4(4) PAIC. 
683  Article 1(2) 2016 Annex 1. See also Kondo 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law  
Journal at 6-8. 
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an enterprise in the territory of another Member State, or the extension of credit 
in connection with a commercial transaction, or any other claims to money that 
do not involve the kind of interests set out in subparagraphs (a) through (g) 
above.684 
 
Except for the exclusion of portfolio investments, these exclusions are similar to those 
contained in Article 1139 of NAFTA, Article 4(c) of the ACIA,685 and Article 1(9) of the 
IACCIA. The ECT does not provide exclusions and its definition of an investment is very 
broad.686 The new definition requires the existence of an enterprise, which must be 
incorporated in terms of the laws of and be located in a host state. An enterprise must 
have been established, acquired or expanded by investors “of another Member State”.  
 
The implications of the compulsory registration of an enterprise in a Host State is that 
the Home State of a shareholder can exercise diplomatic protection against a Host 
State687 if a shareholder suffers injury in the hands of the Host State.688 
 
                                                
684  Article 1(2) 2016 Annex 1 FIP. 
685  Article 4(c), footnote 3 ACIA.  
686  Article 1(6) states that an investment means “every kind of asset, owned or controlled  
directly or indirectly by an Investor”. 
687  United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection”  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 
September 2017) Article 2 defines diplomatic protection as: 
 
… the invocation by a State, through diplomatic action or other means of 
peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by 
an internationally wrongful act of that State to a natural or legal person that is a 
national of the former State with a view to the implementation of such 
responsibility.  
688  United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection”  
Article 11 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 
September 2017). This article is specifically aimed at the protection of shareholders. 
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While it is acceptable for SADC to set nationality requirements for enterprises and 
investors who will be covered by Annex 1,689 company ownership structures can be 
complex, and a group of companies may involve hundreds of subsidiaries, especially 
when dealing with multinational enterprises.690 Often, the ultimate owners of a subsidiary 
of a multinational enterprise incorporated in a particular locality are based in foreign 
jurisdictions. UNCTAD questions the effectiveness of restricting the ownership of local 
operating entities to locals. It states that: 
 
The fact that corporate structures are complex and that consequently investor 
nationality is becoming less and less clear in practice has important implications 
for national and international investment policies. The effectiveness of foreign 
ownership restrictions, for example, is called into question if a domestic majority 
owner is itself owned by other foreign investors.691  
 
UNCTAD further notes that globally, 41 percent of foreign subsidiaries are owned by 
their corporate parents through an ownership structure with at least one intermediate 
subsidiary based in a country different from that of the ultimate owner.692 UNCTAD 
                                                
689  See for example the legitimate reasons which are often used to limit investments to  
nationals of a state at UNCTAD “World Investment Report 2016” (United Nations New 
York and Geneva 2016) at 159-160 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Download.asp?docid=6087&lang=1&intItemID=3489 
(Date of use: 15 October 2017). 
690  UNCTAD “World Investment Report 2016” at 134  
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Download.asp?docid=6087&lang=1&intItemID=3489 
(Date of use: 15 October 2017). 
691  UNCTAD “World Investment Report 2016” at 126  
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Download.asp?docid=6087&lang=1&intItemID=3489 
(Date of use: 15 October 2017). 
692  UNCTAD “World Investment Report 2016” at 125  
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Download.asp?docid=6087&lang=1&intItemID=3489 
(Date of use: 15 October 2017). 
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furthermore notes that financial institutions, institutional investors, founding families and 
governments often own publicly listed MNEs. These are the ultimate beneficial owners 
who benefit from the activities of an MNE. 693 In this regard, it is noteworthy that while 
the 2016 Annex 1 requires that an enterprise must be owned by an investor who is from 
a Member State as discussed above, it does not require that an investor which is a 
juristic entity be owned by persons who are from a Member State.694 Therefore, nothing 
prevents a shareholder who is from outside SADC from ultimately owning an entity that 
is an investor in terms of the above definition.  
 
Despite the above definition of an investment, if an investor-state dispute arose, and an 
investor commenced ICSID arbitration based on the 2006 Annex 1, a tribunal would in 
addition to assessing whether an investment in question met the definition of an 
investment provided in the 2006 Annex 1, also assess if the investment met the criteria 
for an investment in terms of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. It is during this 
process that a tribunal would determine if the investment in question meets the Salini 
criteria. It was shown above that the Salini criteria can be applied to non-ICSID 
arbitration, and thus it is ideal if an investment meets the stated criteria so that a tribunal 
can have jurisdiction ratione materiae. 
 
Depending on the policy objectives of a state, investments can be given a narrow or 
restricted definition, or an all-encompassing or wide definition, as discussed below. The 
SADC Model BIT deals with the options available in this regard and recommends a 
                                                
693  UNCTAD “World Investment Report 2016” at 131 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Download.asp?docid=6087&lang=1&intItemID=3489 
(Date of use: 15 October 2017). 
694  The definition of an investor does not prescribe that the owner (e.g. a shareholder of an  
investor be from a SADC Member State. See the discussion in this section under 
subparagraph (c) below. 
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restricted definition that describes an investment as an enterprise.695 The Model BIT 
explains that a restricted approach is ideal from a developing country perspective.696 
UNCTAD notes in this regard that a wide definition of an investment exposes a host 
state to unexpected liabilities.697  
 
Recent examples of restricted definitions of an investment in developing states can be 
found in the India Model BIT698 and the PAIC.699 These instruments first restrict the 
scope of an investment by providing that an investment must be in the form of an 
enterprise, and nothing else. They further exclude debt securities issued by 
governments, loans to governments, portfolio investments, and claims to money arising 
from commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services by a natural or legal entity, 
or claims relating thereto.700  
 
The India Model BIT further narrows the definition of an investment by providing that an 
enterprise must have real and substantial business operations.701 In a novel move, the 
TTIP proposal,702 India Model BIT703 and the PAIC704 define an investment by reference 
to the Salini criteria. They provide that a business must have: made substantial and 
long-term investment in a host state, employed a substantial number of employees in the 
host state, assumed a business risk, made a substantial contribution to the development 
                                                
695  SADC Model BIT, commentary at 13. 
696  SADC Model BIT, commentary at 13. 
697  UNCTAD “Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development 2015” at 90  
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 August  
2017). 
698  Article 1(6) India Model BIT. 
699  Article 4(4) PAIC. 
700  See Article 1(2), 1(7) India Model BIT; Article 4(4) PAIC. 
701  Article 1.2 India Model BIT. 
702  Article x.2 TTIP. 
703  Article 1.2(1) India Model BIT. 
704  Article 4(4) Draft PAIC. 
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of a host state through its operations, e.g. through the transfer of skills and know-how, 
and the business must have been conducted in accordance with the law of the host 
state.705 The ACIA (whose definition of an investment is similar to that provided in the 
2006 Annex 1) provides that an investment that consists of a single asset that does not 
meet the requirements of an investment (as in the Salini criteria) shall not be an 
investment.706 The Brazil-Malawi ACFI also requires an investment to have real and 
substantial business operations, and provides that an investment must be an enterprise 
established with a “long-lasting economic relation with a view to producing goods and 
services”.707 The 2016 Annex 1 fails to specify that investments must meet the Salini 
criteria. This leaves room for shell companies to obtain the protection of the 2016 Annex 
1. 
 
The TTIP,708 India Model BIT,709 and the PAIC710 provide that an investment that was 
obtained by means of corruption, fraud and the like shall not be covered. This provision 
ensures that only legitimate investments are protected, and is a deterrent against 
corruption. The 2016 Annex 1 does not have such a provision. This is a significant 
omission that misses the opportunity to deter corruption by foreign investors. 
 
Finally, the India Model BIT711 and the PAIC712 provide that investments must be made in 
terms of the laws of a host state. This further restricts the scope of protected 
                                                
705  Article 1.2.2 India Model BIT. The requirement that the business must have been  
conducted in terms of the law of the host state is not part of the Salini criteria. 
706  Article 4(c) footnote 2 ACIA. 
707  Article 2(1) Brazil-Malawi ACFI. 
708  Article 6(6) TTIP Proposal. 
709  Article 9 India Model BIT. 
710  Article 20(2), 20(3), 21 PAIC. The latter provision is in the form of a prohibition on  
investors not to partake in bribery activities in their Host States. 
711  Article 1.6 India Model BIT. 
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investments by excluding non-compliant investments. The Annex 1 does not have such 
provisions.  
 
By contrast, developed states use wide definitions of an investment. For example, the 
ECT713 and the TTIP714 provide the widest possible definitions of an investment, which 
include every conceivable asset class. The TTIP goes even further to cover investments 
that existed prior to the coming into effect of the TTIP.715 The rationale for this wide 
definition is probably that because the EU is a leading capital exporter, a wider definition 
is in the interests of its nationals, as more of their investments abroad will be protected 
by the wide definitions. In North America, the NAFTA also provides a wide definition,716 
though not as wide as that provided by the ECT or TTIP. Again, the rationale should be 
similar to that of the EU. Brazil, as a developing capital exporter also adopts a wide 
definition of an investment that an investment shall be any type of property or right, 
directly or indirectly owned or controlled by an investor.717 Based on the above, SADC as 
a developing region is on the right track by adopting a restricted definition of an 
investment. This will reduce the scope of covered investments, and thus reduces the 
scope of potential claims against host states. 
 
3.3.2 Definition of an enterprise 
As discussed in the preceding section, the 2016 Annex 1 requires an investment to be in 
the form an enterprise, while the 2006 Annex 1 does not have this requirement. This 
definition will be briefly considered. The 2016 Annex 1 defines an enterprise as: 
                                                                                                                                            
712   Article 4(4) PAIC. 
713  Article 1(6) ECT. 
714  Article x2 TTIP Proposal. 
715  Article x1 TTIP Proposal. 
716  Article 1139 NAFTA. 
717  Article 2(1) Brazil-Malawi ACFI. 
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… Any entity constituted or organized under the applicable laws of any State, 
whether or not for profit, and whether privately or governmentally owned or 
controlled, and includes a corporation, trust, partnership, sole proprietorship, 
branch, joint venture, association, or other such organization (Emphasis 
added).718 
 
It is immediately apparent that this definition does not provide that an enterprise must be 
constituted under the laws of a SADC Member State. Rather it refers to “any State”, 
which is ambiguous. On the other hand, as shown above, the definition of an investment 
provides that an enterprise must be established or acquired in accordance with the laws 
of the host state, and be registered in accordance with the legal requirements of the host 
state.  
 
The definition of an investment discussed above makes it clear that an enterprise must 
be incorporated in a SADC host state in order to qualify as an investment. Therefore, the 
above definition of an enterprise does not align with this requirement. It ought to state 
unequivocally that an enterprise must be constituted or organised under the applicable 
laws of a SADC Member State. 
 
By contrast, the PAIC’s definition of an enterprise is properly drafted, and requires that 
an enterprise be constituted or incorporated in terms of the applicable laws and 
                                                
718  Article 1 2016 Annex 1. 
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regulations of a Member State.719 The India Model BIT also requires that an enterprise 
be incorporated in terms of the laws of a Host State.720 
 
3.3.3 Definition of an investor 
The definition of an investor is equally important as that of an investment, as it defines 
who may be a potential claimant in an investor-state dispute with a host state (i.e. it 
determines jurisdiction ratione personae).  A wide definition of an investor enables more 
potential claimants to sue a host state, while a restricted definition limits the number of 
potential claimants. Hence UNCTAD cautions in this regard that a wide definition of an 
investor can result in unanticipated coverage of persons.721 
 
The 2006 Annex 1 provides a nationality-neutral definition of an investor, and states that 
an investor is a person who has “been admitted to make or has made an investment,”722 
On the other hand, the 2016 Annex 1 introduces the nationality of an investor as well as 
the legality of an investment as a pre-requisite. It defines an investor as:   
 
… a natural or a juridical person of a State Party making an investment in 
another State Party, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the State 
Party in which the investment is made. 723 (Emphasis added) 
 
                                                
719  Article 4(1) PAIC. 
720  Article 1.2(i) India Model BIT. 
721  UNCTAD “Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development” at 90  
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 August  
2017). 
722  Article 1(2) 2006 Annex 1. 
723  Article 1(2) 2016 Annex 1. 
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Therefore, the definition of an investor in the 2016 Annex 1 contemplates four 
requirements. Firstly, an investor can be a natural or juristic person. Secondly, the 
investor must be from a SADC Member State. Thirdly, the investor must make an 
investment in another Member State, i.e. not in the investor’s home state. Fourth, the 
investment must be made in terms of the laws and regulations of the host state. 
 
The above definition of an investor is similar to that provided by the IACCIA.724 The ACIA 
also has a similar definition, but it does not require that an investment be made in terms 
of the laws of a Member State.725 The ECT,726 TTIP Proposal,727 India Model BIT,728 
NAFTA,729 and the PAIC730 also require that an investor be a national of a Member 
State.731  
 
The requirement that an investor be “of a Member State” necessarily implies that a 
person who is not “of a Member State” will not qualify as an investor. 732 However, this 
provision is vague and open to interpretation since the 2016 Annex 1 does not define 
what “of a State Party” means. It is submitted that if “of a State Party” means that an 
investor must be a national of a host state, then an investor who is a national of a host 
state will possibly have the dual nationality of his/her home state (unless same was 
                                                
724  Article 1(4) IACCIA. 
725  Article 4(d) ACIA. 
726  Article 1(7) ECT. 
727  Article 1(1)(a) Chapter 1 (General Provisions) Trade in Services, Investment and E- 
Commerce 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153669.pdf)  
(Date of use: 10 October 2017). 
728  Article 1.9 India Model BIT. 
729  Article 1139 NAFTA. However, the definition also defines a non-national of a member  
state as an investor. 
730  Article 4(5) PAIC. 
731  Article 1(7). 
732  See also Kondo 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 at 9. 
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relinquished) as well as that of the host state.733 This will also mean that an investor’s 
home state can exercise diplomatic protection in the event that the investor suffers injury 
at the hands of the host state. In that event, the home state must demonstrate that it has 
predominant nationality with regard to the investor, vis-à-vis the host state.734  
 
However, if a natural person who is not a national of a host state is allowed to be an 
investor, the investor’s home state can exercise diplomatic protection in the ordinary 
course in event that the investor suffers injury at the hands of the host state.735 It is 
therefore important that clear language is used to define who may be an investor, with 
the implications for diplomatic protection in mind as indicated above. 
 
Nonetheless, nationality and not residence is a common criterion used to determine who 
can be an investor.736 The key is to use the appropriate language to define this, as 
stated above. In order to prevent the abuse of nationality for the purpose of obtaining the 
protection of BIT or other instrument, other criteria can be added to determine who may 
be an investor.  
                                                
733  Kondo 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 at 9 notes that the new  
definition does not address the issue of dual nationality that may arise as discussed here. 
734  Article 7 United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic  
Protection”  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 
September 2017). See also Ngobeni 2012 (37) South African Yearbook of International 
Law 169-186. 
735  See Article 3 United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic  
Protection”  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 
September 2017). For recent international case of diplomatic protection involving SADC 
Member State see Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v 
Democratic Republic of Congo) ICJ General List No.103, Judgment of 30 November 
2010 and Judgment of 19 June 2012. 
736  See for example Article 2(1) Brazil-Malawi ACFI, Article 4(e) ACIA, Article 2(1) ECT,  
Article 1.9 India Model BIT, and Article 1139 NAFTA.  
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Other TIPs deal with this issue as follows. The TTIP Proposal provides that a covered 
investment is one that is owned or controlled by investors of one Member State, and 
made in the other Member State.737 It emphasises this requirement by providing that a 
party can deny the benefits of the agreement to an investor if investors from a non-
Member State own or control the investor.738 The India Model BIT provides that an 
investor must be a natural person from a state party, or a legal entity incorporated in 
terms of the laws of a state party, that is owned or controlled by persons from a state 
party, and having real and substantial business operations in the home state.739 The 
Brazil-Malawi ACFI is similar to the TTIP Proposal and the India Model BIT. It provides 
that for an investor to be covered in terms of the ACFI, it must be incorporated in a 
Member State, and it must establish a long-lasting economic relationship with a view to 
producing goods and services.740 The ACFI adds that persons who are nationals or 
permanent residents of a Member State must own an investor.741  
 
The practice of requiring an investor to have real and substantial business operations is 
good for the prevention of the use of shell companies and treaty shopping.742 A recent 
                                                
737  Article x1 TTIP Proposal. 
738  Article 9 TTIP Proposal. 
739  Article 1(6) India Model BIT. 
740  Article 2.1 Brazil-Malawi ACFI. 
741  Article 2.1 Brazil-Malawi ACFI. 
742  For further reading on treaty shopping see Chaisse J “The Treaty Shopping Practice:  
Corporate Structuring and Restructuring to Gain Access to Investment Treaties and 
Arbitration” 2015 (11) Hastings Business Law Journal 225-305; Lee E “Treaty Shopping 
in International Investment Arbitration: How often has it occurred and how has it been 
perceived by tribunals?” LSE Working Paper Series 2015 No. 15-167, 1-54 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/pdf/Dissertations/WP167.pdf) (Date of 
use: 23 February 2017); Kirtley WL “The Transfer of Treaty Claims and Treaty-Shopping 
in Investor-State Disputes” 2009 (10) (3) Journal of World Investment and Trade 427-
461; Primec J Enemy of the State: Is Treaty Shopping in Contradiction with The 
Rationale of Investment Law? (Master’s Thesis University of Amsterdam 2015) 
http://dare.uva.nl/cgi/arno/show.cgi?fid=621905) (Date of use: 24 February 2017); 
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study found that treaty shopping targets developing states in 80 percent of arbitration 
cases studied.743 Another study found that treaty shopping exposes a host state to 
claims by companies to which it would otherwise not allow entry.744 As a result of treaty 
shopping, a host state can find it difficult to regulate in the public welfare.745  
 
Australia was recently exposed to a case based on treaty shopping in Philip Morris Asia 
v Australia.746 In this case, the claimant had changed its corporate structure in order to 
access ISDS under the Agreement between the Government of Hong Kong and the 
Government of Australia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments. The change 
was done in anticipation of disputes that were to arise from the new regulation of 
cigarette packaging introduced by the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 and the 
Tobacco Plain Packaging Regulations 2011.747 The claimant’s alleged rationale for the 
restructuring was to improve efficiencies, while taking into account political risk in 
Australia among other countries. However, the tribunal rejected this argument and found 
that the case was based on treaty shopping.748  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Shreuer C “Nationality of Investors: Legitimate Restrictions v.s. Business Interests” 2009 
(24) (2) ICSID Review Foreign Investment Law Journal 521-527; Wilske S “Protection of 
Taiwanese Investors under Third Party Bilateral Investment Treaties - Ways, Means and 
Limits of Treaty Shopping” 2011 (4) Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal 145-177; 
Zhang X “Proper Interpretation of Corporate Nationality under International Investment 
Law to Prevent Treaty Shopping” 2013 (6) Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal 49-73. 
743  At 25, 28. 
744  Prime J Enemy of the State: Is Treaty Shopping in Contradiction with The Rationale Of  
Investment Law? at 18. 
745  Primec J Enemy of the State: Is Treaty Shopping in Contradiction with The Rationale Of  
Investment Law? at 19. 
746  Philip Morris Asia Limited v The Commonwealth of Australia (PCA Case No. 2012-12)  
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 17 December 2015. 
747  Philip Morris Asia Limited at para 585-588. The tribunal summarized the case law on the  
issue at para 538ff. The corporate structure is described in para 95-98. 
748  Philip Morris Asia Limited at para 98. 
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The tribunal in Phoenix Action 749 also found that the investment in that matter was not 
bona fide, as it was made purely for the purpose of bringing ISDS proceedings against 
the Czech Republic.750  
 
It is clear from the above discussion that the 2016 Annex 1 fails to address the possible 
abuse of nationality by investors. It therefore does not curb the use of shell companies 
and treaty shopping. As indicated earlier, the 2016 Annex 1 also fails to unequivocally 
deny protection to investments that were secured via corrupt means. 
 
3.3.4 Expropriation 
As shown in the preceding chapter, a state has a sovereign right to expropriate property, 
provided certain internal law requirements as discussed in this section are met.751 
However, states and regions are to some extent at liberty to vary the international law 
requirements,752 and they do stipulate their own requirements to be met for an 
expropriation to be valid, as Annex 1 does. One such requirement is the quantum of 
compensation that an investor may obtain in the event of expropriation.753 The 2006 
Annex 1 provides that a Member State may not expropriate an investment unless the 
expropriation is for a public purpose, is non-discriminatory, is in terms of due process, 
and is accompanied by prompt and adequate compensation.754 However, the 2016 
Annex 1 adopts a cautious approach, and changes the standard of compensation from 
                                                
749  Phoenix Action at para 101, 113, 134, 135 and 144. 
750  Phoenix Action at para 142. 
751  See the discussion of expropriation in Chapter 2 above. 
752  An example here is that a state cannot change the requirements to provide that no  
compensation shall be paid for an expropriation, because this will violate the rule that 
compensation must be paid. Instead, a state can vary the quantum of compensation. 
753  The various standards of compensation are discussed in Chapter 2 above. 
754  Article 5 2006 Annex 1.  
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“prompt, adequate and effective” to “fair and adequate”.755 In addition, it provides a 
framework for the determination of fair compensation, as follows: 
 
Fair and adequate compensation shall be assessed in relation to the fair 
market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the 
expropriation took place … and shall not reflect any change in value occurring 
because the intended expropriation had become known earlier. However, 
where appropriate, the assessment of fair and adequate compensation shall 
be based on an equitable balance between the public interest and interest of 
those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances and taking account 
of:  
 
(a)  The current and past use of the property;  
(b) The history of its acquisition;  
(c)  The fair market value of the investment;  
(d)  The purpose of the expropriation;  
(e)  The extent of previous profit made by the foreign investor through  
the investment; and  
(f)  The duration of the investment.756 
 
This provision is the same as Article 6.2 of the SADC Model BIT. The first sentence of 
Article 5(2)757 is similar to Articles 14(2) of the ACIA, 1110(2) of the NAFTA,758 and 13(1) 
                                                
755  Article 5(1) 2016 Annex 1. 
756  Article 5(2) 2016 Annex 1. See also Kondo 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law  
Journal 1 at 15-16. 
757  Article 5(2) 2016 Annex 1 provides that  
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of the ECT.759 Therefore, tribunal decisions that applied NAFTA Article 1110(2)760 and 
ECT Article 13(1)761 will among other sources be valuable in the application of Article 
5(2).  
 
By comparison, the ACIA,762 ECT,763 and the TTIP Proposal764 provide for the payment 
of prompt, adequate and effective compensation, while NAFTA provides for the payment 
of fair market value.765 The IACCIA, 766 India Model BIT767 and the PAIC provide for the 
payment of adequate compensation.768 The ACFI provides for payment of effective 
compensation.769 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Fair and adequate compensation shall be assessed in relation to the fair market 
value of the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took 
place (“date of expropriation”) and shall not reflect any change in value occurring 
because the intended expropriation had become known earlier. 
758  Article 1110(2) of NAFTA provides that  
Fair and adequate compensation shall be assessed in relation to the fair market 
value of the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took 
place (“date of expropriation”) and shall not reflect any change in value occurring 
because the intended expropriation had become known earlier. 
759  Article 13(1) of the ECT provides that 
Such compensation shall amount to the fair market value of the Investment 
expropriated at the time immediately before the Expropriation or impending 
Expropriation became known…  
760  See for example Metalclad at para 118 – 131. 
761  See for example Anatolie Stati at para 314 – 406; Yukos Universal Limited at para 1758- 
1829; Hulley Enterprises Limited at para 1758-1829.  
762  Article 14(1) (c) ACIA. 
763  Article 13(1) (d) ECT. 
764  Article 5(1) (d) TTIP Proposal. 
765  Article 1110(2) NAFTA. 
766  Article 20(1) (c) and Article 159(3) Investment Agreement for the COMESA Investment  
Area (date of signature 23 May 2007, not in force) 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/treaty/3225 (Date of use: 15 October 2017). 
767  Article 5.1 India Model BIT. 
768  Article 11(1) (c) PAIC. 
769  Article 8(2)(c) Brazil-Malawi ACFI 
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Like the 2016 Annex 1, the India Model BIT770 and the PAIC provide guidelines for the 
determination of compensation.771 
 
The 2016 Annex 1 has also relaxed the international law requirement that payment of 
compensation must be prompt. It allows a host state to settle a judgment for the 
payment of compensation obtained by an investor in annual installments over a period of 
three years, or over such period as the parties may agree upon.772 The judgment will 
also bear interest at a rate to be agreed upon by the parties.773 The IACCIA also 
provides for the payment of compensation in installments over a period agreed between 
the parties.774 The PAIC does not have a similar provision. 
 
It must be noted that the standard of compensation for expropriation provided in Annex 1 
and the other TIPs discussed in this Chapter will in all probability not apply in the event 
that an expropriation is found to be illegal. This is because reparation in terms of Article 
31 of ARSIWA may be payable in such event. 
 
3.3.5 FET 
The 2016 Annex 1 has abandoned the right to FET, which was provided for in the 2006 
Annex 1.775 The ACIA776, ECT,777 NAFTA778 also provide for FET. In ISDS, there is no 
                                                
770  Article 5.7 India Model BIT. 
771  Article 12 PAIC. 
772  Article 5(4) 2016 Annex 1; Kondo 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 at  
16. 
773  Article 5(4) 2016 Annex 1. 
774  Article 20(5) IACCIA. 
775  Article 6(1) 2006 Annex 1. 
776  Article 11. 
777  Article 10(1). 
778  Article 1105(1). 
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consensus on what FET is.779 Neither is there an acceptable legal test that can be used 
to determine breach of FET.780 Probably due to these reasons, FET is one of the most 
common grounds for claims against states, since its vague nature makes it difficult for a 
state to defend itself.781 According to UNCTAD, investors use FET as a basis to sue host 
                                                
779  UNCTAD “Fair and Equitable Treatment”, UNCTAD Series on Issues in  
International Investment Agreements II, (New York and Geneva 2012) 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017) 
at 2-3, 7-8. For a brief discussion of FET see also at 5-15. 
780  UNCTAD “Fair and Equitable Treatment” at 11-12  
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017). 
781  See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByBreaches (Date of use 10 April  
2018); Kondo 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 at 17-19; UNCTAD “Fair  
and Equitable Treatment” at 39-92 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf 
(Date of use: 20 October 2017). For selected tribunal decisions on FET see ADF Group v 
United States of America ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)00/1 Award of 9 January 2003, Cargill 
Incorporated, CMS Gas Transmission Company, Desert Line Projects, Duke Energy, 
EDF, Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, LLP v Argentine Republic ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/3 Award of 22 May 2007, GAMI Investments, Alex Genin, Glamis Gold, 
Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd et al v United States of America UNCITRAL 
Award of 12 June 2011, International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v The United 
Mexican States UNCITRAL Award of 26 January 2006, Jan de Nul, LG&E Energy Corp 
(Decision on Jurisdiction), Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P v The Government of Canada 
UNCITRAL Award of 31 March 2010, Metalpar S.A and Buen Aire v The Argentine 
Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/03/5 Award of 6 June 2008, Mondev International Ltd v 
United States of America ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2 Award of 11 October 2002, 
MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile v Republic of Chile ICSID Case No. ARB01/7 
Award of 25 May 2004, L.F.H Neer (USA) v United Mexican States Reports of  Awards 
Vol IV pp60-66 Decision of 15 October 1926, Occidental v Petroleum Corporation and 
Occidental Petroleum Exploration and Production Company v The Republic of Ecuador 
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11 Award of 05 October 2012, Pope v Talbort Inc v The 
Government of Canada NAFTA Award on Merits of Phase 2 of 10 April 2001, Award in 
Respect of Damages of 31 May 2002, PSEG Global and Another v Republic of Turkey 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5 Award of 19 January 2007, Saluka Investments B.V. v The 
Czech Republic UNCITRAL Decision on Jurisdiction over the Czech Republic’s 
Counterclaim of 7 May 2004, S.D. Myers Inc. v The Government of Canada UNCITRAL 
Partial Award of 13 November 2000, Tecmed, Waste Management Inc. v United Mexican 
States ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/3 Award of 30 April 2004. 
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states in all arbitration matters based on BITs.782 FET was used to commence at least 
412 ISDS by 8 April 2018.783 Of these cases, 105 were successful.784 
 
After an extensive analysis of ISDS tribunal decisions, UNCTAD summarises the content 
of the FET obligation as among others:785 
 
(a)  Manifest arbitrariness in decision-making, that is, measures  
taken purely on the basis of prejudice or bias without a legitimate purpose 
or rational explanation;  
(b)   The denial of justice and disregard of the fundamental principles of due  
process;  
(c)   Targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as gender, 
race or religious belief;  
(d)   Abusive treatment of investors, including coercion, duress, and 
harassment. 
  
UNCTAD adds that the broad nature of FET threatens governmental administrative 
action and policy-making.786 This is not far-fetched, considering FET is a leading basis 
for the opening of ISDS cases against host states as discussed above, as well as FET’s 
                                                
782  UNCTAD “Fair and Equitable Treatment” at 39 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017). 
783  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByBreaches (Date of  
use: 8 April 2018). Please note that these cases are mixed with those that are based  
on Most Favoured Nation and denial of justice. 
784  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByBreaches (Date of use: 8 April 2018). 
785  UNCTAD “Fair and Equitable Treatment” at xvi 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017). 
 
786  UNCTAD “Fair and Equitable Treatment” at 1-2. 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017). 
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potential financial impact on states. Awards based on FET can also be very high, as 
Ecuador was recently ordered to pay USD 1.7 Billion in damages for breach of FET 
obligations.787     
 
The TTIP Proposal provides for FET, but seeks to avoid the challenges of its ambiguity 
by defining it in terms of parameters such as denial of justice and a fundamental breach 
of due process etc.788 While the majority of investment treaties contain FET provisions, a 
trend of excluding FET is emerging.789  
 
Even if the 2016 Annex 1 does not have FET obligations, Article 6(1) of the 2016 Annex 
1 contains a national treatment (NT) clause.  This clause obliges a Member State to treat 
foreign investors no less favorably than it treats domestic businesses in like 
circumstances.790 However, Member States can, as an exception, treat domestic 
businesses differently, on the basis of legislation that grants preferential treatment to 
domestic businesses in order to achieve national developmental objectives.791 The 
objective of NT in a business context is to ensure that foreigners who do business in a 
                                                
787  This took place in Occidental Petroleum Corporation. 
788  Art 3(2) TTIP Proposal. 
789  See UNCTAD “Fair and Equitable Treatment” at xiv, 18-20. 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017). 
The Brazilian ACFI, India Model BIT, and the PAIC also  
do not provide for FET. The SADC Model BIT recommends its exclusion (at 22). 
790  For a discussion of national treatment see Galea I and Biris B “National Treatment in  
International Trade and Investment Law” 2014 (55) Acta Juridica Hungary 174-183; 
UNCTAD “International Investment Agreements: Key Issues” Vol. 1 (2004) (New York, 
United Nations 2004) at 161-189, available at HeinOnline; UNCTAD (1999) “National 
Treatment” United Nations, New York and Geneva 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/psiteiitd11v4.en.pdf, (Date of use: 15 October 2017); Salacuse 
The Law of Investment treaties at 245-250. 
791  Article 6(3) 2016 Annex 1. 
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state are treated similarly to their domestic counterparts who are in like circumstances. 
The tribunal in Parkerings said in this regard: 
 
National treatment and Most-Favoured-Nation treatment are treaty clauses that 
have the same substantive effect as the international treatment standard: 
foreigners should be afforded treatment no less favorable than the one granted to 
local citizens. The international law requirement, in fact, acts as a minimum 
requirement as it would be useless for the States party to a treaty to grant 
benefits less sweeping than customary law. In other words, all the requirements, 
be they national treatment, most favored- nation-treatment or non-discrimination 
at large, will in effect bar discrimination against foreign nationals investing in the 
country concerned...792 (Emphasis added) 
 
The ACIA,793 ECT,794 and IACCIA795 India Model BIT796 and NAFTA,797 all provide for NT. 
 
3.3.6 Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment (MFN) 
Just as it did with FET, the 2016 Annex 1 also abandoned MFN treatment.798 The Draft 
Articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses define an MFN clause as a treaty provision in 
terms whereof a state undertakes an obligation towards another State to accord most-
                                                
792  Parkerings at para 367. 
793  Article 5 ACIA. 
794  Article 10(3), 10(7) ECT.  
795  Article 17 IACCIA. 
796  Article 4 India Model BIT. 
797  Article 1102 NAFTA. 
798  See also Kondo 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 at 10. 
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favored-nation treatment to investors in an agreed sphere of relations.799 Most-
Favoured-Nation treatment is defined as: 
 
                                                
799  Article 4 of the United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on  
most-favoured-nation clauses with commentaries” (Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1978 Vol. II Part Two, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly 
on the work of its Thirtieth Session at 8, UN General Assembly Official Records, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add.l (Part 2) (1979) 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_3_1978.pdf (Date of use: 
19 February 2017). A comprehensive discussion hereof is beyond the scope of this 
study. The following sources are useful on the subject: United Nations (International Law 
Commission) “Final Report: Study Group on the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause” Sixty-
seventh session Geneva, 4 May – 5 June and 6 July – 7 August 2015, A/CN.4/L.852 
http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/CN.4/L.852 (Date of use: 18 January 2018); 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development “Most-Favoured-Nation 
Treatment in International Investment Law” (OECD Working Papers on International 
Investment, 2004/02, OECD Publishing)  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/518757021651 (Date 
of use: 15 October 2017); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Most 
Favored Nation Treatment” (United Nations, New York) 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationArchive.aspx?publicationid=353, (Date of use: 15 
October 2017); Cole T “The Boundaries of Most Favored Nation Treatment in 
International Investment Law” 2012 (33) Michigan Journal of International Law 537-585 
http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=mjil) (Date of 
use: 19 February 2017); Thulasidhass PR “Most-favoured Nation Treatment in 
International Investment Law: Ascertaining the Limits Through Interpretative Principles” 
2015 (7) (1) Amsterdam Law Forum, VU University Amsterdam 
http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/view/346/512 (date of use: 18 January 2018); 
Parker SL "A BIT at a Time: The Proper Extension of the MFN Clause to Dispute 
Settlement Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties" 2012 (2) (1) The Arbitration Brief 
30-63 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1027&context=ab 
(Date of use: 18 January 2018); Radi Y “The Application of the Most-Favoured-Nation 
Clause to the Dispute Settlement Provisions of Bilateral Investment Treaties: 
Domesticating the Trojan Horse” 2007 (18) (4) European Journal Of International Law 
757−774 http://www.ejil.org/article.php?article=232&issue=9 (Date of use: 19 February 
2017); Salacuse The Law of Investment treaties at 251-254; Schill SW “Mulitilateralizing 
Investment Treaties through Most-Favored-Nation Clauses” 2009 (27) Berkeley Journal 
of International Law 496-566 http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol27/iss2/5); 
Jakobson PN Most Favoured Nation Treatment Application in International Investment 
Arbitration A Study on Conflicting Precedence in International Dispute Settlement 
Procedure (Master’s Thesis University of Oslo Faculty of Law 2011) 
https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/22714/Master_thesis.pdf?sequence=1 
(Date of use: 19 February 2017). 
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...treatment accorded by the granting State to the beneficiary State, or to 
persons or things in a determined relationship with that State, not less 
favorable than treatment extended by the granting State to a third State or 
to persons or things in the same relationship with that third State.800 
 
Depending on the wording of an MFN clause, an MFN clause in an investment treaty is 
usually for the benefit of the investors and investments of the parties to the treaty.801 
MFN clauses are controversial in that they give foreign investors rights, which they 
would otherwise not have, since MFN clauses allow them to claim better treatment that a 
Host State provides to investors from third-party states.802 MFN clauses by their nature 
can be problematic for developing states with limited financial resources, as they can 
lead to unexpected litigation.  
 
The ACIA,803 ECT,804 IACCIA,805 NAFTA806 and the PAIC have MFN clauses, while the 
SADC Model BIT recommends its exclusion.807 
 
                                                
800  Article 5 United Nations (International Law Commission) (1978) “Draft Articles on most- 
favoured-nation clauses with commentaries” (Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1978 Vol. II Part Two, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly 
on the work of its Thirtieth Session at 8, UN General Assembly Official Records, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add.l (Part 2) (1979)) 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_3_1978.pdf (Date of use: 
19 February 2017  
801  Article 8 United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on most- 
favoured-nation clauses with commentaries” 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_3_1978.pdf (Date of use: 
19 February 2017. 
802  Kondo 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 at 10. 
803  Article 6 ACIA. 
804  Article 10(3) ECT. 
805  Article 19 IACCIA. 
806  Article 1103 NAFTA. 
807  At 22-23 SADC Model BIT. 
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3.3.7 Investor-State dispute resolution 
The 2006 Annex 1 provides that in the event of an investor-state dispute,808 an investor 
must be given access to the courts, judicial and administrative tribunals in a host 
state.809 Furthermore, investor-state disputes that have not been amicably settled shall 
after local remedies have been exhausted,810 and after the expiry of a period of six 
months from the declaration of a dispute, be submitted to ISDS if either an investor or 
host state so requires.811 Where the parties choose ISDS, the parties may agree to refer 
the dispute to the ICSID, or to arbitration in terms of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.812 
If upon expiry of a period of three months from the date of declaration of a dispute the 
parties do not agree on a choice of arbitration forum, then the dispute shall be settled by 
arbitration in terms of the UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules.813  
 
However, the 2016 Annex 1 has removed investor access to ISDS, and only provides for 
the resolution of investor-state disputes in the local courts of host states.814 Other 
jurisdictions deal with the resolution of investor-state disputes as follows.815 
 
The ACIA provides that in the event of a dispute, an investor may litigate in the local 
courts of a host state, or it may commence ICSID, UNCITRAL, ASEAN or such other 
                                                
808  Article 27 Annex 1. See also Kondo 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 at  
28-30. 
809  For a discussion of this requirement as applied by the SADC Tribunal see Mike Campbell  
at 26-41. 
810  The requirement regarding exhaustion of local remedies is subject to the proviso that the  
remedies need not be exhausted if to do so will be futile. 
811  Article 28(1) 2006 Annex 1. 
812  Article 28(2) 2006 Annex 1.  
813  Article 28(3) 2006 Annex 1. 
814  Article 25 2016 Annex 1. The use of local courts as a forum for investor-state disputes  
in SADC is discussed in the next Chapter and will therefore not to be discussed herein. 
815  A detailed discussion of recent developments in this regard in Brazil, the EU and India is  
undertaken in Chapter 5 below. 
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arbitration as the parties may agree upon.816 These options come with a fork-in-the-road 
(or a no u-turn) provision, in terms whereof once an investor selects a forum, then other 
options are no longer available.817 Claims are also subject to a prescription period of 
three years,818 and there are mandatory consultations before arbitration or litigation can 
commence.819 
 
In COMESA, the IACCIA imposes a six-month cooling-off period calculated from the 
issue of a notice to initiate a claim.820 During this period, a party shall seek a mediator to 
assist in resolving the dispute.821 If the parties fail to choose a mediator after three 
months, then the President of COMESA makes the choice for them.822 If the dispute is 
not settled, then an investor may litigate in the host Member State or the CCJ.823 
Alternatively, the investor may commence ICSID, UNCITRAL or such arbitration as the 
parties may agree to.824 Claims are subject to a three-year prescription period,825 and a 
fork-in-the-road provision.826 
 
The ECT requires investor-state disputants to settle a dispute within three months from 
the date of request for such settlement.827 If the dispute cannot be resolved, then an 
                                                
816  Article 33(1) ACIA. 
817  Article 33(1) proviso ACIA. 
818  Article 34(1) (a) ACIA. 
819  Article 31 ACIA. 
820  Article 26(2) IACCIA. 
821  Article 26(4) IACCIA. 
822  Article 26(5) IACCIA. 
823  Article 28(1) (a)-(b) IACCIA. 
824  Article 28(1) (c) IACCIA. 
825  Article 28(2) IACCIA. 
826  Article 28(3) IACCIA. 
827  Article 26(1)-(2) ECT. 
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investor may commence litigation in the courts of the host state.828  Alternatively, an 
investor may commence ICSID, UNCITRAL or ICC arbitration.829 
 
NAFTA requires an investor to adhere to a cooling off period of three months prior to the 
commencement of arbitration.830 An investor has a choice of either ICSID or UNICTRAL 
arbitration.831 Claims are subject to a three-year prescription period,832 as well as a fork-
in-the-road provision.833 Claims are not presented to the local courts of the host state on 
the basis that an impartial party must instead adjudicate such claim.834  
 
The PAIC provides that each AU Member State may resolve investor-state disputes 
according to its own laws and policies.835 It does not prescribe any particular method for 
the resolution of these disputes. 
 
The provisions of the ACFI, India Model BIT and the TTIP Proposal regarding the 
resolution of investor-state disputes are discussed in Chapter 5 below and will not be 
repeated here.  
 
3.3.8 SADC’s ISDS experience 
The above discussion would not be complete without a discussion of the extent to which 
SADC Member States have been, and continue to be exposed to ISDS claims. At the 
                                                
828  Article 26(3) ECT. 
829  Article 26(3)-(4) ECT. 
830  Article 1118 NAFTA.  
831  Article 1120(1) NAFTA. 
832  Article 1116(2), 1117(2), 1121(1) (b), 1121(2) (b) NAFTA. 
833  Article 1121(1) (b) NAFTA. 
834  Article 1115 NAFTA 
835  Article 42(1) PAIC. 
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time of writing, there are major ISDS cases against some SADC Member States.836 
These disputes validate the necessity to revisit and analyse the security of foreign 
investments in SADC in view of recent developments.  
 
Historically, there has been a handful of ISDS cases against the following SADC 
Member States: DRC (4), Lesotho (2), Madagascar (3), Mauritius (2), Mozambique (2), 
South Africa (1), Tanzania (2) (plus recent two cases discussed below), and Zimbabwe 
(3, plus one recent case discussed below).837  
 
Nationals of SADC have also initiated ISDS against SADC and non-SADC host states. 
Mauritian investors take the lead in terms of the number of ISDS commenced by them (6 
cases),838 followed by South Africans (1),839 and nationals of Seychelles (1).840 
 
                                                
836  For a database of ISDS cases per host state and other criteria, see  
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByCountry (Date of use: 05 November 
2017). 
837  See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByCountry (Date of use: 12  
November 2017). 
838  See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/134?partyRole=1 (Date  
of use: 12 November 2017). The cases concerned are (in descending chronological  
order): Astro All Asia Networks and South Asia Entertainment Holdings Limited v India 
(UNCITRAL), Courts (Indian Ocean) Limited and Courts Madagascar S.A.R.L v Republic 
of Madagascar (ICSID Case No. ARB/13/34), Khaitan Holdings Mauritius Limited v India 
(UNCITRAL), CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius private Limited, 
and Telcom Devas Mauritius Limited v Republic of India (PCA Case No. 2013-09), 
Progas Energy Ltd v Pakistan (INCITRAL), and Bechtel Enterprises Holdings, Inc. and 
GE Structured Finance (GESF) v The Government of India (UNCITRAL). 
839  See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/195?partyRole=1 (Date  
of use: 12 November 2017). The cases concerned are Burmilla Trust, The Josias Van Zyl  
Family Trust and Josias Van Zyl v The Kingdom of Lesotho (PCA Case No. 2016-21),  
Oded Besserglik v Republic of Mozambique (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)14/2), and 
Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Limited, Josias Van Zyl, The Josias Van Zyl Family 
Trust and others v The Kingdom of Lesotho (PCA Case No. 2013-29). 
840  See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/188?partyRole=1 (Date  
of use: 12 November 2017). The case concerned is Consolidated Exploration Holdings  
Ltd. And others v Kyrgyz Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF) 13/1). 
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Recently, Madagascar,841 Mauritius,842 Mozambique843 and Tanzania844 faced a barrage 
of new international investor-state arbitration claims,845 while Tanzania and South Africa 
are being challenged for legislative amendments to their mining laws, as explained 
below. 
 
Tanzania recently made legislative amendments to its natural and mining resources 
legislation.846 The amendments entitle the government to have a minimum of 16 percent 
“non-dilatable, free carried” interest in mining companies, which can be increased to 50 
percent, commensurate with the value of tax benefits provided to the owner of that asset 
by the government of Tanzania.847 They also prohibit investor-state disputes relating to 
the extraction, exploitation, acquisition, and use of natural wealth and resources from 
being adjudicated in foreign jurisdictions and forums.848 Finally, the amendments enable 
                                                
841  (DS)2, S.A, Peter de Sutter and Kristof de Sutter v Republic of Madagascar (ICSID Case  
No. ARB/17/18), opened on 14 June 2017; LTME Mauritius and Madamobil Holdings  
Mauritius Limited v Republic of Madagascar (ICSID Case No. ARB/17/28), opened on 9 
August 2017).  
842  Thomas Gosling and others v Republic of Mauritius (ICSID Case No. ARB/16/32),  
opened on 26 January 2017.  
843  CMC Muratori Construction CMC Di Ravenna SOC. Coop, CMC MuratoriCementisti  
CMC Di Ravenna SOC. Coop A.R.L Maputo Branch and CMC Africa, CMC Africa 
Austral, LDA v Republic of Mozambique (ICSID Case No. ARB/17/23), opened 14 July 
2017.  
844  Eco Development in Europe AB & others v United Republic of Tanzania (ICSID Case No.  
ARB/17/33), opened on 11 September 2017. 
845  See http://www.iareporter.com/news-and-analysis/ (Date of use: 25 October 2017).  
Unfortunately, details of these arbitrations are not yet public. 
846  The legislation is: The Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review and  
Renegotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act, 2017, The Natural Wealth and Resources 
(Permanent Sovereignty) Act, 2017, and The Written Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) 
Act, 2017. 
847  Section 10(1) - (2) The Written Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act. 
848  Section 11 The Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act. 
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the government to review and terminate agreements that expose Tanzania among 
others to foreign laws and forums.849  
 
As if to complicate the situation, one law firm has encouraged investors to mount legal 
challenges to Tanzania’s actions.850 Large mining companies were quick to challenge 
the above amendments. On 4 July 2017, Acacia Mining announced that it was 
commencing ISDS against Tanzania relating to the Bulyanhulu Mine and Uzwagi Mine, 
based on these amendments.851 After ten days, AngloGold Ashanti announced that it too 
had commenced ISDS against Tanzania, relating to its Geita Mine.852  
 
A similar situation is unraveling in South Africa, where the Chamber of Mines of South 
Africa is locked in an acrimonious litigation with the South African government. The 
Chamber of Mines has applied to the High Court of South Africa, North Gauteng Division 
(Pretoria) for an order reviewing and setting aside a Mining Charter that was recently 
launched by the Minister of Mineral Resources.853 The grounds for review are too 
numerous to state here, suffice to say that one key objection is that mining companies 
                                                
849  Section 6(2)(i) The Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review and  
Renegotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act. 
850  http://www.kwm.com/en/knowledge/insights/tanzania-natural-resources-mining- 
Legislative-reform-changes-20170710 (Date of use: 25 October 2017).  
851  See Acacia “Announcement” 4 July 2017 
http://www.acaciamining.com/~/media/Files/A/Acacia/press-release/2017/update-on-
developments-in-tanzania-20170704.pdf (Date of use: 25 October 2017). 
852  See AngloGold Ashanti “Press Release”, 13 July 2017 
https://thevault.exchange/?get_group_doc=143/1501167539-PR20170713Geita.pdf 
(Date of use: 25 October 2017). 
853  See Chamber of Mines “Media Statement”, 18 October 2017 
http://www.chamberofmines.org.za/ (Date of use 27 October 2017). The Notice of Motion  
detailing the relief sought, and the Founding Affidavit in support of the application, can be 
found at https://goo.gl/xiBsR4 and https://goo.gl/h7cbML (Date of use 27 October 2017). 
The Mining Charter that is being challenged is attached to the Founding Affidavit 
(Annexure FA5 thereof). 
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must have a 30 percent Black Economic Empowerment ownership, up from 26 
percent.854 It is impossible to speculate on the direction that this dispute may take, as the 
relationship between the parties has broken down so much that the Chamber of Mines 
once said that it will only talk to the Minister of Mineral Resources via the courts.855  
 
Another key development that may lead to protracted legal disputes is the decision of 
the Parliament of the Republic of South African of 27 February 2018, which mandated 
the Constitutional Review Committee to review Section 25 of the Constitution so as to 
enable the expropriation of property without compensation.856 The Constitutional Review 
Committee is expected to report back on 30 August 2018. Despite assurances that the 
investor community needs not be concerned about this development, it is unlikely that all 
affected persons will accept expropriation without compensation.857 
                                                
854  The grounds for review are stated at para 3-6 of the Founding Affidavit. 
855  See Chamber of Mines “Media Statement”, 25 October 2017 
http://www.chamberofmines.org.za/component/jdownloads/send/29-2017/491-chamber-
of-mines-statement-on-minister-gibaba-s-inaugural-mtbps (Date of use: 27 October 
2017). 
856  See Parliament of the Republic of South Africa “Press Release”, 27 February 2018  
https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/national-assembly-gives-constitution-
review-committee-mandate-review-section-25-constitution (Date of use: 4 March 2018; 
https://www.fin24.com/Economy/ramaphosa-were-going-ahead-with-land-expropriation-
without-compensation-20180216; https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/breaking-
national-assembly-adopts-motion-on-land-expropriation-without-compensation-20180227 
(Date of use: 4 March 2018). 
857  See https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/international-community-should-not- 
panic-over-land-reform-sisulu-20180304;  
https://www.fin24.com/Companies/Agribusiness/ramaphosa-says-no-one-should-be-
nervous-over-land-20180115; https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/eff-on-land-
expropriation-no-one-will-lose-their-house-20180227; 
https://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn/land-expropriation-without-
compensation-what-does-it-mean-20180304-5; 
https://www.fin24.com/Economy/expropriation-could-cause-widespread-bankruptcy-
banker-20180302-2; https://www.fin24.com/Economy/move-towards-land-expropriation-
could-have-unintended-results-warn-farm-bodies-20180228; 
https://www.agrisa.co.za/media-release-motion-land-political-populism-trumps-national-
interest/ (Date of use: 4 March 2018). 
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In Zimbabwe, on 16-17 August 2017, some of the farmers who were involved in the Mike 
Campbell case issued notices to commence ISDS against Zimbabwe in terms of the 
2006 Annex 1.858 However, developments in this matter are not yet public. Zimbabwe is 
attempting to annul the award in Bernhard Von Pezold. In this matter, Zimbabwe was 
ordered to return the expropriated farms to the claimants plus damages of USD 56 
million, failing which Zimbabwe had to pay compensation of USD 194 million.859 At the 
time of writing, Zimbabwe was still seeking to have the award annulled, and in the 
interim, an agreement was reached that Zimbabwe will pay the awarded damages into 
an escrow account, pending the conclusion of the annulment proceedings.860  
 
It is clear from the pattern in the cases discussed above that investors will not always 
lightly allow reform socio-economic programmes that negatively impact on their 
investments, while at the same time host states will not fear to implement reforms that 
they deem necessary to develop themselves. These cases reflect the conflict between 
the right of host states to regulate their affairs, versus investors’ expectations that such 
regulation will not threaten their investments in one way or another. It is inevitable that 
more cases will be initiated in response to host states’ development efforts.  
 
 Although SADC has taken the decision to remove ISDS from Annex 1 in order to avoid 
cases such as those mentioned above, investors have other gateways through which to 
                                                
858  See http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/dispossessed-zimbabwean-farmers- 
launch-new-legal-I (Date of use: 27 October 2017). Details regarding this case are not yet  
publicly available. 
859  At para 1020. 
860  Decision on Stay of Enforcement of the Award of 24 April 2017 at para 97-99; Decision  
on the Applicant’s Urgent Application for Provisional Measures Regarding the Temporary 
Stay of Execution and the Escrow Arrangement of 22 August 2017 at para 30. 
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access ISDS. Common among these are BITs, TIPs and investment agreements, which 
are being used in the cases discussed above. Despite the conclusion of the 2016 Annex 
1, some recent BITs concluded by the SADC Member States continue to provide for 
ISDS.861 Therefore, closing the door to ISDS via Annex 1 alone is not a solution as 
Member States have already opened new doors via BITs, TIPs, investment agreements, 
and other instruments.862 This lack of uniformity and consistency with regard to the 
practice of resolution of investor-states is the Achilles heel of SADC Member States, as 
shown in the next chapter.  
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
SADC has succeeded in curtailing investor rights by means of Annex 1, including the 
removal of access to ISDS. Nonetheless, there has not been a publicised uproar from 
the investor community with regard to this decision. Whether this means that investors 
have accepted this change, remains to be seen. 
 
                                                
861  See for example the Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the  
Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments (date of signature 17 May 2013, in force 09 December 2013) 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/636 (Date of use: 15 October 
2017); 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/636 (date of use: 12 
November 2017); Agreement Between the Government of Japan and The Republic of 
Mozambique On the Reciprocal Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
(date of signature 01 June 2013, in force 29 August 2014) 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3114 (Date of use: 15 
October 2017); 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3114 (Date of use: 12 
November 2017). 
862  For access to BITs concluded by SADC Member States select the relevant state at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu (Date of use: 12 
November 2017). 
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Technically, the 2016 Annex 1 lags behind similar instruments in terms of the way it 
regulates foreign investments, as indicated in the preceding discussion. 
 
The regulation of foreign investments by means of either version of Annex 1 is not 
satisfactory, due to the failure of Member States to harmonise their laws and practices 
therewith. SADC’s challenge with regard to the regulation of foreign investments by 
means of Annex 1 is that Member States fail to harmonise their laws and BIT practices 
with it. Among others, this encourages treaty shopping, whereby foreign investors may 
seek to bypass Annex 1 by locating themselves in foreign states that have favourable 
BITs or TIPs with SADC Member States, or in SADC Member States that have 
favourable BITs with other SADC Member States.  
 
Despite the challenges identified herein, a review of Annex 1 by SADC will be academic, 
given that the AfCFTA (or even the T-FTA) will have an investment protocol that will in 
all likelihood replace the 2016 Annex 1. SADC’s challenge is therefore to evaluate the 
positions that it will advance during the AfCFTA (or T-FTA) investment protocol 
negotiations, in view of the analysis undertaken herein, as well as the lessons that 
SADC can learn from Brazil’s ACFTA, the EU’s ICS and India’s Model BIT that are 
discussed in Chapter 5. Furthermore, proposals are made in Chapter 6 with regard to 
the level at which foreign investments in SADC should be regulated, and the nature of 
the instrument that should be used. 
 
The next chapter will analyse the laws of SADC Member States in order to determine if 
they provide satisfactory security to foreign investments in the event of expropriation. 
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CHAPTER 4  
THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN TERMS OF THE LAWS OF 
SADC MEMBER STATES  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss the provisions of the investment laws of the Member States, 
which apply in the event of the expropriation of an investment. It lays the foundation for 
the fulfilment of the fourth objective of this study.863 Expropriation is chosen for 
discussion herein is due to its prevalence as a leading cause of action in ISDS claims, 
as well as its serious implications for host states and investors alike.864 The discussion 
will cover the following areas: the dispute resolution forum, the compensation standard 
in the event of expropriation, and the enforcement of court orders and arbitral awards. 
 
The discussion will be benchmarked by reference to the findings of selected rule of law 
surveys (also known as rule of law indices or scoreboards), namely the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM),865 the 2017 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG),866 
                                                
863  See Objective 1.3.4 in Chapter 1 above. 
864  See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByBreaches (Date of use: 18  
January 2018). 
865  For the foundation of the APRM see African Union (Assembly) (Thirty-Eighth Ordinary  
Session of the Organization of African Unity, 8 July 2002 Durban, South Africa) 
“NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance”  
AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex I at para 28 http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/official-
documents/item/607-declaration-on-democracy,-political,-economic-and-corporate-
governance; African Union (Assembly) (Thirty-Eighth Ordinary Session of the 
Organization of African Unity 8 July 2002 Durban, South Africa) “African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM) Base Document” AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex II 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/aprm-basedoc.pdf (Date of use: 10 April 2018);  
African Union (Assembly) (Eighth Ordinary Session, 20 January 2007, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia) African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance at para 36 
http://archive.ipu.org/idd-E/afr_charter.pdf (Date of use: 15 April 2018); Statute of the 
APRM 2016V11082016 https://aprm-au.org/st_car/statute-of-the-aprm/ (Date of use: 8 
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the World Bank’s 2016 Worldwide Governance Index (WGI),867 the World Justice Project 
Rule of Law Index 2016 (WJP),868 and the U.S. Department of State’s 2016 Climate 
                                                                                                                                            
April 2018); NEPAD “Standards, Objectives, Criteria and Indicators For the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM)” NEPAD/HSGIC-03-2003-/APRM/Guideline/OSCI 9 March 
2003 https://aprm-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Objectives-Standards-Criteria-and-
Indicators.pdf (Date of use: 10 April 2018). 
 
For further information and key documents see https://aprm-au.org/; 
https://www.au.int/en/organs/aprm; https://aprm-au.org/layout- 
search-result-pub/?taxonomy%5Bst_cars_pickup_features%5D=121&orderby=ID (Date 
of use: 8 April 2018). 
 
For APRM country review reports see http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/country-reports-
and-experiences (Date of use: 15 April 2018). At the time of writing only six SADC states 
have conducted their APRM assessments so far, namely Lesotho, Mauritius 
Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia. As a result, the APRM reviews are of 
limited significance in SADC. 
 
The APRM’s main objective is to foster the adoption of policies, values, standards and 
practices of political and economic governance that lead to political stability, accelerated 
sub-regional and continental economic integration, economic growth and sustainable 
development. See African Union (Assembly) “APRM Base Document” at para 3 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/aprm-basedoc.pdf (Date of use: 10 April 2018); 
Article 4(2) Statute of the APRM. Member States that join the APRM agree to voluntarily 
and independently review their compliance with African and international governance 
commitments (Article 6(2) Statute of the APRM). The APRM measures performance and 
progress in four thematic areas: democracy and political governance, economic 
governance and management, corporate governance, and socio-economic development. 
See NEPAD “Standards, Objectives, Criteria and Indicators for the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM)” at para 1.12  
https://aprm-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Objectives-Standards-Criteria-and-
Indicators.pdf (Date of use: 10 April 2018). 
866  See http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG- 
Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 (Date 
of use: 14 December 2017). The Mo Ibrahim Foundation launched the IIAG in 2006.866 It 
aims measure and monitor selected areas of governance in every African State, with a 
view to determine and debate government performance, and to be a decision-making 
instrument with which governments can govern.866 The IIAG measures and monitors 
states in four categories, namely Safety and Rule of Law, Participation and Human 
Rights, Sustainable Economic Opportunity, and Human Development. The Rule of Law 
sub-category measures and monitors five indicators. Only three of these are relevant for 
this study, namely Judicial Independence, Judicial Process and Property Rights.866 The 
IIAG covers all SADC Member States, and is therefore useful in this study. 
867  http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home (Date of use 14 December 2017). The  
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Statements.869 These surveys are used in order to enable a balanced Western and 
African perspective on the rule of law, efficiency, and independence in the judiciaries of 
Member States. The surveys bring a practical perspective to the rule of law in these 
states, which may indicate areas of concern and potential improvement.  
 
4.2 AN OVERVIEW OF SELECTED DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVISIONS OF 
THE INVESTMENT LAWS OF SADC MEMBER STATES 
4.2.1 KINGDOM OF ESWATINI 
Based on 2015 data, Eswatini had a population of 1.2 million, and a landmass of 17 200 
square kilometres (sq. km).870 She had a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of USD 4 
Billion, with an annual growth rate of two percent.871 Per capita income was USD 3 
                                                                                                                                            
WGI is an initiative of the World Bank. The WGI has been published since 1996 and 
covers 215 countries. The WGI measures six indicators, but only the Rule of Law 
indicator is relevant herein. The WGI survey covers all SADC Member States, and is 
therefore useful 
868  https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law-index-2016 (Date  
of use: 14 December 2017). The WJP is an independent American non-profit 
organization whose aim is to study the Rule of Law patterns around the world. The 
version utilised here is the 6th edition of the WJP index. This index is a result of feedback 
from 110 000 households and 2700 experts in 113 countries. The WJP hopes that the 
index will help policy debates within and outside each country surveyed (WJP 2016 
report at 4). The SADC Member States covered by the survey are Botswana, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). The 
WJP claims to be the world’s largest survey of original, independent data on the rule of 
law, but unfortunately it has limited application herein as it only covers 8 SADC states 
(WJP 2016 report at 4). Therefore, the WJP is useful in SADC, but only to a limited 
extent. 
869  https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/#wrapper (Date of  
use: 10 April 2017). The U.S. Department of State Climate Statements are prepared from 
information supplied by embassies and diplomatic staff based abroad. They aim to 
capture the state of investment laws and practices in the country where the contributing 
staff are based. The Climate Statements cover all SADC Member States. 
870  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/748/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
871  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/748/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
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120.872 Eswatini received FDI of USD 719 Million between 2005 and 2012.873 The main 
economic sectors in Eswatini are manufacturing and processing, agribusiness and agro-
processing (sugar cane, citrus fruit, cotton, beef, vegetables, forestry, maize, energy, 
mining (gold, diamonds, coal, iron ore, quarry etc.), information and communications 
technologies, tourism and recreation (major attractions are Umhlanga Reed Dance, 
Incwala, Bushfire Festival, Simunye Fun Fair, East3Route, Eswatini International Trade 
Fair etc.).874 Manufacturing (food and beverages, timber, textiles, and engineering) 
contributes 40 percent towards GDP.875 
 
(a) Applicable regime 
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Eswatini876 and the Eswatini Investment Promotion 
Act877 regulate the expropriation of investments in Eswatini. 
 
(b) Dispute resolution forum 
Should a dispute arise between an investor and the government of Eswatini with regard 
to an investment, the investor may at its option, and subject to any written agreement 
reached between the parties (if any) commence: 
 
(i) Proceedings in the High Court of Eswatini;878  
(ii) Local arbitration;879  
                                                
872  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/748/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
873  Table 3, Appendix hereto. 
874  Eswatini Investment Promotion Agency  
www.sipa.sz/index.php/en/investment-opportunities/) (Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
875  Eswatini Investment Promotion Agency  
www.sipa.sz/index.php/en/investment-opportunities/) (Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
876  2005 version. 
877  Act 1 of 1998. 
878  Section 21(a) Investment Promotion Act. 
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(iii) Under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules;880 or 
(iv) Arbitration under the auspices of the ICSID.881 
 
Eswatini is a member of the ICSID.882 This means that ICSID arbitration can be brought 
against her, including proceedings under Additional Facility Rules (AF)883. AF Rules 
enable an investor whose home state is not a member of ICSID to bring ICSID 
arbitration against an ICSID member state. Membership of ICSID also obliges a member 
state to recognise and enforce an award obtained against it.884 The ICSID Convention 
does not apply to ICSID AF arbitration. 
 
(c) Expropriation and compensation Standard 
Property, or an interest or right in a property that forms part of an investment, may not be 
expropriated unless the expropriation is: 
 
(i)   In accordance with applicable legal procedures;885 
(ii) In pursuance of a public purpose;886 
(iii)  Not discriminatory on the basis of nationality;887  
(iv)  Adequate and fair compensation is promptly paid;888  
                                                                                                                                            
879  Section 21(b) Investment Promotion Act. 
880  Section 21(c) Investment Promotion Act. 
881  Section 21(d) Investment Promotion Act. 
882  https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx (Date of  
use: 01 April 2017). 
883  See https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/AFR_English- 
final.pdf (Date of use: 6 August 2018). 
884  See Article 53-55 ICSID Convention. 
885  Section 20(1) (a) Investment Promotion Act. 
886  Section 20(1) (b); Article 19(2(a) Constitution of the Kingdom of Eswatini. 
887  Section 20(1) (c) Investment Promotion Act. 
888  Section 20(1)(d) Investment Promotion Act; Article 19(2)(b)(i) Constitution of  
the Kingdom of Eswatini. 
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(v)  Such that a right of access to a court of law is provided for by the law under 
which the expropriation is undertaken;889 and 
(vi)  By order of the court.890 
 
(d) Enforcement of awards and orders  
A court order or an arbitral award (e.g. for the payment of damages or compensation for 
expropriation) obtained by an investor against Eswatini must be enforced via the courts. 
The IIAG ranks Eswatini under Rule of Law as follows: an overall Rule of Law score of 
55.8 (all scores out 100), 21.3 points for judicial independence, 70.8 for the judicial 
process and 68.9 for property rights.891 Eswatini ranks 22nd out of 54 African states and 
10th in SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.892 
 
The WGI gives Eswatini a score of 46.6 under the Rule of Law indicator.893  
 
The U.S. Department of State states that Eswatini does not have a history of 
expropriation, and the courts enforce property rights.894  
 
Eswatini is not a member of the New York Convention. This means that an investor may 
have difficulty in enforcing a foreign arbitral award against Eswatini. The New York 
                                                
889  Section 20(1)(d) Investment Promotion Act; Article 19(2)(b)(ii) Constitution of  
the Kingdom of Eswatini. 
890  Article 19(2) (c) Constitution of the Kingdom of Eswatini. 
891  IIAG “Eswatini Scores, Ranks and Trends” 
http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/ (Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
892  IIAG Report 2017 at 26 See http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017- 
IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 
(Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
893  WGI http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (Date of use: 17 April  
2017). 
894  https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?dlid 
=254169&year=2016#wrapper (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
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Convention obliges a member state to recognise and enforce an arbitral award obtained 
against it, as follows: 
 
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce 
them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is 
relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles. There shall 
not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges 
on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention 
applies than are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral 
awards.895 (Emphasis added) 
 
The New York Convention applies to awards obtained outside the state wherein 
enforcement is sought, and therefore it does not apply to awards classified as domestic 
awards in the state where enforcement is sought.896 The Convention makes provision for 
an application for the recognition of an award to be made to a competent authority, 
which is usually a court of law in the state where enforcement is sought.897 Provision is 
also made for a party against whom an award was obtained, to challenge the award and 
have it set aside.898  
 
 
                                                
895  Article III New York Convention. 
896  Article I (1) New York Convention. 
897  Article IV New York Convention. For an update on applications of this nature see (select  
“Judicial review by national courts”) 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByFollowUpProceedings (date of use: 6 
August 2018). 
898  Article V New York Convention . For statistics on applications of these nature see (select  
“Judicial review by national courts”) 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByFollowUpProceedings (Date of use: 6 
August 2018). 
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4.2.2 KINGDOM OF LESOTHO 
Based on 2015 data, Lesotho had a population of 2.1 million, and a landmass of 30 360 
sq. km.899 During 2015 GDP was USD 1.8 Billion, with an annual growth rate of 1.91 
percent.900 Per capita income was USD 872.901 Lesotho received FDI ranging from USD 
51 Million to USD 194 Million between 2005 and 2015.902 Between 2005 and 2012, 
Lesotho’s main economic sectors were agribusiness (crops, aquaculture, horticulture, 
livestock farming, and food processing), manufacturing (textile and garments, leather 
and footwear, consumer electronic goods, packaging materials, automotive components 
etc.), renewable energy, infrastructure and construction, mining (water bottling, diamond 
mining), services (information communications and technologies, financial services), and 
tourism (accommodation, health and wellness resorts, water sports and recreation, high 
altitude training facilities etc.).903  
 
(a) Applicable regime 
Lesotho does not have legislation regulating foreign investments. The Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Lesotho contains the provisions relating to expropriation.904 
 
 
 
                                                
899  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/426/index.html   
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
900  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/426/index.html   
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
901  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/426/index.html   
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
902  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx  
(Date of use: 27 February 2017). 
903  Lesotho National Development Corporation at www.lndc.org.Is/Investor-kit) (Date of use:  
10 April 2017). 
904  Constitution of 1993 as amended to 2001.  
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(b) Dispute resolution forum 
With regard to disputes relating to expropriation, an investor or a person with an interest 
or right over expropriated property has a right of direct access to the High Court.905 Such 
right includes an appeal after the aggrieved person has approached a lower competent 
tribunal or authority.906 The High Court or other lower competent tribunal or authority 
may determine the rights of the aggrieved person, the legality of the expropriation, the 
amount of compensation due, and it may also issue an order enforcing the payment of 
the compensation.907  
 
Lesotho is a member of the ICSID Convention.908   
 
(c) Expropriation and compensation standard 
An owner of, or a person having an interest or right in a property has, irrespective of their 
nationality, a right not to be arbitrarily deprived of its property.909 The state may 
expropriate, or otherwise, take possession of or acquire the rights or interests in a 
property for a variety of reasons.910 An expropriation must meet the following 
requirements, namely that it must be: 
 
(i)  In the public interest;911 
(ii) Justifiable in terms of the hardship caused to the person(s) who had an interest 
or right in the matter;912 and 
                                                
905  Article 17(2) Constitution of Lesotho. 
906  Article 17(2) proviso Constitution of Lesotho. 
907  Article 17(2) (a)-(b) Constitution of Lesotho. 
908  https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx (Date of  
use: 01 April 2017). 
909  Articles 4(1) (m) and 17 Constitution of Lesotho. 
910  Article 17 Constitution of Lesotho. 
911  Article 17(1) (a) Constitution of Lesotho. 
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(iii) Accompanied by prompt and full compensation.913 
 
The High Court or another tribunal authorised to do so may review an expropriation.914 
 
(d) Enforcement of awards and orders  
As was stated above, the High Court or other competent tribunal or authority has 
jurisdiction to enforce the payment of compensation, or any order that may have been 
made.915 The IIAG ranks Lesotho as follows under the Rule of Law: an overall Rule of 
Law score of 64.1 (all scores out of 100), 64.6 for judicial independence, 58.3 for judicial 
process and 67.7 for property rights.916 Lesotho ranks 8th out of 54 African states and 6th 
in SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.917 
 
The WGI gives Lesotho a score of 50 under the Rule of Law indicator.918 The 2010 
APRM Review did not make any adverse findings on the state of the rule of law in 
Lesotho. It however found systematic lack of capacity, corruption, and lack of 
accountability in the public service in general.919  
 
                                                                                                                                            
912  Article 17(1) (b) Constitution of Lesotho. 
913  Article 17(1) (c) Constitution of Lesotho. 
914  Article 17(2) Constitution of Lesotho. 
915  Article 17(2(b) Constitution of Lesotho. 
916  IIAG “Lesotho Scores, Ranks and Trends” 
http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/ (Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
917  IIAG 2017 Report at 26 See http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017- 
IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 
(Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
918  WGI http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (Date of use: 17 April  
2017). 
919  APRM “Lesotho Country Review Report No. 12”, June 2010 at para 112-115 
http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/country-reports-and-experiences (Date of use: 10 
February 2018). 
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The U.S. Department of State states that Lesotho courts are overburdened and slow.920 
The Department also states that a commercial court was established in 2010 to address 
some of these challenges. This court had decided only 63 cases by July 2015, with a 
maximum of 15 cases per year at a rate of between one and five cases per month.921 It 
appears from these figures that this court has a light caseload. 
 
Lesotho is a member of the New York Convention.922 
 
4.2.3 REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA 
Based on 2015 data, Angola had a population of 25 million, and a landmass of 1.2 
million sq. km.923 Angola is the second largest economy in SADC in terms of GDP (USD 
146 Billion), and is second only to South Africa (USD 349 Billion).924 GDP growth was 
2.96, and per capita income was USD 5 450.925 During 2015 Angola was the 7th largest 
recipient of FDI in Africa,926 and the top FDI recipient in SADC (USD 8.6 Billion) during 
the same period.927 Angola's economy is driven by its oil sector.928 Oil production and 
related activities account for approximately 50 percent of GDP, which contributes more 
                                                
920  https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?dlid 
=254169&year=2016#wrapper (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
921  http://www.lesotholii.org/content/high-court-commercial-division (Date of use: 10 April  
2017). 
922  http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
923  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/024/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
924  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/024/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
925  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/024/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
926  FDI Intelligence at 4 http://www.casafrica.es/casafrica/Agenda/2016/11_Africa- 
Investment-Report_Klassa-Presentation.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018). 
927  See Table 3, Appendix hereto. 
928  Summary extracted from http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/angola/angola_ 
economy.html (Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
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than 70 percent of government revenue, and more than 90 percent of Angola’s exports. 
Angola is the second biggest exporter of oil in Africa after Nigeria. Diamonds contribute 
another five percent towards exports. Subsistence farming provides the main livelihood 
for most of the people, although there are food shortages and half of the country's food 
is imported.  
 
(a) Applicable regime 
The new Private Investment Law regulates the expropriation of investments in Angola.929 
 
(b) Dispute resolution forum 
The Private Investment Law provides that investor-state disputes shall be referred to the 
Angolan courts for adjudication.930 Disputes may optionally be referred to arbitration in 
terms of the Arbitration Act of 2003, but it is reported that such arbitration is not widely 
used.931 In 2014, the Ministry of Justice opened the Centre for Human Rights and Legal 
Alternatives for Conflict Resolution, but again it is reported that the facility is not being 
utilised.932 Among other functions, the Centre provides consultation, mediation, and 
arbitration of contract disputes for both Angolan and foreign businesses.933  
 
Angola is not a member of the ICSID Convention. 
 
 
                                                
929  Law No. 14/15 of 11 August 2015. 
930  Article 20(1) Private Investment Law. 
931  Law No. 16/03. See https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/ 
#wrapper (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
932  https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/#wrapper (Date of  
use: 01 April 2017). 
933  https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/#wrapper (Date of  
use: 01 April 2017). 
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(c) Expropriation and compensation standard 
The Private Investment Law provides that in the event of the expropriation of an 
investment, fair, prompt and effective compensation shall be paid to an investor.934  
 
(d) Enforcement of awards and orders  
Any order issued by a court, or an arbitral award issued by a tribunal, must be enforced 
via the courts. This raises the issue of the efficiency, partiality, and costs of using the 
local courts. The IIAG ranks Angola’s rule of law as follows: an overall Rule of Law score 
of 42.2 (all scores out of 100), 23.4 for judicial independence, 12.5 for judicial process 
and 33 for property rights.935 Angola ranks 39th out of 54 African states and 14th in SADC 
in terms of the rule of law.936  
 
The WGI gives Angola a score of 12 out of 100 under the Rule of Law Indicator.937  
 
The United States Department of State Report indicates that the Angolan court system is 
not always impartial, that it takes approximately four years for a commercial case to be 
concluded, and the costs of the proceedings are approximately 44 percent of the value 
of a claim.938 
 
                                                
934  Article 20(2) Private Investment Law. 
935  IIAG “Angola Scores, Ranks and Trends” 
http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/ (Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
936  IIAG 2017 Report at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017- 
IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 
(Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
937  WGI http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (Date of use: 17 April  
2017). 
938  https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/#wrapper (Date of  
use: 01 April 2017). 
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Angola is not a member of the New York Convention.939  
 
4.2.4 REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA  
Based on 2015 data, Botswana had a population of 2.2 million, and a landmass of 566 
730 sq. km.940 Her GDP was USD 14 Billion, with an annual growth rate of 0.32 percent. 
Per capita income was USD 6365.941 Botswana FDI inflows fluctuated from USD 208 
Million to 515 Million between 2005 and 2015.942 Botswana is the second-largest 
diamond producer in the world by value.943 Botswana and De Beers formed Debswana 
Diamond Mining Company (Pty) Ltd in 1969. Botswana gradually increased its 
shareholding from 15 percent, and by 1975 the parties were equal partners.944 During 
2014, the partnership generated USD 6.9 Billion, of which Botswana received 32 
percent. The partnership also contributed 34 160 jobs.945 The partnership has 
contributed to Botswana’s stable political and regulatory environment. It is therefore no 
                                                
939  Membership confirmed at http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (Date of use: 01  
April 2017). 
940  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/072/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
941  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/072/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
942  Available under Botswana country profile at  
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/072/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
943  De Beers Group “Turning Finite Resources into Enduring Opportunity: The  
economic contribution to Botswana of the Partnership between the Government of the 
Republic of Botswana and De Beers” at 16 
http://www.debeersgroup.com/en/reports/impact/country/botswana-and-cut-8/ 
the-principles-of-partnership.html (Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
944  De Beers Group “Turning Finite Resources into Enduring Opportunity” at 13  
http://www.debeersgroup.com/en/reports/impact/country/botswana-and-cut-8/ 
the-principles-of-partnership.html (Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
945  De Beers Group “Turning Finite Resources into Enduring Opportunity” at 35  
http://www.debeersgroup.com/en/reports/impact/country/botswana-and-cut-8/ 
the-principles-of-partnership.html (Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
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surprise that Botswana ranked 1st under the Safety and Rule of Law component of the 
IIAG.946 
 
(a) Applicable regime 
The Constitution of the Republic of Botswana947 and The Acquisition of Property Act948 
regulate the expropriation of investments in Botswana. 
 
(b) Dispute resolution forum 
The Constitution of the Republic of Botswana provides that the High Court shall be the 
competent but not the only forum for disputes relating to expropriation.949 The 
Constitution makes provision for proceedings to be commenced at a lower authority.950 
Issues that may be brought before the High Court include the determination of the 
interests or rights of an affected person, the legality of an expropriation, and the amount 
of compensation to be paid, and the enforcement of the payment of compensation.951  
 
Botswana is a member of the ICSID. 
 
(c) Expropriation and compensation standard 
The Constitution of the Republic of Botswana provides that no property may be 
expropriated unless the expropriation will benefit the development of mineral resources. 
It provides that: 
                                                
946  IIAG 2017 Index Report at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017- 
IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 
(Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
947  Constitution of 1966 as amended by Act 12 of 2002. 
948  Chapter 32:10 of 28 January 1955 as amended. 
949  Article 8(1) (b) (ii) Constitution of the Republic of Botswana. 
950  Article 8(1)(b)(ii) Constitution of the Republic of Botswana. 
951  Article 8(1) (b) (ii) Constitution of the Republic of Botswana. 
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(i) The expropriation must be in the interest of public order, public defense and the 
like;952 
(ii) The expropriated property must be used for public benefit;953 
(iii) The expropriation must aim to or will secure the development of mineral 
resources;954 
(iv) The law providing for the expropriation must provide for the prompt payment of 
adequate compensation;955 and 
(v) The law providing for the expropriation must provide for access to the High Court, 
either directly or on appeal from a lower competent authority.956 
 
Section 3 of the Acquisition of Property Act also provides for the expropriation of land 
and certain real rights if the acquisition of such property is necessary or expedient in the 
interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and 
country planning or land settlement; or in order to secure the development or utilisation 
of that or other property for a purpose beneficial to the community, paying such 
compensation therefore as may be agreed upon or determined under the provisions of 
the Act. 
 
A person seeking to challenge the legality of an expropriation under the Acquisition of 
Property Act must approach the High Court for relief.957 A Board of Assessment 
                                                
952  Article 8(1) (a) (i) Constitution of the Republic of Botswana. 
953  Article 8(1) (a) (ii) Constitution of the Republic of Botswana. 
954  Article 8(1) (a) (iii) Constitution of the Republic of Botswana. 
955  Article 8(1) (b) (i) Constitution of the Republic of Botswana. The payment of royalties in  
lieu of a lump sum is deemed to be sufficient for the purpose of this provision (Article  
8(3) Constitution of the Republic of Botswana. 
956  Article 8(1) (b) (ii) Constitution of the Republic of Botswana. 
180 
 
appointed for each dispute adjudicates disputes relating to compensation.958 The 
decision of the Board is final as against the persons who participated in the assessment 
process, but any person aggrieved by the decision of the Board may appeal the decision 
before the High Court.959 
 
(d) Enforcement of awards and orders  
The High Court of Botswana or other competent authority shall be entitled to order the 
enforcement of an order made by it.960 The IIAG ranks Botswana as follows under the 
Rule of Law: an overall rule of law score of 92.8 (all scores out of 100), 74 points for 
judicial independence, 100 for judicial process and 85 for property rights.961 Botswana 
ranks 2nd out of 54 African states and 2nd in SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.962 
 
The WGI gives Botswana a score of 73 under the Rule of Law indicator.963 The WJP 
Index gives Botswana a score of 58.964  
 
                                                                                                                                            
957  Section 9 Acquisition Act. 
958  Section 11 Acquisition Act. The Board will consider the factors listed in Section 16 in  
order to reach its decision.  
959  Section 20 Acquisition Act. 
960  Article 8(1)(b)(ii) Constitution of the Republic of Botswana makes the High Court the  
competent Court to deal with expropriation disputes. 
961  IIAG “Botswana Scores, Ranks and Trends” 
http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/ (Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
962  IIAG 2017 Report at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017- 
IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 
(Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
963  WGI http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (Date of use: 17 April  
2017). 
964  WJP Rule of Law Index 2016 at 21 https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law- 
index/wjp-rule-law-index-2016 (Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
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The U.S. Department of State notes that the courts of Botswana do enforce judgments, 
and can be regarded as fair.965 However, the Department states that it can take up to 
two years to enforce a judgment in a commercial dispute.  
 
Botswana is member of the New York Convention.966  
 
4.2.5 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
Based on 2015 data, the DRC is the SADC’s largest state in terms of landmass, with an 
area of 2.2 million sq. km, which is almost double the size of South Africa.967 It also has 
the highest population in SADC of 77 million.968 The DRC received stable FDI since 
2007, which ranged from USD 663 Million to USD 3.3 Billion at its peak.969 The DRC had 
a GDP of USD 38 Billion in 2015, with a GDP growth of 7.17 percent.970 Per capita 
income was USD 504.971 The DRC has vast natural resources, and, therefore, has great 
potential as an investment destination. However, political instability, illegal mining, 
smuggling of mineral resources and the presence of armed groups plague the DRC and 
cost it its true investment potential.972 A report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic 
                                                
965  https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?dlid 
=254169&year=2016#wrapper (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
966  http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
967  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/180/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
968  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/180/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
969  Available at (http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx  
(Date of use: 27 February 2017). 
970  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/180/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
971  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/180/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
972  See United Nations (Security Council) “Final Report of the Group of  
Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo”, S/2014/42 (23 January 2014) 
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Republic of Congo commissioned by the United Nations found that illegal mining and the 
smuggling of minerals are so prevalent that 98 percent of gold worth approximately USD 
400 Million produced during 2013 was smuggled out of the country.973  
 
(a) Applicable regime 
The legislation regulating the expropriation of investment in the general economy of the 
DRC is the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo,974 and the Investment 
Code.975 The Investment Code does not apply to the following sectors: mining and 
hydrocarbons, banking, assurance and insurance, arms production and related military 
activities, production of explosives, and assembly of military, paramilitary and security 
equipment.976  
 
(b) Dispute resolution forum 
The Investment Code states that disputes that may arise regarding the interpretation or 
application of the Code are to be settled according to the procedure set out in the Code 
on Congolese Civil Procedure.977 This includes disputes between an investor and the 
DRC government, and allegations of violation of the rights of the investor or of the 
investment.978 The parties to a dispute are given three months from the date of the 
                                                                                                                                            
https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1421515.pdf (Date of use: 10 April 
2017). 
973  UN (Security Council) “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic  
of Congo” at 32 https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1421515.pdf (Date of  
use: 10 April 2017). 
974  Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo of 2005. 
975  Law No. 004 of 21 February 2002. Mining, hydrocarbons, finance, and other sectors 
 are covered by other legislation (https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/ 
investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?dlid=254169&year=2016#wrapper) (Date of use: 
01 April 2017). 
976  Article 3(1) Investment Code. 
977  Article 37 Investment Code. 
978  Article 38 Investment Code. 
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declaration of a dispute to resolve it amicably.979 If the dispute is not resolved, then the 
matter goes into the ISDS stage.980 At this stage, an investor has the option of ICSID 
arbitration (including Additional Facility arbitration) or International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) arbitration.981  
 
The DRC consents to ICSID arbitration by virtue of Article 38 of the Investment Code, 
while an investor consents to arbitration by virtue of having a qualifying investment in 
terms of the Investment Code.982 If a foreign investor is operating through a company of 
Congolese nationality that he controls or supervises, then it is presumed that the 
company is of the foreign nationality of the investor.983  
 
The DRC is a member of the ICSID Convention.984 
 
(c) Expropriation and compensation standard 
The DRC Constitution provides that the right to property is protected.985 However, it 
provides that property may be expropriated for a public purpose and against payment of 
just compensation under conditions determined by law.986 The Constitution further 
provides that no property may be seized except by order of a competent tribunal.987 In 
line with the Constitution, the Investment Code provides that the property of an investor 
cannot be expropriated except: 
                                                
979  Article 38 Investment Code. 
980  Article 38 Investment Code. 
981  Article 38 Investment Code. 
982  Article 38 Investment Code.  
983  Article 38 Investment Code.  
984  https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx (Date of  
use: 01 April 2017). 
985  Article 34 Constitution of the DRC. 
986  Article 34 Constitution of the DRC. 
987  Article 34 Constitution of the DRC. 
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(i) As provided for by law or order of a court;988 
(ii) For a public purpose;989 and 
(ii) Against payment of fair and equitable compensation.990 
 
(d) Enforcement of awards and orders  
Any order issued by a court, or an arbitral award issued by a tribunal, must be enforced 
via the courts. This raises the issue of the efficiency, partiality, and costs of using the 
local courts. The IIAG ranks the DRC as follows under the Rule of Law: an overall Rule 
of Law score of 32.1 (all scores out of 100), 20 for judicial independence, 41.7 for the 
judicial process and 39 for property rights.991 The DRC ranks 48th out of 54 African states 
and 15th in SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.992 
 
The WGI gives the DRC a score of 3.3 under the Rule of Law indicator.993 
 
However, the U.S. Department of State states that the courts of the DRC are marked by 
a high degree of corruption, public administration is not reliable, and both expatriates 
and nationals are subject to the selective application of a complex legal code.994 The 
                                                
988  Article 26 Investment Code. 
989  Article 26 Investment Code. 
990  Article 26 Investment Code. Compensation is fair if it is based on the market value of the  
property (Article 26). Note that Article 34 Constitution of the DRC requires “just  
compensation”. 
991   IIAG “DRC Scores, Ranks and Trends”   
http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/ (Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
992  IIAG 2017 Report http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG- 
Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 (Date 
of use: 14 December 2017). 
993  WGI http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (Date of use: 17 April  
2017). 
994  https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?dlid 
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Department notes, however, that modern commercial courts are being set up in parallel 
with the existing court system.  
 
The DRC is a member of the New York Convention.995  
 
4.2.6 REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR 
Based on 2015 data, Madagascar had a population of 24 million, and a landmass of 581 
700 sq. km.996 GDP for 2015 was USD 9.7 Billion, with an annual growth rate of 3.2 
percent. Per capita income was USD 401.997 Madagascar received FDI of USD 169 
Million from South Africa between 2005 and 2012.998 The main investment sectors in 
Madagascar are agribusiness, tourism, mining, information communications and 
technologies, light industries and renewable energy.999 Madagascar’s main exports are 
agricultural products. During 2014, Madagascar exported 999 000 tons of product.1000 
Madagascar has a 50 percent share of the global vanilla market, and 70 percent of the 
European market for Litchis.1001 She produces more rice than the rest of SADC 
                                                                                                                                            
=254169&year=2016#wrapper (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
995  http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
996  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/450/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2016). 
997  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/450/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2016). 
998  Table 4 at http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_fdistat/docs/webdiaeia2014d3_ZAF.pdf  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
999  Economic Development Board of Madagascar “Madagascar Investment Guide” (undated) 
(www.edbm.gov.mg/content/downlaod/1025/5177/file/Investor’s%20Guide%20 
Madagascar-en.pdf (Date of use: 10 November 2017). 
1000  Economic Development Board of Madagascar “Madagascar Investment Guide” at 3  
(www.edbm.gov.mg/content/downlaod/1025/5177/file/Investor’s%20Guide%20  
Madagascar-en.pdf (Date of use: 10 November 2017). 
1001  Economic Development Board of Madagascar “Madagascar Investment Guide” at 15  
(www.edbm.gov.mg/content/downlaod/1025/5177/file/Investor’s%20Guide%20 
Madagascar-en.pdf (Date of use: 10 November 2017). 
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combined.1002 Being surrounded by ocean, Madagascar has a thriving fishery and 
aquaculture sector.1003 Madagascar’s unique fauna and flora are a major tourist 
attraction, with between 180 000 and 240 000 tourists visiting per year since 2010.1004  
 
The mining sector has potential for investment in marble, ruby, sapphire, emerald, 
aquamarine, topaz, coal, uranium, quartz, gold, platinum, silver, copper, iron and many 
others.1005 Madagascar’s connection to the East African Submarine System and LION 
high-speed internet networks makes it ideal for technology parks, manufacture and 
assembly of electronic parts, call centers, mobile telephone providers, and other 
technology related opportunities.1006 Madagascar’s abundant rivers, sunshine, and 
constant winds are ideal for hydropower, solar and wind energy generation.1007  
 
 
 
 
                                                
1002  Economic Development Board of Madagascar “Madagascar Investment Guide” at 15  
(www.edbm.gov.mg/content/downlaod/1025/5177/file/Investor’s%20Guide%20 
Madagascar-en.pdf (Date of use: 10 November 2017). 
1003  Economic Development Board of Madagascar “Madagascar Investment Guide” at 15  
(www.edbm.gov.mg/content/downlaod/1025/5177/file/Investor’s%20Guide%20 
Madagascar-en.pdf (Date of use: 10 November 2017). 
1004  Economic Development Board of Madagascar “Madagascar Investment Guide” at 16  
(www.edbm.gov.mg/content/downlaod/1025/5177/file/Investor’s%20Guide%20 
Madagascar-en.pdf (Date of use: 10 November 2017). 
1005  Economic Development Board of Madagascar “Madagascar Investment Guide” at 17  
(www.edbm.gov.mg/content/downlaod/1025/5177/file/Investor’s%20Guide%20 
Madagascar-en.pdf (Date of use: 10 November 2017). 
1006  Economic Development Board of Madagascar “Madagascar Investment Guide” at 18  
(www.edbm.gov.mg/content/downlaod/1025/5177/file/Investor’s%20Guide%20 
Madagascar-en.pdf (Date of use: 10 November 2017). 
1007  Economic Development Board of Madagascar “Madagascar Investment Guide” at 20  
(www.edbm.gov.mg/content/downlaod/1025/5177/file/Investor’s%20Guide%20 
Madagascar-en.pdf (Date of use: 10 November 2017). 
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(a) Applicable regime 
The primary legislation regulating the expropriation of foreign investments in 
Madagascar is the Madagascar Investment Law.1008 
 
(b) Dispute resolution forum 
Investor-state disputes must be submitted to the local courts for adjudication.1009  
 
Madagascar is a member of the ICSID.1010 
 
(c) Expropriation and compensation standard 
The Investment Law provides that property may not be expropriated except in public 
interest cases.1011 These cases include infrastructure works, the establishment of nature 
reserves, or military sites, among others, requiring expropriation of private 
property.1012 In the event of such expropriation fair compensation is payable.1013 
 
(d) Enforcement of awards and orders 
Any order issued by a court, or an arbitral award issued by a tribunal, must be enforced 
via the courts. This raises the issue of the efficiency, partiality, and costs of using the 
local courts.  The IIAG ranks Madagascar as follows under the Rule of Law: an overall 
Rule of Law score of 55.8 (all scores out of 100), 30 points for judicial independence, 
                                                
1008  Law No. 036 of 2007. 
1009  Article 21 Madagascar Investment Law. 
1010  https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx (Date of  
use: 01 April 2017). 
1011  Article 4 Madagascar Investment Law. 
1012  https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements 
/#wrapper (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
1013  Article 4 Madagascar Investment Law. 
188 
 
58.3 for judicial process and 41.1 for property rights.1014 Madagascar ranks 29th out of 54 
African states and 11th in SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.1015 
 
The WGI gives Madagascar a score of 28 under the Rule of Law indicator.1016 The WJP 
gives her a score of 45 under the Rule of Law indicator.1017 Madagascar is not a member 
of the APRM. 
 
The U.S. Department of State states that the Malagasy courts are nominally 
independent, they appear open to influence from the executive and other players, the 
judges lack proper training, cases take about three years to conclude, costs are high and 
can take about 42 percent of the value of a claim, there are complaints that they avoid 
dealing with the merits of some cases and dismiss them on technical grounds.1018 The 
Department adds that corruption and slow pace affects the enforcement of judgments 
and awards.1019 
 
Madagascar is a member of the New York Convention.1020 
 
                                                
1014  IIAG “Madagascar Scores, Ranks and Trends” 
http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/ (Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
1015  IIAG 2017 Report at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG- 
Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 (Date 
of use: 14 December 2017). 
1016  WGI http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (Date of  
use: 17 April 2017). 
1017  WJP 2016 Rule of Law Index at 21 https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law- 
index/wjp-rule-law-index-2016 (Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
1018  https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements 
/#wrapper (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
1019  https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements 
/#wrapper (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
1020  http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
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4.2.7 REPUBLIC OF MALAWI 
Based on 2015 data, Malawi had a population of 17 million and a landmass of 94 280 
sq. km.1021 GDP was USD 6 Billion, with an annual growth rate of three percent.1022 
Malawi’s FDI levels are similar to those of Lesotho, with a low of USD 35 Million and a 
maximum of 195 Million between 2005 and 2015.1023 Malawi’s main economic sectors 
are energy (hydropower, solar energy, fuel storage, wind energy, thermal power, 
biomass stoves, services (financial, real estate, healthcare), food and beverage 
production, processing and packaging, information communications and technologies, 
infrastructure construction and rehabilitation, tourism (hotels, casinos, water and lake 
sports, camps and lodges, eco-tourism), mining (bauxite, corundum, limestone, titanium, 
vermiculite, coal, phosphate, pyrite etc.), manufacturing (light manufacturing, textile and 
garments) and forestry.1024 
 
(a) Applicable regime 
The Investment and Export Promotion Act,1025 and the Constitution of the Republic of 
Malawi1026 regulate the expropriation of investments in Malawi. 
 
(b) Dispute resolution forum 
The Constitution of Malawi provides that if a person is aggrieved by the alleged 
infringement of a constitutional right, including the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of 
                                                
1021  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/454/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
1022  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/454/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
1023  Table 3, Appendix hereto. 
1024  Malawi Investment and Trace Centre (MITC) www.mitc.mw/index.php?option=com- 
content & view=article&id=299&ltemid=611 (Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
1025  Act 11 of 2012. 
1026  Constitution of 18 May 1994. 
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one’s property, then such person must approach the competent court to protect or 
enforce the right.1027 A competent court may make such order as it sees fit, including the 
award of compensation to the complainant.1028 
 
Malawi is a member of the ICSID Convention.1029  
 
(c) Expropriation and compensation standard 
The Constitution of Malawi provides that there is a right not to be arbitrarily deprived of 
property.1030 However, the Constitution allows for the expropriation of property, provided 
that: 
 
(i) The expropriation is in the public interest;1031 
(ii) Adequate notice of the intention to expropriate was given to the interested 
party;1032 
(iii) Appropriate compensation is paid;1033 and 
(iv) An interested party shall have a right of appeal to a court of law.1034 
 
(d) Enforcement of awards and orders  
Any order issued by a court, or an arbitral award issued by a tribunal, must be enforced 
via the courts. This raises the issue of the efficiency, partiality, and costs of using the 
                                                
1027  Article 46 Constitution of the Republic of Malawi. 
1028  Article 28(1) and (2) Constitution of the Republic of Malawi. 
1029  https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx (Date of  
use: 01 April 2017). 
1030  Article 28(1) and (2) Constitution of the Republic of Malawi. 
1031  Article 44(4) Constitution of the Republic of Malawi. 
1032  Article 44(4) Constitution of the Republic of Malawi. 
1033  Article 44(4) Constitution of the Republic of Malawi. 
1034  Articles 46(3) and (4) Constitution of the Republic of Malawi. 
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local courts.  The IIAG ranks Malawi as follows under the Rule of Law: an overall Rule of 
Law score of 73.2 (all scores out of 100), 60 points for judicial independence, 83.3 for 
judicial process and 55.5 for property rights.1035 Malawi ranks 17th out of 54 African 
states and 9th in SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.1036 
 
The WGI gives Malawi a score of 44 under the Rule of Law indicator.1037 The WJP gives 
Malawi a score of 41 under the Rule of Law indicator.1038 
 
The U.S. Department of State states that the courts of Malawi have long backlogs, staff 
shortages, and it can be difficult to enforce judgments.1039 However, the courts are not 
biased, and there seems to be little political interference in cases. 
 
Malawi is not a signatory to the New York Convention.  
 
4.2.8 REPUBLIC OF MAURITIUS 
Based on 2015 data, during 2015 Mauritius had a population of 1.2 million, and a 
landmass of 2000 sq. km.1040 GDP was USD 11 Billion, with an annual growth rate of 3.5 
                                                
1035  IIAG “Malawi Scores, Ranks and Trends” 
http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/ (Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
1036  IIAG 2017 Report at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG- 
Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 (Date 
of use: 14 December 2017). 
1037  WGI http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (Date of use: 17 April  
2017). 
1038  WJP 2016 Rule of Law Index at 21 https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law- 
index/wjp-rule-law-index-2016 (Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
1039 https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/ 
index.htm?dlid=254169&year=2016#wrapper (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
1040  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/480/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
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percent. Per capita income was USD 9 075.1041 Mauritius offers investment in agro-
industry, education, financial services, healthcare, hospitality and property development, 
smart-cities, Information communications and technologies, life sciences, logistics, 
manufacturing, media and creative industry, ocean economy, renewable energy and 
seafood.1042 Mauritius is a renowned tourism hotspot, and the government has taken 
steps to increase FDI in the hospitality and property sector by encouraging non-citizens 
to acquire property and live there too. The Property Development Scheme enables a 
non-citizen to acquire resident status if they buy property worth at least USD 500 000.1043  
 
(a) Applicable regime 
The Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius1044 and the Investment Promotion Act1045 
regulate the expropriation of investments in Mauritius. Regulations made under the Act 
are also applicable.1046 
 
(b) Dispute resolution forum 
The Constitution provides that the Supreme Court of Mauritius, or a competent lower 
authority or court, is the forum for the determination of the interests of persons affected 
by expropriation.1047 The Investment Promotion Act does not provide for the settlement 
                                                
1041  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/480/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
1042  Invest Mauritius at www.investmauritius.com/investment-opportunities.aspx (Date of use:  
10 April 2017). 
1043  Invest Mauritius at www.investmauritius.com/investment-opportunities/property- 
development.aspx (Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
1044  Constitution of 1968 as amended to 2015. 
1045  Act 42 of 2000, as amended to 2009. 
1046  Regulations in terms of sections 12 and of the Act, made under Government Notice No.  
128 of 2015. 
1047  Section 8(1) (c) (ii) and 17 Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius.   
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of disputes. However, parties can choose arbitration, which can take place in terms of 
the International Arbitration Act.1048  
 
There are two main arbitration institutions in Mauritius. The first is the LCIA-MIAC 
Arbitration Centre.1049 The LCIA-MIAC Arbitration Centre was established by the 
Government of Mauritius, the London Court of Arbitration and the Mauritius Centre 
during July 2011. The second is the Arbitration and Mediation Centre.1050 The centre was 
created by the Mauritius Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 1996 (then as the MCCI 
Permanent Court of Arbitration).   
 
Mauritius is a member of the ICSID Convention.1051 
 
(c) Expropriation and compensation standard 
The Constitution of Mauritius provides that property may be expropriated, provided that: 
 
(i) The expropriation is necessary or expedient in the interests of defense, public 
safety, public order, public morality, public health, town, and country planning;1052  
(ii)  There is reasonable justification for the causing of any hardship that may result to 
any person having an interest in or right over the property;1053 and 
                                                
1048  Act 37 of 2008 as amended by Act 8 of 2013. Section 4 of the Act allows parties to  
consent to arbitration in writing. 
1049  http://www.lcia-miac.org/ (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
1050  https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/ 
index.htm?dlid=254169&year=2016#wrapper. The MARC website is  
https://www.mcci.org/en/our-services/arbitration-mediation/arbitration/introduction-to-
marc-arbitration/ (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
1051  https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx  (Date of  
Use: 01 April 2017). 
1052  Section 8(1) (a) Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius. 
1053  Section 8(1) (b) Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius. 
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(iii)  The law authorising the expropriation makes provision: 
 
(i)  for the payment of adequate compensation;1054 and 
(ii)  Guarantees to a person with an interest or right over the affected  
property a right of access to the Supreme Court, to determine his interest 
or right, or the validity of the expropriation, and the quantum of 
compensation to which he is entitled, and for the purpose of obtaining 
payment of that compensation.1055 
 
(d) Enforcement of awards and orders  
Any order issued by a court, or an arbitral award issued by a tribunal, must be enforced 
via the courts. This raises the issue of the efficiency, partiality, and costs of using the 
local courts. The IIAG ranks Mauritius as follows under the Rule of Law: an overall Rule 
of Law score of 92.5 (all scores out of 100), 88.4 points for judicial independence, 100 
for judicial process and 80.9 for property rights.1056 Mauritius ranks 1st out of 54 African, 
and 1st in SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.1057 
 
The WGI gives Mauritius a score of 77.4 under the Rule of Law indicator.1058 The 2010 
APRM Review found that Mauritius has independent democratic institutions, and that 
constitutional provisions are respected.1059  
                                                
1054  Section 8(1) (c) (i) Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius. 
1055  Section 8(1) (c) (ii) Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius. The access to the Supreme  
Court may be by way of appeal from a lower court or authority. 
1056  IIAG “Mauritius Scores, Ranks & Trends”  
http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/ (Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
1057  IIAG 2017 Report at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG- 
Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 (Date 
of use: 14 December 2017). 
1058  WGI http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (Date of use: 17 April  
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The U.S. Department of State states that the Mauritian judiciary is efficient, independent, 
non-iscriminatory and transparent.1060  
 
Mauritius is a member of the New York Convention.1061  
 
4.2.9 REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE 
Based on 2015 data, Mozambique has a population of 27 million, and a landmass of 786 
380 sq. km.1062 Her GDP was USD 14 Billion, with an annual growth rate of 6.1 percent. 
Per capita income was USD 526.1063 Mozambique’s FDI has grown significantly since 
2005 when it was USD 107 Million, up to a peak of USD 5.6 Billion in 2012.1064  
Mozambique’s leading sectors for investment are in the energy sector, oil and gas, 
mining and tourism.1065 
 
(a) Applicable regime 
The Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique1066 and the Law on Investment1067 
regulate the expropriation of investments in Mozambique. 
                                                                                                                                            
2017). 
1059  APRM “Mauritius Country Review Report No. 13”, July 2010 at 144 
http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/country-reports-and-experiences (Date of use: 10 
February 2018). 
1060  https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/ 
index.htm?dlid=254169&year=2016#wrapper (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
1061  http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
1062  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/508/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
1063  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/508/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
1064 Table 3, Appendix hereto. 
1065  http://www.theevent.co.za/2018/03/five-reasons-to-invest-in-mozambique/ (Date of use:  
20 Aril 2018). 
1066  Constitution of 16 November 2004. 
1067  No. 3/93 of 24 June 1993. 
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(b) Dispute resolution forum 
In general, investor-state disputes may, if not amicably resolved, be referred to 
competent local courts.1068 A dispute between the Mozambican state and an investor 
that is not resolved amicably or via local courts shall if the parties so agree, be submitted 
to either ICSID or ICC arbitration.1069 There is also an optional of referring the dispute to 
the Centre for Commercial Arbitration, Conciliation and Mediation, a state institution that 
caters for commercial arbitration to which the state can be a party.1070 
 
Mozambique is a member of the ICSID Convention.1071  
 
(c) Expropriation and compensation standard 
The Constitution guarantees the right to ownership of property.1072 Nonetheless, the 
state may expropriate property, provided that the expropriation is in the public 
interest.1073 Fair compensation must be paid for the expropriation.1074 
 
(d) Enforcement of awards and orders  
Any order issued by a court, or an arbitral award issued by a tribunal, must be enforced 
via the courts. This raises the issue of the efficiency, partiality, and costs of using the 
local courts. The IIAG ranks Mozambique as follows under the Rule of Law: an overall 
                                                
1068  Section 25(1) Law on Investment. 
1069  Section 25(2) Law on Investment.   
1070  https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index. 
htm?dlid=254169&year=2016#wrapper (Date of use: 01 April 2017).  
1071  https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx (Date of  
Use: 01 April 2017). 
1072  Section 82(1) Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique; Section 13(1) Law on  
Investment. 
1073  Section 82(2) Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique. 
1074  Section 82(1) Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique. However, section 13(2) of the  
Law on Investment provides for just and equitable compensation. 
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Rule of Law score of 54.6 (all scores out of 100), 38.1 points for judicial independence, 
41.7 for judicial process and 46.1 for property rights.1075 Mozambique ranks 31st out of 54 
African states, and 12th in SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.1076 
 
The WGI gives Mozambique a score of 19 under the Rule of Law indicator.1077 The 2010 
APRM review found that constitutionally protected rights are not getting the necessary 
enforcement, the institutions which are designed to protect these rights either do not 
function well, or their functions are severally curtailed,1078 the functioning of the courts 
was inadequate, the public did not even know about the Constitutional Council, the 
Administrative Court was found to be inaccessible and was rarely used, with citizens not 
even knowing about the existence of the court, and there was widespread corruption in 
the judicial system.1079 With regard to judicial independence, the executive is seen as 
having excessive powers vis-à-vis the judiciary.1080 
                                                
1075  IIAG “Mozambique Scores, Ranks and Trends”   
http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/ (Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
1076  IIAG 2017 Report at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017- 
IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 
(Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
1077  WGI http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (Date of use: 17 April  
2017). 
1078  APRM “Mozambique Country Review Report No. 11”, June 2009 at para 276 
http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/country-reports-and-experiences (Date of use: 10 
February 2018). 
1079  APRM “Mozambique Country Review Report” at para 277  
http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/country-reports-and-experiences (Date of use: 10 
February 2018). 
1080  APRM “Mozambique Country Review Report” at para 280  
http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/country-reports-and-experiences (Date of use: 10 
February 2018). 
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The U.S. Department of State states that the Mozambican judicial system is slow, 
inconsistent, and largely ineffective in resolving commercial disputes, and that 
Magistrates are overloaded with work.1081 
 
Mozambique is a member of the New York Convention.1082 
 
4.2.10 REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA 
Based on 2015 data, Namibia had a population of 2.4 million and a landmass of 823 290 
sq. km.1083 GDP was USD 12 Billion, with an annual growth rate of 4.3 percent.1084 Per 
capita income was USD 5 122.1085 Namibia’s FDI has gradually grown from USD 385 
Million in 2005 to a peak of USD 1.1 Billion in 2011, 2012 and 2015.1086 Namibia’s main 
economic sectors are agri-business, aquaculture, energy generation (biomass, solid 
waste, solar energy, electricity from landfills), infrastructure, manufacturing (bricks, soap, 
safety equipment, mining and exploration equipment, chlorine and caustic soda etc.), 
mining, services (emergency health services, marketing and communication, mobile 
vending and payment services etc.), and tourism (lodges, camp sites, caravan sites, 
waterfront rest camps, conference and accommodation facilities etc.).1087 
 
 
                                                
1081  https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/ 
index.htm?dlid=254169&year=2016#wrapper (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
1082  http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
1083  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/516/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
1084  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/516/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
1085  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/516/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
1086  Table 3, Appendix hereto. 
1087  Ministry of Industrialization and Trade (MTI) at www. Mti.gov.na/investment- 
opprtunity.html) (Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
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(a) Applicable regime 
The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia1088 and the Namibia Investment Promotion 
Act1089 regulate the expropriation of investments in Namibia. 
 
(b) Dispute resolution forum 
The local courts of Namibia have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes relating to the 
Namibia Investment Promotion Act.1090 However, the state (represented by the Minister 
responsible for investment) and an investor may (by written agreement) agree to local 
arbitration in terms of the Arbitration No. 42 of 1965.1091 
 
(c) Expropriation and compensation standard 
The Constitution protects the right to own and dispose of property, but foreigners may be 
prohibited from owning immovable property.1092 The Constitution provides that the state 
or its organs may expropriate private property provided that the expropriation is: 
 
(i) For a public purpose;1093 
(ii) Accompanied by prompt and just compensation;1094 and 
(iii) In accordance with the procedures and requirements of an Act of Parliament. 
 
The Namibia Investment Promotion Act provides that investments may be expropriated 
in terms of the provisions of the Constitution described above, subject to the payment of 
                                                
1088  1998 version. 
1089  Act No. 9 of 2016. 
1090  Section 28(4) Namibia Investment Promotion Act.  
1091  Section 28(4) Namibia Investment Promotion Act. 
1092  Article 16(1) Constitution of the Republic of Namibia. 
1093  Article 16(2) Constitution of the Republic of Namibia. 
1094  Article 16(2) Constitution of the Republic of Namibia; Section 22(1) Namibia Investment  
Promotion Act. 
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just compensation.1095 The Namibia Investment Promotion Act sets out factors that must 
be considered in the determination of just compensation. These include the fair market 
value of the investment, profits made by the investor to date of expropriation, the capital 
cost of the investment, the current and past use of the investment etc.1096 The 
Agricultural Land Reform Act also allows the state to expropriate agricultural land for 
purposes of land reform, subject to payment of compensation.1097 
 
(d) Enforcement of awards and orders  
Any order issued by a court, or an arbitral award issued by a tribunal, must be enforced 
via the courts. This raises the issue of the efficiency, partiality, and costs of using the 
local courts. The IIAG ranks Namibia under Rule of Law as follows: an overall Rule of 
Law score of 87.1 (all scores out of 100), 94 points for judicial independence, 100 for 
judicial process and 60 for property rights.1098 Namibia ranks 3rd out of 54 African states 
and 3rd in SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.1099 
 
The WGI gives Namibia a score of 61.54 under the Rule of Law indicator.1100  
 
The U.S. Department of State states that Namibia has an independent, effective 
judiciary.1101 However, the Department says that the court processes are slow.  
                                                
1095  Section 21(1) Namibia Investment Promotion Act. 
1096  Section 22(2) Namibia Investment Promotion Act. 
1097  No. 6 of 1995. Sections 19-35 deal with expropriation. 
1098  IIAG “Namibia Scores, Ranks and Trends”  
http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/ (Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
1099  IIAG 2017 Report at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017- 
IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 
(Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
1100  WGI http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (Date of use: 17 April  
2017). 
1101  https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm? 
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Namibia is not a member of the New York Convention.  
 
4.2.11 REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES 
Seychelles is the smallest SADC state. During 2015 Seychelles had a population of 96 
000 and a landmass of 455 sq. km.1102 GDP was USD 1.5 Billion, with an annual growth 
rate of 3.5 percent. Due to her small population, Seychelles had the highest per capita 
income in SADC of USD 16 145.1103 Seychelles received FDI of between USD 85 million 
and USD 261 million per year between 2005 and 2015.1104 The main economic sectors 
in Seychelles are agriculture (crops and livestock such as poultry, pigs, cattle, goats and 
rabbits), energy generation (wind farms, oil, solar energy), international financial 
services, (international companies, trusts, foundations, limited partnerships, mutual 
hedge funds, insurance etc.), tourism services (accommodation establishments, car hire, 
restaurants, tour operations, yachting), and fisheries (tuna fishing, long-line fishing, 
marine and aquaculture, fish processing and storage, retail and distribution of marine 
fishing equipment).1105 
 
(a) Applicable regime 
The Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles of 19931106 and the Seychelles 
Investment Act1107 regulate the expropriation of investments in Seychelles. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
dlid=254169&year=2016#wrapper 
1102  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/690/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
1103  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/690/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
1104  Table 3, Appendix hereto. 
1105  Seychelles Investment Board at www.sib.sc/index-php/sectors) (Date of use: 10 April  
2017). 
1106  As amended by Act 14 of 1996. 
1107  Act 31 of 2010. 
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(b) Dispute resolution forum 
The Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles provides that in the event of 
expropriation, a person with an interest in expropriated property shall be given access to 
the Supreme Court.1108 In addition, the Seychelles Investment Act provides that an 
investor may have recourse to other remedies provided by law, or to dispute settlement 
measures contained in an agreement between the government of Seychelles and the 
investor.1109 
 
Seychelles is a member of the ICSID Convention.1110  
 
(c) Expropriation and compensation standards 
The right to own, use and dispose of property in Seychelles is protected by the 
Constitution.1111 However, this right is subject to certain limitations.1112 Private property 
may be expropriated by law, provided that: 
 
(i) The law allows for reasonable notice to be given to any person who has an 
interest in the property, informing it of the intention to expropriate;1113 
(ii) The expropriation is for a public purpose;1114 
(iii) The expropriation is non-discriminatory;1115 
                                                
1108  Article 26(3) (e) Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles. 
1109  Section 5(3) Seychelles Investment Act. 
1110  https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx (Date of  
use: 01 April 2017). 
1111  Article 26(1) Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles of 1993 as amended by Act 14 of  
1996. 
1112  Article 26(2) Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles. 
1113  Article 26(3) (a) Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles. 
1114  Article 26(2)(b) Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles; Section 5(1) Seychelles  
Investment Act. 
1115  Section 5(1) Seychelles Investment Act. 
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(iv) There is a reasonable justification for causing hardship to any person who has an 
interest in the property;1116 
(v) Prompt and full compensation is paid for the expropriation;1117 and 
(vi) Provision is made for access to the Supreme Court of Seychelles for the 
determination of the rights or interest of an interested person, to determine the 
legality of the expropriation, to determine the amount of compensation to be paid, 
or to enforce the payment of the compensation.1118 
 
(d) Enforcement of awards and orders  
The Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles provides that the Supreme Court may be 
the forum for the enforcement of payment of compensation.1119 The IIAG ranks 
Seychelles under the Rule of Law as follows: an overall Rule of Law score of 76.3 (all 
scores out of 100), 67.2 points for judicial independence, 37 for judicial process and 66.7 
for property rights.1120 Seychelles ranks 7th out of 54 African states and 4th in SADC in 
terms of the Rule of Law.1121 
 
The WGI gives Seychelles a score of 62 under the Rule of Law indicator.1122  
                                                
1116  Article 26(3) (c) Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles. 
1117  Article 26(3)(d) Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles; Section 5(1) Seychelles  
Investment Act. Section 5(2) Seychelles Investment Act provides that the value of the  
property shall be the market value immediately before the expropriation. The  
compensation shall bear interest from date of dispossession to date of payment. 
1118  Article 26(3) (e) Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles. 
1119  Article 26(3)(e) Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles. 
1120  IIAG “Seychelles Scores, Ranks and Trends”  
http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/ (Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
1121  IIAG 2017 Report at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017- 
IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 
(Date of use: 14 December 2017).   
1122  WGI http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (Date of use: 17 April  
2017). 
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The United States Department of State states that court processes in Seychelles are 
slow, and they can take up to five years before a judgment is granted.1123 Resources are 
also insufficient and the system has multiple appeals, both of which contribute to a slow 
pace. The government encourages the referral of investor-state disputes to an 
Investment Appeal Panel.  
 
Seychelles is not a member of the New York Convention. 
 
4.2.12 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 
South Africa is the third largest state in SADC in terms of landmass, behind the DRC 
and Angola.1124 During 2015 South Africa had a population of 54, 490 million, and a 
landmass of 1 213 090 sq. km.1125 During 2015 South Africa had the highest GDP in 
SADC (USD 314 Billion).1126 The GDP had an annual growth rate of 0.6 percent. South 
Africa had a per capita income of USD 5773.1127 South Africa received FDI of between 
USD 6.6 Billion and USD 1.7 Billion per year between 2005 and 2015.1128 South Africa is 
an ideal investment destination for a variety of reasons ranging from location, stage of 
development, political stability, the presence of natural and mineral resources etc.1129 
                                                
1123  https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index. 
htm?dlid=254169&year=2016#wrapper 
1124  See Table 2, Appendix hereto. 
1125  See Table 2, Appendix hereto. 
1126  See http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en- 
GB/710/GeneralProfile710.pdf (Date of use: 21 November 2017). 
1127  See http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/Ge”neralProfile/en- 
GB/710/GeneralProfile710.pdf (Date of use: 21 November 2017). See also  
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0441/Press_statement_1_4q_2015.pdf (Date of 
use: 22 November 2017). 
1128  Table 3, Appendix hereto. 
1129 See Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa) “South Africa: Investors  
Handbook 2014/2015” at 1-8, 39-52   
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The main economic sectors in South Africa during the 2015 reporting year were finance, 
real estate and business services, Government services, wholesale, retail and motor 
trade, Manufacturing, mining, transport, storage and communication, personal services, 
construction, electricity and water, and agriculture.1130 
 
South Africa’s top ten investment projects are bio fuels, business outsourcing, the 
Centurion Aerospace Village, the COEGA Industrial Development Zone, manufacturing, 
the Dube Tradeport, the East London Industrial Development Zone, Green Economy 
Industries, the Richards Bay Industrial Development Zone, and the Saldanha Bay 
Industrial Development Zone.1131 
 
(a) Applicable regime 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa lays the basis on which property may be 
expropriated.1132 An Expropriation Bill is in existence and is presently before 
Parliament.1133 The Protection of Investment Act regulates the protection of foreign 
investments but does not contain provisions for expropriation.1134 The Act defers the right 
to property to Section 25 of the Constitution.1135 
                                                                                                                                            
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/za/Documents/tax/ZA_DTI-
InvestinginSA_2014-15.pdf (Date of use: 19 November 2017); Webber Wentzel 
“Investing in South Africa Charting the Legal Landscape with Webber Wentzel 2015/16” 
http://www.investinginsouthafrica.co.za/downloads/en/Webber_Wentzel_Investing_in_So
uth_Africa_complete.pdf (Date of use: 19 November 2017). 
1130  Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa) “South Africa: Investors  
Handbook 2014/2015” at 39 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/za/Documents/tax/ZA_DTI-
InvestinginSA_2014-15.pdf (Date of use: 19 November 2017). 
1131  Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa) (2013) “South Africa’s Top Ten  
Investment Projects” http://www.thedti.gov.za/DownloadFileAction?id=833 (Date of use:  
19 November 2017). 
1132  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, as amended to 2013. 
1133  Bill B 4-2015, published in Government Gazette 38418 of 26 January 2015. 
1134  Act 22 of 2015. 
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(b) Dispute resolution forum 
Should a dispute arise between an investor and the government of South Africa, an 
investor may refer the dispute to mediation1136 or a local court.1137 ISDS is also possible, 
subject to the exhaustion of local remedies, and the consent of the government of South 
Africa.1138 
 
South Africa is not a member of the ICSID Convention. 
 
(c) Expropriation and compensation Standard 
Section 25 of the Constitution regulates expropriation. It provides that a law of general 
application may only expropriate property for a public purpose or interest, and subject to 
the payment of just and equitable compensation.1139 Just and equitable compensation 
must be quantified with due regard to the:1140 
 
(i)  Current use of the property;  
(ii)  History of the acquisition and use of the property;  
(iii) Market value of the property;  
(iv)  Extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial 
capital improvement of the property; and  
(v)  Purpose of the expropriation. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
1135  Section 10 Protection of Investment Act. 
1136  Section 13(1) Protection of Investment Act. 
1137  Section 13(4) Protection of Investment Act. 
1138  Section 13(5) Protection of Investment Act. 
1139  Section 25(2)-(3) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
1140  Section 25(3) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
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The Constitution emphasises the importance of land reform, and in particular, the 
Constitution shall not impede the state from taking measures to achieve land, water, and 
related reform in order to redress the effects of apartheid.1141 It must be noted that there 
are moves to amend Section 25 of the Constitution, so as to provide for expropriation 
without compensation.1142  
 
(d) Enforcement of awards and orders  
An order issued by a court or an arbitral award must be enforced via the courts. This 
raises the issue of the efficiency, partiality, and costs of using the local courts.  The IIAG 
ranks South Africa under Rule of Law as follows: an overall Rule of Law score of 94.7 
(all scores out of 100), 96.5 points for judicial independence, 100 for judicial process and 
85.4 for property rights.1143 South Africa ranks 7th out of 54 African states, and 5th in 
SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.1144 
 
The WGI gives South Africa a score of 58.17 under the Rule of Law indicator.1145 South 
Africa’s 2014 APRM report notes that progress is being made with regard to the 
transformation and independence of the judiciary.1146 
 
                                                
1141  Section 25(8) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
1142  Parliament of the Republic of South Africa “Press Release” 27 February 2018  
https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/national-assembly-gives-constitution- 
review-committee-mandate-review-section-25-constitution (Date of use: 4 March 2018) 
1143  IIAG “South Africa Scores, Ranks & Trends”  
http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/ (Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
1144  IIAG 2017 Report at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017- 
IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 
(Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
1145  WGI http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#reports (Date of use: 17 April 2017). 
1146  At 121 http://aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/component/docman/doc_view/491- 
south-africa-third-report-on-aprm-npoa-implementation-2014 (Date of use: 14 November 
2017). 
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The U.S. Department of State states that dispute resolution in South Africa can be time-
consuming.1147 However, there are no concerns raised regarding the independence of 
the judiciary or the efficiency of the courts. South Africa conducted an APRM 
assessment in 2007, but the report is now over a decade old, and may not reflect the 
true position regarding the contents thereof.1148 
 
South Africa is a member of the New York Convention.1149  
 
4.2.13 UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA 
During 2015 Tanzania had the third highest SADC population of 53 million, and a 
landmass of 885 800 sq. km.1150 GDP was USD 46 Billion, with an annual growth rate of 
6.9 percent. Per capita income was USD 865.1151 Tanzania’s FDI is stable at between 
USD 1 Billion and 2 Billion.1152  
 
The main economic sectors in Tanzania are agriculture (farm implements, agro-
processing, agricultural machinery, irrigation equipment, fishing equipment, agricultural 
commodity trading), information and communications technologies (broadcasting, 
                                                
1147  https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/#wrap 
per (Date of use: 14 November 2017). 
1148  APRM “South Africa Country Review Report No. 2” September 2007 
http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/country-reports-and-experiences (Date of use: 10 
February 2018). See also APRM “Third Report on the implementation of South Africa’s 
APRM Programme of Action”, January 2014 
http://aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/component/docman/doc_view/491-south-africa-third-report-
on-aprm-npoa-implementation-2014 (Date of use: 20 April 2018). 
1149  http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (Date of use: 14 November 2017). 
1150  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/834/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
1151  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/834/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
1152  Table 3, Appendix hereto. 
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computer supplies etc.), environment and energy generation (petroleum, solar, wind, 
natural gas, geothermal power generation) health (hospitals, pharmaceuticals, health 
equipment etc.), construction (roads and other infrastructure, equipment hire), consumer 
goods (agricultural processing and light consumer goods), financial services, mining 
(gold, copper, cobalt, coal, tin, phosphates etc.), textiles (cotton and textiles), tourism 
(agency services, camping equipment, vehicles, hotel equipment, diving equipment, 
tourist boats, mountain climbing equipment as well as tour promotion services e.g., web 
designing) and transportation (land, marine and air transport).1153 
 
(a) Applicable regime 
The Tanzania Investment Act1154 and the Constitution of the United Republic of 
Tanzania1155 regulate the expropriation of foreign investments in Tanzania.  
 
(b) Dispute resolution forum 
The Tanzania Investment Act provides that disputes between an investor and the 
government of Tanzania shall first be resolved amicably.1156 If the dispute is not amicably 
resolved, then it shall by agreement of the parties be resolved by arbitration.1157 The 
arbitration may be any of the following, and both parties have to agree to the choice of 
forum.1158 
 
                                                
1153  http://www.foreign.go.tz/index.php/en/diaspora/category/news-and-events (Date of use:  
10 April 2017). 
1154  Act 26 of 1997. 
1155  Constitution of 1977 as amended up to 30 June 1995, referred to as the 1997  
Constitution. 
1156  Section 23(1) Tanzania Investment Act. 
1157  Section 23(2) Tanzania Investment Act. 
1158  Section 23(2) Tanzania Investment Act.  
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(i) National arbitration in terms of the arbitration laws of Tanzania;1159  
(ii) ICSID arbitration;1160 or 
(iii) Arbitration in terms of an investment treaty between Tanzania and the home 
state of the investor.1161 
 
It must be noted that Tanzania has passed a law that prohibits the state from being a 
party to ISDS and foreign proceedings.1162 
 
Tanzania is a member of the ICSID Convention.1163 
 
(c) Expropriation and compensation Standard 
The state may expropriate private property, provided that the expropriation is in terms of 
due process that provides for: 
 
(i) Prompt, fair and adequate compensation;1164 and 
(ii) A right to access to a court or arbitration forum, for the purpose of 
determining the rights of the investor as well as the amount of 
compensation.1165 
 
 
                                                
1159  Section 23(2) (a) Tanzania Investment Act. 
1160  Section 23(2) (b) Tanzania Investment Act. 
1161  Section 23(2) (c) Tanzania Investment Act. 
1162  Section 11 The Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act. 
1163  https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx (Date of  
use: 01 April 2017). 
1164  Article 24(2) Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania; Section 22(2)(a) Tanzania  
Investment Act. 
1165  Section 22(2) (b) Tanzania Investment Act. 
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(d) Enforcement of awards and orders  
An order issued by a court or an arbitral award must be enforced via the courts. The 
IIAG ranks Tanzania under Rule of Law as follows: an overall Rule of Law score of 56.3 
(all scores out of 100), 62.6 points for judicial independence, 54.2 for judicial process 
and 55.2 for property rights.1166 Tanzania ranks 14th out of 54 African states and 8th in 
SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.1167 
 
The WGI gives Tanzania a score of 39.4 under the Rule of Law indicator.1168 The 
Tanzania 2013 APRM Report noted that the judiciary had resource and capacity 
constraints, which limited access to justice,1169 and that there was tension between the 
judiciary and the legislature, due to the judiciary’s authority to declare legislation 
invalid.1170 
 
The U.S. Department of State states that the court system suffers from backlogs going 
up to four years.1171 
 
Tanzania is a member of the New York Convention.1172  
                                                
1166  IIAG “Tanzania Scores, Ranks & Trends” 
http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/ (Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
1167  IIAG Report 2017 at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017- 
IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 
(Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
1168  http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (Date of use: 17 April 2017). 
1169  APRM “Tanzania Country Review Report No. 17”, January 2013 at 143 
http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/country-reports-and-experiences (Date of use: 10 
February 2018). 
1170  APRM “Tanzania Country Review Report” http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/country- 
reports-and-experiences (Date of use: 10 February 2018). 
1171 https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?dlid 
=254169&year=2016#wrapper 
1172  http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
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4.2.14 REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA 
As at 2015, Zambia had a population of 16 million and a landmass of 743 390 sq. km.1173 
GDP was USD 21 Billion, with an annual growth rate of 3.6 percent.1174 Per capita 
income was USD 1 352. Zambia’s FDI was between USD 1 Billion and 3 Billion from 
2011 to 2015.1175 Zambia’s main economic sectors are mining (copper, cobalt, gold 
emeralds, topaz, opal, aquamarine etc.), agriculture (maize, soya beans, cowpeas, 
mixed beans, cassava etc.), manufacturing (textiles, wood products, building materials, 
processed foods, chemicals, leather products, tobacco etc.), infrastructure (railway, 
road, aviation), energy generation (coal, hydro, bio fuels), Information Communications 
and technology, health (private health care facilities and equipment) and education 
(private tertiary education institutions).1176 
 
(a) Applicable regime 
The Constitution of the Republic of Zambia1177 and the Zambia Development Agency 
Act1178 regulate the expropriation of foreign investments in Zambia. 
 
(b) Dispute resolution forum 
Disputes arising from an investment made under or regulated by the Zambia 
Development Agency Act are resolved by arbitration under the Arbitration Act.1179 In 
                                                
1173  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en- 
GB/894/index.html (Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
1174  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en- 
GB/894/index.html (Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
1175  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en- 
GB/894/index.html (Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
1176  Zambia Development Agency “Zambia Investors Guide Handbook” (undated) at 6-8 
http://www.zda.org.zm/?q=content/investment-guide-zambia (Date of use: 10 August  
2018). 
1177  Constitution of 1991 as amended by Act 18 of 1996. 
1178  Act 11 of 2006. 
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terms of section 23 of the Arbitration Act, an organisation responsible for the regulation 
of the practice of a profession may apply to the Minister for recognition as an arbitration 
institution. An arbitration award is final and binding upon the parties.1180 However, a court 
may set aside the award upon the application of one of the parties.1181 Foreign lawyers 
are not allowed to represent parties at arbitration.1182 An arbitral award made in terms of 
the Arbitration Act is final and binding.1183 Arbitration proceedings are deemed to be 
private and confidential, and no details thereof may be published except as provided 
therein.1184  
 
Zambia is a member of the ICSID Convention.1185  
 
(c) Expropriation and compensation standard 
The Constitution of the Republic of Zambia allows for property to be expropriated.1186 In 
line with the Constitution, the Zambia Development Act provides that property may be 
expropriated, provided that the expropriation: 
 
(i) Shall be for public purposes;1187 
(ii) Is in terms of an Act of Parliament;1188 
                                                                                                                                            
1179  Section 21 Zambia Development Agency Act. The Act in question is the Arbitration Act 19  
of 2000.  
1180  Section 20 Arbitration Act. 
1181  Section 17 Arbitration Act. 
1182  https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?dlid 
=254169&year=2016#wrapper 
1183  Section 20 Arbitration Act. 
1184  Section 27 Arbitration Act. 
1185  https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx (Date of  
use: 01 April 2017). 
1186  Article 16(1) Constitution of the Republic of Zambia. 
1187  Section 19(1) Zambia Development Agency Act; Article 16(1) Constitution of the Republic  
of Zambia. 
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(iii) The said Act of Parliament provides for prompt payment of compensation at 
market value;1189 and  
(iv) The payment shall be freely remittable in foreign currency.1190 
 
(d) Enforcement of awards and orders  
Arbitration awards are enforced in the High Court, and appeals thereon are made to the 
Supreme Court.1191 The IIAG ranks Zambia under Rule of Law as follows: an overall 
Rule of Law score of 74.9 (all scores out of 100), 63.1 points for judicial independence, 
83.3 for the judicial process and 60.5 for property rights.1192 Zambia ranks 9th out of 54 
African states and 7th in SADC in terms of Rule of Law.1193 
 
The WGI gives Zambia a score of 47.2 under the Rule of Law indicator,1194 while the 
WJP gives her a score of 48 under the Rule of Law indicator.1195 Zambia’s 2013 APRM 
review notes that the president appoints members of the judiciary and determines their 
                                                                                                                                            
1188  Section 19(2) Zambia Development Agency Act; Article 16(1) Constitution of the Republic  
of Zambia. 
1189  Section 19(2) Zambia Development Agency Act; Article 16(1) Constitution of the Republic  
of Zambia. 
1190  Section 19(2) Zambia Development Agency Act; Article 16(1) Constitution of the Republic  
of Zambia.  
1191  Section 18-19 Arbitration Act. 
1192  IIAG “Zambia Scores, Ranks and Trends”  
http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/ (Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
1193  IIAG Report 2017 at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017- 
IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 
(Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
1194  WGI http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (Date of use: 17 April  
2017). 
1195  WJP 2016 Rule of Law Index at 21 https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law- 
index/wjp-rule-law-index-2016 (Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
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terms of service.1196 The report recommended that Zambia entrench the functional, 
financial and structural aspects of the legislature and the judiciary.1197 
 
The U.S. Department of State states that access to justice in Zambia is limited by 
physical accessibility, financial accessibility and unreasonable delay in the dispensation 
of justice.1198  
 
Zambia is a member of the New York Convention.1199  
 
4.2.15 REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE 
According to 2015 figures, Zimbabwe had a population of 15 million and a landmass of 
386 850 sq. km.1200 It had a GDP of USD 14 Billion, with a growth rate of 3.2 percent.1201 
Per capita income was USD 965.1202 Zimbabwe’s economic opportunities lie in 
agriculture (tobacco, sugar, cotton, and horticulture), mining (diamonds, gold, and 
platinum) and manufacturing (food and beverages, clothing and textiles, wood and 
timber, fertilizers and chemicals and pharmaceuticals).1203 FDI inflows from other 
                                                
1196  APRM “Zambia Country Review Report No. 16”, January 2013 at para 48.2 
http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/country-reports-and-experiences (Date of use: 10 
February 2018). 
1197  APRM “Zambia Country Review Report” at para 52  
http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/country-reports-and-experiences (Date of use: 10 
February 2018). 
1198  https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?dlid 
=254169&year=2016#wrapper (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
1199  http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
1200  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/716/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
1201  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/716/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
1202  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/716/index.html  
(Date of use: 10 April 2017). 
1203  Zimbabwe Investment Authority A Practical Guide to Doing Business In Zimbabwe  
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sources have been between USD 40 Million and USD 500 million per annum. These 
have stabilised at approximately USD 400 Million per year since 2011.1204 
 
(a) Applicable regime 
The Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe regulates the expropriation of investments 
in Zimbabwe.1205 
 
(b) Dispute resolution forum 
With regard to the expropriation of agricultural land, the only aspect that may be 
challenged before a court is compensation for improvements made prior to the 
expropriation.1206 An expropriation of agricultural land may also not be challenged on the 
grounds that it is discriminatory.1207 
 
In all other cases, a person who has a right or interest in a property that has been 
expropriated may, subject to section 72 of the Constitution, approach a competent court 
for the return of the property, the legality of the expropriation, or the amount of 
compensation.1208  
 
Zimbabwe is a member of the ICSID Convention.1209  
 
                                                                                                                                            
(undated) at 11 
http://www.comesaria.org/site/en/opportunities.php?country=30&sector=& 
keyword=Search&id_article=133&tender=&button=Search (Date of use: 08 May 2017).  
1204  Table 3, Appendix hereto. 
1205  Constitution of 2013 (31 January version). 
1206  Section 4(26), 72(3) (b) Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe. 
1207  Section 72(3)(c) Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe. 
1208  Section 71(3) (d)-(e) Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe. 
1209  https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx (Date of  
use: 01 April 2017). 
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(c) Expropriation and compensation standard 
The Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe provides that every person has the right to 
acquire, hold, occupy, use, transfer, hypothecate, lease or dispose of all forms of 
property, either individually or in association with others.1210 It allows for expropriation 
where the following conditions are satisfied the expropriation is: 
  
(i) In terms of a law of general application;1211  
(ii) Necessary for the interests of defense, public safety, public order, public morality,  
public health or town and country planning;1212 and 
(iii)   For a public purpose.1213 
   
With regard to agricultural land, no compensation is payable except for improvements to 
the land.1214 Furthermore, a court is prohibited from adjudicating on a dispute relating to 
compensation for expropriated land.1215  
 
(d) Enforcement of awards and orders  
Disputes relating to expropriation are brought local courts for adjudication. The IIAG 
ranks Zimbabwe under Rule of Law as follows: an overall Rule of Law score of 42.5 (all 
scores out of 100), 45.6 points for judicial independence, 37.5 for the judicial process 
and 23.5 for property rights.1216 Zimbabwe ranks 38th out of 54 African states and 13th in 
SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.1217 
                                                
1210  Section 71(2) Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe. 
1211  Section 71(3) (a) Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe. 
1212  Section 71(3) (b) Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe. 
1213  Section 71(3) (b) Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe. 
1214  Section 72(3) (a) Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe. 
1215  Section 72(3) (b) Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe. 
1216  IIAG “Zimbabwe Scores, Ranks and Trends” 
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The WJP gives Zimbabwe a score of 37 under the Rule of Law indicator.1218  
 
The U.S. Department of State states that the judiciary lacks resources, cases are 
backlogged, there is lack of partiality in cases with political overtones, and politicians 
interfere in foreign cases that are not favorable to Zimbabwe.1219  
 
Zimbabwe is a member of the New York Convention.1220 
 
4.3 SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES IN THE EVENT OF  
EXPROPRIATION 
Below is a summary of the remedies available to an investor or investment in the event 
of expropriation, based on the preceding discussion. 
 
SADC 
STATE 
APPLICABLE 
LAW 
 
DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 
FORUM 
COMPENSATION 
STANDARD 
ENFORCEMENT 
MECHANISM 
Angola Private 
Investment 
Law 
Local courts Fair, prompt and 
effective 
compensation 
Local courts 
Botswana Constitution; Local courts Prompt and Local courts; 
                                                                                                                                            
http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/ (Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
1217  IIAG 2017 Report at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG- 
Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 (Date 
of use: 14 December 2017). 
1218  WJP 2016 Rule of Law Index at 21 https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law- 
index/wjp-rule-law-index-2016 (Date of use: 14 December 2017). 
1219  https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2016/af/254261.htm (Date of use: 17 April 2017). 
1220  http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (Date of use: 01 April 2017). 
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Acquisition of 
Property Act 
  adequate 
compensation 
 
New York 
Convention 
DRC Investment 
Code; 
Constitution 
Local 
arbitration, 
failing, 
international 
arbitration 
(ICSID or ICC)  
Fair and equitable. 
Based on market 
value 
Local courts; 
New York 
Convention 
Lesotho Constitution Local courts Full and prompt at 
market value 
 
Local courts; 
New York 
Convention 
Madagascar 
 
Investment 
Law 
Local courts Fair compensation Local courts 
 
 
Malawi Investment 
and Export 
Promotion 
Act; 
Constitution 
 
Local courts 
 
Appropriate 
compensation 
Local courts 
Mauritius Investment 
Promotion 
Act; 
Constitution 
Local courts 
 
Adequate 
compensation 
Local courts; 
New York 
Convention 
220 
 
 
Mozambique Law on 
Investment;  
Investment 
Law 
Regulations; 
Constitution 
Local courts, or 
if parties 
agree, ICSID 
or ICC 
arbitration. 
 
Fair compensation Local courts; 
New York 
Convention 
Namibia Investment 
Promotion 
Act; 
Constitution 
Local courts or 
local arbitration 
(if state 
agrees)  
 
Just 
compensation 
Local courts; 
New York 
Convention 
Seychelles Investment 
Act; 
Constitution 
Local courts, or 
by law or as 
per investment 
agreement. 
 
Prompt and full 
compensation 
Local courts 
New York 
Convention 
South Africa 
 
Constitution; 
Protection of 
Investment 
Act 
Mediation, 
local courts or 
state-state 
arbitration if 
state agrees 
Just and equitable Local Courts 
New York 
Convention 
Eswatini 
 
Investment 
Promotion 
Act; 
Investor 
chooses local 
courts or local 
Adequate and fair 
compensation 
Local courts; 
New York 
Convention 
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Constitution arbitration or 
UNCITRAL or 
ICSID. 
 
Tanzania Investment 
Act; 
Constitution 
Both parties 
must agree on 
the choice of 
Local 
arbitration, or 
ICSID, or 
arbitration i.t.o 
treaty. 
 
 
Prompt fair and 
adequate 
compensation 
Local courts; 
New York 
Convention 
Zambia Zambia 
Development 
Agency Act; 
Constitution 
 
Local 
arbitration. 
 
Market value Local courts; 
New York 
Convention 
Zimbabwe 
 
Investment 
Authority Act; 
Constitution  
Local courts. 
 
Fair and adequate 
compensation 
Local courts 
 
 
Table 1: Summary of provisions relating to expropriation in SADC. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on the preceding discussion 
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4.4 ANALYSIS  
It is clear from the abovementioned analysis that the investment laws of Member States 
are in conflict with each other, as well as with the 2006 Annex 1 or the 2016 Annex 1. 
The next section will look at the implications of these conflicts for the security of foreign 
investments in SADC. 
 
4.4.1 Dispute resolution forum 
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe provide for local courts as the forum for settlement 
of investor-state disputes. Mozambique and Tanzania can be added to this list because 
they provide conditional access to ISDS, failing which a dispute must be referred to local 
courts. Furthermore, Tanzania has passed legislation to prohibit the state from being 
subjected to ISDS. The laws of these Member States are coincidentally aligned to the 
2016 Annex 1, which provides that investor-state disputes shall be referred to the local 
courts of host states.  
 
The mandatory referral of investor-state disputes to local courts puts the rule of law in 
those Member States in the spotlight, since that is the only forum to which the disputes 
can be referred (in the absence of applicable BITs, TIPs, or investment contracts). It was 
shown above that there are concerns about the state of the rule of law regarding the 
courts of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Seychelles, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
 
The DRC, Mozambique, Eswatini, and Tanzania provide for ISDS, contrary to the 
provisions of the 2016 Annex 1. Mozambique and Tanzania require mutual consent for 
arbitration. Eswatini gives an investor a choice of forum and the investor’s choice is 
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binding on the state. The DRC also provides for arbitration as of right. Therefore, state 
practice is divergent even among states that provide for ISDS. In this regard, only the 
DRC and Eswatini are in compliance with the 2006 Annex 1 on the issue of ISDS. But in 
so doing they contravene the 2016 Annex 1. Mozambique is non-compliant with the 
2006 and 2016 Annex 1 by providing optional access to ISDS.  The rest of the Member 
States are in line with the 2016 Annex 1 by not providing access to ISDS. 
 
The DRC, Madagascar Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Eswatini, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
as members of COMESA face conflicting obligations arising from the 2006 Annex 1 and 
2016 Annex 1 on the one hand, and the COMESA Treaty on the other. For example, the 
COMESA Treaty provides for the referral of disputes to the CCJ, 1221  while the 2006 
Annex 1 gives an investor a right to ISDS, and the 2016 Annex 1 refers disputes to local 
courts. This raises the question: which forum must an investor whose investment was 
expropriated by one of these Member States use: the CCJ, ISDS or local courts? The 
2006 Annex 1, the 2016 Annex 1 and the COMESA Treaty provide conflicting remedies 
in the event of expropriation. The overall effect of these conflicts is to create instability, 
unpredictability, and to raise the legal costs for all parties since the conflicts may lead to 
prolonged legal action. This also shows the result of multiple REC memberships that 
causes conflicting treaty obligations. 
 
In the event of a conflict between either version of Annex 1 and the law of a host state, 
the provisions of Annex 1 shall prevail, since Annex 1 is an annex to a TIP, being the 
FIP. This is because a treaty is an international obligation that must be honoured, 
irrespective of the provisions of domestic law. 
 
                                                
1221  Article 26 COMESA Treaty. 
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Even if a Member State provides access to ISDS, contrary to the 2016 Annex 1, it can 
still refuse to be drawn into an ISDS case, on the basis that doing so will violate a treaty 
obligation provided in the 2016 Annex 1 not to provide Member State laws to be in line 
with the 2016 Annex 1. 
 
4.4.2 Expropriation and compensation standard 
 
It was shown above that SADC Member States provide for different levels of 
compensation in the event of expropriation.1222 Botswana, Lesotho, Seychelles provide 
for full compensation. The DRC, Madagascar, Mozambique, Eswatini, Tanzania, and 
Zimbabwe provide for fair compensation. Malawi provides for appropriate compensation. 
Zambia provides for compensation at market value, which is close to if not similar to fair 
compensation. Namibia provides for just compensation, and Mauritius provides for 
adequate compensation. 
 
It is important to note that the compensation standards of some SADC Member States 
are not in line with the 2006 Annex 1, which provides for prompt, adequate and effective 
(full) compensation. Botswana, Lesotho, Seychelles expressly provide for full 
compensation, while it may be said that Mauritius, Eswatini, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe also provide full compensation since they provide for “adequate 
compensation”. The 2016 Annex 1 requires the Member States to pay fair and adequate 
compensation.1223 Therefore these Member States are in compliance with the 2006 
Annex 1, but they are not compliant with the 2016 Annex 1. 
 
                                                
1222  See Table 1 above. 
1223  Article 5 2016 Annex 1. 
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In the event of a conflict between any version of Annex 1 and the laws of a host state 
with regard to the quantum of compensation for expropriation, it is submitted that the 
quantum provided in Annex 1 shall prevail, since the standard of compensation provided 
by Annex 1 is a treaty obligation that Member States must follow, irrespective of the 
provisions of their investment laws. 
 
SADC Member States that are members of COMESA, namely the DRC, Madagascar 
Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Eswatini, Zambia and Zimbabwe have an additional issue 
to deal with. The COMESA Treaty obliges them to pay adequate compensation in the 
event of expropriation.1224 This compensation standard complies with the 2006 Annex 1 
to the extent that it provides for full compensation. It will, however, not comply with the 
2016 Annex 1, which does not require the payment of full compensation. However, the 
COMESA Treaty and the 2016 Annex 1 do not provide the same standard of 
compensation. Therefore, these Member States face conflicting compensation 
standards. 
 
4.4.3 Enforcement 
In terms of Article 54 of the ICSID Convention and Article III of the New York 
Convention, the courts of a host state must enforce ICSID and non-ICSID awards 
respectively. Articles 5 of the New York Convention and Article 36 of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law respectively allow a court to refuse recognition of an award among others if 
the court finds that the recognition or enforcement of the award will be against the public 
policy of the Member State. This exposes non-ICSID awards to being challenged and 
set aside.  
 
                                                
1224  Article 159(3) COMESA Treaty. 
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A 2008 study done by Queen Mary University reports that in up to 90 percent of 
arbitrations, Member States voluntarily complied with an award, while 40 percent of the 
cases were settled after the issue of the award.1225 Therefore, it is only in the minority of 
the cases that states frustrate or fail to comply with arbitral awards. This is supported by 
UNCTAD data. According to UNCTAD, as of 22 November 2017, of 78 awards 
presented national courts for recognition, 50 were upheld, 11 were set aside, 3 were 
partially set aside, 1 was discontinued, and 13 were pending.1226  
 
Nonetheless, the possibility of host states and courts refusing to recognise an award is a 
real threat to an investor. Three recent examples illustrate this point. In Government of 
the Republic of Zimbabwe v Louis Karel Fick,1227 the respondents had to approach 
South African Courts to enforce an order of the SADC Tribunal that was awarded 
against Zimbabwe.1228 Another matter that concerning Zimbabwe is being is Bernhard 
Von Pezold.  In this matter, Zimbabwe was ordered to return the expropriated farms to 
the claimants plus damages of USD56 million, failing which Zimbabwe had to pay 
USD194 Million.1229 Zimbabwe is seeking to have the award annulled, and in the interim 
has agreed to pay the damages into an escrow account pending the decision on 
annulment.1230 Of course, one can also view Zimbabwe’s annulment application as a 
bona fide use of available redress to challenge the award.  
 
                                                
1225  See http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/docs/123294.pdf (Date of use: 09 April 2017). 
1226  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByFollowUpProceedings (Date of use:  
22 November 2017). 
1227  CCT 101/12 [2013] ZACC 22.  
1228  See also De Wet 2014 (17) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 553-565. 
1229  Bernhard Von Pezold at para 1020. 
1230  Bernhard Von Pezold Decision on Stay of Enforcement of the Award of 24 April 2017  
at para 97-99; Decision on the Applicant’s Urgent Application for Provisional Measures 
Regarding the Temporary Stay of Execution and The Escrow Arrangement of 22 August 
2017. 
227 
 
Further afield, the attempts to enforce the award in Walter Bau made global headlines 
for all the wrong reasons, because Thailand did everything it could to avoid complying 
with the tribunal award.1231 Since the award was issued in July 2009, the case was 
fought in New York, Switzerland, and Germany with no closure, because the Thai 
government consistently refused to comply with the award.1232 When Walter Bau 
attached a Boeing 747 jet belonging to the Thai crown prince, the government gave 
security for the payment of the award in order to release the jet. However, by 2015, the 
case was still being contested, and at the time of writing there were no public reports of 
the status of the matter.1233  
 
It is imperative that the SADC Member States comply with court orders and tribunal 
awards made against them, because failure to do so compromises the state of the rule 
of law in their states. In turn, this may lead to a loss of trust in their judicial systems. This 
may, in turn, lead to forum and treaty shopping by investors who seek to bypass their 
judicial systems.  
                                                
1231  See for example Sucharitkul V “From Walter Bau to Hopewell to Bangkok Don Muang  
Airport” Asia-Pacific Arbitration Reporter 2015 (1) APAR 309-315 
http://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/09/2015-1-APAR-Article-
Vanina-Sucharitkul.pdf (Date of use: 08 April 2017). 
1232  Walter Bau AG was German construction business. During 1998, Walter Bau and a Thai  
partner were awarded a concession to build a 20km toll road from Bangkok to the Don 
Muang Airport. The final agreement was signed during 1989 in the name of a consortium 
of which Walter was a shareholder/partner. The toll road was ultimately finished, but 
there were unresolved disputes that led to Walter Bau commencing arbitration. Key 
disputes were the refusal of the Thai government to increase toll fees as agreed in one of 
the memoranda between the parties, the unilateral closure of the Don Muang Airport for a 
year and the creation of alternative road which reduced traffic on Walter Bau’s toll road. 
The arbitral tribunal found that the Thai government breached Walter Bau’s right to fair 
and equitable treatment, and awarded compensation of EUR30 million. 
1233  Sucharitkul “From Walter Bau to Hopewell to Bangkok Don Muang Airport” at 313  
http://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/09/2015-1-APAR-Article-
Vanina-Sucharitkul.pdf (Date of use: 08 April 2017). 
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4.5 CONCLUSION 
The regulation of foreign investments in SADC by means of Member State laws and 
Annex 1 has been chaotic, unsatisfactory and a failure, because as shown above, 
Member States have failed to harmonise their laws with both the 2006 and 2016 Annex 
1. There is also no uniformity among the Member States in terms of the regulation of 
foreign investments, especially with regard to the resolution of foreign investment 
disputes, and the quantum of compensation payable in the event of expropriation. 
 
Furthermore, Member States such as Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe appear to provide 
inadequate levels of rule of law in their judicial systems. This is a violation of Article 4(c) 
of the SADC Treaty, which requires the Member States to respect the rule of law.  
 
The status quo is unsustainable. What options does SADC have regarding the way 
forward?  
 
In an endeavour to address this question, the next chapter will analyse recent 
developments in Brazil, the EU and India with regard to the regulation of foreign 
investments, so as to determine the lessons that SADC may learn there from, and what 
options may lie ahead for SADC in this regard. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
229 
 
CHAPTER 5 
SADC AT CROSSROADS: TOWARDS A NEW DISPENSATION FOR THE 
REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS  
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
It was shown in Chapter 1 that one of the key objectives of this study is to analyse the 
options that are open to SADC to address the challenges identified in the Problem 
Statement, in particular with regard to the regulation of foreign investments and the 
forum for the resolution of investor-state disputes.1234 This Chapter implements this 
objective. The Chapter will analyse recent developments in Brazil, the EU, and India, 
with regard to the regulation of foreign investments and the forum for the resolution of 
investor-state disputes. Building on this analysis, the chapter will propose the lessons 
that SADC can learn from these developments. The chapter will conclude with an 
analysis of the options that are open to SADC with regard to the level at which foreign 
investments in SADC should be regulated, and the mechanism for the resolution of 
investor-state disputes. This will lay the basis for the recommendations that will be made 
in Chapter 6. 
 
ISDS has various challenges, as discussed in Chapter 2 above.1235 According to 
UNCTAD, states and regions have responded to the challenges presented by ISDS in 
different ways,1236 such as by maintaining the status quo (e.g. Brazil), disengaging from 
                                                
1234  See Objective 1.3.5 in Chapter 1. 
1235  See the relevant discussion in Chapter 2 above.   
1236  See also Mbengue and Schacherer 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment and Trade  
414 at 442; Miles K “Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Conflict, Convergence, and 
Future Directions” 2016 European Yearbook Of International Economic Law 274-305; 
Schill SW “In Defence of International Investment Law” 2016 European Yearbook Of 
International Economic Law 309-338; Titi C “Recent Developments in International 
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the ISDS system (e.g. SADC), introducing selective adjustments (e.g. India) or by 
implementing systematic reforms (e.g. the EU).1237 The question that arises for SADC is 
whether, given that it removed ISDS from the 2016 Annex 1, there are other options 
open to it? This study answers this question in the affirmative, and this chapter justifies 
the existence of other options that are open to SADC. 
 
The EU’s proposed ICS is the first of its kind, and is worthy of consideration. Brazil’s 
ACFI is relevant because it provides for diplomatic protection in the form of state-state 
arbitration for the resolution of investor-state disputes. Angola, Mozambique, and Malawi 
have signed ACFIs with Brazil.1238 This raises the question of, if these Member States 
like ACFIs enough to conclude them, do they view the ACFI model as a solution for 
SADC or even Africa? The India Model BIT 2015 is relevant herein because it adheres 
to ISDS while imposing limitations on access to ISDS, among other measures. India 
therefore believes that ISDS can be patched or fixed. 
 
This chapter will commence with a brief discussion of the ICS Proposal, Brazil’s ACFI 
and Indian Model BIT. This will be followed by an analysis of the lessons that SADC can 
learn from the developments in these jurisdictions. The chapter will conclude with an 
analysis of the options that are open to SADC with regard to the future regulation of 
foreign investments, and the forum for the resolution of investor-state disputes. These 
                                                                                                                                            
Investment Law” 2016 European Yearbook Of International Economic Law 703-731; 
Tuerk E and Rosert D “The Road Towards Reform of the International Investment 
Agreement Regime: A Perspective from UNCTAD” 2016 European Yearbook Of 
International Economic Law 769-786. 
1237  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment  
Agreement Issues Notes” No. 3, June 2014 at 2-9 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2014d6_en.pdf (Date of use: 18 
January 2018). 
1238  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/27#iiaInnerMenu  
(Date of use: 9 August 2018). 
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lessons and options will be relevant, as SADC takes part in the AfCFTA investment 
protocol negotiations.1239 
 
5.2 AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS THE  
CHALLENGES ARISING FROM ISDS  
 
5.2.1 The EU’s proposed ICS 
In terms of a recent opinion of the European Court of Justice, and Articles 3(1) and 207 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the EU Parliament and 
the EU Council have the exclusive mandate to negotiate and conclude trade and foreign 
direct investment agreements.1240 Based on this mandate, the EU has recently 
concluded the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA),1241 
the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement,1242 the EU-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement,1243 and was negotiating the TTIP,1244 until the USA withdrew from the TTIP 
                                                
1239  African Union (Assembly) “Decision” at para 12(iii), 13. 
https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/african-union/1834-au-decision-on-the-draft-
agreement-establishing-the-african-continental-free-trade-area-21-march-2018-1/file.html 
(Date of use, 28 March 2018). 
1240  Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506- 
fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_2&format=PDF (Date of use: 21 April 2017). See also the 
recent opinion of the European Court of Justice requested by the European Commission 
in the case of ECLI:EU:C:2017:376 (Opinion 2/2015) at para 33, 305 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30d63c5084083f
7b49bd8e26e1cacbce1dfd.e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxyLb3r0?text=&docid=190727&pag
eIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=473213 (Date of use: 21 
May 2017). 
1241  A copy of the CETA is available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta- 
chapter-by-chapter/ (Date of use: 20 April 2017).  
1242   http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437 (Date of use: 21  
April 2017). 
1243  Available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961 (Date of use: 21  
April 2017).  
1244  For documents and updates see http://eu.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/documents- 
and-events/index_index_en.htm#eu-position (Date of use: 21 April 2017). 
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negotiations.1245 Key to this study is the EU’s proposed Investment Court System (ICS), 
which proposal is part of the dispute resolution mechanism of the TTIP. 
 
Two things are noteworthy regarding the ICS proposal. Firstly, on 27 March 2014, the 
EU commenced a public consultation process in order to gauge public sentiment on the 
TTIP, in particular, with regard to the inclusion of ISDS in the TTIP.1246 The public 
rejected the proposals with an overwhelming 99 percent majority.1247 In particular, 
respondents rejected the inclusion of ISDS in the TTIP.1248 The EU then returned to the 
drawing board, and emerged with the present ICS proposal (which as it will be shown 
below, is ISDS in disguise). Secondly, the negotiating directive of 17 June 2013 issued 
by the Council of the EU regarding the TTIP stipulated among others that the TTIP must 
provide for ISDS with an appeal mechanism.1249 
  
                                                
1245   The withdrawal of the U.S. from the TTIP has not necessarily dampened the resolve to 
 forge ahead with the ICS, as it is contained in the EU-Canada CETA 2016 and EU-
 Vietnam FTA 2016. 
1246  http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?consul_id=179 (Date of use: 03  
November 2017).  
1247  See the report of the outcome of the consultations: European Union (Commission)  
“Report on Online public consultation on investment protection and investor-to-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
Agreement (TTIP)”, (Brussels, 13.1.2015 SWD (2015) 3 final)  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc153044.pdf (Date of use: 03 
November 2017). 
1248  See European Commission “Report on Online public consultation” at  para 3.1  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153044.pdf (Date of use: 03 
November 2017). 
1249  See European Union (Council) “Directives for the negotiation on the Transatlantic  
Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union and the United States of 
America”, Brussels, 9 October 2014, at 9 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST- 
11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf (Date of use: 04 September 2017). 
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The TTIP text consists of 24 Chapters, divided into 4 Parts.1250 Part 1 deals with Market 
Access, Part 2 deals with Regulatory Cooperation, Part 3 deals with Rules, and Part 4 
deals with Institutional and General Arrangements. The ICS proposals that will be used 
in this discussion are contained in Subsection 3 (Resolution of Investment Disputes and 
Investment Court System), Chapter II of Part 3 and Part 4.1251 The proposed functioning 
of the ICS in relation to the mechanism for the resolution of investor-state disputes will 
now be briefly analysed, followed by some comments.1252 
 
The ICS is supposed to be an international court, which will apply international law.1253 It 
will have a Tribunal of First Instance (the Tribunal),1254 and an Appeal Tribunal (the 
Appeal Tribunal).1255 The ICS proposal provides for investor-state disputes to be 
resolved via ADR, although this is not mandatory.1256 If ADR measures are not 
successful in resolving a dispute within six months from the submission of a request for 
consultation, an investor may submit a claim to the ICS Tribunal in terms of the ICSID 
                                                
1250  The full text of the TTIP proposal is available in parts at  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230 (Date of use: 1 November 
2017). 
1251  http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230#institutions (Date of use: 1  
November 2017). 
1252  See also Baetens F “The European Union’s Proposed Investment Court System:  
Addressing Criticisms of ISDS While Raising New Challenges” 2016 (43) (4) Legal Issues 
of Economic Integration 367–384; Reinisch A “Will the EU’s Proposal Concerning an 
Investment Court System for CETA and TTIP Lead to Enforceable Awards?—The Limits 
of Modifying the ICSID Convention and the Nature of Investment Arbitration” 2016 (19) 
Journal of International Economic Law 761–786; Schwieder RW” TTIP and the 
Investment Court System: A New (and Improved) Paradigm for  
Investor-State Adjudication” 2016 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 178-227 at 
189-193. 
1253 Article 13(2) Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal. 
1254  Article 9 Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal.  
1255  Article 10 Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal. 
1256  Articles 2-4 Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal. 
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Convention, UNCITRAL or other arbitration rules agreed by the parties to the dispute.1257 
In order to avoid parallel proceedings, a claimant is required to first withdraw any 
proceedings relating to the claim that may be pending before any court or tribunal.1258 A 
claimant is required to submit proof of the withdrawal of such proceedings, as well as a 
declaration stating that it will not submit the same claim in another forum in the future 
(“no-U-turn clause”).1259  
 
A claimant must commence consultations within three years since it first acquired 
knowledge of the measures of a host state complained of, or within two years after the 
cessation of proceedings for the exhaustion of local remedies, if these were 
commenced.1260 Furthermore, if a claimant does not refer a dispute to the ICS Tribunal 
within 18 months from submission of the request for consultations, the claimant shall be 
deemed to have withdrawn its request for consultations.1261 A claimant is exempted from 
compliance with this deadline if it cannot do so due to the measures of a host state 
complained of.1262 
 
A claimant is not required to first exhaust local remedies in a host state.1263 A claimant 
may not submit a claim relating to an investment that was obtained through fraudulent 
misrepresentation, concealment, corruption, or conduct amounting to an abuse of 
process.1264  
                                                
1257  Article 6(2) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal. 
1258  Article14 (1)-(2) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal. 
1259  Article 14(2) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal. 
1260  Article 4(5) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal. 
1261  Article 4(6) Sub-section 3, Chapter II TTIP Proposal. 
1262  Article 4(7) Sub-section 3, Chapter II TTIP Proposal. 
1263  See the discussion in para 5.3.3 below. This contrasts with the Indian Model BIT, which  
requires mandatory ADR and the exhaustion of local remedies, as discussed below. 
1264  Article 6(6) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal. 
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The ICSID and the PCA are designated as the Secretariat of the ICS.1265 The ICSID 
Convention, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or other arbitration rules shall apply to ICS 
proceedings.1266 More specifically, Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention regarding 
jurisdiction ratione personae, as well as Article II of the New York Convention shall 
apply.1267 One cannot help but notice at this early juncture that the ICS is displaying 
elements of an arbitration institution.       
    
The UNCITRAL Transparency Rules shall also apply to the proceedings.1268 These rules 
encourage transparency and access to information in arbitration proceedings. They 
mandate that information and documents relating to an investor-state arbitration shall be 
made available to the public, interested parties such as amici curiae may join the 
proceedings, and hearings shall be open to the public.1269 
 
The judgment of an ICS Tribunal is called a provisional award.1270 A Tribunal shall issue 
a provisional award within eighteen months from the submission of a claim, although it 
may on good reason take longer to render an award.1271 A Tribunal may order monetary 
damages or restitution of property with an alternative for monetary compensation.1272 
However, a tribunal may not award monetary damages that are greater than the loss 
                                                
1265  Article 9(16), 10(15) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal. 
1266  Articles 2, 7, 29(1) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal. 
1267  Article 7(2) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal. 
1268  Article 18(1) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal. The rules are available at  
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-
Transparency-E.pdf (Date of use: 21 April 2017). 
1269  Articles 3-6 UNCITRAL Transparency Rules. 
1270   A provisional award shall become final if an appeal against it is not lodged within 90 days  
of the issue of the award. 
1271  Article 28(6) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal. 
1272  Article 28(2) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal. 
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actually suffered by a claimant as a result of the breach of the relevant provisions of the 
TTIP agreement, reduced by any prior damages or compensation already provided by 
the Party concerned.1273 Furthermore, a Tribunal may not award punitive damages.1274 
 
The TTIP proposal provides for the establishment of non-judicial structures. These are a 
Joint Committee (JC),1275 Contact Points (CPs),1276 Transatlantic Regulators Forum 
(TRF),1277 Specialised Working Committees (SWCs) and Working Groups (SWGs),1278 
Domestic Advisory Groups (DAGs)1279 and a Civil Society Forum (CSF).1280 The JC1281 
and CPs1282 are noteworthy structures, as they are similar in function to their Brazilian 
equivalents, which are discussed in the next section. Each Member State shall establish 
a DAG, which shall comprise of independent representative organisations of civil society 
in a balanced representation of economic, social, and environmental stakeholders, 
including, among others, employers and workers organisations, nongovernmental 
organisations, business groups, consumer groups, and public health associations.1283 
The CSF shall be a joint structure, and shall be convened by the JC at least once per 
                                                
1273  Article 28(2) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal. 
1274  Article 28(3) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal. 
1275  Article X.1 Part 4 TTIP Proposal (EU Proposal for Institutional, General and Final  
Provisions) of 14 July 2016 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/july/tradoc_154802.pdf (Date of use: 04 
September 2017). 
1276  Article X.5 Part 4 TTIP Proposal. 
1277  Article X.2 Part 4 TTIP Proposal. 
1278  Article X.1 Part 3 TTIP Proposal. 
1279  Article X.7 Part 4 TTIP Proposal. 
1280  See EU Proposal for Institutional, General and Final Provisions of 14 July 2016   
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/july/tradoc_154802.pdf (Date of use: 04 
September 2017). 
1281  The relevant function of the TTIP Joint Committee here is the resolution of problems that 
may arise in areas covered by the Agreement. The Brazilian Joint Committees also 
perform a similar function. 
1282  The TTIP Contact Points are aimed at facilitating communication between Member  
States, just like the Brazilian Focal Points. 
1283  Article X.7 Part 4 TTIP Proposal (this Part is not divided into Chapters). 
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year, and shall include DAGs and independent representative organisations of 
employers, workers, environmental interests, business groups, consumer groups, and 
public health associations.1284  
 
The proposed creation of DAGs and CSFs is an important component of the TTIP. It 
brings public participation to the implementation of the TTIP, thus enabling transparency 
as well as the consideration of broader societal interests.  
 
A few comments will now be made on the ICS proposal, noting that it is impossible to 
conduct a full analysis thereof herein.1285 
 
 As a starting point, it appears that the EU might not have the legal competency to 
establish the ICS as proposed. According to the German Magistrates Association, the 
ICS will be outside the scope of the existing EU legal and judicial order, and therefore its 
establishment will be a violation of EU law.1286 This is supported by an opinion of a full 
bench of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the European and Community Patents 
Court case. In this matter, the ECJ held that the establishment of the European and 
Community Patents Court as an international court would be a violation of the EU Treaty 
and FEU Treaty.1287 The ECJ found in this regard that such a court would be outside the 
                                                
1284  Article X.8 Part 4 TTIP Proposal. 
1285  For a critique of whether the ICS proposal addresses the challenges of ISDS, see  
Schwieder 2016 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law at 194-202. 
1286  German Magistrates Association “Opinion on the establishment of an investment tribunal 
in TTIP - the proposal from the European Commission on 16.09.2015 and 11.12.2015” at 
2 https://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/eu-
us_trade_deal/2016/english_version_deutsche_richterbund_opinion_ics_feb2016.pdf 
(Date of use: 76 September 2017).  
1287  European Court of Justice “Opinion 1/09: Opinion delivered pursuant to Article 218(11)  
TFEU (Opinion delivered pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU – Draft agreement – Creation 
of a unified patent litigation system – European and Community Patents Court – 
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institutional and judicial framework of the EU.1288 The ICS therefore faces the same 
predicament of illegality. 
  
Aside from its possible illegality, the ICS also has an identity crisis. Is it really a court, or 
a standing arbitration tribunal in disguise? While the ICS purports to be an international 
court, it is strictly speaking not a court at all. Despite being branded by the EU as an 
international court, the ICS is more of an arbitral tribunal institution than a court in the 
ordinary sense of the word. The biggest give-away in this regard is that the ICS uses 
arbitration infrastructure such as ICSID and PCA as its Secretariat, and it uses the ICSID 
Convention, UNCITRAL Rules and the New York Convention to function. Furthermore, 
judgments of the ICS are called awards, a language that is used by arbitral tribunals.1289 
The EU Commissioner for Trade also made it clear that the “judges” of the ICS are in 
reality arbitrators when she said that:  
 
Our idea here is for governments, long before any actual cases are launched, to 
nominate a limited list of trustworthy arbitrators who would decide on all TTIP 
investment cases. To get onto the list, the arbitrators would have to be 
sufficiently qualified. For example, they would have to be eligible to be judges in 
their home systems.1290  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Compatibility of the draft agreement with the Treaties)”  
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=80233&pageIndex=0&d
oclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=812343 (Date of use: 18 January 
2018). 
1288  At para 71.  
1289  See for example Articles 10, 28-30   
1290  See European Commission Speech by Cecilia Malmstrom - Commissioner for Trade  
“Discussion on Investment in TTIP at the meeting of the International Trade Committee of 
the European Parliament” Brussels 15 March 2015 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-15-4624_en.htm (Date of use: 03 November 2017). 
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Finally, the negotiation directive issued by the EU Council stated that the TTIP must 
retain ISDS, with an appeal mechanism.1291 Indeed, this directive was followed, as can 
be seen from the use of ISDS facilities, rules and arbitrators. It is, therefore, difficult to 
argue that the ICS is a departure from ISDS when the EU’s mandate was that ISDS 
must be retained. Otherwise, the ICS proposal is outside of the EU’s directive as stated 
herein, and would then face issues of illegality. 
 
The labelling of the ICS as an international court is therefore misleading. Reinisch 
suggests that the ambiguity relating to the naming of the ICS as a court rather than an 
arbitral institution appears to be deliberate.1292 He opines that the ICS is an arbitral 
tribunal, despite the fact that the arbitrators were appointed by states without the 
involvement of investors.1293 The German Magistrates Association also concludes that 
the ICS is a permanent court of arbitration and not an international court.1294  Little 
wonder that a commentator calls the ICS “a wolf in a sheep’s skin”.1295  
 
Nonetheless, the ICS proposal has some positive aspects. These are discussed below. 
 
                                                
1291  European Union (Council) “Directives for the negotiation on the Transatlantic  
Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union and the United States of 
America” at para 23-24 http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-
DCL-1/en/pdf (Date of use: 04 September 2017). 
1292  Reinisch 2016 (19) Journal of International Economic Law 761 at 765. 
1293  Reinisch 2016 (19) Journal of International Economic Law 761 at 768. 
1294  German Magistrates Association “Opinion on the establishment of an investment tribunal 
in TTIP - the proposal from the European Commission on 16.09.2015 and 11.12.2015” at 
2 
https://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/euus_trade_deal/2016/english_version_deut
sche_richterbund_opinion_ics_feb2016.pdf (Date of use: 76 September 2017). 
1295  Ebenhart P “ICS: The Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing, The EU’s Great Corporate Rebrand”  
Public Services International May 2016 http://www.world-psi.org/en/investment-court-
system-ics-wolf-sheeps-clothing (Date of use: 17 April 2017). 
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It is commendable that the ICS seeks to regulate the maximum legal costs that an 
unsuccessful claimant who is a natural person or a small or medium-sized business 
(SMEs) can pay.1296 This will enable SMEs to enforce their rights in the event that they 
are impaired, without fear of being exposed to unlimited legal costs.1297 
 
The ICS proposal’s effort to reduce the duration that it takes to conclude cases to 
eighteen months, and for appeals to be concluded within six months is a positive move. 
But potentially, this means cases will take close to two years to conclude. The fact that 
Article 28(6) makes provision for cases to take a longer duration to conclude (without 
setting a ceiling on the extensions that can be granted) means that cases can potentially 
take longer. There ought to be ramifications if cases are not concluded on time, as 
contemplated by the ICS proposal.1298 
 
The application of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules on transparency is another 
commendable feature, as it promotes public access and participation in investor-state 
cases.1299  
                                                
1296  Article 28(5), Chapter II, TTIP Proposal. 
1297  However, SMEs still face significant legal costs if they use the ICS, due to the multiple  
layers of appeals and the possibility of the inclusion of amici curiae etc. (Article 4 of the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law “Rules on Transparency in 
Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration” 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-
Transparency-E.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017) allow an interested party to join the 
proceedings in order to make submissions on a matter to which the dispute relates). 
1298  Baetens 2016 (43) (4) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 367 at 377. 
1299  Articles 4 and 5 of the United Nations Commission on International Trade “UNCITRAL  
Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration” United Nations, New 
York 2014 http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-
transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017) 
allow interested parties to join a case. See also Baetens 2016 (43) (4) Legal Issues of 
Economic Integration 367 at 373-374; Schwieder 2016 (55) Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 178 at 196. 
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It is noteworthy that the EU, like Brazil (as discussed in the next section), proposes the 
use of JCs and CPs to facilitate investor-state dispute resolution. This is an interesting 
pattern that deserves to be watched. 
 
There are, however, a number of downsides to the ICS proposal, as discussed next. The 
use of the ICSID and PCA as the ICS Secretariat will increase costs for all parties, as 
these institutions charge their own fees, which are excessive.1300 For example, the ICSID 
charges USD 25000.00 for the opening of a case, an annual administration fee of USD 
42000.00, and USD 10 000.00 for the appointment of arbitrators.1301 These are very 
significant for SMEs and developing states, especially when converted to local African 
currency. National courts in SADC do not charge fees of this magnitude.1302 For 
example, in South Africa, there are no fees for opening a court case. 
 
The application of the ICSID Convention to ICS cases poses serious challenges. This is 
because the EU is not a party to the Convention, and therefore an ICSID tribunal would 
lack jurisdiction against the EU.1303 Furthermore, the EU cannot join the ICSID, as ICSID 
membership is presently limited to states only.1304 The ICS proposal does not indicate 
how this challenge will be addressed. 
 
                                                
1300  ICSID fees are available at  
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/Schedule-of-Fees.aspx, while  
PCA fees are available at https://pca-cpa.org/fees-and-costs/ (Date of use: 07 September 
2017). 
1301  https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/Schedule-of-Fees.aspx (Date of use: 10  
November 2017). 
1302  Baetens 2016 (43) (4) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 367 at 379. 
1303  Baetens 2016 (43) (4) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 367 at 369; Reinisch  
2016 (19) Journal of International Economic Law 761 at 768-769. 
1304  Reinisch 2016 (19) Journal of International Economic Law 761 at 769. 
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Another challenge is that the ICS proposal for the creation of a standing set of judges is 
contrary to Article 37(2) of the ICSID Convention, which requires the parties to a dispute 
to appoint arbitrators in every case.1305 As the ICS proposal stands, investors do not play 
a role in the selection of judges/arbitrators. However, while this is worth highlighting, it 
may not be fatal, as Article 38 of the ICSID Convention empowers the Chairman of the 
ICSID to appoint arbitrators if none were appointed after 90 days.1306 This procedure can 
be used to appoint ICS judges.1307 But still, this defect shows the result of the patchwork 
that is the ICS. 
 
Another challenge is that the introduction of an appeal mechanism (the ICS Appellate 
Tribunal) is in conflict with the ICSID Convention, which does not have an appeal 
mechanism. The ICSID Convention provides for the annulment of awards only.1308 
However, it is arguable that an appeal mechanism is not contrary to the spirit of the 
ICSID Convention, as the grounds of appeal are based on the grounds of annulment 
provided by the Convention.1309 Once again, this is a potential point of contention, which 
the ICS proposal does not address. 
 
The description of the ICS as a court and not an arbitral tribunal may render the New 
York Convention inapplicable to awards of the ICS.1310 This is because the New York 
Convention only applies to foreign arbitral awards, not foreign court orders.1311 The 
possibility, therefore, exists that if the EU insists that the ICS is a court, a state party may 
                                                
1305  Reinisch 2016 (19) Journal of International Economic Law 761 at 777. 
1306  Reinisch 2016 (19) Journal of International Economic Law 761 at 777. 
1307  Reinisch 2016 (19) Journal of International Economic Law 761 at 777. 
1308  Reinisch 2016 (19) Journal of International Economic Law 761 at 779. 
1309  Reinisch 2016 (19) Journal of International Economic Law 761 at 780. 
1310  Reinisch 2016 (19) Journal of International Economic Law 761 at 783. 
1311  Article 1 New York Convention. The name of the convention also makes clear that it  
applies to foreign arbitral awards. 
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challenge an ICS award that is sought to be enforced in terms of the New York 
Convention.1312 Therefore the continued reference to the ICS as a court may backfire on 
the EU.  
 
The choice of the ICSID and the PCA as the secretariats to the ICS is controversial. The 
ICSID is controversial, due to its connection with the besieged ISDS, while the PCA is 
not popular with states that favor the ICSID system.1313 Overall, the use of these 
structures connects the ICS to ISDS. It attracts attention to the ICS and raises the 
question of whether the ICS is not a rebranded form of ISDS after all.  
 
The ICS proposal does not indicate how the ICS will deal with the issue of judicial 
precedent, in order to provide consistency with regard to decisions of the tribunals. 
Nothing in the proposal states that decisions of an ICS court shall be binding on future 
tribunals, and on what basis this will happen. Therefore, the ICS proposal fails to 
demonstrate how it will overcome this challenge. 
 
The financial and professional independence of judges is also in issue here. This relates 
to how the judges are appointed, how their contracts are renewed, and how they are 
remunerated. The present proposal gives states the right to appoint judges and 
terminate or renew their appointments, to the exclusion of investors. Furthermore, states 
determine the judges’ remuneration. Since states are potential respondents in the ICS, 
the amount of power they wield with regard to the above issues is cause for concern. 
Any perception that states appoint judges who will be friendly to their cause is not good 
                                                
1312  Baetens 2016 (43) (4) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 367 at 382; Reinisch  
2016 (19) Journal of International Economic Law 761 at 783. The relevant part is Article 
11(1) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, TTIP Proposal. 
1313  Baetens 2016 (43) (4) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 367 at 369. 
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for the ICS. It will compromise the legitimacy of the ICS from day one. Ideally, judges 
should be appointed in a transparent manner and by an independent party or structure. 
Either way, the DAG, and CSF should be involved in the process, as they represent the 
public interest in the selection process.  
 
The German Magistrates Association opines in this regard that the ICS proposal does 
not meet the standards for professional and financial independence of judges as set out 
in the Magna Carta of Judges of the CCJE of 17 November 2010 (CCJE (2010/3).1314 In 
addition, the ICS proposal allows government employees or persons who are on a 
government payroll to be appointed as judges, which also potentially tampers with the 
independence of judges, as these judges may be seen to be on the side of a state.1315 
Furthermore, the ICS may struggle to find highly qualified judges who will have to leave 
private practice to be full time with the ICS for short durations and low remuneration, in 
order to avoid conflict of interest as counsel or expert witness for one of the parties in 
future.1316  
 
                                                
1314  German Magistrates Association “Opinion on the establishment of an investment tribunal  
in TTIP - the proposal from the European Commission on 16.09.2015 and 11.12.2015” at 
2 https://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/eu-
us_trade_deal/2016/english_version_deutsche_richterbund_opinion_ics_feb2016.pdf 
(Date of use: 76 September 2017). 
1315  Baetens 2016 (43) (4) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 367 at 370; Schwieder  
2016 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 178 at 203-206. 
1316  German Magistrates Association “Opinion on the establishment of an investment tribunal  
in TTIP” at 2 https://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/eu-
us_trade_deal/2016/english_version_deutsche_richterbund_opinion_ics_feb2016.pdf 
(Date of use: 76 September 2017); Baetens 2016 (43) No. 4 Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration 367 at 370; Schwieder 2016 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 178 
at 203. 
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The ICS proposal is silent on equality issues such as gender. It is glaring that the ICS 
proposal does not propose how to include and empower women in the appointment as 
judges.1317  
 
Kleinheisterkamp and Poulsen suggest that the TTIP should exclude provisions for ISDS 
entirely.1318 They opine that removing ISDS provisions will enable EU policy makers to 
return to the drawing board, to find ways to address the procedural and substantive 
issues involved from the bottom up.1319 
 
In spite of the challenges discussed above, the ICS remains an important model and 
milestone in the improvement of the current ISDS system. However, the improvements 
will not please everyone, especially states and regions that have resolved to move away 
from ISDS, such as SADC.  
 
Structurally, the EU must first overcome the legal obstacles that face the establishment 
of the ICS, in view of the ECJ opinion stated above. It must also resolve the legal 
conflicts that arise from linking the ICS with the ICSID Convention and the New York 
Convention, among others. From a public perception perspective, the EU will have to 
show that the ICS is not a disguised version of ISDS, but something entirely new, 
especially since the public referendum rejected the initial proposal that contained ISDS. 
This will not be an easy task, as the ICS uses elements of ICS. These are major 
challenges that the EU may fail to resolve. Even if the EU and its trade partners 
                                                
1317  Baetens 2016 (43) (4) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 367 at 373. 
1318  Kleinheisterkamp J and Skovgaard Poulsen LN “Investment Protection in TTIP: Three  
Feasible Proposals 2016 (7) European Yearbook of International Economic Law 527- 
540 at 529. 
1319  Kleinheisterkamp and Poulsen 2016 European Yearbook of International Economic Law  
527 at 529. 
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implemented the ICS proposal, respondents can have a field day raising objections 
regarding the jurisdiction of the ICS, based on the legal challenges raised above. 
 
5.2.2 The Brazilian Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Agreement  
Brazil, like most Latin American states, was originally opposed to the idea of BITs and 
ISDS.1320 Brazil almost changed its attitude under the presidency of Collor de Mello, who 
initiated a process to liberalise Brazil’s economy and a drive to attract foreign 
investment.1321 During this period, BITs were globally touted as relevant to attract foreign 
investments, a theory which to date has not proven to be true.1322  
Between 1994 and 1999, Brazil signed 14 BITs. However, only the BITs with Germany, 
Chile, France, Portugal, the United Kingdom and Switzerland were presented to 
Congress for ratification.1323 Attempts to have the BITs ratified met stiff resistance from 
Congress. This, coupled with lack of a strong resolve by the Executive to ensure that the 
BITs were ratified, led to the demise of the ratification attempts.1324  
                                                
1320  Lemos L and Campello D “The non-ratification of Bilateral Investment Treaties in Brazil:”  
A Story of Conflict in a Land of Cooperation” at 5-
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2243120 (Date of use: 7 May 
2017). For a background to Brazil’s BIT practice see Volterra RG and Mandelli GF “India 
and Brazil: Recent Steps towards Host State Control in the Investment Treaty Dispute 
Resolution Paradigm” 2017 (6) Indian Journal of Arbitration Law 90-112 at 105-106. 
1321  Lemos and Campello “The non-ratification of Bilateral Investment Treaties in Brazil:” A  
Story of Conflict in a Land of Cooperation” at 7  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2243120 (Date of use: 7 May  
2017).  
1322  Lemos and Campello “The non-ratification of Bilateral Investment Treaties in Brazil:”  
A Story of Conflict in a Land of Cooperation” at 8 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2243120 (Date of use: 7 May 
2017). 
1323  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/27#iiaInnerMenu (Date of use: 22  
April 2017). 
1324  Morosini F and Badin MTS “The Brazilian Agreement on Cooperation and  
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During 2012, the Brazilian Chamber of Foreign Trade (CAMEX) mandated a Technical 
Group for Strategic Studies on Foreign Trade (GTEX) to work on a new investment 
agreement that will replace the controversial BITs.1325 At this point, Brazilian foreign 
investments were USD 355 Billion, most of which were located in Latin America and 
Africa.1326 These investments needed to be protected. CAMEX then approved a new 
species of investment agreement termed the ‘Investment Cooperation and Facilitation 
Agreement’ (ACFI). The ACFI is part of Brazil’s tool to increase Brazilian exports and 
market access abroad, especially in developing states. Angola and Mozambique were 
the first targeted parties to conclude the ACFI. 
 
The Mozambique ACFI was the first to be signed on 30 March 2015, while the Angola 
ACFI was signed the next day on 01 April 2015.1327 Mexico signed the ACFI on 26 May 
2015, Malawi signed on 25 June 2015, and Chile and Colombia signed on 24 November 
and 09 October 2015 respectively.1328 However, only the ACFI with Angola was ratified 
                                                                                                                                            
Facilitation of Investments (ACFI): A New Formula for International Investment 
Agreements?” supplied by the author and available at 
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/08/04/the-brazilian-agreement-on-cooperation-and-
facilitation-of-investments-acfi-a-new-formula-for-international-investment-agreements/ 
(Date of use: 7 May 2017). For a discussion of the dynamics of the failed ratification 
process see Voltera and Mandelli (2017) (6) Indian Journal of Arbitration Law 90 at 105.  
1325  Morosini and Badin “The Brazilian Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of  
Investments (ACFI): A New Formula for International Investment Agreements?” at para 1 
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/08/04/the-brazilian-agreement-on-cooperation-and-
facilitation-of-investments-acfi-a-new-formula-for-international-investment-agreements/ 
(Date of use: 7 May 2017); Jimenez AG “On the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between China and Latin America” 2017 (5) China Legal Science 34-62 at 52. 
1326  Morosini and Badin “The Brazilian Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of  
Investments (ACFI): A New Formula for International Investment Agreements?” at para 1  
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/08/04/the-brazilian-agreement-on-cooperation-and-
facilitation-of-investments-acfi-a-new-formula-for-international-investment-agreements/ 
(Date of use: 7 May 2017). 
1327  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/27#iiaInnerMenu (Date of use: 22  
April 2017). 
1328  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/27#iiaInnerMenu (Date of use: 22  
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at the time of writing.1329 This ratification is historic, since Brazil never ratified a BIT in the 
past (however Brazil did ratify 13 TIPs out of 18 that were concluded). It means that the 
ratification of the other ACFIs could be imminent, which in turn will usher state-state 
arbitration in SADC. During April and Amy 2018, Brazil signed further ACFI’s with 
Ethiopia and Suriname respectively.1330 
 
The Brazil-Malawi ACFI that is the only ACFI that is available from UNCTAD in 
English,1331 and it will therefore be used in this discussion. The dispute resolution 
provisions of the Brazil-Malawi ACFI (ACFI) will now be briefly considered, noting that it 
is impossible herein to conduct a full analysis thereof.  
 
It must be said at the onset that the ACFI is less focused on investor protection than on 
the facilitation of mutual investments between Member States.1332 This makes it 
markedly different to instruments such as BITs that have investor protection as their 
focus. A central feature of the ACFI is that an investor cannot commence ISDS against a 
host state in the event of a dispute.1333 Instead, Brazil and the other state party to the 
                                                                                                                                            
April 2017). 
1329  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/27#iiaInnerMenu  
(Date of use: 10 September 2018). 
1330  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/27#iiaInnerMenu (Date of use:  
10 September 2018). 
1331  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/27/treaty/3663 (Date of use: 18 January  
2018). 
1332  Article 1 Brazil-Malawi ACFI; Morosini and Badin “The Brazilian Agreement on 
Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFI): A New Formula for International 
Investment Agreements?” at para 2 https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/08/04/the-brazilian-
agreement-on-cooperation-and-facilitation-of-investments-acfi-a-new-formula-for-
international-investment-agreements/ (Date of use: 7 May 2017). 
1333  Morosini and Badin “The Brazilian Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of  
Investments (ACFI): A New Formula for International Investment Agreements?” at para 
2.2 https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/08/04/the-brazilian-agreement-on-cooperation-and-
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ACFI will attempt to resolve the dispute amicably, failing which they may at their 
discretion engage in state-state arbitration.  
 
The ACFI provides two structures that are central to resolving investor-state disputes.1334 
The first is the Joint Committee (JC).1335 The JC is made up of representatives of each 
State Party, who are designated by their respective governments.1336 The JC shall meet 
at least once a year, or as often is necessary.1337 The chairmanship of the JC shall rotate 
annually.1338 Some of the functions of the JC are to monitor the implementation of the 
ACFI, discuss and share investment opportunities, and to resolve disputes between 
investors and host states.1339 The JC may establish ad hoc groups, which may meet on 
their own, or with the JC, as necessary.  
 
The second structure is the Focal Point (FP), or Ombudsmen.1340 The FP is not a joint 
structure like the JC. Each Member State shall establish its own FP.1341 CAMEX is 
                                                                                                                                            
facilitation-of-investments-acfi-a-new-formula-for-international-investment-agreements/ 
(Date of use: 7 May 2017). 
1334  See Jimenez 2017 (5) China Legal Science 34 at 52-53; Voltera and Mandelli 2017 (6)  
Indian Journal of Arbitration Law 90 at 107.   
1335  Article 3 Brazil-Malawi ACFI; Morosini and Badin “The Brazilian Agreement on  
Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFI): A New Formula for International 
Investment Agreements?” at para 2.2 https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/08/04/the-brazilian-
agreement-on-cooperation-and-facilitation-of-investments-acfi-a-new-formula-for-
international-investment-agreements/ (Date of use: 7 May 2017). 
1336  Article 3(1) Brazil-Malawi ACFI. 
1337  Article 3(3) Brazil-Malawi ACFI. 
1338  Article 3(3) Brazil-Malawi ACFI. 
1339  Article 3(4) Brazil-Malawi ACFI. 
1340  Article 4 Brazil-Malawi ACFI; Morosini and Badin “The Brazilian Agreement on  
Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFI): A New Formula for International 
Investment Agreements?” at para 2.2 https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/08/04/the-brazilian-
agreement-on-cooperation-and-facilitation-of-investments-acfi-a-new-formula-for-
international-investment-agreements/ (Date of use: 7 May 2017). 
1341  Article 4(1) Brazil-Malawi ACFI. 
250 
 
Brazil’s FP, while the Malawi Investment and Trade Centre is Malawi’s FC.1342 FPs shall 
operate under the guidance of JCs.1343  
 
Some of the responsibilities of an FP are to act as a conduit between the Member States 
and investors and between the Member States, as well as to communicate suggestions 
and complaints from the other state or its investors, and to resolve investor-state 
disputes.1344 FPs of the respective state parties shall cooperate to resolve disputes 
through consultations, negotiations, dialogue and bilateral meetings.1345 
 
The ACFI provides the following procedure for the amicable resolution of investor-state 
disputes. The process starts when a claimant (being an investor or investment) lodges a 
complaint with its home state’s JC about unfavorable treatment it received at the hands 
of a host state.1346 Upon receipt of the complaint, the JC of an investor’s home state shall 
inform the host state of the dispute in writing, providing details of the claimant’s 
complaint.1347 The JC of the host state shall have 60-120 days to respond to the 
complaint.1348 An investor, as well as representatives of the host state whose entity or 
department etc. is involved in the dispute, may take part in the bilateral meetings 
between the JCs.1349  
 
                                                
1342  Article 4(2) Brazil-Malawi ACFI. 
1343  Article 4(4) (a) Brazil-Malawi ACFI. 
1344  Article 4(4) Brazil-Malawi ACFI. 
1345  Article 13(1) (a) Brazil-Malawi ACFI. 
1346  Article 13(3) (a) Brazil-Malawi ACFI. 
1347  Article 13(3) (a) Brazil-Malawi ACFI. 
1348  Article 13(3) (b) Brazil-Malawi ACFI. 
1349  Article 13(4) (c) Brazil-Malawi ACFI. 
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If the dispute is not resolved by negotiations and consultation, the parties may 
commence state-to-state arbitration.1350 However, the ACFI does not detail how state-to-
state arbitration will operate, such as the forum, arbitration rules etc. This vagueness, 
coupled with the fact that state-to-state arbitration is not mandatory, means that the 
possibility of the state parties reaching a deadlock regarding establishment and 
operation of the arbitration is real. Furthermore, state-to-state arbitration will only 
commence once it is convenient for the states, as they commence it at their 
discretion.1351  
 
Secondly, the ACFI is silent on whether or not a claimant must first exhaust local 
remedies prior to the commencement of state-to-state arbitration. This is a   critical 
omission. In this regard, it must be noted that Article 14 of the ILC Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection are relevant when diplomatic protection (including state-state arbitration) is to 
be exercised. Article 14 of the ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection provides that a state 
may not exercise diplomatic protection before the claimant in respect of whom protection 
is sought has exhausted local remedies in the host state.1352  
 
However, Article 15(e) allows a host state to waive the requirement for the exhaustion of 
local remedies since failure to exhaust local remedies is a defence available to it.1353 The 
                                                
1350  Article 13(6) Brazil-Malawi ACFI. 
1351  Article 15(5) Brazil-Mozambique ACFI; Voltera and Mandelli (2017) (6) Indian Journal of  
Arbitration Law 90 at 108. 
1352  Booysen Principles of International Trade Law As A Monistic System at 66-67;  
United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Article 22 and 44  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/ (Date of use: 02 October 2017); Panevezys-Saldutiskis 
at 22; ELSI at 42 para 50; Interhandel case (Switzerland v United States of America), 
(Preliminary Objections) Judgment of March 21st 1959, I.C.J Reports 1959 6 at 27; Article 
14 of the Articles on Diplomatic Protection and the Commentary thereon; Ngobeni 2012 
(37) South African Yearbook of International Law 169 at 171.  
1353  See Commentary on Article 15(e) at note 12-1, United Nations (International Law  
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waiver can be given in a treaty between an investor’s home state and a host state, or in 
a contract between a host state and an investor.1354 The waiver can be express or 
implied.1355 This entails that the failure to exhaust local remedies will be a defence 
available to a host state before an arbitral or another tribunal. Hence the silence of the 
ACFI on this issue is a critical omission. 
 
A downside of state-to-state arbitration is that it is susceptible to the same challenges as 
diplomatic protection. The key challenge of diplomatic protection is that it is an exclusive 
remedy to be exercised by a state at its sole discretion.1356 Therefore, an investor has no 
right to compel its home state to exercise it. This creates uncertainty for an investor, as it 
has no guaranteed recourse in the event of expropriation or other harmful measures 
taken by a host state.  
 
The involvement of states in investor-state disputes risks politicising investment 
disputes. For example, it is unlikely that states that have close economic or political ties 
                                                                                                                                            
Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection” 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 
September 2017). 
1354  See Commentary on Article 15(e) at note 13-14 United Nations (International Law  
Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection” 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 
September 2017). 
1355  See Commentary on Article 15(e) at note 13 United Nations (International Law  
Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection” 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 
September 2017). 
1356  See Commentary on Article 1, note 3-5 United Nations (International Law  
Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection” 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 
September 2017); Kaunda & others v President of the Republic of South Africa & others 
2005 (4) SA 235 (CC), Van Zyl & others v Government of the Republic of South Africa & 
others 2008 (3) SA 294 (SCA). The Government of the Republic of South Africa v Von 
Abo (283/10) [2011] ZASCA 65 (4 April 2011) at para 20-23; Ngobeni 2012 (37) South 
African Yearbook of International Law 169 at 171. 
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will embark on strenuous state-state arbitration, and risk jeopardising their ties for the 
sake of a private investor. However, the situation may be different when a claimant is a 
state owned entity owned by one of the parties. 
 
For developing states with limited resources, exercising state-state arbitration may 
present a resource and expertise challenge. The state may have far more pressing 
issues to deal with back home, rather than to spend resources it doesn’t have fighting for 
an investor. This may be detrimental to investors from such states. International 
arbitration requires the expensive services of arbitration institutions, lawyers and 
experts, not to mention the disbursements of state officials involved in a case. 
 
State-to-state arbitration is also subject to Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention.1357 This 
Article provides that state-to-state arbitration will not be available once a claimant 
accepts a state’s consent to ICSID arbitration. Consent to arbitration can be given in 
advance in a BIT, TIP, statute or investment contract.  
 
Furthermore, the fact that arbitration is between states does not remove some of the 
challenges that ISDS faces, as discussed in Chapter 2 above. 
 
 
 
                                                
1357   Which provides that 
No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an international 
claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting 
State shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under 
this Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have failed to abide by 
and comply with the award rendered in such dispute. (Emphasis added) 
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5.2.3 The India Model BIT 2015 
 
From 1994, India embarked on a BIT-signing campaign that led to 84 BITS being signed 
by 2013.1358 These BITS were mainly based on the India Model BIT of 2003.1359 At the 
time of writing, 52 out of remaining 61 these BITs were in force, although India gave 
notices that 58 of these remaining BITs will not be renewed when they expire in the first 
half of 2017.1360  Furthermore, 9 out of 13 TIPs were in force at the time of writing.1361 
 
India was prompted to review her BITs policy for the same reason that other developing 
states and regions did: it was swamped by costly ISDS cases in a short space of 
time.1362 As a result of these cases, India reviewed resolved that a new Model BIT was 
required, which will form the basis of new BITs. A new Model BIT was, therefore, 
                                                
1358  See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/96#iiaInnerMenu  
(Date of use: 10 September 2018). For a background to India’s foreign direct investment 
see Voltera and Mandelli 2017 (6) Indian Journal of Arbitration Law 90 at 91-95; Ranjan 
P India’s international investment agreements and India’s regulatory power as a host 
nation (PhD Thesis Kings College London 2012) at 35-66 
https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/13524464/Studentthesis-Prabhash_Ranjan_2013.pdf 
(Date of use: 08 September 2017). 
1359  See https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1026.pdf (Date of use: 26 April  
2017). 
1360 See Voltera and Mandelli 2017 (6) Indian Journal of Arbitration Law 90 at 94;  
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/08/10/india-takes-steps-to-reform-its-investment-policy- 
framework-after-approving-new model bit/; http://www.dipp.gov.in/English/questions/ 
25072016/lu1290.pdf; http://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/2017/03/16/mixed-messages-to-
investors-as-india-quietly-terminates-bilateral-investment-treaties-with-58-countries/; 
http://www.bothends.org/en/newsitem/469/India-terminates-bilateral-investment-treaties-
BITs-; http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/indias-bilateral-investment-pacts-
under-cloud/article9625580.ece (Date of use: 24 May 2017). 
1361  See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/96#iiaInnerMenu  
(Date of use: 10 September 2018). 
1362   See Voltera and Mandelli 2017 (6) Indian Journal of Arbitration Law 90 at 194. White  
Industries Australia was the first ISDS that India lost. For a list of arbitration cases against 
India see http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/96?partyRole=2 
(Date of use: 10 September 2018). Unfortunately details of the arbitrations are 
confidential and are publicly available. 
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approved during December 2015.1363 In a nutshell, the Model BIT is designed to among 
others: limit the scope of investments which would be protected by the Model BIT;1364 set 
out measures that will be outside the scope of the Model BIT; and impose significant 
substantive and procedural limitations on an investor’s access to arbitration, without 
taking away the right to arbitration. The Model BIT vastly succeeds in this regard, as 
shown below. 
 
Some selected provisions of the Model BIT will now be briefly discussed.1365  
 
In order to reduce the scope of future disputes, the Model BIT starts by placing 
restrictions on the areas covered by the BIT, who can access it, and under what terms. 
This is noteworthy, as it increases India’s regulatory space. Some of these restrictions 
are as follows. 
 
The Model BIT discourages forum shopping and the use of shell companies, by limiting 
the types of entities that can access the BIT.1366 It achieves this by denying the 
protection of the BIT to entities that do not have substantial business activities in their 
                                                
1363 http://dea.gov.in/sites/default/files/ModelBIT_Annex_0.pdf (Date of use: 25 April 2017). 
1364  See also Volterra and Mandelli 201) (6) Indian Journal of Arbitration Law 90 at 96, 99. 
1365  See also Jandhyala S “Bringing the state back in: India’s 2015 model BIT” Columbia FDI  
Perspectives on Topical Foreign Direct Investment Issues, No. 154 August 17, 2015 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No-154-Jandhyala-FINAL.pdf (Date of use: 08 
September 2017); Rosmy J “Renegotiation of Indian Bilateral Investment Treaties: An 
Analysis from a Development Perspective”  
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/Papers_for_Programme/99-JOAN-
Renegotiation_of_Indian_Bilateral_Investment_Treaties.pdf (Date of use: 08 September 
2017); Paktar A “Bilateral Investment Treaties - Has India Taken It a “Bit Too Far?” 
International Journal of Law and Legal Jurisprudence Studies: ISSN: 2348-8212: Volume 
2 Issue 7 http://ijlljs.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/26.pdf (Date of use: 08 September 
2017). 
1366  By “BIT” in this context is meant a BIT that is based on the Model BIT. 
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home states,1367 entities that are owned or controlled directly or indirectly by persons of a 
non-party state,1368 and entities that have been established or restructured with the 
primary purpose of gaining access to the dispute resolution mechanisms provided in the 
BIT.1369 
 
The Model BIT also limits the scope of the application of the BIT, by providing that it 
shall not apply to government procurement, subsidies or grants, services supplied in the 
exercise of governmental authority, taxation matters and disputes arising from 
investment agreements.1370 This is a major carve-out of areas and sectors that foreign 
investors would typically be invested in, especially government procurement and 
services supplied under government authority (which could cover the non-commercial 
activities of state owned entities). 
 
The Model BIT also excludes investments obtained by means of corruption, as they will 
not have been made in accordance with the Model BIT.1371  
 
The Model BIT limits the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal. It provides that an arbitration 
tribunal established in terms of the BIT shall not re-examine any legal issue that was 
finally determined by a court of a host state in a dispute between the host state and the 
party to the investment dispute.1372 Neither may a tribunal review the merits of a decision 
                                                
1367  Article. 1.9 India Model BIT; Volterra and Mandelli 2017 (6) Indian Journal of Arbitration  
Law 90 at 101-102. 
1368  Article 20.1(i) India Model BIT. 
1369  Article 20.1(ii) India Model BIT. The claim in Philip Morris Asia was dismissed on similar  
grounds. 
1370  Article. 2.6 India Model BIT; See Volterra and Mandelli 2017 (6) Indian Journal of  
Arbitration Law 90 at 108.96. 
1371  Article 1(6) (ii) read with Article 9 India Model BIT. 
1372  Article 14.2 India Model BIT. 
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of the court of a host state, nor may it accept jurisdiction over a claim that is subject to 
arbitration between Member States.1373 
 
The dispute resolution provisions of the Model BIT operate as follows.  
 
Unlike the ACFI and the ICS Proposal, Article 14(3) of the Model BIT provides that the 
first step that an investor must take is the exhaustion of local remedies before the courts 
or administrative bodies of the host state.1374 It sets a prescription period of one year 
within which the exhaustion of local remedies must commence.1375 If a claimant has 
exhausted local remedies, but is not satisfied with the outcome thereof, or having 
exhausted local remedies, a claimant is of the opinion (and it can demonstrate that the 
continued exhaustion of local remedies will be futile), then it can proceed to the next 
stage, which is the commencement of preventative ADR.1376 
The current Model BIT makes the exhaustion of local remedies and the commencement 
of ADR measures, mandatory. A claimant who omits any of these steps shall not be 
entitled to proceed to commence arbitration in terms of the BIT.1377 As a further 
disincentive, a tribunal is required to order costs of arbitration against a claimant, if it 
commenced arbitration without compliance with the requirements for exhaustion of local 
remedies, waiting periods for ADR or provisions of Article 14(1).1378 
When a claimant commences ADR, it must issue a Notice of Dispute, to which a 
statement shall be attached, stating that the requirements for the exhaustion of local 
                                                
1373  Article 14.2 India Model BIT. 
1374  Volterra and Mandelli 2017 (6) Indian Journal of Arbitration Law 90 at 100-101. 
1375  Article 14.3(i) India Model BIT. 
1376  Article 14.3(ii) India Model BIT. 
1377  Article 14.3(v) India Model BIT. 
1378  Article 14.12(ii) India Model BIT. 
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remedies as well as Articles 9 to 12 of the Model BIT have been met.1379 After submitting 
the Notice of Dispute, the parties have a period of one year to consult and negotiate on 
the resolution of the dispute.1380  
 
In addition to the exhaustion of local remedies and ADR, the Model BIT sets a 
prescription period within which a claimant must commence arbitration. This period is 
three years from the date a claimant became aware, or should have become aware of 
the host state measure complained of, or eighteen months since the conclusion or 
abandonment of local remedies, whichever is later.1381 A claimant must submit a Notice 
of Arbitration at least ninety days before commencing arbitration. Only then can a 
claimant submit an Arbitration Claim, stipulating the parts of the Model BIT which it is 
alleged a host state has breached, and that the claimant has suffered actual and non-
speculative damages as a result of direct and foreseeable result of the breach.1382  
 
Similar to the ICS, a claimant must also submit a waiver of a right to initiate or continue 
other dispute resolution procedures before another administrative tribunal, court etc. 
(“no-U-turn clause”), with regards to the same claim, unless it can show that it is not 
possible to give such waiver due to the expropriation or interference with the host state’s 
management or control of the investment.1383  
 
                                                
1379  Article 14.3(iii) India Model BIT. 
1380  Article 14.3(iv) India Model BIT. 
1381  Article 14.3(v) India Model BIT. 
1382  Article 14.4(ii) India Model BIT. 
1383  Article 14.4(i) (f) India Model BIT. 
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In a patial similarity to the ICS, the arbitration shall be conducted in terms of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules unless the parties agree otherwise.1384 The Model BIT 
places upon a claimant the burden of proof with regard to jurisdiction, the existence of an 
obligation under Chapter II of the Model BIT, a breach of an obligation(s), that the 
investment, or the investor with respect to the Investment, has suffered actual and non-
speculative losses as a result of the breach, and that those losses were foreseeable and 
directly caused by the breach.1385 After a hearing, a tribunal may award monetary 
damages only, which shall not include punitive or moral damages.1386 When awarding 
damages, a tribunal shall take into consideration any breaches of the BIT or laws of the 
host state by an investor/investment.1387 An award shall be enforced in terms of the laws 
of the respondent host state.1388 This provision brings the courts of a host state back into 
play with regard to the final implementation of an award, as does the New York 
Convention. 
 
A respondent state may launch a counterclaim against a claimant to seek declaratory 
relief, enforcement action or monetary compensation.1389  
 
The parties shall share arbitration costs and expenses equally unless a tribunal rules 
otherwise.1390 However, each party shall pay its own legal costs, unless a tribunal rules 
otherwise.1391 
 
                                                
1384  Article 14.7(i) India Model BIT. 
1385  Article 14.9(ii) India Model BIT. 
1386  Article 14.10(iii) India Model BIT. 
1387  Article 14.10(ii) India Model BIT. 
1388  Article 14.10(v) India Model BIT. 
1389  Article 14.11(i) India Model BIT. 
1390  Article 14.12(i) India Model BIT. 
1391  Article 14.12(i) India Model BIT. 
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The Model BIT replicates Article 27 of the ICSID Convention. It provides that an 
investor’s home state may not commence diplomatic protection unless the host state has 
failed to comply with an award or the decision of its courts.1392  
 
A few comments will now be made on the India Model BIT. 
India has introduced what is probably the most radical and extensive measures in recent 
times. The scope of exclusions provided in Articles 2.6, 16 and 17, as well as the 
investor obligations specified in Articles 9 to 12 will definitely have the intended effect of 
limiting investor claims in the targeted areas. In return, India will more regulatory space 
as investors in the excluded sectors cannot commence ISDS against her. This may push 
investors to seek protections via existing BITs that do not have the stated limitations, 
since India still has 52 BITS in effect. This will encourage to treaty shopping prior to the 
termination of these BITs. Investors with significant bargaining power can also negotiate 
investment contracts with better protections than those provided by the Model BIT. The 
rest will have to make do with the local courts of host states. 
The central issue with regard to mandatory ADR and the exhaustion of local remedies is 
whether strict compliance therewith is necessary or not, i.e. whether this is a procedural 
requirement which can be condoned, or whether it is a jurisdictional requirement which 
may lead to a tribunal finding that it has no jurisdiction on the matter. A guide to the 
answer to this can be found in Tulip Real Estate. The tribunal in Tulip Real Estate held 
that a state’s consent to arbitration in a BIT is a qualification on a state’s sovereignty.1393 
                                                
1392  Article 14.13(i) India Model BIT. 
1393  At para 135. 
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Therefore, a state is entitled to set the terms under which it is prepared to submit to 
arbitration, which must be strictly complied with if they were meant to be mandatory.1394  
Therefore, the mandatory nature of the pre-arbitration requirements of the Mode BIT are 
such that a tribunal may find that they must be strictly complied with, as stipulated in 
Article 14(3)(v) of the Model BIT.  
The provision to the effect that a tribunal must order an investor who commences 
arbitration prematurely to pay the state’s costs will be an additional deterrent to investors 
who do not comply with the pre-arbitration requirements.1395  Read with the decision in 
Tulip Real estate, the effect of this provision bolsters the view that pre-arbitration 
requirements, including ADR, must be complied with. 
It remains to be seen how tribunals will deal with the provision that a tribunal shall not re-
examine any legal issue that was finally determined by a court of a host state in a 
dispute between an investor and a host state.1396 The unwritten intent of this provision is 
to preserve an order made in favour of a host state. Will tribunals allow their decision-
making powers to be curtailed by this provision? Will investors accept the provision? It is 
unlikely that investors will leave this provision unchallenged, especially if the earlier 
ruling was in favour of a host state. Nonetheless, India has made her position on the 
issue clear, and a tribunal must consider the provision for what it is. 
In conclusion, India has boldly narrowed the scope of the Model BIT by placing 
restrictions that give her more regulatory space. This will significantly limit future investor 
claims. However, the Model BIT will remain a piece of paper until India concludes BITs 
                                                
1394  Tulip Real Estate at para 55-72,135.  
1395  Article 14.12(ii) India Model BIT. 
1396  Article 14.2 India Model BIT. 
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based thereon. Until then, the existing 52 BITs and 9 Tips provide investors with more 
protection that the Model BIT, Therefore, if the Model BIT is to be of any significance, all 
existing BITs and TIPs to which India is a party must be renegotiated or terminated, and 
be replaced with new ones based on it. However, such termination is easier said than 
done, since most BITs are designed to have survival clauses that keep them in effect for 
several years after their termination. For example, India’s BIT with Mozambique (which 
is in force) has a survival period of fifteen years from date of termination.1397 
 
If India replaces its existing BITs and (and relevant part of TIPs) with the Model BIT, the 
restrictions placed by the Model BIT on access to ISDS through stringent pre-arbitration 
requirements will only serve to slow the commencement of ISDS with regard to the 
covered sectors. Ultimately, an investor who has an eye on ISDS as the prize will get to 
it, because investors in sectors that are protected by the Model BIT have guaranteed 
access to ISDS after complying with the formalities of pre-arbitration ADR and the 
exhaustion of local remedies.1398  
 
Furthermore, the India Model BIT does not address the key challenges of ISDS, which 
are discussed in Chapter 2 above. 
 
Finally, SMEs will incur significant costs to sue India, given the mandatory exhaustion of 
local remedies and ADR before arbitration can commence.  
 
                                                
1397  Article 15(2) Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and  
the Government of the Republic of India for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/96/treaty/1937 (Date of 
use 10 September 2018). 
1398  Article 14.4 India Model BIT. 
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5.3 LESSONS AND OPTIONS FOR SADC  
5.3.1  Lessons for SADC 
SADC can learn many lessons from the TTIP and ICS proposal\s, the Brazil-Malawi 
ACFI, and the India Model BIT. These lessons may be useful when SADC engages in 
the negotiations for the T-FTA or AfCFTA investment protocols, and even a review of 
Annex 1. 
 
The key lessons from the EU are that the TTIP proposal shows that it is possible to have 
a single regional or continental instrument of foreign investments, and that provides a 
single forum for the resolution of investor-state disputes. The boldness of the EU in 
presenting the ICS proposal, with its challenges as discussed above, shows that SADC 
and other African states should not be afraid of going into uncharted territory in this 
regard, if needs be.  
 
The use of the JCs and CPs by the EU and Brazil shows that there is a resurrection of 
diplomatic protection for the resolution of investor-state disputes. It is a pattern that 
SADC should pay attention to. 
 
Through the DAG and CSF, the TTIP proposal also provides a valuable lesson in the 
involvement of civil society in the implementation of foreign investment regulation laws. 
The fact that the EU commenced the search for a solution to ISDS with the public 
referendum is commendable. 
 
The India Model BIT provides a lesson in the tightening of foreign investment regulation, 
with a view to maximise regulatory space for host states. The provisions of the model 
BIT such as those relating to the scope of the BIT, ADR, and investor obligations, are 
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relevant lessons for SADC. They are useful for increasing the regulatory space of SADC 
Member States. 
 
The India Model BIT also offers valuable lessons in the management of treaty shopping 
and the denial of benefits to corrupt investors. By denying the protection of the Model 
BIT to shell companies and corrupt investors, India sends a clear message that only 
genuine and law-abiding investments will be protected.  
 
The India Model BIT also shows that mandatory preventative ADR can be a useful tool.  
Although making ADR mandatory will increase legal costs, in the long term it will 
inculcate a culture that promotes the settlement of disputes rather than litigation. The 
early settlement of disputes is good for all parties in the long term, as it saves them time, 
money as well as their relationship. 
 
The Brazil-Malawi ACFI provides an alternative to the traditional options of ISDS or local 
courts. SADC can learn to use state-state arbitration, and state-state consultations in the 
form of structures such as the JC and FP as a form of preventative ADR. This despite 
the fact that state-state arbitration is a discretionary remedy. 
 
The South Korean Office of Foreign Investment Ombud (OFIO), on which the Brazilian 
FP is based, has had great success in resolving investor-state disputes, and is worthy of 
further study in terms of its operational mode.1399 The office of an Ombud can be very 
effective, especially where there are bureaucratic inefficiencies, and its early intervention 
                                                
1399  See resolved cases at http://ombudsman.kotra.or.kr/eng/rsc/case07.do?s  
ResolutionCaseTyCd=07 (Date of use: 20 May 2017). 
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can pre-empt costly arbitration or litigation.1400 It appears from reports that the IFIO has 
been highly effective. It is reported that the OFIO received approximately 4700 cases 
between 1999 and 2011, and that it resolved approximately 90 percent of the cases.1401 
SADC and even the AU can do well to incorporate a similar structure in the future as part 
of preventative ADR.1402  
 
5.3.2 Options for SADC 
It is now opportune to analyse some of the options that are open to SADC, with regard to 
the level at which investments should be regulated, as well as the mechanism for the 
resolution of investor-state disputes.1403  
 
On the first aspect, it was shown in Chapter 1 that there are at least three views that 
emerged from the review of selected scholarly literature. These are the regulation of 
foreign investments at REC level, regulation at AU level via a soft law instrument such 
as the PAIC, and regulation at AU level via an investment treaty. On the second aspect, 
the options that are open to SADC are ISDS, litigation before the courts of host states, 
the SADC tribunal, and or the ACH&PR/ACJ&HR. These options will be briefly analysed, 
with a view to making proposals thereon in Chapter 6. 
 
With regard to the level at which foreign investments should be regulated, the first option 
proposed by Denters and Gazzini is the use of RECs to regulate foreign investments. 
However, such regulation will face the same challenges as regionalism, that are 
discussed in Chapter 1 above. 
                                                
1400  Chen 2017 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 547-591 at 590. 
1401  Chen 2017 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 547 at 588. 
1402  Chen 2017 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 547 at 589. 
1403  This is in line with Objective 1.3.5 in Chapter 1. 
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The second proposal by Mbengue and Schacherer is the use of soft law instruments 
such as the PAIC to foster the harmonisation of investment treaty practice among AU 
Member States.1404 However, this option has limitations, as shown in the discussion of 
this proposal in Chapter 1.  
 
The third option, proposed by Paez, is the use of a continental investment treaty to 
regulate foreign investments.1405 However, Paez does not provide sufficient motivation 
for this proposal. Therefore, it is difficult to critique the proposal. Nonetheless, its 
continental theme resonates with the recommendation made in Chapter 6 with regard to 
the regulation of foreign investments. 
 
The rejection of the REC and PAIC proposals leaves the regulation of foreign 
investments at continental level to be evaluated. This will be done in the next section. 
 
5.3.3  Towards a continental framework for the regulation of foreign investments 
This section will discuss a possible continental framework for the regulation of foreign 
investments, as well as for the resolution of investor-state disputes. The section lays the 
basis for proposals that will be made in Chapter 6. 
 
(a) The regulation of foreign investments 
The recent formation of the AfCFTA and the future formation of the AEC puts the AU 
firmly in control of the future regulation of foreign investments in Africa. The formation of 
the AfCFTA means that RECs that are not already (or on the path to be) customs unions 
                                                
1404  See the relevant discussion Chapter 1 above. 
1405  See the relevant discussion Chapter 1 above. 
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will gradually cease to be free trade zones, as they cannot coexist with the AfCFTA.1406 
Such RECs shall cease to have authority over trade policy, which will be gradually taken 
over by the AfCFTA.1407 Therefore, it makes sense that the RECs gradually transfer their 
authority over the regulation of foreign investments to the AfCFTA. It is also noteworthy 
that the AU is mandated to enhance socio-economic integration in Africa.1408 
Furthermore, the views espoused herein in this regard have been vindicated by the fact 
that the AfCFTA will have an investment protocol, an event that occurred when this 
study had been concluded. What follows is the author’s views in support of the 
regulation of foreign investments in Africa by means of an AfCFTA investment protocol. 
 
The real value of an AfCFTA investment protocol is that it will (unlike a soft instrument 
such as the PAIC) be an international agreement that is binding on Member States. This 
will enable it to foster uniformity and harmonisation from the top-down. This will also 
bring an end to the current regulation of foreign investments by conflicting RECs and 
state laws alike. 
 
(b) The resolution of investor-state disputes 
Based on the discussion of developments in the Brazil, the EU and India above, SADC’s 
options regarding the resolution of investor-state disputes will now be analysed. The 
options are ISDS, the courts of host states, sub-regional courts, and continental/regional 
                                                
1406  African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the  
Continental Free Trade Area About” at 123 
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 
15 December 2017). 
1407  African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the  
Continental Free Trade Area About” at 123-124 
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 
15 December 2017). 
1408  Mbengue and Schacherer 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment and Trade 414 at 419. 
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courts. 
 
(i) The ISDS option 
ISDS has many challenges, as indicated in Chapter 2 above. Hence SADC has removed 
it from the 2016 Annex 1, Brazil doesn’t favour it, the EU is trying unsuccessfully to get 
rid of it, and India is restricting access to it. Despite the challenges, as well as SADC’s 
removal of ISDS from the 2016 Annex 1, the reality is that some SADC Member States 
still have BITs and laws that allow access to it.1409 There seems to be no major rush on 
the part of these Member States to terminate or renegotiate existing BITs, or to amend 
their laws to be in line with the 2016 Annex 1. Furthermore, there seems to be a 
horizontal shift towards state-state arbitration by SADC states that conclude ACFIs with 
Brazil, such as Angola and Malawi. SADC Member States do not seem to have a 
principled, consistent approach with regard to what to do with ISDS, given its removal 
from the 2016 Annex 1. It was also shown in Chapter 4 that SADC Member States laws 
differ with regard to the provision of ISDS to their investors. It was also shown therein 
that the laws of some Member States conflict with their REC treaty obligations. 
 
Given the policy differences among SADC Member States with regard to ISDS, it is ideal 
to allow those Member States that wish to provide ISDS to their investors to do so. This 
is in line with the provisions of the PAIC,1410 as well as the proposal of Ngobeni and 
Fagbayibo to the effect that host states may delay consent to ISDS, which will at least 
keep the door open for parties that wish to utilise it.1411 South Africa also employed this 
                                                
1409  For a database of BITs in force at see 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu (Date of use: 11 
April 2018).  
1410  See Article 42(1) PAIC.  
1411   Ngobeni and Fagbayibo 2015 (19) Law, Democracy and Development 175 at 189. 
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approach in the new Promotion of Investment Act, by providing that ISDS can take place 
if the state so agrees1412 while Namibia did the same (albeit with regard to the provision 
for local arbitration).1413 This practice is not new, as it was shown in Chapter 4 that the 
internal laws of some host states provide access to ISDS if the host state agrees thereto.  
 
No matter what one’s views towards ISDS are, the reality in this regard is that the 
sovereignty of states implies host states must be allowed to regulate foreign investments 
and the resolution of investor-state disputes as they see fit, including by providing or 
denying ISDS for their foreign investors. In a nutshell, ISDS with all its challenges is not 
about to be removed from regulatory instruments. It is here to stay, at least for the 
foreseeable future. Its continued used will simply have to be managed (e.g. by the 
creation of an appeal mechanism, shortening the duration for the rendering of awards, 
reducing institutional costs, allowing states and other parties to sue investors or to 
counterclaim etc). Recommendations are made in this regard in Chapter 6 to the effect 
that ISDS can co-exist with litigation, as described in the recommendations. 
 
(ii) The Local courts’ option 
It is controversial whether an investor must be obliged to refer an investor-state dispute 
to the courts of a host state or not.1414 As shown in Chapter 2 above, central to the 
current debate regarding this issue is whether investor-state disputes must be referred to 
ISDS, the courts of host states, or both.1415 Another way to phrase the issue is whether it 
is unfair and/or unjust to require investors to refer investor-state disputes to the courts of 
a host state, whether as a last resort or not. There is no cut-and-dried solution to the 
                                                
1412  Section 13(5) Promotion of Investment Act. 
1413  Section 28(4) Namibia Investment Promotion Act. 
1414  See the discussion of the ISDS and litigation in Chapter 2 above.  
1415  See the discussion of litigation and ISDS in Chapter 2. 
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resolution of this issue. The view adopted herein is that whether it is fair or unfair to 
make it mandatory for a foreign investor to refer an investor-state dispute to the courts of 
a host state depends primarily on the state of the rule of law in that state. This is further 
explained below. 
 
Like ISDS, local litigation also has its downside. This includes the possibility that a host 
state may not guarantee an efficient and independent judicial system, or that local courts 
may lack independence, or be subject to political control.1416 Furthermore, local litigation 
may take long to conclude e.g. due to a high caseload, thus resulting in costly 
litigation.1417 However, unlike with ISDS, these challenges are not universal, as only 
some states would have one or more of these challenges. Furthermore, unlike with 
ISDS, the challenges relating to litigation are capable of being addressed on state by 
state basis.  
 
There is ample support for the use of the courts of host states to resolve investor-state 
disputes, as shown below. 
 
                                                
1416  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment  
Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4, November 2017 at 11 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMEN
T%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf (Date of 
use: 10 April 2018). 
1417  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment  
Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4, November 2017 at 11 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMEN
T%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf (Date of 
use: 10 April 2018). 
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According to UNCTAD, there are five benefits to the use of the courts of host states.1418 
Firstly, such use puts foreign investors on an equal footing with domestic investors, as 
well as with other foreign investors that are not protected by investment contracts, or are 
from States that do not have BITs or TIPs with a host state.1419 Secondly, litigation helps 
to establish a level playing field among foreign investors., by providing a similar forum to 
which their disputes with host states shall be referred.1420 Thirdly, unlike arbitral tribunals, 
local courts are well-suited to applying and interpreting domestic laws.1421 Fourth, ISDS 
is less needed in countries with well-developed and efficient legal systems, where the 
risk of denial of justice by virtue of a poor rule of law is low.1422 Fifth, the use of local 
courts fosters the development of legal and judicial institutions of a host state.1423 Finally, 
                                                
1418  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment  
Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4, November 2017 at 11 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMEN
T%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf (Date of 
use: 10 April 2018). 
1419  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment  
Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4, November 2017 at 11 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMEN
T%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf (Date of 
use: 10 April 2018). 
1420  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment  
Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4, November 2017 at 11 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMEN
T%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf (Date of 
use: 10 April 2018). 
1421  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment  
Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4, November 2017 at 11 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMEN
T%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf (Date of 
use: 10 April 2018). 
1422  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment  
Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4, November 2017 at 11 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMEN
T%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf (Date of 
use: 10 April 2018). 
1423  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment  
Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4, November 2017 at 11 
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local courts may, depending on the state of their rule of law, be an attractive forum for 
the adjudication of investor-state disputes.1424 
 
At the continental level, the AU vigorously supports the use and development of 
domestic courts. Firstly, the African Charter mandates that human rights disputes must 
first be referred to local courts before they can be referred to the Commission.1425 
Secondly and most importantly, Agenda 2063 envisages that by 2023, 70 percent of the 
populations of AU Member States must perceive their judiciaries to be independent, that 
they deliver judgments on a fair and timely basis, and that the rule of law is 
entrenched.1426 Therefore, irrespective of the AU’s or its Member States’ views towards 
ISDS, the policy decision is that local courts must be used, and the rule of law must be 
promoted and protected. 
 
Some scholars also support the use of the courts of host states, as shown below. 
 
According to Chen, investors like to invest in states that have effective law-making, 
administrative and judicial institutions.1427 Thus where states provide for ISDS, they have 
an incentive to improve the efficiency of their courts if the exhaustion of local remedies is 
a pre-requisite.1428  
 
                                                                                                                                            
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMEN
T%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf (Date of 
use: 10 April 2018). 
1424  Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 163. 
1425  Article 50, 56 African Charter. 
1426  African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 First Ten-Year Implementation Plan  
2014-2023” at 69 http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-
first10yearimplementation.pdf (Date of use: 16 November 2017). 
1427  Chen 2017 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 547 at 570-572. 
1428  Chen 2017 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 547 at 572. 
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Portfield suggests that requiring investors first to exhaust local remedies before referring 
disputes to ISDS can be of benefit to both the courts of a host state, as well as 
subsequent arbitral tribunals.1429 The first benefit is that the use of the courts of host 
states supports of the rule of law in host states,1430 and that it assists in the development 
of the legal systems of host states.1431 Secondly, the use of the courts of host states 
improves the decision making of arbitral tribunals, by narrowing down facts and 
determining points of law, such as whether a contract was breached, or whether 
property rights have vested or not.1432 Thirdly, the courts of host states may assist in the 
clarification of the relationship between domestic law and international law.1433  
 
Schreuer suggests that arbitral tribunals and the courts of host states are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive.1434 He opines that the courts of host states may be required to stay 
or compel arbitration proceedings.1435 They may also be competent to issue provisional 
measures during arbitral proceedings.1436 In non-ICSID arbitration, the courts of host 
states are inevitably required to recognise and enforce foreign arbitral awards in terms of 
the New York Convention.1437 The courts of host states may also clarify issues of 
domestic law, such as by determining whether property or contractual rights actually 
                                                
1429  Portfield MC “Exhaustion of Local Remedies in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An  
Idea Whose Time Has Come?” 2015 (41) The Yale Journal of International Law  
Online 1-12. 
1430  Portfield 2015 (41) The Yale Journal of International Law Online 1 at 5-6. 
1431   Portfield 2015 (41) The Yale Journal of International Law Online 1 at 5-6. 
1432  Portfield 2015 (41) The Yale Journal of International Law Online 1 at 6. 
1433  Portfield 2015 (41) The Yale Journal of International Law Online 1 at 7. 
1434  Schreuer C “Calvo’s Grandchildren: The Return of Local Remedies in Investment  
Arbitration” 2005 (1) The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 1- 
17 at 17 para 7. 
1435  Schreuer 2005 (1) The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 1 at 2. 
1436  Schreuer 2005 (1) The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 1 at 2. 
1437  Schreuer 2005 (1) The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 1 at 2. 
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exist or not.1438 Furthermore, a claim based on denial of justice cannot be brought until 
domestic courts have had the opportunity to deal with a matter.1439 
 
Salacuse opines that local courts may, if they are reformed (i.e. if their rule of law is 
acceptable), be an attractive forum for the adjudication of investor-state disputes.1440  
 
Onyema also acknowledges the role of domestic courts in arbitrations.1441 She opines 
that domestic courts are relevant before the commencement of arbitrations, during the 
arbitration proceedings as well as at the conclusion of the arbitration.1442 Nonetheless, 
Onyema suggests that the role of domestic courts should be limited so that they play a 
less (interfering) role in arbitrations.1443  
 
Vial and Blavi also accept that domestic courts are indispensable in arbitrations. But like 
Onyema, they opine that local courts should safeguard arbitration procedures without 
much interference therewith.1444  
 
Even the ICSID Convention provides that a host state may as a pre-condition to 
providing consent to arbitration, require an investor to first exhaust local remedies before 
commencing ICSID arbitration.1445 
                                                
1438  Schreuer 2005 (1) The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 1 at 2-3. 
1439  Schreuer 2005 (1) The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 1 at 3. 
1440  Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 163. 
1441  Onyema 2014 (17) 5 International Arbitration Law Review 99-111. 
1442  Onyema 2014 (17) 5 International Arbitration Law Review 1 at 10. 
1443  Onyema 2014 (17) 5 International Arbitration Law Review 1 at 10-12. 
1444  Vial G and Blavi F “New Ideas for the Old Expectation of Becoming an Attractive  
Arbitral Seat” 2016 (25) Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 279-308 at 283-
284.  
1445  Article 26 ICSID Convention. For a discussion of this provision see GK Foster, ‘Striking a  
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The customary international law also makes it mandatory that investor-state disputes 
must be referred to the courts of host states before diplomatic protection can be invoked. 
This explanation requires one to revisit the use of local courts in history of the resolution 
of investor-state disputes, because it is recommended in Chapter 6 that investor-state 
disputes be referred to local courts, if the state of the rule of law is acceptable. The 
lengthy explanation that follows is warranted. 
 
As recently as the 1970’s, investors were not in the same position to sue host states as 
they are today. As Salacuse and Sullivan state: 
 
…existing international law offered foreign investors no effective enforcement 
mechanism to pursue their claims against host countries that had injured or 
seized their investments or refused to respect their contractual obligations. As a 
result, investors had no assurance that investment contracts and arrangements 
made with host country governments would not be subject to unilateral change 
by those governments at some later time… Injured foreign investors who were 
unable to negotiate a satisfactory settlement, secure an arbitration agreement 
with a host state, or find satisfaction in the local courts had few options other than 
to seek espousal of their claims by the source country government…1446 
 
During this era and specifically before the coming into being of the ICSID Convention, 
diplomatic protection was the main mechanism for the resolution of investor-state 
disputes.1447 Diplomatic protection required an investor to exhaust local remedies before 
                                                                                                                                            
Balance between Investor Protections and National Sovereignty: The Relevance of Local 
Remedies in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ 2011 (49) Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law 201-267 at 212-213; Schreuer The ICSID Convention: A Commentary at 348-413. 
1446  Salacuse and Sullivan 2005 (46) Harvard International Law Journal 67 at 70. 
1447  See for example GK Foster “Striking a Balance between Investor Protections and  
National Sovereignty: The Relevance of Local Remedies in Investment Treaty Arbitration” 
2011 (49) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 201-267 at 209. For a discussion of the 
evolution of the protection of foreign investments see Miles K The Origins of International 
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its home state could be entitled to intervene.1448 This requirement has been codified as 
Article 14 of the ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection.1449 The ICJ confirmed this 
requirement in the ELSI1450 and Interhandel1451 cases. The ICJ also considered, but did 
not apply this requirement in Diallo as the court found it unnecessary to do so.1452 The 
SADC Tribunal confirmed the rule in Mike Campbell.1453 
 
The exhaustion of local remedies rule has its roots in the 9th century rule that reprisals 
for injury to foreigners should only be authorised in the event of denial of justice in the 
jurisdiction where an alien suffered injury.1454 This rule developed over the centuries, 
                                                                                                                                            
Investment Law: Empire, Environment and the safeguarding of Capital (Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge 2013) at 19-121. 
1448  See Ngobeni 2012 (37) South African Yearbook of International Law 169 at 23. 
1449  See United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic  
Protection” Commentary at 80 para 1 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 
September 2017); Ngobeni 2012 (37) South African Yearbook of International Law 169 at 
23. 
1450  I.C.J Reports 1989 15 at 42 para 50. For a discussion of this case see Murphy SD “The  
ELSI Case: An Investment Dispute at the International Court of Justice” 1991 (16) Yale 
Journal of International Law 391-452; Kubiatowski AS “The Case of Elettronica Sicula 
S.p.A: Toward Greater Protection of Shareholders' Rights in Foreign Investments” 1991 
(29) Columbia  Journal of Transnational Law 215-244; Palenzuela AL “The International 
Court of Justice and the Standing of Corporate Shareholders under International Law: 
Elettronica Sicula v. Raytheon (U.S. v. Italy)” 1991 (1) University of Miami Year Book of 
International Law 292-308. 
1451  I.C.J Reports 1959 6 at 27. For a discussion of this case see Branning R “Comments on  
the Interhandel Case” 1958 (52) American Society of International Law 125-181; Briggs 
HW “Interhandel: The Court's Judgment of March 21, 1959, on the Preliminary 
Objections of the United States” 1959 (53) American Journal of International Law 547-
563; Meron T “The Incidence of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies” 1959 (35) 
British Year Book of International Law 83-101; Simmonds KR “The Interhandel Case” 
1961 (10) International Law Quarterly 495-547. 
1452  Merits, Judgement, I.C.J Reports 2010 639 at 659 para 48. 
1453  Mike Campbell at 19-22. 
1454  For a discussion of the history of this rule see Cancado Trindade AA “Origin and  
Historical Development of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International 
Law" 1976 (12) Belgian Review of International Law 499-527 at 501-507. For a 
discussion of the relationship between the exhaustion of local remedies and denial of 
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such that by 1875, it was an established rule that local remedies had to be exhausted 
before diplomatic protection could be invoked.1455 
 
The basis of the exhaustion of local remedies rule is to ensure that where a host state is 
alleged to have violated the right(s) of an alien, it must have the opportunity to address 
the dispute within the framework of its domestic legal system.1456 This was also 
recognised in Mike Campbell.1457  
 
The exhaustion of local remedies rule acknowledges that it may not be ideal under 
certain circumstances to require an investor to first exhaust local remedies before 
diplomatic protection can be invoked. Hence Article 15 of the ILC Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection provides five exceptional circumstances where under local remedies need not 
be exhausted. Two of these exceptions that are relevant herein provide that local 
remedies need not be exhausted where:1458 
 
                                                                                                                                            
justice see Cancado Trindade AA “Denial of Justice and its Relationship to Exhaustion of 
Local Remedies in International Law” 1978 (53) Philippine Law Journal 404-420. 
1455  Cancado Trindade 1976 (12) Belgian Review of International Law 499 at 517. 
1456  See United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic  
Protection” Commentary on Article 14 at 71  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a6110.pdf (Date of use: 04 
September 2017); D’Ascoli S and Scherr KM “The Rule of prior exhaustion of Local 
Remedies in the Context of Human Rights Protection” Italian Yearbook of International 
Law 2006 (16) 117-138 at 126; GK Foster “Striking a Balance between Investor 
Protections and  
National Sovereignty: The Relevance of Local Remedies in Investment Treaty Arbitration” 
2011 (49) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 201-267 at 211. 
1457  Mike Campbell at 20. 
1458  Article 15(a)-(b) United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on  
Diplomatic Protection” http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a6110.pdf 
(Date of use: 04 September 2017). 
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(a) There are no reasonably available local remedies to provide effective redress, 
or the local remedies provide no reasonable possibility of such redress; and 
(b) There is undue delay in the remedial process that is attributable to the State 
alleged to be responsible. 
 
The essence of the first exception above is that local remedies need not be exhausted if 
doing so will be futile or ineffective, or if there are no reasonably available remedies.1459 
The latter scenario encompasses situations where among others the courts of a host 
state lack judicial independence or are consistently biased against foreigners, or if the 
host state does not have an adequate judicial system.1460 This exception was recognised 
in Mike Campbell.1461 
 
The second exception above entails that an investor need not exhaust local remedies if 
there is an undue or unreasonable delay in the conclusion of proceedings for the 
exhaustion of local remedies.1462 This exception was also recognised in Mike 
Campbell.1463 
 
                                                
1459  See United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on  
Diplomatic Protection” Commentary on Article 15, para 3 at 77 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a6110.pdf (Date of use: 04 
September 2017).  
1460  See United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on  
Diplomatic Protection” Commentary on Article 15, para 3 at 79 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a6110.pdf (Date of use: 04 
September 2017). 
1461  Mike Campbell at 21. 
1462  United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on  
Diplomatic Protection” Commentary on Article 15, para 5 at 79-80 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a6110.pdf (Date of use: 04 
September 2017).  
1463  Mike Campbell at 21. 
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The exceptions in Article 15(a)-(b) resonate with some of the findings made by the rule 
of law surveys regarding SADC Member States referred to in Chapter 4 above, in that 
they share the common themes of judicial independence and the efficiency of the courts 
of the host state. Therefore, it is reasonable that an investor should not be compelled to 
refer an investor-state dispute to the courts of a host state, under circumstances where 
the investor would be excused from doing so had the case been one based on 
diplomatic protection. 
 
The exhaustion of the local remedies rule has over the years been incorporated into 
BITs and TIPs, by way of a provision that requires an investor to first exhaust local 
remedies prior to accessing ISDS. For example, SADC had such a provision in the form 
of Article 28(1) of the 2006 Annex 1.  
 
It is clear from the above that whether ISDS is made available or not, the courts of host 
states are indispensable in the settlement of investor-state disputes. The acceptance of 
the central support role played by domestic courts in ISDS begs the question why, if 
such courts can be trusted with the support function they lend to ISDS, they cannot be 
trusted to resolve investor-state disputes entirely.  
 
If one works from the premise that neither ISDS nor litigation is inherently better than the 
other, then there is a case to made for the retention of both mechanisms. However, 
retaining both mechanisms raises the question of, under what circumstances can 
investor-state disputes be referred to each of these forums?  
 
Ideally, what is required is a mechanism that will, independently of the choice of an 
investor or a host state, determine when a dispute can be referred to the courts of a host 
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state, and when it cannot be so referred. This mechanism must take into account the 
state of the rule of law in a host state. 
 
Some rule of law surveys assess the rule of law in various jurisdictions, including African 
states.1464 Within the AU, the APRM has as one its roles the evaluation and monitoring of 
the rule of law in Member States.1465 The IIAG also conducts annual surveys that include 
the rule of law in Africa.1466 Therefore, AU Members are used to having their state of rule 
of law assessed, and should therefore welcome a new rule of law scoreboard if they see 
its value.  
 
It was also shown above that the AU has as one its Agenda 2063 objectives, the 
improvement of the rule of law in all Member States by 2023.1467 However, except for 
stating member States shall undertake APRM reviews, the AU does not propose an 
independent mechanism that will foster the development of the rule of law in Member 
States. In other words, the objective to improve the rule of law is there, but the means to 
achieve it are not convincingly spelt out. It is shown in Chapter 6 that the APRM cannot 
on its own foster the rule of law. And it is noteworthy that the AU does not have an 
alternative mechanism in this regard. 
 
                                                
1464  See the relevant discussion in Chapter 4 above. 
1465  See the discussion of the APRM in Chapter 4. 
1466  See http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/ (Date of use: 11 April 2018). The IIAG  
was used in the discussion undertaken in Chapter 4 above. 
1467  See African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 First Ten-Year Implementation  
Plan 2014-2023” at 69 http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-
first10yearimplementation.pdf (Date of use: 16 November 2017). 
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Of the different rule of law scoreboards and surveys that were utilised herein, the 
Gaffney Rule-of-Law-Proposal deserves mention.1468 This proposal suggests the use of 
a treaty-based rule of law rating system, similar to sovereign rating systems.1469 The 
system would indicate whether there is a significant risk that the courts of a host state 
would not uphold the rule of law.1470  
 
The common denominator between the rationale for the use of local courts discussed 
above, and the Gaffney proposal, is that both are in agreement that investor-state 
disputes must be referred to the courts of host states unless there will be a denial of 
justice if such courts are utilised.   
 
Schwieder is of the view that the Gaffney Rule-of-Law-Proposal will not add value in 
developed states, since their justice systems are often credible, transparent and 
independent.1471 Therefore, investors in developed states can dispense with access to 
ISDS, since these states have a high rule of law rating, which will rule out the use of 
ISDS.1472 This view is in line with that adopted in this study. 
 
However, Schwieder opines that the Gaffney proposal may reduce investment 
transaction costs in developing states, by providing investors with reliable, free 
                                                
1468  Available at http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No-149-Gaffney-FINAL.pdf (Date  
of use: 18 September 2017); Schwieder 2016 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law 178 at 213-218. 
1469  Gaffney “Rule of Law Proposal” at 1 http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No-149- 
Gaffney-FINAL.pdf (Date of use: 18 September 2017); Schwieder 2016 (55) Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 178 at 214. 
1470  Gaffney “Rule of Law Proposal” at 1 http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No-149- 
Gaffney-FINAL.pdf (Date of use: 18 September 2017); Schwieder 2016 (55) Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 178 at 214; Schwieder 2016 (55) Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 178 at 214. 
1471  Schwieder 2016 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 178 at 215. 
1472  Schwieder 2016 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 178 at 216. 
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information regarding the rule of law status in target host states.1473 Otherwise, host 
states that do not improve their rule of law will continue to face ISDS claims.1474  
 
The Gaffney Rule-of-Law-Proposal, as well as the rule of law surveys discussed in 
Chapter 4 above inspire the proposal that will be made in Chapter 6, regarding the 
mechanism that should regulate access to the courts of host states as proposed 
therein.1475  
 
(iii)  The Sub-regional courts’ option 
The status quo in Africa is that there are sub-regional (or REC) courts to which investor-
state disputes may be referred. These are the SADC Tribunal, the CCJ1476 and the 
EACJ.1477 Despite the fact that investors do not have access to the SADC Tribunal 
anymore, investors in SADC who reside in Member States that have cross membership 
with either COMESA or the EAC have access to the CCJ or the EACJ respectively. 
Investors who are residents of SADC/COMESA Member States, namely the Comoros, 
DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Eswatini, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe can 
refer investor-states disputes to the CCJ, while those who are residents of SADC/EAC, 
namely Tanzania, can access the EACJ. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate if the 
CCJ or the EACJ are effective forums for the resolution of investor-state disputes or not. 
In order to do so, the jurisdiction of the CCJ and EACJ will be briefly considered, noting 
that it is impossible to fully analyse them herein.1478 
                                                
1473  Schwieder 2016 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 178 at 215. 
1474  Schwieder 2016 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 178 at 216-218. 
1475  See Recommendation 6.2.3 in Chapter 6 below. 
1476  The court is established in terms of Article 19 of the COMESA Treaty. Its functioning is  
provided for in Articles 20-26. See http://comesacourt.org/ (Date of use: 18 May 2017). 
1477  These courts are discussed below in this section. 
1478  For a discussion of the CCJ and EACJ see Gathii JT “The Under-Appreciated  
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The CCJ1479 was established in 1994 in terms of Article 7(1) (c) and 19 of the COMESA 
Treaty.1480 Since 1998, the CCJ was based at the COMESA Secretariat in Lusaka, 
Zambia, but in 2003, the COMESA Authority resolved to relocate the court to Khartoum, 
Sudan.1481 This relocation took place in 2015 when the current bench was 
inaugurated.1482 
 
The object of the CCJ is to ensure legal compliance in the interpretation and application 
of the COMESA Treaty.1483 The functioning of the CCJ is regulated by the CCJ Rules of 
Procedure 2016.1484  The CCJ has a First Division and an Appellate Division.1485 The 
                                                                                                                                            
Jurisprudence of African Trade Judiciaries” 2010 (12) Oregon Review of International  
Law 245-281 at 1-22 http://lawecommons.luc.edu/facpubs (Date of use: 30  
February 2018). Please note that the page numbers refer to those in the web version 
available in the link provided. 
1479  See http://comesacourt.org/ (Date of use: 10 December 2017);  
http://comesacourt.org/comesa-court-of-justice-inaugurated/ (Date of use: 11 December 
2017). 
1480  See http://www.comesa.int/comesa-court-of-justice__trashed/ (Date of use: 11 December  
2017). 
1481  http://www.comesa.int/comesa-court-of-justice__trashed/ (Date of use: 11 December  
2017). 
1482  See http://comesacourt.org/focus-on-sudan-as-the-comesa-court-holds-series-of- 
events/ (Date of use: 11 December 2017). 
1483  Article 19 COMESA Treaty. 
1484  COMESA Court of Justice “Rules of Procedure 2016”  
http://www.comesa.int/other-publications/ (Date of use: 18 May 2017). 
1485  Article 19(2) COMESA Treaty. 
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First Division comprises of seven judges,1486 while the Appellate Court has five 
judges.1487  Judges hold office for a renewable period of five years,1488  
 
The CCJ has jurisdiction over matters that may be brought before it pursuant to the 
COMESA Treaty.1489 Any person who is resident in a COMESA Member State may refer 
for determination by the CCJ the legality of any act, regulation, directive, or decision of a 
Member State on the grounds that such act, directive, decision or regulation is unlawful 
or an infringement of the provisions of the Treaty.1490 However, such person must first 
exhaust local remedies before the courts of the host state.1491 The decision of the CCJ 
regarding the interpretation of the COMESA Treaty shall take precedence over 
interpretations by the courts of Member States.1492  
 
The COMESA Treaty provides for the arbitration of disputes to which COMESA or its 
institutions are a party, or to which Member States are parties.1493 Natural and legal 
persons can therefore not access this arbitration mechanism. Despite a review of the 
                                                
1486  Article 20(1) COMESA Treaty; http://comesacourt.org/composition/ (Date of use: 11  
December 2017). These are Principal Judge Lady Justice Qinisile Mabuza (Eswatini), 
Justice Ali Sulaiman Mohamed (Ethiopia), Justice Mary N. Kasango (Kenya), Justice Dr. 
Leonard Gacuko (Burundi), Justice Clotilde Mukamurera (Rwanda), Justice Chinembiri 
Energy Bhunu (Zimbabwe), see http://comesacourt.org/focus-on-sudan-as-the-comesa-
court-holds-series-of-events/ (Date of use: 11 December 2017). For the tenure of judges 
see Articles 21 and 22 COMESA Treaty. 
1487  Article 20(1) COMESA Treaty; http://comesacourt.org/composition/ (Date of use: 11  
December 2017). These are Judge President Lady Justice Lombe Chibesakunda, 
(Zambia), Justice Abdalla Elamin El Bashir (Sudan), Justice Dr. Michael Charles Mtambo 
(Malawi), Justice David Chan Kan Cheog (Mauritius), Justice Dr. Wael Marodouh Hassan 
Rady (Egypt), see http://comesacourt.org/focus-on-sudan-as-the-comesa-court-holds-
series-of-events/ (Date of use: 11 December 2017). 
1488  Article 21(1) COMESA Treaty. 
1489  Article 23 COMESA Treaty. 
1490  Article 26 COMESA Treaty.  
1491  Article 26 COMESA Treaty. 
1492  Article 29 COMESA Treaty. 
1493  Article 28 COMESA Treaty. 
285 
 
COMESA 2003 Arbitration rules during 2017, it appears that the scope of the review is 
not intended to grant natural and legal persons access to arbitration.1494 Recently, the 
COMESA Treaty was amended to allow for the arbitration of investor-state disputes. 
 
The CCJ is well placed as a forum for the resolution of investor-state disputes, primarily 
because natural and legal persons have the right to refer cases to it, and the COMESA 
Treaty provides certain rights to investors, including the right to FET1495 and 
compensation upon expropriation of an investment.1496 However, it requires sufficient 
resources in order to discharge its functions. 
 
The EACJ is established in terms of Article 9 of the EAC Treaty.1497 The EACJ has its 
temporary seat in Arusha, Tanzania.1498 The EACJ is an ad hoc court, and will only be a 
full-time court when it has sufficient caseload to justify a full-time operation.1499  The 
EACJ has a First Instance Division and an Appellate Division.1500 The First Instance 
Division is comprised of a maximum of ten judges,1501 while the Appellate Division has a 
maximum of five judges.1502Judges hold office for a maximum period of seven years.1503 
                                                
1494  See COMESA “Call for Applications Consultant to Review COMESA Court of Justice  
Arbitration Rules” at 3-4 http://comesacourt.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/170403_Call-for-Apllications-Consultant-to-Review-CCJ-
Arbitration-Rules-N.pdf (Date of use 30 January 2018). The outcome of the review is not 
public at this stage. 
1495  Article 159(1) (a) COMESA Treaty. 
1496  Article 159(3) (b) COMESA Treaty. 
1497  For a discussion of the operation of the court see Articles 23-47 EAC Treaty. 
1498  http://eacj.org/?page_id=19 (Date of use: 10 December 2017). 
1499  http://eacj.org/?page_id=19 (Date of use: 10 December 2017). 
1500  Article 23(2) EAC Treaty. 
1501  Article 24(2) EAC Treaty. Current judges are Hon. Lady Justice Monica Mugenyi  
(Principal Judge), Hon. Justice Isaac Lenaola (Deputy Principal Judge), Hon. Justice 
Faustin Ntezilayayo, Hon Mr Justice Fakihi Abdalla Jundu, Hon. Mr Justice Audace 
Ngiye, see http://eacj.org/?page_id=1135 (Date of use: 11 December 2017). 
1502  Article 24(2) EAC Treaty. Current judges are Hon. Justice Dr Emmanuel Ugirashebuja  
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Natural and legal persons that are resident in the EAC may refer for determination by the 
court the legality of a regulation, directive, decision or action of a Member State or an 
institution of the EAC on the grounds that such Act, regulation, directive, decision or 
action is unlawful or is an infringement of the provisions of the EAC Treaty.1504 A litigant 
must bring such proceedings within two months of the enactment, publication, directive, 
decision or action complained of, or in the absence thereof, of the day in which it came 
to the knowledge of the litigant, as the case may be.1505 Unlike in the case of the CCJ, 
there is no requirement that a litigant must first exhaust local remedies.1506 
 
Parties may refer disputes to the EACJ for arbitration, including investor-state 
disputes.1507 Arbitration takes place in terms of the EACJ Arbitration Rules 2012.1508 It 
appears that this facility is not being utilised. 
 
However, the EACJ faces various challenges, such as limited financial resources, lack of 
respect for court decisions by Member States, lack of security of tenure of judges, staff 
shortages, limited jurisdiction, lack of physical and functional visibility etc.1509 
                                                                                                                                            
(President of the Court), Hon. Justice Liboire Mkurunziza (Vice-President of the Court), 
Hon. Mr Justice Edward Rutakangwa, Hon. Justice Aaron Ringera, Hon. Justice Geoffrey 
W.M Kiryabwire (Judge Appellate Division), see http://eacj.org/?page_id=1135 (Date of 
use: 11 December 2017). 
1503  Article 25(1) EAC Treaty. 
1504  Article 30(1) EAC Treaty. 
1505  Article 30(2) EAC Treaty. 
1506  Article 26 COMESA Treaty. 
1507  Article 32(c) EAC Treaty. 
1508  Available at http://eacj.org//wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Arbitration-Rules-of-EACJ.pdf  
(Date of use: 30 January 2018). See also http://blogaila.com/2016/03/18/the-east-african- 
court-of-justices-arbitral-jurisdiction-over-commercial-contract-disputes-by-dr-faustin-
ntezilyayo/ (Date of use: 30 January 2018). 
1509  See East African Court of Justice “Strategic Plan 2010-2015” at 14-18  
http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/EACJstrategicplan2010-15.pdf (Date of use: 
10 December 2017).  
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Furthermore, Member States and policy makers, in particular, seem not to appreciate 
the role and place of the EACJ.1510 The EACJ is therefore operationally compromised, 
although it is noted that the court’s strategic plan aims to address the above 
challenges.1511 
 
Irrespective of the suitability or otherwise of the CCJ and the EACJ, the reality is that 
these courts cannot fill the void left by the SADC Tribunal, since they are not accessible 
to all SADC residents. This leaves SADC investors without access to their own sub-
regional court. 
 
The issue under discussion is not limited to the efficiency of the CCJ, EACJ or SADC 
Tribunal. Rather, the high-level issue is whether sub-regional courts are an effective 
forum for the resolution of investor-state disputes in SADC and Africa as a whole. The 
view adopted herein that the answer is in the negative, as explained below. 
 
In addition to the resource challenges indicated above, the use of sub-regional courts 
will increase the duration and cost of investor-state litigation, particularly in the context of 
the proposals made in this study where the use of local and continental courts is 
proposed. For example, in South Africa, there is a three-tier superior court system 
comprising of the High Court,1512 Supreme Court of Appeal1513 and finally the 
Constitutional Court.1514 Thus a claimant will have to first exhaust this judicial system, 
                                                
1510  East African Court of Justice “Strategic Plan 2010-2015” at 17 http://eacj.org/wp- 
content/uploads/2017/07EACJstrategicplan2o1o-15.pf (Date of use: 10 December 2017). 
1511  East African Court of Justice “Strategic Plan 2010-2015” at 20-26 http://eacj.org/wp- 
content/uploads/2017/07EACJstrategicplan2o1o-15.pf (Date of use: 10 December 2017. 
1512  See http://www.judiciary.org.za/high-courts.html (Date of use: 8 January 2018). 
1513  See http://www.justice.gov.za/sca/ (Date of use: 8 January 2018). 
1514  See http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/home.htm (Date of use: 8 January 2018). 
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followed by the SADC Tribunal or other sub-regional court, and finally the ACJ&HR. 
Navigating these tribunals will take years and cost of lot of money in legal fees and other 
indirect costs. The preferred view is that sub-regional courts could at least be turned into 
local divisions of a continental court such as the ACJ&HR. This will reduce travelling 
time and costs for litigants who can access the court in their areas. 
 
Furthermore, the SADC Tribunal, CCJ and EAC are not harmonised. Each has different 
jurisdiction, rules of procedure, access to resources, and varying levels of judicial 
expertise. This encourages forum shopping, whereby litigants who are able to so can 
choose one court over another due to for example the fact that the chosen court is seen 
as being more efficient. This is not a sustainable status quo when one takes a 
continental view of the matter. 
 
In addition, if sub-regional courts are to be maintained, a continent-wide network of 
thereof will have to be established, to ensure that litigants throughout Africa have access 
to a sub-regional court in their area. While this is possible in theory, it is doubtful that the 
necessary resources can be put in place to create and operate such a network. On a 
practical level, the fact that the CCJ and EACJ have light caseloads and are under-
resourced, as shown in this section, shows that these courts are not geared to be as 
efficient as they should be. The reality is that RECs, the AU and its Member States do 
not have the resources to establish a continent-wide network of sub-regional courts. 
 
In conclusion, for reasons stated above, the use of sub-regional courts for the resolution 
of investor-state disputes is not effective or ideal in the context of regional integration 
that is taking place in Africa. A different solution will have to be found. 
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The elimination of sub-regional courts in this discussion leaves the continental option of 
utilising ACJ&HR1515 for consideration. This discussion will now be undertaken. 
 
(iv)  The Continental courts’ option 
The ACH&PR was formed in order to give effect to the protection of the rights provided 
in the African Charter.1516 The Court commenced operations in November 2006 in 
Ethiopia, but it relocated to Arusha, Tanzania in August 2007.1517 The Court delivered its 
first judgment in 2009, and by 16 January 2018, it had received in excess of 194 cases, 
of which 43 were finalised,1518 while the rest were pending.1519 
 
The jurisdiction of the ACH&PR covers all cases and disputes concerning the 
interpretation and application of the African Charter, the protocol establishing the 
ACH&PR, and any other Human Rights instrument ratified by respondent Member 
States.1520 The ACH&PR may also render advisory opinions on any legal matter relating 
to the African Charter or relevant human rights instruments to Member States of the AU, 
the AU or any of its organs, and any African Organisation recognised by the AU.1521 The 
                                                
1515  Article 2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human  
Rights of 2008 merges the ACH&PR and the Court of Justice of the African Union to form 
the ACJ&HR. Articles 4-7 of the protocol provide the transitional arrangements leading up 
to the coming into effect of the ACJ&HR. The protocol is available at 
https://www.au.int/web/en/treaties/protocol-statute-african-court-justice-and-human-rights 
(Date of use: 18 May 2017).  
1516  Article 1 African Charter.  
1517  http://en.african-court.org/ (Date of use: 10 July 2017). 
1518   http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/cases/2016-10-17-16-18-21#finalised-cases of  
(Duse: 16 January 2018). 
1519  http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/cases/2016-10-17-16-18-21#pending-cases  
(Date of use: 16 January 2018). 
1520  Article 3 Protocol to African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on The  
Establishment of an African Court On Human and Peoples Rights; the Court’s website is 
http://en.african-court.org/ (Date of use: 10 July 2017). 
1521  Article 4 Protocol to African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on The  
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sources of law to be applied by the ACH&PR are the African Charter and relevant 
human rights instruments.1522 
 
Non-Governmental Organisations that have observer status before the Commission, as 
well as natural and legal persons, may institute proceedings before the court if the 
respondent Member State has lodged a declaration consenting to such action in terms of 
Article 34(6) of the protocol.1523 The court dismissed a number of cases, some 
investment-related, on this basis.1524 Current practice, as demonstrated by the number of 
submitted declarations, shows that the Member States are reluctant to allow natural and 
legal persons to sue them at this court.  As of May 2017, only eight Member States had 
lodged declarations whereby they consent to the jurisdiction of the Court in cases 
referred by natural persons and organisations.1525 For the moment, this is a major 
weakness in terms of the value of this court to investors.  
 
In the medium term, any weaknesses of the ACH&PR and its protocol will be short-lived, 
as the protocol establishing the ACH&PR is in the process of being replaced by the 
protocol establishing the ACJ&HR, which is discussed next. 
                                                                                                                                            
Establishment of an African Court On Human and Peoples Rights. 
1522  Article 7 Protocol to African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on The  
Establishment of an African Court On Human and Peoples Rights. 
1523  Article 5(3) Protocol to African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on The  
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights. 
1524  Finalised cases can be found at http://en.african-court.org/index.php/cases/2016-10-17- 
16-18-21#finalised-cases (Date of use: 20 June 2017). Some of the cases that were 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction are Baghdadi Ali Mahmoud v The Republic of Tunisia, 
Application 007/2012; Youssef Ababou v Kingdom of Morocco, Application 007/2011; 
Amir Adam Timan v The Republic of the Sudan, Application 005/2012; Delta International 
SA and others v The Republic of South Africa, Application 002/2012; National Convention 
of Teachers Trade Union v The Republic of Gabon, Application 012/2011. 
1525  These are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Tanzania and   
Tunisia (http://en.african-court.org/index.php/12-homepage1/1-welcome-to-the-african- 
court) (Date of use: 10 July 2017). 
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The ACJ&HR is the result of a merger of the ACH&PR and the ACJ, which was 
implemented by Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights of 2008.1526 The ACJ&HR is expected to be operational 
during 2030.1527 It shall come into effect upon ratification by 15 Member States.1528 At the 
time of writing, only six Member States had ratified the protocol establishing the 
ACJ&HR.1529 The term of the judges of the ACH&PR shall end when the judges for the 
ACJ&HR are elected and sworn in.1530 Unconcluded cases under the ACH&PR shall be 
transferred to the ACJ&HR.1531 The ACJ&HR shall be the main judicial organ of the 
AU.1532 
 
The ACJ&HR is divided into three sections: a General Affairs Section a Human and 
Peoples Rights Section and International Criminal Law Chamber.1533 The General Affairs 
Section hears all matters except those relating to human rights in terms of Article 33 of 
the Statute of the Court, while the Human and Peoples’ Rights Section hears human 
                                                
1526  For a critique of this merger see Naldi GJ and Magliveras KD “The African Court of  
Justice and Human Rights: A Judicial Curate’s Egg” 2012 (9) International  
Organizations Law Review 383-449. 
1527  African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 Framework Document” at 171, Target  
for 2063 No. (e) http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf 
(Date of use: 15 November 2017). 
1528  Article 9 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. As  
of March 2017, only 6 Member States had ratified the protocol, namely Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Djibouti, Lesotho, Liberia and Madagascar 
(https://www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/treaties/7792-sl- 
protocol_on_the_statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_human_rights.pd)(Date of 
use: 10 July 2017). Is this the latest ratification status? 
1529  https://www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/treaties/7792-sl  
protocol_on_statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_hr_0.pdf (Date of use: 18 May 
2017). 
1530  Article 4 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
1531  Article 5 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
1532  Article 9 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
1533  Article 16 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. Please note that  
during 2014 in Malabo, the AU amended the protocol by adding the International  
Criminal Law Chamber. 
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rights matters in terms of Article 34 of the Statute of the Court.1534 The jurisdiction of the 
ACJ&HR covers the interpretation and application of the Constitutive Act, the 
interpretation, application or validity of other AU Treaties and all subsidiary legal 
instruments adopted within the framework of the AU or the OAU and many areas.1535  
Individuals or relevant NGOs accredited to the AU or to its organs may refer cases to the 
court, subject to the provisions of Article 8 of the Protocol establishing the Court. 1536 The 
sources of law to be applied by the ACJ&HR are the AU Constitutive Act, International 
treaties, whether general or particular, ratified by the contesting States etc. 1537 
 
Despite the fact that among others, natural and legal persons do not have an automatic 
right to refer cases to the ACJ&HR (and the ACH&PR), the ACJ&HR is an ideal 
continental court for the resolution of investor-state disputes, for the following reasons. 
The argument in support of a single continental court is not new.1538 
 
First and foremost, the ACJ&HR is the judicial organ of the AU and the AEC.1539 The 
Third Guiding Principle of a AfCFTA Institutional Structure provides that the AfCFTA 
Institutional Structures must be accessible to the people, and must leave no one 
behind.1540 On this basis, UNECA, AU and the AfDB envision that the general public 
should have access to the ACJ&HR to enforce AfCFTA obligations.1541 They state that: 
                                                
1534  Article 17 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
1535  Article 28 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
1536  Article 30 the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
1537  Article 31 the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
1538  See for example Kindiki K “The Proposed Integration of the African Court of Justice and  
the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Legal Difficulties and Merits” 2007  
(15) Journal of International and Comparative Law 138-146 at 144-145. 
1539  Article 18(1) AEC Treaty. 
1540  African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VIII Bringing the  
Continental Free Trade Area About” at 119 
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… The proposed structures must extend down to the country level and give 
individuals the right to enforce compliance of CFTA obligations in national courts. 
However, appeals could be addressed at regional courts and subsequently the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights so that citizens see the bigger picture 
on regional and continental jurisprudence developed through the additional 
layers of integration. In addition to national institutions, this will also require 
dispute settlement arrangements that are accessible to individuals…1542 
 
As can be seen from the passage cited above, the AfCFTA Architecture as proposed, 
contemplates that the public can enforce compliance with AfCFTA obligations via their 
national courts.1543 It is said that this will “decentralise compliance”.1544 In order to give 
effect to this, AfCFTA obligations will be made part of domestic law.1545 
 
                                                                                                                                            
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 
15 December 2017).  
1541  The reader is advised to refer to the AfCFTA Agreement with regard to the final position  
in this regard.  
1542  African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VIII Bringing the  
Continental Free Trade Area About” at 119 
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 
15 December 2017). 
1543  See also African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VIII  
Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area About” at 126 
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 
15 December 2017). 
1544  African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VIII Bringing the  
Continental Free Trade Area About” at 126 
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 
15 December 2017). 
1545  African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VIII Bringing the  
Continental Free Trade Area About” at 126 
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 
15 December 2017). 
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The fact that the current jurisdiction of the ACJ&HR will need to be amended as 
proposed herein is not an obstacle, as the AU Assembly can amend the jurisdiction of 
the ACJ&HR at any time.1546 Therefore, all that is required to position the ACJ&HR to 
adjudicate investor-state disputes is a decision of the AU Assembly. 
 
Furthermore, the ACJ&HR is a neutral, supranational court established by all AU 
Member States. It was not imposed on them. This gives it credibility among the Member 
States, and also depoliticises disputes by removing them from the courts of host states.  
 
Most importantly, the use of the ACJ&HR will promote the rule of law in Africa. This is 
due to the fact that judges in the ACJ&HR are appointed through a democratic and 
credible process,1547 judicial independence in terms of international law is enshrined,1548 
judges enjoy diplomatic immunity throughout Africa during their term of office,1549 and a 
judge can only be suspended or removed from office by a two-thirds decision of the rest 
of the judges.1550 Member States are obliged to comply with and execute a judgment of 
the court.1551 Furthermore, by using existing ACJ&HR facilities, the court will not be 
exclusively for the use of investors to sue host states, as is the case with ISDS 
institutions, which are created for the benefit of foreign investors only.  
 
The statute of the ACJ&HR provides for the appointment of judges who are competent in 
international law, which encompasses the field of investor-state disputes. Thus, there will 
be no need to appoint judges with additional skills and competencies. Furthermore, the 
                                                
1546  Article 18(4) AEC Treaty. 
1547  See Articles 6 and 7 of Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
1548  Article 12 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
1549  Article 15 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
1550  Article 9 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
1551  Article 46 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
295 
 
fact that the judges will not be limited to adjudicating investment cases means that their 
expertise will be better utilised by all litigants. 
 
Having a single judicial authority for the continent will also make it easy for resources to 
be channeled towards the court, instead of the status quo of having multiple regional 
courts and tribunals, each of which requires (and presently lacks) scarce resources.  
 
As stated above, existing sub-regional courts are ideally placed to act as divisions of the 
ACJ&HR. This will enable litigants to have access to the ACJ&HR in their regions, which 
will save them travel time and costs. This will also bring the ACJ&HR closer to the 
people, and enable it to live up to its status as the court of the continent. Therefore, the 
use of the ACJ&HR will not entail that existing REC courts’ resources will go to waste. 
Establishing divisions of the ACJ&HR will also reduce the caseload of the ACJ&HR, 
thereby leading to the speedy conclusion of cases, which in turn will save litigants time 
and money. This is also in line with the AfCFTA approach that RECs and their resources 
shall be gradually subsumed into the continental framework.  
 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
There is clearly not a one-size-fits-all solution to the challenges facing the regulation of 
foreign investments in SADC or anywhere in the world for that matter. This applies to the 
mechanism for the resolution of investor-state disputes as well. SADC, together with its 
partners in the AfCFTA, must be innovative and bold in finding a lasting solution to the 
future regulation of foreign investments. It must find a solution that is unique to its 
African circumstances, and not blindly import solutions that were invented by others. The 
EU, Brazil, and India have demonstrated that it is possible to do this. These issues are 
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inherently complex, and no one state or region can claim to have found a solution 
thereto. Furthermore, no solution can appease all stakeholders. 
 
Given the continental integration thrust towards the formation of the AEC that is gaining 
momentum by the day, the AU is best-placed to drive the regulation of foreign 
investments in Africa. Therefore, a legally binding regulatory instrument, such as the 
investment protocol that will be negotiated to from part of the AfCFTA, is the ideal 
instrument to regulate foreign investments in SADC and the rest of Africa.  Similarly, the 
ACJ&HR as the judicial organ of the AU is equally well placed to adjudicate investor-
state disputes. The conclusion of the AfCFTA Agreement, and the negotiation of the 
AfCFTA investment protocol confirm the view adopted in this study, to the effect that 
foreign investments must be regulated at AU level. 
 
Nonetheless, the local courts of host states must not be ignored, as it was shown above 
that they are indispensable for the resolution of investor-state disputes. 
 
ISDS too must, despite its challenges not be written off, as there are definitely SADC, 
AU Member States and RECs that prefer to use it. This point is demonstrated by the 
deadlock reflected in the dispute resolution mechanism of the PAIC, as well as the 
continuing conclusion of BITs that provide for ISDS by some SADC Member States.  
 
What is needed is not a choice of ISDS or local courts, because the circumstances of 
each host state are not the same. Rather, what is needed is a mechanism that 
determine when an investor-state dispute can be referred to a court, bearing in mind the 
state of the rule of law in a host state.  
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The next chapter will summarise the findings made in this study and will make 
recommendations following SADC’s options analysed above.  
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CHAPTER 6 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This study aims to recap the answers to the research questions raised in Chapter 1. 
These questions were answered in the course of the discussions undertaken in 
Chapters 2 through 5. The following is a summary of the findings made in each chapter 
in this regard. 
 
Chapter 2 introduced the theoretical foundation of the study.  It was shown therein that a 
host state cannot rely on its internal law to avoid complying with its international 
obligations. Secondly, it was shown that a host state that breaches its international 
obligations, such as by undertaking an unlawful expropriation, is liable to pay reparation 
and not compensation. Thirdly, the argument was made that the definition of an 
investment as applied in ICSID decisions including Salini may be applicable to non-
ICSID arbitration.  
 
Furthermore, it was shown that some states are moving towards the inclusion of the 
Salini criteria in their investment treaty practice. Finally, it was shown that litigation and 
ISDS have their pros and cons, and that circumstances should determine when each of 
these can be an appropriate mechanism for the resolution of investor-state disputes. 
 
Chapter 3 analysed the provisions of 2006 and 2016 Annex 1, and compared these to 
similar regulatory instruments from other jurisdictions. It was found that the 2016 Annex 
1 has reduced the protection that investors had in terms of the 2006 Annex 1, by 
removing access to ISDS and leaving the courts of host states as the only forum to 
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which investor-state disputes can be referred. Technically, the 2016 Annex lags behind 
similar instruments in terms of the way it regulates foreign investments, such as by 
failing to address treaty shopping by investors. 
 
It was also found that SADC’s decision to refer investor-state disputes to the courts of 
host states may be controversial, but that there is nothing wrong in principle with such a 
decision.  
 
Finally, it was found that the regulation of foreign investments by means of either version 
of Annex 1 is not satisfactory, due to the failure of Member States to harmonise their 
laws and practices therewith. 
 
Chapter 4 analysed the remedies that an investor would have in terms of the laws of 
SADC Member States, in the event of an expropriation. It was found that the security of 
foreign investments at Member State level is unsatisfactory, in that Member State laws 
are not harmonised with either version of Annex 1. It was found that as a result of the 
conflict between Annex 1 and Member State investment laws, the relevant version of 
Annex 1 will prevail over the investment laws. It was also found that the rule of law in 
most SADC Member states is not satisfactory. This risks denial of justice for investors 
who may be compelled to use the courts of these states, and is a possible contravention 
of Article 4(c) of the SADC Treaty.  
 
Chapter 5 analysed recent developments in Brazil, the EU, and India with regard to the 
regulation of the resolution of investor-state disputes. The chapter analysed the lessons 
that SADC can learn from these developments, and the options that SADC has, with 
regard to the future regulation of foreign investments and the mechanism for the 
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resolution of investor-state disputes.  It was found that SADC could learn various 
lessons, which are indicated therein. It was also found that SADC has the option of 
regulating of foreign investments at REC level by means of Annex 1 (the status quo), or 
of regulating foreign investments at T-FTA level (which is not different to the status quo), 
or of doing so at AfCFTA/AU level.  As far as the resolution of investor-state disputes is 
concerned, the options that are open to SADC were found to be litigation before the 
courts of host states, ISDS, the SADC Tribunal (revitalisation thereof), or the 
ACH&PR/ACJ&HR.  
 
The regulation of foreign investments at AU level by means of an AfCFTA investment 
protocol, as well as the referral of investor-state disputes to local courts, the optional 
provision for ISDS and the use of the ACJ&HR were preferred. With regard to the 
referral of investor-state disputes to local courts, it was found that there is a need for a 
mechanism that will determine when such disputes can be referred to local courts, and 
when they cannot be so referred, with due consideration to the state of the rule of law in 
a host state. 
 
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN  
INVESTMENTS AND THE RESOLUTION OF INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES IN  
SADC 
 
This section will make four recommendations with a view to addressing the challenges 
identified in the Problem Statement. The areas that are central to the security of foreign 
investments in SADC are the level at which foreign investments are regulated, and the 
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mechanism for the resolution of investor-state disputes.1552 Therefore, the 
recommendations are focused on these areas. These recommendations are addressed 
to the AU, SADC, the T-FTA and their respective Member States.  
 
In addition to contribute to the discourse on the issues covered by this study, the unique 
contribution hereof to the body of knowledge is the use of the proposed African Justice 
Scoreboard (AJS) as a gateway for access to the local courts of host states. The core of 
the recommendations is that foreign investments in SADC must be regulated by an 
AfCFTA investment protocol,1553 and that investor-state disputes must be referred to the 
courts of host states (as determined by the AJS), or to optional ISDS, the ACJ&HR or 
other forum.  
 
It is recommended that: 
 
6.2.1 Foreign investments in Africa be regulated by means of an AfCFTA 
investment protocol: 
 
The motivation for this proposal is provided in Chapter 5 above.1554 It was found therein 
that in view of the formation of the AfCFTA and the AEC, it is preferable to regulate 
foreign investments at continental (AU) level than at REC level. The core motivation 
herein is that the regulation of foreign investments at AU level will create a single 
regime for the regulation of foreign investments, and thus it will facilitate harmonisation 
                                                
1552  These areas emanate from objectives 1.3.4 and 1.3.5 in Chapter 1 above at 11.  
1553  This proposal was drafted prior to the conclusion of the AFCFTA. Therefore, the fact that  
the AfCFTA will have an investment protocol is an incidental support of this proposal. 
1554  See Chapter 5 above at 253-254. This recommendation was made prior to the AU’s  
decision on 21 March 2018, to commence negotiations for an AfCFTA investment 
protocol.  
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in this regard. This will bring an end to the fragmentation that is caused by the 
regulation of foreign investments by different RECs. The decision of the AU to include 
an investment protocol to the AfCFTA Agreement underscores that this recommended 
is well founded. 
 
6.2.2 Investor-State disputes must be referred to the local courts of a host state, 
optional ISDS, the ACJ&HR or other forum: 
 
The motivation for this proposal is provided in Chapter 5 above. This proposal works 
from the premise that investor-state disputes must first be referred to the local courts of 
host states, if the AJS rating of a state is acceptable. If a state’s AJS rating does not 
permit the referral of a dispute to local courts, then the dispute can be referred to 
optional ISDS (i.e. if a host state agrees thereto), the ACJ&HR or other forums that may 
be provided for that purpose. What is paramount here is that the courts of a host state 
are the first option to be considered for the resolution of investor-state disputes. 
 
Ideally and in line with the continental approach motivated in Chapter 5, disputes that 
cannot be referred to the local courts of host states due to their poor AJS rating should 
be referred to the ACJ&HR. Should disputes be referred to other forums such as ISDS, 
the ACJ&HR can still act as a tribunal of last resort. With regard to ISDS, the use of the 
ACJ&HR in this way will enable the court to act as an appeal court with regard to arbitral 
awards. This linkage will require the amendment of current ISDS rules, or the creation of 
new ISDS institutions and rules. In this regard, motivation can be drawn from the EU’s 
proposed Investment Court System, which shows that it is possible to create a new 
version of ISDS. 
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6.2.3 An AJS be established under the auspices of the AU:  
 
It is recommended that an AJS be established under the auspices of the AU. The AJS 
will be a gateway used to determine whether an investor shall be obliged to refer a 
dispute to the courts of a host state or not. The motivation for the AJS is provided below. 
 
In order to establish the AJS, the criteria and indicators to be used in assessing the AJS 
score shall first be determined. In this regard, existing rule of law scoreboards such as 
those referred to in Chapter 4, as well as the European Justice Scoreboard, can be used 
as a reference point.  
 
A threshold AJS score shall be set. This threshold shall be the minimum AJS score that 
a host state can obtain in order for its rule of law to be deemed satisfactory for the 
adjudication of investor-state disputes. An AJS score that is above the set threshold 
shall imply that a host state’s is satisfactory. Therefore, in the event of a dispute, an 
investor shall be obliged to refer it to the courts of a host state. On the other hand, an 
AJS score that is lower than the set threshold shall imply that the rule of law in a host 
state is unsatisfactory. This shall entitle an investor to bypass the courts of such host 
state, and to refer the dispute to ISDS (if the host state consents), the ACJ&HR or other 
forum provided for that purpose.  
 
In order to prevent parallel proceedings, the AJS should be used on a fork-in-the-road or 
no-U-turn basis, meaning that an investment and all its investors must be irreversibly 
bound by the choice of forum that an investor or investment is directed to utilise as 
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determined by the AJS score of a host state.1555 Therefore once a dispute is referred to 
either the courts of a host state, ISDS or the ACJ&HR, the same dispute cannot 
thereafter be referred to any other forum. Furthermore, if an investor commences 
proceedings, then the investment company shall be precluded from commencing 
proceedings based on the same cause of action. NAFTA,1556 The EU’s TTIP 
Proposal,1557and the India Model BIT1558 provide examples of how parallel proceedings 
can be avoided.1559 
 
The critical role that the AJS will play as proposed entails that its outcomes must be 
credible and beyond question. Therefore, the AJS must have credibility before Member 
States and investors alike. The AJS must be incorporated into the AfCFTA investment 
protocol, so that it becomes a treaty-based mechanism, unlike existing scoreboards that 
have no legally binding effect. 
 
It must be noted in this regard that the AJS and the APRM are not mutually exclusive.1560 
Each has a different scope, and serves a different purpose. The APRM monitors 
performance by AU Member States in the areas of democracy and political governance, 
economic governance and management, corporate governance and socio-economic 
                                                
1555  For a discussion of parallel proceedings in ISDS see for example Cremades BM and  
Madalena I “Parallel Proceedings in International Arbitration” 2008 (24) Arbitration 
International 507-540. 
1556  Article 1121 NAFTA. 
1557  Article 14(2) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal. 
1558  Article 14.4(i)(B)(f) India Model BIT. 
1559  Article 14(2) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal; Article 14.4(i)(B)(f). 
1560  For further information regarding the APRM, as well as APRM reports see the Statute of  
the APRM at https://aprm-au.org/st_car/statute-of-the-aprm/; https://aprm-au.org/,  
https://au.int/en/organs/aprm; http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/official-
documents/item/598-protocol-establishing-the-aprm-base-document-official-protocol-
establishing-the-aprm-au-nepad (Date of use: 8 April 2018).  
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development.1561 It is a self-monitoring instrument,1562 and its membership is 
voluntary.1563 Hence the rule of law forms a fraction of the scope of the APRM, while the 
AJS will be entirely dedicated to the assessment of the rule of law.1564 This places the 
AJS in a better position to conduct detailed rule of law surveys. The AJS will also serve a 
purpose that the APRM does not serve, namely to act as a legally binding, independent, 
treaty-based tool for the monitoring of the rule of law in African states.  
 
In terms of the conduct of the AJS surveys, it is recommended that the AU use a 
credible, professional and independent party such as an audit or law firm. This is to 
ensure that the AJS is devoid of political interference. The chosen service provider must 
serve for a certain period only, so as to allow other service providers to render the 
service, and to once again cement the independence and integrity of the AJS. The firm 
should be appointed through a public and transparent procurement process.  
 
There are a number of benefits to the use of the AJS. The AJS will, if properly 
implemented, play an important role in the development of the rule of law in Africa, as it 
is an incentive for host states to improve the rule of law in their territories. In the process, 
the AJS will assist AU Member States to achieve their Agenda 2063 rule of law 
objectives.1565 
 
                                                
1561  Article 4(1) the Statute of the APRM.  
1562  Article 5(1) the Statute of the APRM; https://au.int/en/organs/aprm (Date of use: 8 April  
2018). 
1563  Article 6(2) the Statute of the APRM; https://au.int/en/organs/aprm (Date of use: 8 April  
2018). 
1564  The rule of law is assessed under the section of democracy and political governance. 
1565  See African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 First Ten-Year Implementation  
Plan 2014-2023” at 69 http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063- 
first10yearimplementation.pdf (Date of use: 16 November 2017).  
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In addition to serving as a gateway to local courts, the AJS will serve as an independent 
monitoring and remedial tool for the AU and Member States. Member States that score 
below the AJS threshold will be able to identify areas where there are shortcomings, and 
improve on them. Similarly, Member States that score above the AJS threshold will 
notice areas where they are performing satisfactorily, and will be able to take steps to 
sustain such performance. In this regard, the AJS and the APRM will complement each 
other, as each will learn from the successes, failures and outcomes of the other. This is 
good for both of them, and ultimately for the AU Member States.  
 
6.2.4 An AIO be established under the auspices of the AU: 
 
The AIO should be modelled on the South Korean OFIO, with necessary variations 
where needed. It was shown above that the OFIO has a high success rate of resolving 
investor-state disputes.  The legal status and independence of the AIO is critical if it is to 
be successful and trusted. Therefore, in order to be fully empowered, the AIO must be 
established in terms of the AfCFTA investment protocol. 
 
The credibility, competency, independence, and efficiency of the AIO will be critical, 
given the nature of the AIO’s intervention. An independent person with competence in 
among others business and international economic law should lead the AIO. Equally, 
competent support personnel should also staff the AIO.  
 
Member States and the business community must support the AIO once established 
because the prevention of investor-state disputes is in their mutual interests. Its success 
will contribute to a stable foreign investment climate and will save all parties significant 
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time and money from litigation and arbitration that would otherwise follow if disputes are 
not resolved early. 
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https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1959/06/19590607%2009- 
35%20PM/Ch_XXII_01p.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018) 
 
ICSID Convention 
 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States (with Rules and Regulations) 1965, amended to 2006, (ratified 14 
September 1966, in force 14 October 1966) 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/2006%20CRR_English- 
 
E 
EAC Treaty 
 
Treaty Establishing the East African Community, (date of signature 30 November 1999, 
in force 07 July 2000) 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2487 (Date of use: 15 
October 2017) 
 
Energy Charter Treaty  
 
Energy Charter Treaty 2080 UNTS 95; 34 ILM 360 (1995), (date of Signature 17 
December 1994, in force 16 April 1998),  
http://www.ena.lt/pdfai/Treaty.pdf#search=%22energy%20charter%20treaty%22 (date of 
use: 21 November 2017) 
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European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5, Article 14, (date of 
signature 4 November 1950, in force 3 September 1953) 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (Date of use: 21 October 2017) 
 
I 
India Model BIT 
 
Model Text for The India Bilateral Investment Treaty 2015 
https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the%20I
ndian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017) 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR 
Supp (No 16), UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171, (date of signature 16 December 
1966, in force 23 March 1976) 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-
english.pdf (Date of use: 31 October 2017) 
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI), 
21 UN GAOR Supp (No 16) at 49, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3, (date of 
signature 19 December 1966, in force 3 January 1976) 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cescr.pdf (Date of use: 31 October 
2017) 
 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 
December 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, p. 195, (date of signature 21 
December 1965, in force 4 January 1969) 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3940.html (Date of use: 21 October 2017) 
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Investment Agreement For the COMESA Investment Area 
 
Investment Agreement For the COMESA Investment Area, (date of signature 23 May 
2007, not in force)  
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/treaty/3225 (Date of use: 15 October 2017) 
 
J 
Japan-Mozambique BIT 
 
Agreement Between the Government of Japan and The Republic of Mozambique On the 
Reciprocal Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Investments, (date of signature 01 
June 2013, in force 29 August 2014) 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3114 (Date of use: 15 
October 2017)  
 
N 
NAFTA 
 
North American Free Trade Agreement, (date of signature 17 December 1992, in force 
01 January 1994) 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2412 (Date of use: 15 
October 2017)  
 
P 
PAIC 
 
Pan African Investment Code 
https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/32844-doc-draft_pan-
african_investment_code_december_2016_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017) 
 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of 
an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc 
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III), (adopted 10 June 1998, in force 25 January 2004) 
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https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-african-charter-human-and-peoples-rights-
establishment-african-court-human-and (Date of use: 18 January 2018) 
 
Protocol on the Amendments to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
Protocol on the Amendments to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, (date of signature 
27 06 2014, not in force) https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7804-treaty-0045_-
_protocol_on_amendments_to_the_protocol_on_the_statute_of_the_african_court_of_ju
stice_and_human_rights_e-compressed.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017) 
 
Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union 
 
Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, (date of signature 01 July 2003, in 
force 11 February 2009) https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7784-treaty-0026_-
_protocol_of_the_court_of_justice_of_the_african_union_e.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 
2017) 
 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, (date of 
signature 01 July 2003, in force 11 February 2009) 
https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7792-treaty-0035_-
_protocol_on_the_statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_human_rights_e.pdf 
(Date of use: 15 October 2015) 
  
S 
SADC Agreement Amending Annex 1 (2016 Annex 1) 
 
Southern African Development Community Agreement Amending Annex 1 (Co-operation 
on Investment) of The Protocol on Finance and Investment, (date of signature 31 August 
2016, in force 24 August 2017) 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5527 (Date of use: 15 
October 2017)  
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SADC FIP (2006 Annex 1) 
 
Southern African Development Community Protocol on Finance and Investments, (date 
of signature 18 August 2006, in force 16 April 2010) 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2730 (Date of use: 15 
October 2017) 
 
SADC Model BIT 
 
Southern African Development Community Model Bilateral Treaty Template, (published 
July 2012) http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/SADC-Model-BIT-
Template-Final.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018) 
 
SADC Tribunal Protocol 
 
Southern African Development Community Protocol on Tribunal and Rules of Procedure 
thereof, (date of signature 07 August 2000, in force 14 August 2011) 
http://www.sadc.int/documents- 256  
publications/show/Protocol_on_the_Tribunal_and_Rules_thereof2000.pdf (Date of use: 
15 October 2017) 
 
SADC Treaty 
 
Treaty of The Southern African Development Community, (Date of signature 17 August 
1992, in force 30 September 1993) 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3112 (Date of use: 15 
October 2017) 
 
Statute of the APRM 
 
Statute of the APRM  
https://aprm-au.org/st_car/statute-of-the-aprm/; https://aprm-au.org/, 
https://au.int/en/organs/aprm; http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/official-
documents/item/598-protocol-establishing-the-aprm-base-document-official-protocol-
establishing-the-aprm-au-nepad (Date of use: 8 April 2018).  
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T 
T-FTA Agreement 
 
Agreement Establishing a Tripartite Free Trade Area Among the COMESA, EAC and 
SADC, (date of signature 10 June 2015, not in force) https://www.tralac.org/resources/by-
region/comesa-eac-sadc-tripartite-fta.html (Date of use: 15 October 2017) 
 
U 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III) (adopted 10  
December 1948) 
http://www.un.org/en/udhrbook/pdf/udhr_booklet_en_web.pdf (Date of use: 21 October 
2017) 
 
United Nations Charter 
 
Charter of the United Nations, (date of signature 26 June 1945, in force 24 October 1945)  
1 UNTS XVI 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publications/ctc/uncharter.pdf (Date of use: 31 October 2017). 
 
V 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, 1969 (8) ILM 679 (date of 
signature 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980) 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-
english.pdf (Date of use: 31 October 2017) 
 
8 NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
 
Angola 
Arbitration Act, Law No. 16/03 
The New Private Investment Law, No. 14/15  
 
Botswana 
Acquisition of Property Act Chapter 32:10 of 28 January 1955 as amended 
Constitution of the Republic of Botswana Constitution, 1966 (amended 2002) 
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DRC 
Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2005 
Investment Code, Law, No. 004 of 21 February 2002 
 
Lesotho 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Lesotho, 1993 (amended 2001) 
 
Madagascar  
Madagascar Investment Law, No. 036 of 2007 
 
Malawi 
Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1994 
Investment and Export Promotion Act 11 of 2012 
 
Mauritius 
Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius, 1968 (amended 2009) 
Investment Promotion Act of 2000 Act 37 of 2008 (amended 2013) 
 
Mozambique 
Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique, 2004 
Law on Investment, No. 3/93  
 
Namibia 
Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1998 
Namibia Investment Promotion Act 9 of 2016 
 
Seychelles 
Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles, 1993 (amended 1996) 
Seychelles Investment Act 31 of 2010 
 
Eswatini 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Eswatini, 2005 
Eswatini Investment Promotion Act 1 of 1998 
 
South Africa 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, as amended to 2013 
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Expropriation Bill (B 4-2015, published in Government Gazette 38418 of 26 January 2015) 
Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015 
 
Tanzania 
Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 (amended 1995, referred to as the 1997 
Constitution) 
Tanzania Investment Act 26 1997 
The Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review and Renegotiation of Unconscionable 
Terms) Act, 2017 
The Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act, 2017  
The Written Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2017 
 
Zambia 
Constitution of the Republic of Zambia, 1991 (as amended 1996) 
Zambia Development Agency Act 11 of 2006 
 
Zimbabwe 
The Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 2013 
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9 STATISTICAL TABLES 
 
SADC State Population 
(Million) 
Land 
Area 
(Sq. Km) 
GDP 
(USD 
millions) 
GDP  
Growth 
(% p.a) 
GDP  
(USD/ 
Capita)  
CPI  
Growth 
Rate to 
USD 
Angola 25 831 1 246 
700 
136 359 2.96 5 450 10.28 120AOA 
Botswana 2 262 566 730  14 400 -0,32 6365 3.06 10 BWP 
DRC 77 267 2 267 
050 
38 915 7.17 504 1.20 925 CDF 
Lesotho 2 135 30 360 1 861 1.91 872 3.18 12 LSL 
Madagascar 24 235 581 800 9 711 3.20 401 7.10 2933 MGA 
Malawi 17 215 94 280 6 111 3.0 355 21.25 496 MWK 
Mauritius 1 273 2 030 11 555 3.52 9 075 1.29 35 MUR 
Mozambique 27 978 786 380  14 716 6.10 526 3.55 39 MZN 
Namibia 2 459 823 290 12 594 5.66 5 122 4.34 12 NAD 
Seychelles 0.96 455 1 558 3.50 16 145 4.04 13 SCR 
S Africa 54 490 1 213 
090 
314 980 1.28 5 780 4.51 12 ZAR 
Eswatini 1 287 17 200 4 016 2.0 3 120 3.27 12 SZL 
Tanzania 53 470 885 800 46 265 6.95 865 5.59 1191 TZS 
Zambia 16 212 743 390 21 921 3.60 1 352 10.10 8 ZMK 
Zimbabwe 15 603 386 850 14 719 3.2 965 112 1 ZWD 
 
Table 2. Select economic statistics on SADC Member States at 2015. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on UNCATDSTAT country profile data.1566 
 
 
 
                                                
1566  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/Index.html (accessed 20 February 2017). 
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SADC State 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Angola 1303 -37 -893 1678 2205 -
3227 
-
3023 
-
6897 
-
7120 
1921 8680 
Botswana 421 486 494 520 208 218 1371 487 398 515 393 
DRC 266 256 1808 1726 663 2939 1686 3312 2098 1843 1673 
Lesotho 70 58 104 194 92 51 149 138 123 162 169 
Madagascar 86 294 773 1169 1066 808 809 812 567 350 517 
Malawi 139 35 124 195 49 97 128 129 119 130 142 
Mauritius 41 105 339 382 247 429 433 589 293 418 208 
Mozambique 107 112 398 591 898 1017 3558 5629 6175 4901 3710 
Namibia 385 386 733 720 506 793 1119 1133 800 431 1077 
Seychelles 85 145 181 182 171 210 207 261 170 229 194 
S Africa 6646 311 6538 9209 7502 3635 4242 4558 8300 5770 1772 
Eswatini 45 121 37 105 65 135 93 89 29 -32 -120 
Tanzania 935 403 581 1383 952 1813 1229 1799 2087 2049 1531 
Zambia 356 615 1238 938 425 633 1110 2433 1809 3194 1653 
Zimbabwe 102 40 68 51 105 165 387 399 400 544 421 
 
Table 3: FDI inflows into SADC Member States from 2005 to 2015, in USD Millions.  
Source Author’s compilation from UNCTAD STAT data.1567  
 
 
 
                                                
1567   http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx  
(accessed 27 February 2017). 
